≡ Menu

Question for Randian IP Advocates

Great question by Sheldon Richman:

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Question for Randian IP Advocates

The Randian case for intellectual “property rights” is that all value-productive action (which is necessary for life) proceeds from a creative idea, and therefore all property is ultimately intellectual property. Deprive a person of the exclusive right to his idea and you attack the very foundation of life.

That case prompts a thought experiment: Imagine a primitive tribe in which one member does painstaking research on which wild berries are good for human consumption and which are not. (The Randian case emphasizes that such knowledge is not automatic as it in the case of lower animals, but has to be discovered by intellectual effort.) He learns through his work that when he eats one particular berry he gets healthier and more energetic — better in every way. He also discovers that other berries are best avoided. The rest of the tribe observes and takes notes.

Question: Under Randian IP law, would the others need the innovator’s permission before they may consume the healthful berries? Or does the innovative have an exclusive right to the fruits of his effort. (Pun intended.)

If not, why not?

Share
{ 2 comments }

Let’s Make Copyright Opt-OUT

[From my Webnote series]

see

From the Mises blog; archived comments below.

If you oppose IP and don’t want a patent–just don’t apply. Unfortunately, someone else might independently invent the same thing, patent it, and shut you down, since your having invented it first, or independently invented it, is no defense. So, you might also want to lower your knickers and reveal your idea publicly, to lower the chance someone else can patent it (this is called defensive patent publishing).1

But if you don’t want copyright, you’re out of luck. Under the current law, copyright is received automatically. Contrary to popular wisdom, you don’t “copyright” something. It’s not a verb. You don’t need to put a copyright notice on your work. You don’t need to register it. It’s automatic. And there’s nothing you can do about it. (See “Copyright Is Very Sticky!“) This makes it often impossible to know who the owner of a given work is or who to approach to ask permission; it contributes to the “orphan works” problem as well–where older works still apparently under copyright fall into obscurity because the copyright owner is unknown or cannot be found for permission to republish.

Thus, some of us would prefer a return to the older law.2  Previously US law required a copyright notice and even registration to obtain copyright. But the US acceded to the Berne Convention in 1989, which forbids such “formalities,” making copyright protection automatic. The US is therefore unable to revise copyright law to make it “opt-in” instead of opt-out, because this would violate international obligations.

But we do not even have an opt-out system, since, as noted, copyright is automatic, and there is no way to get rid of it. Snide commentators sometimes say, “if you are against IP why do you copyright your works?” or “why don’t you just waive your rights?” Well we don’t copyright our works–your system does. And your system does not allow us to waive our rights. There is no way to make a copyright-protected work public domain. The closest thing to it is CC0, but this cannot “guarantee a complete relinquishment of all copyright and database rights in every jurisdiction”.

So why not reform copyright law to at least legalize creative-commons type licenses, including CC0–let us opt out if we want to!

Archived comments:

{ 33 comments… read them below or add one }

Anonymous April 12, 2011 at 2:09 am

Actually, there is no such thing as an “international obligation.” If Congress had the political will, it could repeal the Berne Convention and restore the previous copyright laws. The United States Congress is unable to change the copyright laws so long as they remain part of the Berne Convention, which we can leave at any time.

Although I agree with your opposition to all IP, I would be happy if Congress restored the original Copyright Act, which limited copyright to 2 14-year terms (with a renewal required to get the 2nd term) and limited copyright to specific types of works produced by Americans (works produced by foreigners were automatically public domain in the United States).

REPLY

nate-m April 12, 2011 at 3:07 am

The treaty itself is what causes the ‘international obligation’.

Having the ability to get rid of the treaty and thus remove the international obligation is hardly the same as having no international obligations at all.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 12:37 pm

exactly. Anon was spouting off. In any case there is no more impetus behind abandoning Berne any more than there is for revising copyright law to re-impose registration. They are just politically unrealistic. They will not permit it to be an opt-in system or fight to abandon the treaty that forbids it.

But it should be politically uncontroversial to make clear the system IS opt out–to provide a clear and reliable way for people to reject the copyright the state gives them. If the state offers me a job, I can say no (well, unless it’s fighting for LBJ or Lincoln or FDR). IF the state gives me a car I can give it away or abandon it or reject it. Why do I have to accept the right-to-sue they give me in copyright law? let me get rid of it if I want to. Who does that hurt? What possible argument could there be to not let me voluntarily choose not to have this copyright the state automatically conferred on me?

REPLY

John S April 12, 2011 at 4:16 pm

It is not necessary to return to the original Copyright Act (by repealing Berne) to restore balance. We could instead offer limited automatic copyright under Berne with the option to extend copyright through the registration process for a longer period (for example, re-registration every 10 years until some maximum time).

This would ensure that creative works with limited commercial interest enter the public domain relatively quickly, while ensuring that works which have commercial value are maintained. Works which are not re-registered would enter the public domain automatically when the term expires.

This approach also produces the added benefit that expired works are provably and irrevocably in the public domain. This will go far to prevent abuses such as NAB asserting “rebroadcast copyright” over public domain works.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 4:29 pm

John, how do you know this would be compatible w/ Berne? Are you a copyright lawyer, or have you studied this? Can you cite me to the provision of Berne that permits this?

REPLY

Andras April 12, 2011 at 2:42 am

Stephan,
Don’t be ridiculous. You want even more contradictions in the statute? Your suggestion would be like arbitrary keeping right or left in traffic law. Or in your sacred cow, homesteading, absolutely no rules who claims what. After all, why should I accept your totally arbitrary rules of homesteading. Just because you claim to be the authentic Libertarian?

REPLY

nate-m April 12, 2011 at 3:05 am

The reality of things like copyright is that there is no fundamental concepts or logic behind it. It’s something born out of censorship and it continues to this day because of a theory that it provides economic benefit to the nation.

It’s nothing but a mess of contradictions and violations of liberty. Adding some more contradictions in a effort to limit the damage that is happening to society is hardly a bad thing to suggest. Obviously scrapping the whole thing would be superior (and thus getting rid of the contradictions and other BS), but that’s not something that is going to happen anytime soon due to the nature of politics and the level of delusion of what really is the effect and purposes of ‘copyright’ that most people seem to operate under.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 12:31 pm

hunh? are you saying the state should give me a copyright and not let me renounce it? say what?

REPLY

Andras April 12, 2011 at 7:16 pm

Why would you care? If you don’t ask the state to enforce it they won’t. They are not allowed to!

REPLY

kingcherub April 12, 2011 at 8:25 pm

That may be fine for people who are aware of Stephan’s views on IP. But, if someone isn’t sure who holds the copyright on a given work or their views on IP, how are they going to know if they can use that piece of work or not?

REPLY

Andras April 12, 2011 at 10:32 pm

They shouldn’t. However, that wasn’t what Stephan addressed above. The system remains intact and he has practically opted out.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 13, 2011 at 12:47 am

You don’t know what you are talking about. If I sign a license with you, you publish my stuff b/c you can rely on it. You know I cannot change my mind.

That is the purpose of the CC licenses. You want to let people realize that they have the right to use it–that they will not be sued if they do. They cannot be sure, unless they are given an effective license, or the copyright is somehow removed.

It’s obscene the statist IP system will not let people opt out of it.

Andras April 13, 2011 at 12:34 pm

@Stephan,
Here you go again. Read my post instead of fighting your demons!
You should not care. No-one forces you to sign anything. Let them do whatever they want with your property. This is your property after all, you can do whatever you want with it.

Peter Surda April 22, 2011 at 4:14 am

Andras,

homesteading is based on the physical attributes of the world, such as volume or location. IP is based on the subjective human interpretations of the world, such as meaning and value. Of course, we can never avoid arbitrariness fully, just like we need to arbitrarily define the kilogram, meter, Kelvin, second or radian. But that is hardly an argument that one would make to equate astronomy (based on the physical attributes of phenomena) and astrology (based on meaning of those attributes).

Furthermore, the approaches contradict each other.

REPLY

Dan Q April 12, 2011 at 3:13 am

If there’s one key thing I disagree with Kinsella on it’s CC0. There is nothing wrong with it, there is the license fallback system to protect it, and as for the other Creative Commons licenses, like the GPL you are subject to the will of the organization’s management.

GPL proved this when GPLv3 (at the decision of the Free Software Foundation’s management) came out in 2006 and was forced on people who didn’t think of taking the upgrade clause out of the 1991 GPLv2 template.

Creative Commons does not force an upgrade so they say, but international treaty might force Creative Commons to act, and people will be forced to accept Creative Commons’ then-lawyers and adopt a new license, which perhaps could be not-so-permissive or require an update. What disturbs me the most is recent versions of ShareAlike, which allows Creative Commons Inc. to relicense your works the organization deems “in the spirit of the original licenses” (no such licenses have been chosen, but note the FSF screw-job above)

What exactly do you mean by “legalize” Creative Commons? How are the licenses “illegal”? I would be careful not to give ASCAP any credibility to their bogus claims.

REPLY

nate-m April 12, 2011 at 3:35 am

and as for the other Creative Commons licenses, like the GPL you are subject to the will of the organization’s management.

The GPL is not a Creative Commons license. Creative Commons licenses are a series of licensing suggestions that a author can choose to adopt different features of for different purposes.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_Commons

Like there is Creative Common licenses that allow for derivative non-commercial works. There is Creative Common licenses that allow for commercial derivatives, but only if they give credit to the original author. Stuff like that. The ‘CC0′ is a specific version of Creative Commons were the author surrenders as much copyright restrictions as possible.

GPL is not part of that family of licenses.

GPL proved this when GPLv3 (at the decision of the Free Software Foundation’s management) came out in 2006 and was forced on people.

It did nothing of the sort. Programmers were absolutely free to choose whether or not to give FSF discretion on licensing upgrades to the GPL. Nothing was hidden and nothing was forced on anybody. Plenty of people choosing to use ‘GPLv2 only’ proves this.

Your really being ignorant here or are being intentionally misleading.

What exactly do you mean by “legalize” Creative Commons? How are the licenses “illegal”? I would be careful not to give ASCAP any credibility to their bogus claims.

Unless your able to obtain clarification on the license of something that is considered ‘original work’ by USA copyright law then you are forced, due to liability concerns, to assume that everything defaults back to full copyright restrictions.

Gaining clarification can be very expensive and given that ‘derivative works’ tends to be viral this can put people creating complex works, that will invariably incorporate other ‘original works’ from disparate sources, in very difficult position. If they cannot afford to spend the time and money necessary to get clarification on copyrights, or they are unable to determine this even if they did spend the money and time, then they cannot take advantage much of the creative history of works that people have created in the past 75-100 years or so… even if nobody is ever going to seek licensing terms for it.

If your going to have copyright it is much saner to have things ‘default to liberty’ rather then ‘default to liability’.

REPLY

El Tonno April 12, 2011 at 5:55 am

“Programmers were absolutely free to choose whether or not to give FSF discretion on licensing upgrades to the GPL. Nothing was hidden and nothing was forced on anybody. Plenty of people choosing to use ‘GPLv2 only’ proves this.”

Absolutely correct.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 12:33 pm

are you giving a legal opinion about CC0′s legal validity? Even CC says they cannot ““guarantee a complete relinquishment of all copyright and database rights in every jurisdiction”.”

I don’t think you’re right about being subject to the will of CC’s managment–you adopt a given version, say 3.0. if CC adopts 4.0 later, that’s for other works.

CC is not ideal. I wish it did not have to exist. It exists only b/c copyright exists. If copyright were to go away then so would GNU and CC.

REPLY

J. Murray April 12, 2011 at 12:52 pm

I agree, it’s not ideal, but CC does have one level that does emulate a libertarian system, and it’s this one.

Based on my understanding of it, that one means that anyone can freely use my work, so long as I’m attributed as an originator, and it forces everyone from that point into infinity to provide the same permissions. It allows for anyone to use the work and profit off of it, but it disallows anyone who uses the work, and all future uses that are remotely derived from it, from ever entertaining a copyright action against someone who uses it in turn.

Of course, you’ve more knowledge than I in this case and may see something that I’ve missed, but it seems to me that if enough authors use this particular CC level then they can effectively destroy the entire copyright system as, eventually, all ideas will be effectively forced to be labeled with that same standard.

REPLY

Dan Q April 12, 2011 at 2:40 pm

(CC0) Even if the rights waiver and subsequent fallback license and subsequent inability to sue doesn’t work, just the fact that the author is waiving as many rights as possible is sufficient enough to be pro-libertarian and thus should be encouraged wherever possible.

(Other CC licenses) I still don’t understand what you mean by Creative Commons licenses being illegal to use. Please clarify for me.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 2:51 pm

this is why you should not weigh in with legal certainty on matters you don’t get.

The are not illegal. They just may not work. Most licenses are contracts btween A and B, where A gives B a license, and B gives A consideration (payment). In a CC license there is maybe no consideration, esp. for CC0. That is one reason, I think. In other countries they may require more proof, an actual bargain or negotiation, written evidence, or they may say the author has inalienable rights. who knows.

the point is if you do it, but it’s not effecive, it doesn’t bind you, and you can change your mind, and if you do, that means people can’t rely on it, so it’s like having no license at all.

this is a legal matter; I encourage you not to pronounce on these matters in loose cannon faschion if you don’t understand this. Some people have trouble with contract and license law.

REPLY

Dan Q April 12, 2011 at 3:41 pm

I wasn’t trying to be a lawyer, I was talking about being a libertarian and giving my personal opinion on what was most compatible with libertarianism.

REPLY

Dan Q April 12, 2011 at 2:45 pm

(CC management) Meaning international treaty might break version 3.0, and so CC reacts with Version 4.0, and CC decides that everything after CC must accept an upgrade. Just the “compatible licenses” clause we have in ShareAlike now is enough to be suspicious.

REPLY

Dan Q April 12, 2011 at 3:44 pm

mistake: everything after CC->everything after v4.0

REPLY

BioTube April 13, 2011 at 8:31 pm

In regards to the GPL, the relevant clause is “or (at your option) any later version”; this just means that any GPL-licensed software is effectively multilicensed under the version it was released under and every one after that. There are plenty of projects that strike that clause(such as the bulk of the Linux kernel codebase) and it’s even permissible to strike it after you initially included it.

REPLY

Peter Surda April 12, 2011 at 6:21 am

I have a better idea. Let’s make the whole IP opt-out. If you support IP, you can use it to “protect” yourself but need to respect other people’s IP too. If you don’t support it, you cannot use it to “protect” yourself but also do not need to respect other people’s IP. Quid pro quo.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 12:33 pm

yes. but they would not go for it any more than social security privatization/opt out.

REPLY

Briggs April 12, 2011 at 10:08 am

When posting images to sites like Picasa, users can choose among Public Domain and several Creative Commons options. What is the significant difference between PD and CC0?

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 12:31 pm

Public domain means its copyright has expired. You can not make the term expire. All you can do is waive your rights by CC0, but there is concern that that is not effective–the contract would not be binding. PD is just a description as to the status of a given work. CC0 is something you attempt to do to it–a license granted while the copyright is in force. for PD there is no copyright left.

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 12, 2011 at 12:34 pm

If Picasal lets you choose PD it’s a mistake, unless they are simply askingy ou to identify it as some old work already in the PD. You can’t “chooose’ PD.

REPLY

Stranger April 12, 2011 at 8:01 pm

All we have for evidence of that is your own fantastical opinion. Has such a case been brought to a judge?

REPLY

Stephan Kinsella April 13, 2011 at 12:48 am

it’s just a definition. Public domain *means* works whose copyright term is expired. You cannot make your copyright term expire. Even if CC0 were to work it would not be the same as PD though for some purposes the difference would be trivial.

REPLY

Anti-IP Libertarian April 13, 2011 at 10:16 pm

You are WRONG: Read about PD and then state if someone can willingly put some new work into PD WORLDWIDE.

Read about copyright laws in the US. And read about copyright laws in EUROPE (and worldwide). For example in Germany you cannot absolutely waive your rights into some work if you are not dead for more than a long period of time. A potential copyright issue for the user exists this way.

So a potential user of some PD work would encounter legal issues because PD does not apply (the same way) everywhere.

  1. See Google’s Defensive Patent Acquisition; Prior User Rights and Patent Reform; Jefferson on Anonymous Defensive Patent Publishing; Defensive Patent Publishing. []
  2. See my Reducing the Cost of IP Law, proposing copyright law be reformed to “Require active registration and periodic re-registration (for a modest fee) and copyright notice to maintain copyright”. []
Share
{ 11 comments }

Steal Like an Artist and Relax: Original Is Relative

Lifehacker post:

Steal Like an Artist and Relax: Original Is Relative

Adam Pash — If you know enough about any field, it’s hard to imagine you can do anything new or original. For people who do creative work, that kind of mindset can be paralyzing. But as writer and artist Austin Kleon points out, no idea exists in a vacuum; the key is identifying what’s worth stealing.

It’s not a new idea—you’ve very likely heard the phrase “Good artists borrow, great artists steal.” It’s commonly attributed to Pablo Picasso, or T.S. Eliot, though it likely originated with neither. Kleon illustrates his point in the cartoon above, and has this to say on the subject:

Here’s what artists understand. It’s the a three-word sentence that fills me with hope every time I read it:

Nothing is original.

It says it right there in the Bible. Ecclesiastes:

“That which has been is what will be, That which is done is what will be done, And there is nothing new under the sun.”

Every new idea is just a mashup or a remix of previous ideas.


Read more>>

Share
{ 1 comment }

Mises blog post. Archived comments below. See also On the Danger of Metaphors in Scientific Discourse; “Objectivist Law Prof Mossoff on Copyright; or, the Misuse of Labor, Value, and Creation Metaphors”; “Thoughts on Intellectual Property, Scarcity, Labor-ownership, Metaphors, and Lockean Homesteading“.

I just read a fascinating paper, “Law and Economics, David Hume and Intellectual Property,” by Scottish law professor Hector Lewis MacQueen.1 MacQueen argues that Hume probably would not have recognized IP as a form of property. This seems right to me. As Arnold Plant noted in a classic study in 1934, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions”:2

The statutes creating patents in the various countries impose limitations on the exercise of the property rights which they comprise, but these are not the only peculiarities of this form of property.  Despite the limitations, property rights in patents are more potent than is generally true of private property.  The significance of private property in the economic system was enunciated long ago with great clarity by David Hume in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Property, he argued, has no purpose where there is abundance; it arises, and derives its significance, out of the scarcity of the objects which become appropriated, in a world in which people desire to benefit from their own work and sacrifice. [Emphasis added]

In other words, Hume recognized the importance of scarcity in the definition of what property is.3

One thing that caught my eye was this quote from one of Hume’s footnotes:

Some philosophers account for the right of occupation, by saying, that every one has a property in his own labour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it gives him the property of the whole: But, 1. There are several kinds of occupation, where we cannot be said to join our labour to the object we acquire: As when we possess a meadow by grazing our cattle upon it. 2. This accounts for the matter by means of accession; which is taking a needless circuit. 3. We cannot be said to join our labour to any thing but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking, we only make an alteration on it by our labour. This forms a relation betwixt us and the object; and thence arises the property, according to the preceding principles. [A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part II, Section III note 16; all emphasis added]

Here Hume is criticizing the overly metaphorical (“figurative”) idea of “labor” being “joined to” or mixed with objects, and he disagrees that this assumption is necessary to justify Lockean homesteading. He thinks a simpler version of Locke’s argument still works, one that drops the assumption that labor has to be “joined” to the object.

Update: Penner on Intellectual Property, Monopolies, and Property: “While patents are not property rights in ideas,43 nor copyrights property rights in expressions,44 nor again trade marks property rights in symbols or words, in general it does no harm to speak of rights in ideas, or in manuscripts, or in marks, any more than it does to refer to one’s rights in one’s labour.” [continue reading…]

  1. University of Edinburgh School of Law, Working Paper Series, No 2011/09; also published in Nick Kuenssberg (ed), Argument amongst Friends: Twenty-five years of Sceptical Enquiry (David Hume Institute, Edinburgh, 2010), pp 9–14. See also MacQueen’s Intellectual Property and the Common Law in Scotland C.1700-C.1850. []
  2. Economica, New Series, 1, no. 1 (Feb., 1934). []
  3. See also my Against Intellectual Property, text at n. 57, making a similar point about Hume. []
Share
{ 14 comments }

In his great (1995) article The Libertarian Case Against Intellectual Property Rights. This was published in the great, but obscure, journal formulations (1993-2000), the archives of which are online. See also Long’s Owning Ideas Means Owning People; Thoughtcrime; Bear Becomes Mushroom; Trout Implicated; Comments on Bedirhanoğlu and Schaefer.

Share
{ 2 comments }

Hayek on Patent and Copyright

From The Fatal Conceit, 1988 (p. 35) :

The difference between these and other kinds of property rights is this: while ownership of material goods guides the user of scarce means to their most important uses, in the case of immaterial goods such as literary productions and technological inventions the ability to produce them is also limited, yet once they have come into existence, they can be indefinitely multiplied and can be made scarce only by law in order to create an inducement to produce such ideas. Yet it is not obvious that such forced scarcity is the most effective way to stimulate the human creative process. I doubt whether there exists a single great work of literature which we would not possess had the author been unable to obtain an exclusive copyright for it; it seems to me that the case for copyright must rest almost entirely on the circumstance that such exceedingly useful works as encyclopaedias, dictionaries, textbooks and other works of reference could not be produced if, once they existed, they could freely be reproduced.

Similarly, recurrent re-examinations of the problem have not demonstrated that the obtainability of patents of invention actually enhances the flow of new technical knowledge rather than leading to wasteful concentration of research on problems whose solution in the near future can be foreseen and where, in consequence of the law, anyone who hits upon a solution a moment before the next gains the right to its exclusive use for a prolonged period.

See Jeff Tucker,  “Hayek on Patents and Copyrights“; also his post “Misesian vs. Marxian vs. IP Views of Innovation“.

Share
{ 0 comments }

Microsoft Co-Founder on Software “Borrowing”

In Microsoft’s Odd Couple in Vanity Fair, Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen

The Altair was little more than a bare-bones box with a C.P.U.-on-a-chip inside. It had no hard drive, no floppy disk, no place to edit or store programs.

We moved into Harvard’s Aiken Computation Lab, on Oxford Street, a one-story concrete building with an under-utilized time-sharing system. The clock was ticking on us from the start. Bill had told Ed Roberts, MITS’S co-founder and C.E.O., that our BASIC was nearly complete, and Ed said he’d like to see it in a month or so, when in point of fact we didn’t even have an 8080 instruction manual.

In building our homegrown basic, we borrowed bits and pieces of our design from previous versions, a long-standing software tradition. Languages evolve; ideas blend together; in computer technology, we all stand on others’ shoulders.

Of course, this is true of all creativity and innovation. We learn, tweak, remix, compete, emulate. Yet IP law tries to stop this.

Related posts: Steal Like An Artist; Everything is a Remix.

[H/t Vijay Boyapati]

Share
{ 0 comments }

‘Death Of ACTA’ Song Taken Down In Copyright Claim

Modern IP almost makes you think we live in Bizarro world. As Mike Masnick reports at Techdirt:

You may recall last fall we wrote about one of Dan Bull’s excellent tracks commenting on copyright issues, called Death Of ACTA.

… he noted with a bit of irony recently that the song on Mediafire was taken down due to a copyright claim. Considering the whole song is about the overreaching efforts of copyright as censorship, this seems pretty ironic.

Dan was kind enough to forward on the takedown message… and it’s a total mess. There’s simply no useful info in it other than that a French company called TF1 wants the file (and a bunch of others) off of Mediafire as quickly as possible. Now, it’s not clear what the issue is here, but it’s not difficult to take a guess. “Death of ACTA” is obviously a play on Jay-Z’s “Death of Autotune” Jay-Z’s song features prominently a sample of the song “In the Space” by French film composers Janko Nilovic and Dave Sarkys. It’s quite likely that Jay-Z licensed the sample. Not surprisingly, Dan Bull did not, but that’s the nature of creating a parody song.

Also, since all of this is happening in Europe, there aren’t fair use laws. Dan would probably have a stronger argument in the US. In Europe, it’s a bit more of a crap shoot. Of course, the whole thing is pretty silly if you think about it. Is there any less demand for “In the Space,” due to Dan’s song? Anyone who suggests that’s the case is not in touch with reality.

In the end, though, how ridiculous is it that a song that’s all about the excessive nature of copyright law ends up being subject to a takedown notice itself? It seems to encapsulate everything that the song is talking about as being ridiculous concerning copyright law.
Read more>>

Share
{ 0 comments }

FDA and USPTO: Joint Killers

In my posts Update: Patents Kill: Compulsory Licenses and Genzyme’s Life Saving Drug and Patents Kill: Compulsory Licenses and Genzyme’s Life Saving Drug, I noted that, due to the monopoly granted by patent, people suffering from the genetic illness Fabry disease are unable to obtain the drug Fabrazyme, which is in short supply because the sole, monopolistic manufacturer, Genzyme, can’t make enough quickly enough–and no one else is permitted to make it due to the patent.

In the latest round of this saga, lawyer Allen Black, representing two of the victims pro bono, filed a petition for “march-in” rights with the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, requesting that the DHHS provide a license in order to manufacture Fabrazyme. Sadly, the NIH denied the march-in request in December. But, as Black explained in an email,

the NIH denied the petitioners march-in request stating that they did not believe that allowing other manufacturers to make the patented product would remedy the shortage because administrative laws of its sister agency (the FDA) make it impossible to timely manufacture the drug.

Or, as Black’s press release notes, “the NIH stated that the FDA regulations prevented a manufacturer from entering the market in time to remedy the current shortage.”

So: government issued patent monopolies cause a shortage. The government that grants these odious monopolies has statutory authority to issue compulsory licenses–i.e., to partially weaken the monopoly privilege they previously granted. But they choose not to here, because the FDA’s regulations would prevent any competitors from using the license in time to meet the shortage. This resembles the law school hypos about cause-in-fact (sometimes called “but-for” causation): if A and B both shoot C at the same time, A can say he is not a cause-in-fact of C’s death since even if he had not pulled the trigger, B’s bullet would have killed C. Of course, B can make the same argument. If such legal legerdemain is permitted, both A and C could avoid responsibility by pointing the blame at each other. The proper approach is to consider A and B to both be C’s murderer. And so it is here: the combined effect of the FDA and patent office is killing people–in other words, the American central state.

[Mises]

Share
{ 1 comment }

Lawmakers renew push for “rogue websites” bill

From Reuters:

Lawmakers renew push for “rogue websites” bill

Mon Apr 4, 5:59 pm ET

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – A bipartisan group of lawmakers from both chambers of Congress on Monday vowed to pass legislation giving the U.S. Justice Department new authority to go after foreign and domestic websites that sell pirated music and movies and counterfeit goods.

“Online infringement and the sale of counterfeit goods cost American creators, producers, and businesses billions of dollars and results in the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs,” Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, a Democrat, told reporters.

Intellectual property theft is “one of the greatest threats to our economy today” because of the big role that copyrights, patents and trademarks play in boosting U.S. exports and productivity, said House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith, a Republican.

“If we’re going to have a healthy economy, we need to have a healthy IP sector,” Smith said.

Leahy said he would push forward with a new version of a “rogue websites” bill that cleared his committee last year by a vote of 19-O but did not get a vote in the full Senate.

Read more>>

Share
{ 2 comments }

Great post by Joe Mullin from a couple years back:

Patent defendants aren’t copycats. So who’s the real inventor here?

1876_Bell_Speaking_into_TelephoneRecently, I met up with a freelance photographer who was taking some photos for a patent infringement lawsuit I was reporting on. After I introduced myself, he asked me to sum up the story: “So the plaintiff is saying this company ripped off his idea, right?”

If you wanted a one-liner to capture the popular conception of what patent lawsuits are all about, that’s a pretty good one. But here’s the thing: it’s nearly always wrong.

It’s not just that defendants in patent lawsuits aren’t found guilty of copying—with very few exceptions, they aren’t even accused of copying, according to a new study by two leading patent academics. Taking that data as a jumping-off point, I took a closer look at the issue of copying and other popular misconceptions about patent lawsuits in my January IPLB story, “The Inventor’s Tale.” The story has now been published on Law.com as well, with a different title: “How Juror Misconceptions Affect Patent Trials.”

In the course of reporting this story, I traveled to Marshall, Texas, where I watched my first full patent trial. Watching that trial, Mass Engineered Design v. Ergotron, I really started to see where the rubber hits the road in patent law. I will have more reflections from that trial and the trip that I’ll share here. But today I want to take a closer look at the research on copying by law professors Mark Lemley (Stanford) and Christopher Cotropia (U. of Richmond). Their fascinating study, “Copying in Patent Law,” is available on SSRN.

 

First, the basics. One big difference between patents and other kinds of intellectual property, like copyrights and trademarks, is that patent-holders who want to sue someone for infringement don’t have to show that their patents or their products were actually copied by the defendant. In fact, the issue of copying is legally irrelevant when determining whether or not someone infringed a patent. (It is relevant to willfulness—more on that below.) The flip side of that rule is that a defendant company can have a really nice story about they did their own research, invention, and development—but it doesn’t matter one bit, legally speaking. Such “independent invention” stories are no defense.

“No one seems to know whether patent infringement defendants are in fact unscrupulous copyists or independent developers,” writes Lemley. So he and his partner went on a hunt looking for copycats in patent disputes. How much copying did they find? Not much at all.

The researchers studied 193 patent cases and found only 21 of them—that’s 10.9 percent—that contained even an allegation of any copying, whether that’s copying from a patent or from a patent-holder’s commercial product.

And here’s the kicker: more than half of the copying allegations they did find were from pharmaceutical and chemical cases. Remember that a big chunk of patent litigation involves branded drug companies fighting generic drug makers to determine when generic drugs can be marketed—and generic drug companies, of course, are legally required to make exact copies of a branded drug. So there’s good reason to consider pharma/chemical cases separately.

Once you set aside life sciences, copying in patent law goes from rare to almost nonexistent. Of the 193 cases analyzed, 76 were disputes over non-software computer related patents: only two of those cases included allegations of copying. Software patents were litigated in 67 lawsuits: again, only two plaintiffs alleged copying. To put it another way, in computers and software, less than 3% of the patent lawsuits studied involved allegations of copying, and less than 1% involved proof of copying. (see charts by industry on pages 27-28 of the paper.)

Maybe the allegations didn’t show up in the documents they checked? Possible, but not too likely.  Plaintiffs have good reasons to put any copying allegations or evidence they have on the record. Such evidence makes defendants look bad and can get plaintiffs enhanced damages for willfulness, even though it is not relevant to whether or not infringement took place.

But Americans tend to believe that patent lawsuits are about copying—and they believe there’s a whole lot of copying going on. These beliefs persist, even though most defendants aren’t copying—and aren’t even accused of copying—and often have never heard of the patent-holder or his alleged inventions.

Those who favor strong patent rights often wave the banner of the “independent inventor.” I’ve heard many patent holders—and many patent lawyers—praise strong patents as needed to protect inventors’ rights. But when we look at the litigation landscape—the public record of how patents are actually used—we find strong evidence that nearly all accused infringers developed their technology on their own.

So, who are the nation’s “independent inventors?” Are they patent-holders busy denouncing patent reform? Or are they the people and companies who must defend themselves against lawsuits brought by those patent-holders?

If independent invention was a defense against a patent infringement allegation, the data suggests we would see a sharp drop in patent litigation. Would it be a 90 percent drop-off? That’s not an unreasonable guess, but it’s tough to know for sure. As Lemley pointed out to me, such a change could encourage some to file on more dubious claims, or could lead to more licensing as opposed to litigation.

Now, about willfulness: While copying is irrelevant to proving infringement, it is relevant to proving willfulness, and a finding of willfulness can result in triple damages for a patent-holder. So patent plaintiffs have a very strong incentive to put any copying evidence they find on the record. (That incentive lends more weight to the study’s findings; if anything, they may have overstated the frequency of copying in patent disputes.)

But willfull infringement is not the same as copying. A patent-holder merely has to give notice of a patent to allege willfullness; so a willfulness accusation isn’t so much a patent-holder saying “You copied me!” as it is: “You knew that I had a valid patent and you were infringing it.” We can also imagine a scenario where copying is alleged but willfulness is not—for example, a defendant who deliberately copied someone else’s product, but didn’t know that it was patented. Willfulness allegations, unlike copying allegations, are very common, and willfulness was alleged in 81 percent of the cases in this study.

Some of Lemley and Cotropia’s conclusions:

  • The use of terms like “theft” and even “piracy” is wholly unjustified in the patent debate. Calling patent defendants “copyists” or thieves “is simply inaccurate,” write the researchers.
  • Courts are awarding greater and greater sums as a “reasonable royalty,” in part to deter future patent infringement. But that makes little sense. We can’t have deterrence when “the overwhelming majority of defendants are independent developers who were unaware of the existence of the patent when they made their product design decisions.”
  • Not all patent licenses are just payouts to avoid or end litigation: some patent licensing does involve the actual giving of technology. But modern patent litigation, by and large, isn’t about “policing failed efforts at technology transfer.” It’s about patent owners trying “to enforce their right of exclusivity or to collect revenue from independent creators.”

More interesting findings:

  • The public notice function that patents are supposed to serve? Doesn’t really exist. Lemley writes: “A variety of evidence already suggests that scientists in most industries rarely read patents, and that even if they did those patents aren’t a particularly good means of conveying technical information.” (Lemley’s 2007 paper “Ignoring Patents” has more on that.)
  • Nearly 70% of plaintiffs don’t even claim the defendant knew about the patent before the lawsuit. (The day you gave a defendant notice of your patent is the day willfullness damages start accruing—so again, it’s possible, but unlikely, that these facts are missing from court records.)
  • Did plaintiffs find copying after discovery? Very few did. Lemley & Cotropia analyzed 98 amended complaints from their dataset; only two of the amended complaints added a copying allegation; only three of were amended to add a willfullness allegation.
  • Very few cases included non-patent allegations that might indicate copying. Of the 193 cases, only ten (5.2%) had complaints that mentioned a prior business relationship between the parties; only five (2.6%) included an allegation of misappropriating trade secrets; and only two cases (1%) involved an allegation of infringement by departing employees.
  • Lemley & Cotropia found similar results with other methods. For example, they also analyzed judge’s opinions in 1,871 patent cases. Within that, they looked specifically at 226 of those opinions in which a judge ruled on willfullness (where plaintiffs have a strong incentive to bring up any copying evidence.)  Copying was only mentioned or implied in 40 of those cases (17.7%).

To be sure, this study won’t be the final word on copying in patent law, and I’m certainly interested in doing more reporting in this area. And I’ve started making questions about copying—or the lack thereof—part of my standard questions when reporting on patent disputes.

Note to readers: Thanks for your patience during my radio silence the past few weeks! Lots of changes are underway for IPLB’s web site and that has kept me very busy, but I now blog onwards.

Photo via wikimedia: “Bell speaking into telephone,” 1876.

Share
{ 3 comments }

From Mises blog, Nov. 2009:

[Update: see also KOL207 | Patent, Copyright, and Trademark Are Not About Plagiarism, Theft, Fraud, or Contract]

Common Misconceptions about Plagiarism and Patents: A Call for an Independent Inventor Defense

Defenders of patents commonly say they are against innovators’ ideas being “stolen” or “plagiarized.” This implies that patents simply permit an innovator to sue those who copy his idea. This position betrays either disingenuity or ignorance about patent law. Let me explain.

Under copyright law, someone who independently creates an original work similar to another author’s original work is not liable for copyright infringement, since the independent creation is not a reproduction of the other author’s work. Thus, for example, a copyright defendant can try to show he never had access to the other’s work, as a defense. The reason for this is that the fundamental copyright is, well, a right to copy one’s original creative work. By the nature of creative works that are subject to copyright, it is very unlikely someone would independently create the same novel, say, or painting, as another author. (And if copyright only protected literal copying, it would be much less a problem; but unfortunately it protects a bundle of rights including also the right to make “derivative works“.) But, in the rare case where author 2 independently creates a work very similar to that of author 1, it is not an infringement of author 1?s copyright, since author 2 did not copy anything.

Patent law is different. Very different. Most defenders of IP do not seem to be aware of this difference–one reason they should not be opining in favor of legal regimes they know little about. When patent defenders say that patent abolitionists are in favor of plagiarism and idea theft, they imply that patent law is like copyright law–that it simply prevents people from copying others’ ideas.
Not so. To prove copyright infringement you have to show an actual copying of the work. But to prove patent infringement, the patentee need only prove that the accused infringer makes, uses, sells, or offers to sell, or imports the patented invention–that is, a device or method that is described in at least one of the “claims” of the patent. It doesn’t matter if the infringer invented it independently. It doesn’t even matter if the infringer invented it before the patentee. Got that? Someone who previously invented the same thing and is using the idea in secret can actually be liable for infringing the patent granted to the second inventor. If a later person independently invents the same idea that was previously patented by another, this is also no defense. Prior use or independent invention are not a defense.

Obviously, it should be. The Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 did add a limited first inventor (prior user) defense for prior commercial users of “business methods“–see 35 U.S.C. § 273–but not a general one. Justice obviously requires that, at the very least, a general independent inventor defense be added to the patent system. To blunt its sharp, unjust edges. In particular, a defense should be provided for those who are prior users of, or who independently invent, an invention patented by someone else. This would greatly reduce the cost of the patent system since one difficulty faced by companies is that they do not know what patents they might infringe. If someone learns of an invention from another’s patent, at least they are aware of the risk and can possibly approach the patentee for a license. But quite often a company independently comes up with various designs and processes while developing a product, which designs and processes had been previously patented by someone else. If the goal of patent law is to reward invention, it should be sufficient to permit patentees to sue people who actually learned of the idea from the patent–just as copyright infringement exists when someone reproduced another’s work but not when it is independently created. A broad prior user right defense should be established, as well as an independent inventor defense that even a later inventor could use. (Pending patent reform legislation originally proposed to broaden the existing prior user defense by eliminating the business method patent limitation so that users of all types of inventions would have been able to use the defense, but this was removed from later versions of the bill. The Council on Foreign Relations study, “Reforming the U.S. Patent System: Getting the Incentives Right,” recommends a prior-user right be adopted; James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Princeton University Press, 2008), recommend an independent inventor defense–see the Introduction.)

Even pro-IP libertarians usually reluctantly agree that independent invention should be a defense, once you dispel their ignorance about the system they for some reason support (well, the reason is not that hard to see–it’s lingering state-indoctrination, or some form of statism such as minarchism, or some unprincipled, incoherent grounds like utilitarianism). This is one of the aspects of arguing IP policy that infuriates me. Whenever you point one of these things out to a libertarian defender of IP, he will usually say, “well, I don’t support that.” So you say, “well, what do you support?” The answer is basically, “Hey, I’m not a patent lawyer; that’s just a detail.” I.e., they are in favor of some ideal patent system; not the current, statist one (though they oppose abolishing it or weaking it!), but a “libertarian” one (as if one could imagine a patent system concocted by decentralized courts without legislative power! [on this see my Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society]). In other words, they don’t know what in the heck they are even talking about. They can’t describe the system they favor, and are not willing to abandon a statist system they admit is unjust.

And they seem blithely unaware that removing the obvious, “problematic” features of patent law would largely gut it, resulting in an emaciated, weak patent system–a change that would be attacked by mainstream IP advocates as “harming innovation,” in the same way that these libertarian patenteers criticize us patent abolitionists. Libertarian IP advocates are schizophrenic. They shy away from the obvious injustices of patent law, and would favor reforms that most normal IP proponents would recoil in horror from; while they try to maintain the facade that they support IP because they support innovation and inventors’ “rights”, even though they cannot tell you what their ideal libertarian patent system even looks like.

Don’t believe me that providing an (obviously just) “independent inventor” defense would gut the patent system? I’ve been practicing patent law since 1993. I have lost count of the number of times I’ve been called upon by a client to analyze a patent that has come to the client’s attention, that concerns it. What typically happens is this. Company A is producing or developing a product. They hear a rumour from a customer “Hey, I think that Company B has a patent on something similar to this.” Or, they get a letter from Company B saying, “Hi, we attach a copy of our latest patent for your interest! If you want to discuss licensing, give us a call! <smiley face! we’re all friends! it’s all good! Don’t file a declaratory judgment action against us, please! We wouldn’t want to give you cause to sue us first, robbing us of the chance to choose the venue! <double-smiley-face> Love, Company B”. So Company A calls me, says, “can you take a look at this patent? Are we in trouble? Are we infringing? Is the patent valid? If so, can we change our design to get around it? We’ll be happy to pay your $30k fee for an analysis and opinion.” Such a productive use of precious capital!

Now, what I want to emphasize here is that: in all the umpteen times I’ve done this over the last 15 or so years, I have never, ever, even once, seen a case where the client’s engineers copied the patented invention. In every case that I can recall, the company designed its product on its own–using available technology, to meet the market demands–and then only later were made aware of some patent buried among millions in the bowels of the patent office. Then they panic, worrying that they might be shut down by an injunction by a competitor, or sued into the ground (for examples see my Radical Patent Reform Is Not on the Way).

No doubt in some cases there is copying. An entrepreneur espies a popular product, and makes a similar one; lo and behold, it turns out there were some patents, and so he is sued. Still unjust–what is wrong with emulation, competition, and learning?!–but still, sure, in some cases, there is copying. But there can be no doubt that millions and millions of dollars are lost on attorneys’ fees alone, not to mention the cost of changing designs to avoid infringement, or foregoing development in a field crowded with patents or rife with uncertainty, in cases where the victim was not copying or even learning anything from the company that just happens to hold a red-ribbon adorned manilla certificate issued by a technocratic bureaucracy of the criminal central state. Add an independent inventor defense, and a lot of the work done by lawyers like me would dry up–meaning a more efficient economy, lower priced goods, more competition and innovation, more innovative freedom, more breathing room.

This is a type of reform that most libertarian patent advocates, in my experience, begrudgingly agree to. And it would gut the patent system. The caterwauling of the patent bar, deprived of half their federal law-sponsored teats, would reach a deafening crescendo. Large companies that rely on the inchoate threat of patent lawsuits to squelch competition and keep small innovators down, would increase their bribes to DC, fearful of barriers to entry falling.

So why not come all the way with us, my fellow libertarians? You see the injustices of the patent system, and usually agree with our concrete criticisms of them. You are not sure of what a good patent system would even look like. The current one is undeniably a mess. And it’s just an arbitrary fake-law scheme enacted by an obviously incompetent, evil, illegitimate, and criminal state. Why in the world would a libertarian support this? Besides, by advocating such reforms you are going to be lumped in with us “enemies of innovation” by the vested IP interests. So if you are doing the time, you might as well do the crime.

Update: See Mike Masnick’s excellent posts, Calling For An Independent Invention Defense In Patents and If Patents Are Supposed To Support The Independent Inventor, Why Isn’t There An Independent Invention Defense?, the latter of which mentions a great post by Joe Mullin, Patent defendants aren’t copycats. So who’s the real inventor here?

Share
{ 2 comments }

Google’s Defensive Patent Acquisition

I’ve discussed before the practice of defensive patenting and defensive patent publishing–companies acquire patents or publish their trade secrets to prevent others from suing them for patent infringement (or to prevent them from patenting the same idea). This results in huge waste, as companies acquire patents simply to ward off lawsuits; it erects barriers to entry to smaller firms who do not have a big enough patent arsenal to be protected or to enter into cross-licensing arrangements with existing patent holders; and it forces smaller companies to make public information they would prefer to keep secret.1

Google explicitly admits it’s doing this in Patents and innovation, which describes its “bid for Nortel’s patent portfolio in the company’s bankruptcy auction.” If they win, they will likely spend hundreds of millions of dollars simply to “create a disincentive for others to sue Google” so that Google will be allowed to “continue to innovate.” What a sad waste of resources. And what about all the smaller companies and innovators and entrepreneurs who cannot afford to acquire a defensive patent arsenal? They are naked before the power of IP holders. I continue to be astonished when I find libertarians who support IP and think that it is compatible with property rights and the free market.

Google also notes that it has “long argued in favor of real patent reform,” and in that linked post they say they are “optimistic” about the chance for patent reform in 2009. Well it looks like patent reform may actually happen in 2011–but there is no reason whatsoever to be optimistic about it, as I note in Patent Reform is Here! O Joy! and Prior User Rights and Patent Reform.

[Mises]

  1. See Jefferson on Anonymous Defensive Patent Publishing; Defensive Patent Publishing. []
Share
{ 2 comments }

Let’s Bring Back the Good Old Days of English Patents

From Mises blog in 2007:

Let’s Bring Back the Good Old Days of English Patents

August 31, 2007 by Stephan Kinsella

It’s somewhat striking that modern libertarian advocates of patent rights seem blithely unaware of the utterly monopolistic, completely unlibertarian origin of “patent grants” by English monarchs. At the very least, they ought to be a bit uncomfortable that patents arose in this manner.

[Note: Update: Patent-Seeking as a Defensive Move — Then, and Now]

Interestingly, as reported by the Patently-O Patent Law Blog (The Roots of Patent Policy: Rethinking Early English Patent Policy),

Dr. Chris Dent, an Australian Researcher, has written an interesting new paper on the history and value of original English patents. Although invention was not the basis of the patent grant, Dent argues that they may still have been based on sound public policy goals.

Dent concedes (from Patently-O’s synopsis) that “The manner in which the early modern English monarchs–Elizabeth I and James I–granted patents of monopoly is not seen in a good light in current legal discourse. There are many tales of the nepotism that was, allegedly, rife and the public outrage at the abuses of the Crown–circumstances that only ended with the “triumph” of the Statute of Monopolies in 1624.” Right. No surprise.

However, argues Dent, “This simplistic understanding does not do justice to the good intentions of Elizabeth and James; and, to an extent, may be inaccurate.” Amazing! The opposition to nepotistic and utterly unjustified state monopoly grants is “simplistic,” and does not “do justice” to the monarchs’ “good intentions”. Ha! Dent actually argues that

three key policy objectives informed the monopolies awarded by the two monarchs. … These goals–increased employment levels, an improved balance of trade with other countries and the better regulation of industries–not only appear to be modern, but also may be understood to have been fundamental to the modernisation of English society and its economy. Examples of these goals in practice include the granting of monopolies for water pumping inventions to more effectively mine for minerals (increasing both goods production and employment); grants for the establishment of local industries, based on imported technical knowledge, to reduce the reliance on foreign goods; and the regulation of manufacturers to improve the quality of goods available for sale. Economic historians note that the English economy underwent significant change in the 16th and 17th centuries; this change may have been, in part, a result of the policy actions of the Executive of the time. Actions that included the grant to individuals and companies of the now-maligned grants of monopolies.

So here we have it: not only is the monopolistic origin of our modern invention-based patent system not embarrassing, it was a good thing, similar to our modern legislative “tweaks” of “unbridled” capitalism. Seen in this light, modern patents and ancient ones have a lot in common.

Share
{ 0 comments }