[Cross-posted at PFS Blog]
Congrats, pro-IP libertarians. This is the kind of fascist bullshit you support. https://t.co/Om2WrqIbRI
— Stephan Kinsella (@NSKinsella) June 11, 2026
[Cross-posted at PFS Blog]
Congrats, pro-IP libertarians. This is the kind of fascist bullshit you support. https://t.co/Om2WrqIbRI
— Stephan Kinsella (@NSKinsella) June 11, 2026
See Lawrence Wilson and Sylvia Xu, “The Loophole Drug Makers Use to Keep Prices High: How pharmaceutical companies use the patent system to delay generic drugs from coming to market,” Epoch Times – In Depth – Premium Reports (
Intellectual Property Rights as Negative Servitudes [continue reading…]
[From my Webnote series]
From various posts at C4SIF.org and StephanKinsella.com:
The Problem with Intellectual Property:****
I tire of people repeating over and over again that we need IP because without it there would be no innovation, etc. I have pointed out to them over and over that not only is this false,1 but that it misconceives the purpose of law itself. It imagines that there are market failures and imperfections,2 such as “holdout problems” and “free riders,”3 and “too much competition,4 and that the state is therefore justified in intervening–in engaging in what are in effect takings—in attempt to grow the size of the pie. Of course this never works because (a) there are no market failures, (b) even if there are, they are dwarfed by political failure, i.e. the solution is worse than the problem. But it also assumes that if the state could intervene and make things “better” in some vague sense, that this is justified. But this misconceives the purpose of law: it is is to do justice—by recognizing, identifying, defining, respecting, and protecting property rights.5 IP law violates property rights;6 it is the opposite of justice. It is a perversion of law and justice. [continue reading…]
Kinsella, “Defamation as a Type of Intellectual Property,” in A Life in Liberty: Liber Amicorum in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, edited by Jörg Guido Hülsmann & Stephan Kinsella (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2024)
Trademarks and Free Speech: Conflicts and Resolutions: CIPIL Evening Seminar, Cambridge lecture by Lisa P. Ramsey, author of Trademarks and Free Speech: Conflicts and Resolutions (Cambridge, 2026). [continue reading…]
[From my Webnote series]
Interesting recent case discussed by Sarah Isgur and David French in Advisory Opinions:1 Vericool World LLC v. Igloo Products Corp. (9th Cir. May 6, 2026).2 [continue reading…]
Summary of the two attached papers by Glynn S. Lunney Jr.
1. “Trademark Monopolies” (Emory Law Journal, 1999)
This is a major scholarly critique of the expansion of U.S. trademark law in the second half of the 20th century. Lunney traces trademark doctrine from its early 18th–mid-20th century roots, where courts and commentators (including Edward Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition) treated trademarks as a form of monopoly that required careful limits to avoid harming competition. Early trademark protection was justified primarily on deception-based grounds: preventing consumer confusion about the source of goods so that buyers could match their preferences to products accurately. This served an efficiency function (better information, quality incentives) while still allowing “workable” or “fair” competition.
Lunney argues that since the mid-1950s (especially after the Lanham Act), trademark law has undergone a profound shift toward property-based protection. Courts and commentators increasingly treat the trademark itself as a valuable asset/product worth protecting independent of any source-identifying function. This has produced:
The result, Lunney contends, is the creation of “trademark monopolies” in the pejorative sense: market power and deadweight loss without the offsetting consumer-information benefits of traditional deception-based trademarks. He rejects the common analogy to patent/copyright (which at least purport to incentivize new creation), noting that trademark doctrine does not tie protection to any proven need for extra incentives and risks locking up product differentiation in ways that harm competition. The paper calls for restoring the competitive balance by limiting protection to cases of material deception.
2. “A Natural Right to Copy” (Texas A&M Law Scholarship / SSRN, 2019)
This essay is a direct philosophical and normative attack on natural-rights justifications for copyright (and by extension IP more broadly). Lunney begins with the observation that copying/imitation is the foundation of civilization: language, culture, technology, and knowledge transmission all depend on it. Without the ability to copy, humans could not learn, share discoveries, or build cumulatively (“standing on the shoulders of giants”). Creativity is valuable but secondary; copying is the sine qua non of progress.
He critiques Wendy Gordon’s influential 1993 article that used John Locke’s labor-desert theory to argue for a natural right to exclude others from copying original expressive works. Lunney argues Gordon conceded too much by equating copying with “theft.” Copying is not theft (it does not deprive the owner of the original); it is a natural human faculty and the default rule in any sensible baseline. Locke’s framework, properly read, supports a natural right to copy, not a natural right to monopolize copies. Copyright is purely positive (statutory) law—an artificial, narrow exception to the general freedom to copy—and should be construed narrowly. Lunney emphasizes that self-interest, reputation, and market forces already provide substantial incentives for creation even without broad copyright; expansive protection mainly serves concentrated industry interests at the expense of consumers and cumulative culture.
How anti-IP is Lunney compared to Stephan Kinsella?
Kinsella is one of the most radical and consistent abolitionists of all IP (patents, copyrights, and trademarks). He argues IP is unjust government-granted monopoly privilege that violates natural rights in tangible property and free speech, impedes innovation, and should be abolished entirely in favor of private-ordering alternatives (contracts, trade secrets, etc.). His site (C4SIF) celebrates scholars who are “thumbs down” on IP and explicitly frames copyright as “the new mercantilism.”
Lunney is strongly anti-IP in practice and is explicitly cited approvingly by Kinsella in both of the consulted posts:
Key differences in degree of opposition:
In short, Lunney is one of the more prominent academic critics of expansive IP and is squarely in the “anti-IP” camp as Kinsella defines it—he supplies powerful scholarly ammunition against modern copyright and trademark expansion. But he stops short of Kinsella’s full abolitionist position, leaving open the possibility of a stripped-down, incentive-justified core. Kinsella is farther out on the spectrum: total elimination of state IP monopolies. Lunney is “anti-IP” enough to be praised by Kinsella, but more moderate/reform-oriented in his ultimate prescriptions.
***
A Natural Right to Copy
Glynn S. Lunney Jr, “Trademark Monopolies,” Emory L. J. 48 (1999): 367–487
Abstract:
Since 1742, when Lord Hardwicke seemingly equated trademark protection with monopoly in one of the first trademark cases, until the mid-1950s, concerns that trademarks represented a form of illegitimate monopoly effectively constrained the growth of trademark protection. In the twentieth century, Edward Chamberlin became the leading proponent of the trademark as monopoly view with the publication of his work, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, in 1933. In his work, Chamberlin argued that a trademark enabled its owner to differentiate her products and then to exclude others from using the differentiating feature. By doing so, trademark protection can effectively cede control over distinct product markets to individual producers and thereby generate for trademark owners the downward sloping demand curve of a monopolist, with its associated monopoly rents and deadweight losses. Although Chamberlin himself recognized the need for product differentiation and rejected the supposed ideal of the perfect competition model, his work became a common rallying point for the trademark as monopoly argument. During the legislative debates leading to the Trademark Act of 1946, his work served as a basis for the Justice Department’s opposition to broad trademark protection.
***
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., “A Natural Right to Copy,” Boston University Law Review, Forthcoming; Texas A&M University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-42 25 (Posted: 20 Aug 2019)
Abstract:
In this symposium, we gather to celebrate the work of Wendy Gordon. In this essay, I revisit her article, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property. In the article, Professor Gordon first used the “no-harm” principle of John Locke to justify copyright as natural right and then used his “enough-and-as-good” proviso to limit that right. Her second step turned natural rights approaches to copyright on its head. Through it, she showed that even if we accept copyright as natural right, that acceptance does not necessarily lead to a copyright of undue breadth or perpetual duration. Rather, even a natural rights framework leads to a copyright regime shorter and narrower than we presently have.
While I agree that copyright should be shorter and narrower, I worry that Professor Gordon conceded too much in her first step. Neither Locke’s reasoning nor Professor Gordon’s reading of it can justify a right to prohibit copying as a matter of natural law. It is not the right to prohibit copying to which we have a natural entitlement. It is the right to copy.
Andrea Togni, “The Multiple-Homesteading Theory and the Metaphysics of Ideas and Information,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 30, no. 1 (2026): 64–86.
Abstract:
This article explores the intersections between privacy, property rights, ideas, and information. The multiple-homesteading theory (MHT) posits that property rights have universal applicability, encompassing the physical, digital, and mental domains. Property in ideas and information (PII) exists only as long as privacy is fully maintained. Once shared, ideas and information trigger automatic homesteading processes in any individual who comes into contact with them; these individuals then form new and original ideas, which remain their exclusive property as long as privacy is preserved. Any libertarian addressing PII must investigate the ontological nature of ideas and information, which cannot be defined in purely physicalistic terms. This article carries out this preparatory work through examinations of heterogeneous philosophical and scientific theories, literature, and classical music. In addition, a meme theory of ideas is outlined. Ultimately, recognizing the existence of PII does not legitimize positivistic intellectual property (IP) legislation, which is incompatible with libertarian principles. Instead, the MHT demonstrates that privacy bridges coherent libertarian theory and effective libertarian action, especially in a world dominated by the pervasive intersection of the physical and digital domains.
I have no doubt in my mind they will royally screw this up.
May 8, 2026
Friday, 12:00 p.m. EDT
Webinar
Sponsors: Intellectual Property Practice Group [continue reading…]
In comments I suggested:
Gamrot, A Critique of Moore’s Intellectual Property Theory
Related:
Wojciech Gamrot, “A Critique of Moore’s Intellectual Property Theory,” The Journal of Value Inquiry (2025).
From the Introduction:
Several authors try to provide a moral justification for intellectual property (IP) rights. A popular strand of these theories refers to the philosophy of John Locke, and portrays IP as a natural right. Among them, the writings of Adam D. Moore have gained substantial popularity. His theory is presented in several widely quoted works. It was criticized by numerous authors.Footnote1 However its ontological underpinnings draw little attention. This paper aims to investigate their validity. The discussion focuses on a detailed exposition of the theory presented in Moore’s (2004) book.Footnote2 Some insights are also drawn from his other works.Footnote3 In the second section the theory is briefly sketched. In the third section preliminary remarks regarding the justification of natural rights are offered. In the next three sections ontological assumptions of Moore’s theory are identified and challenged. Two objections are stated. They independently lead to the formulation, in the seventh section, of a competing ontology that is superior to Moore’s metaphysics. In the following five sections its implications are explored. It is argued, against Moore, that humans cannot possess, use, or labor on types. In the remaining sections these findings are confronted with Moore’s IP justification. It is demonstrated that his theory does not justify rights to types, and that any such rights are meaningless.
I have done what I can to present my case against IP not only to Austrians and libertarians but to other lawyers. Anything to get the word out and to defeat or put a dent in the support for evil IP. I asked Walter Block one time why he published so many articles on blackmail theory, many redundant or duplicative. He just said something like, “As Murray Rothbard would say … SMASH ‘EM!”1 I guess I feel the same about IP. So I’ve accepted debates and spoken before non-libertarian audiences and published in various related fora such as IP group newsletters, universities, or Federalist society or other fora, e.g.:
Rothbard: bad and confused on patent and IP by contract; silent on trademark; good on defamation.
See the following, adapted from my tweet in response to Matt Zwolinski in The Myth of Libertarianism. [continue reading…]
Seemed to be leaning against IP, though not entirely clearly. See Hayek’s Views on Intellectual Property; also Tucker, “Misesian vs. Marxian vs. IP Views of Innovation“; Tucker, “Hayek on Patents and Copyrights“; Salerno, Hayek Contra Copyright Laws
See also Don’t tell me to read Hayek
Oscar Grau has been a relentless critic of Javier Milei,1 as have other libertarians.2 Now Miguel Hernández has posted the article “Anatomy of a libertarian fraud” (April 16, 2026), another criticism of Milei, and announced it in a post on X. In response, Grau, who has been critical of libertarians who have vocally supported Milei, wrote:
Miguel Hernández has essentially published a book that plagiarizes all the work I have done on Milei over the past two years. The title he has chosen is even ironic, since most of his book is actually my own work. That is, he is also a fraud.
Others chimed in claiming that Grau has no complaint since IP is illegitimate. One wrote: “There is no thing such as intellectual property in anarcho-capitalism. You should be happy that your ideas are spreading.”; another wrote “Oscar, do you defend intellectual property?”
This brings up an interesting illustration of the issue of IP and its relation to plagiarism. [continue reading…]
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