Kant on Intellectual Property

See Marcus Willaschek, “‘This Is Mine’: On Intellectual and Other Property,” in Kant: A Revolution in Thinking, Peter Lewis, trans. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2025) (sample; Scribd).

Note the opening quote to ch. 12: “The value of money is . . . only indirect. One cannot enjoy money itself or make immediate use of it in any way. Yet it is still a means which, among all things, has the greatest usefulness.”¹

Grok summary of ch. 12:

Summary of Chapter 12: “This Is Mine”: On Intellectual and Other Property

In this chapter (pp. 138–147), Marcus Willaschek explores Kant’s views on property rights, both intellectual and material, framing them within the context of Kant’s personal wealth and his broader political philosophy. The discussion blends biographical details with philosophical analysis, drawing primarily from Kant’s Doctrine of Right (1797) and his essay “On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books” (1785).

Kant’s Personal Wealth and Business Acumen (pp. 138–140)

Willaschek begins by detailing Kant’s substantial fortune at the time of his 1798 will (and later amendments), estimated at around 63,000 guilders by his death in 1804—equivalent to millions in modern terms. Sources included his professorial salary (rising to ~400 thalers annually), lecture fees, book royalties (e.g., 10 thalers per page for On Perpetual Peace), and investments yielding 6% annual interest in a trading firm owned by friends. Kant was portrayed as a shrewd businessman who valued fair compensation, contrasting with the era’s lack of intellectual property protections.

Intellectual Property: Against Piracy (pp. 139–140)

Kant publicly opposed unauthorized reprints, which plagued authors in the 18th century due to ineffective laws. Willaschek highlights Kant’s argument that a book is not merely a material object (which can be freely bought/sold) but an “action” or “speech” from author to public. Publishers act as the author’s agents; piracy deceives readers and violates the authorized publisher’s rights. This positioned Kant as a pioneer of intellectual property law, influencing later developments in Europe (e.g., England 1710, France 1791, Germany in the 19th century). Kant embedded this in his property theory, emphasizing rights over content dissemination.

General Theory of Property: Critiques and Kant’s Framework (pp. 140–144)

Willaschek situates Kant in 18th-century debates, contrasting him with predecessors:

• Rejects Locke: Labor theory treats property as a person-object relation; Kant sees it as interpersonal (right to exclude others).
• Critiques Rousseau: Private property isn’t humanity’s “fall” but needs justification beyond utility (contra Hobbes/Hume, who viewed it as a conflict-avoiding convention).
• Kant’s alternative: Property is “intelligible possession” (conceptual right to exclude, independent of physical control) vs. “physical possession.” It stems from freedom: Unappropriated land must be acquirable unilaterally (initial appropriation) to avoid restricting human use, rooted in humanity’s “original possession in common” of the Earth (all have innate right to occupy space on a finite planet). However, such rights are “provisional” in a state of nature (open to disputes) and become “peremptory” only in a civil state with laws, courts, and enforcement reflecting the “general will.”

Distributive Justice and Legacy (pp. 144–147)

Kant touches on inequality: Wealth disparities often arise from “government injustice,” making charity insufficient (the rich benefit from systemic favoritism). Willaschek notes socialist (e.g., linking to moral equality) and liberal/libertarian (e.g., emphasizing freedom) interpretations of Kant, but calls them anachronistic given Kant’s pre-industrial context. He supported state welfare but offered no specifics on taxes or production ownership.

The chapter closes with Kant’s will: He bequeathed his fortune to siblings and nieces/nephews (no charitable donations). Initially generous to servant Martin Lampe (annual pension), but after a 1802 incident (Lampe’s drunken violence), it was reduced to 40 thalers yearly. Kant remained charitable in life but prioritized family.

Overall, the chapter portrays Kant as a pragmatic thinker on property: Rights enable freedom but require state oversight for legitimacy, with intellectual property as a key extension protecting authors’ “speech.”

Was Kant Pro-IP or Anti-IP?

Kant was pro-intellectual property, particularly in the context of copyright for books. He argued vigorously against unauthorized reprinting (piracy), viewing it as wrongful deception and a violation of authors’ and publishers’ rights (pp. 139–140). His 1785 essay and Doctrine of Right laid groundwork for modern IP law by distinguishing content as an “action” deserving protection. However, his focus was narrow (e.g., publishing), not extending to patents or broader IP like inventions, and he tied it to interpersonal rights rather than economic incentives alone. No evidence suggests he was anti-IP; his personal frustration with piracy (losing royalties and facing errors in editions) reinforced his stance.

1. [“In the case of Kant’s principal work, the Critique of Pure Reason, following the common practice in the literature on Kant, references are given in the form “A . . . ,” “B . . . ,” and “A . . . / B . . .” (e.g., A xii; B406; A365/B390). Here, “A” refers to the page numbers of the first edition of the Critique, published in 1781, while “B” references the second edition, of 1787.”] Ak. 6:287, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), in Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor, CWK [The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation, 16 vols., Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, general eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–2016)] (1996), 435. [↩]