Mises post; archived comments below.
Update: See “Intellectual Property Is ‘Evil’—And Businesspeople Should Oppose It,” interview with Jack Criss, BAMSouth (Oct. 29, 2013)
***
As I’ve noted before, with the rise of IP abolitionism among libertarians, with IP defenders on the ropes, the Objectivists are trying to strike back. Rand’s defense of IP was incoherent, confused, and never complete (her brief argument assumed the US patent system is first to file, which is incorrect; and she had an incoherent admixture of utilitarianism and intuitionism in her tortured attempt to defend a finite, arbitrary term for patent and copyright).
Modern defenders such as Greg Perkins and law professor Mossoff are attempting to put her IP views on a sound footing.1
One thing ironic about this is Rand put so much stock into the importance of IP–she said ““patents are the heart and core of property rights,”2 she told a patent attorney that “Intellectual property is the most important field of law,”3 and Mossoff claims that “All Property is Intellectual Property”. Well if IP is that important, if it’s the base of her whole system, but if she only devoted one brief and confused essay to it, and if her followers are still struggling to rehabililate and flesh her views out on IP (in the presentation I’ll discuss below, Ayn Rand Institute President Yaron Brook says he will participate in the Q&A even though “I don’t know anything about intellectual property”), how can Objectivism be a comprehensive, complete, and closed system? Surely its claims to completeness are suspect if its very foundations are IP and those foundations are still in need of shoring up?
In any case, GMU Objectivist law professor and Adam Mossoff is putting a lot of effort in trying to come up with a coherent defense of IP.4 In a lecture last November, “Why Should Business Leaders Care about Intellectual Property?—Ayn Rand’s Radical Argument,” Professor Mossoff (joined by ARI head Yaron Brook in the Q&A) attempts to defend IP based on Objectivist principles.
The attempt fails completely, because it is riddled with confused arguments and non-sequiturs, so many that it’s hard to know where to begin. I started keeping notes but could not keep up, so I will only make a few observations based on what I did jot down.
First, Mossoff says (or implies; I can’t recall) that Locke believed IP was a natural right. This is false, as shown by Ronan Deazley and Tom Bell.5 Nor did Jefferson or the Founders. It was the modern perpetuation of the ancient state grants of monopoly privilege and censorship, reworked democratically for administration by a state bureaucracy to advance a policy goal of encouraging innovation, disclosure, and artistic creation. It had nothing to do with natural rights or desert. They were just temporary, unlike normal property.
Mossoff repeats the crankish Objectivist argument that man “creates values”, as values are things, ownable things; he says the goals of action are the creation of values. But there is no property right to value, since value is relational: it has to do with how individuals regard the usefulness of real things–as demonstrated in action (this Misesian notion of demonstrated preference is similar to Rand’s definition of value as something one acts to gain and/or keep). We do not own values, and we do not create values. Rather, we value certain means and ends and demonstrate this valuing by acting to use the means to attain a given end. Often this action involves transforming an owned scarce resource to make it more valuable–that is to increase wealth. Man acts, and uses ideas, information, knowledge, intellect, creativity, action, labor, to transform given things from one state to another, presumably to a more valuable state. This is the only way we create value–by making an owned thing more valuable.
Rand recognized this:
The power to rearrange the combinations of natural elements is the only creative power man possesses. It is an enormous and glorious power—and it is the only meaning of the concept “creative.” “Creation” does not (and metaphysically cannot) mean the power to bring something into existence out of nothing. “Creation” means the power to bring into existence an arrangement (or combination or integration) of natural elements that had not existed before.
Mossoff says the source of rights is man’s need to “create material values.” He seems to miss the importance of the word “material” here, which complements Rand’s observation above regarding how production really involves rearranging existing material. As some Objectivists put it:
The right to property is the right to gain, keep, use, and dispose of material values without physical compulsion, coercion, or interference by other men (neither criminals nor governments). Because human beings are physical organisms, every life-sustaining action they take has a material dimension. Land, buildings, and material objects of all kinds are the means by which people live. Without property rights, no other rights are possible—including the rights to life and liberty.
This is actually good–it’s compatible with the Misesian idea of scarce resources being important to human action, and, thus, the importance of property rights in these material things. Still, it’s crankish to talk about “material values” as things. What is “a value” in their terminology? According to this usage, if you take “fallow land” and transform it into a farm, the farm “is” “a value” that you have … created? But this is confused. What you did was (a) homestead a scarce resource (the fallow land); (b) use your effort, labor, action, ingenuity, skill, knowledge, to transform the land into a farm; (c) you own the farm because you already owned the land which you rearranged into a farm; (d) the farm is “more valuable” to you (value is subjective) than was the unimproved land, so you now have more “wealth”–your action created wealth, but did not create property. Notice: there is an equivoction in “value” here–if it means wealth, then sure, your action created wealth but all this means is you transformed your own property into a more valuable arrangement, so this has no implications for property rights; but if it means an ownable thing, “a farm,” which is “a value,” then to say you own the value (the farm) because you “created” it, is simply false, a severe confusion.
At one point Mossoff says that leftist opponents of IP are labor theory of value types; and that the problem with this view is that it’s not physical labor but intellectual effort or labor that is the source of property. So it’s still a labor theory of value/property.6 Hume had it right when he wrote:
Some philosophers account for the right of occupation, by saying, that every one has a property in his own labour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it gives him the property of the whole: But, 1. There are several kinds of occupation, where we cannot be said to join our labour to the object we acquire: As when we possess a meadow by grazing our cattle upon it. 2. This accounts for the matter by means of accession; which is taking a needless circuit. 3. We cannot be said to join our labour to any thing but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking, we only make an alteration on it by our labour. This forms a relation betwixt us and the object; and thence arises the property, according to the preceding principles.7
Locke, and Rand, are too metaphorical–figurative–in their emphasis on “labor” and (for Rand) “value.”
At another point in his talk, Mossoff conflates knowledge, technology, knowhow, and innovation with IP–he gives a laundry list of impressive human innovations and achievements, as if this is IP; as if this makes it obvious that IP is good–this is pure equivocation.
One of his arguments backfires completely. He tries to give an example which is supposed to show how great and necessary patents are in the case of Shockley (co-inventor of the transistor) and Noyce, who, Mossoff says, simultaneously and independently invented the integrated circuit. I am not sure if this story is correct–I think it was Noyce and Jack Kilby, not Noyce and Shockley, but whatever (forgive me, I’m a EE and these guys are giants in my mind). In any case, according to Mossoff, these two independent co-inventors got into a two-year “interference” litigation at the patent office to determine who got the patent–and after two years of wasted litigation they both dropped and went on with their lives. I blinked when I hears this example. Is this supposed to show that patents are good? Here we have two people independently inventing the same thing–meaning the invention’s “time was ripe” and was going to come regardless; neither should have gottten a patent! And in this case, they wasted tons of time and resources obtaining and fighting over patents… that they dropped because the litigation was consuming their time. So…. this supports the notion of IP exactly how? I can see why the patent bar likes it, but… libertarians?
As I noted above, it’s amusing that when Yaron Brook, the President of ARI, introduces Mossoff, he says he will participate in the Q&A even though “I don’t know anything about intellectual property”! Even though IP is the heart and core of all property rights! Even though he does participate in the Q&A at the end!
Mossoff says all rights are intellectual property rights, but he only means, I think, that there is (of course) an important element of intellectual creativity and the mind involved in homesteading resources, and then transforming them. Of course; who denies this. But this is yet another equivocation: the IP proponent first uses “intellectual” in this sense, to show that rights are “intellectual” (in that the intellect is involved in acts of homesteading), and then they do the equivocation switcheroo and say “well then you are in favor of intellectual property” “and that includes patent and copyright”. Argument by equivocation.
Mossoff also trots out the old argument that the reason for American success since its founding is that it had patent and copyright. He gives an example of how the Supreme Court (in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, IIRC) opened the door for certain gene patents in the 1980s, leading to our dominance in biotech, unlike the Europeans whose courts or IP standards were “behind” ours at the time. Correlation v. causation, anyone? We’ve also had significant taxation, racism, and regular wars since our founding. Maybe that’s why we are so great!
Mossoff says that libertarians who oppose IP (he mentions Misesisans like me and Catoites like Tom Palmer by name) are “Benthamite” utilitarians, because we understand scarcity is an important aspect of property. This is completely confused. This is a commonplace observation: It was recognized by Hume (1751),8 Benjamin Tucker (1890s),9 Arnold Plant (1934),10 Rothbard,11 and Hoppe.12 In fact, the arguments given by Randians for having an arbitrary, finite term for IP (say, approx. 17 years for patent, about 100 years for copyright) is what is completely ad hoc, unprincipled, reverse engineered, and utilitarian.
IP libertarians rarely seem to understand the horrible, unlibertarian implications of their views. Case in point, Mossoff recently appeared on an IP panel at the recent APEE annual meeting, along with several anti-IP libertarians, including Sheldon Richman (I believe Roderick Long was present too but I am not sure if he was on that panel).13 The panel also had Ed Lopez who offered efficiency arguments against IP but was not much part of the debate. Richman related to me that at one point, Roy Cordato asked Mossoff if IP would protect a Kirznerian entrepreneur who has a novel insight about the gap between the cost of inputs and the price of an output. At first Mossoff said he didn’t know what a Kirznerian entrepreneur was (Cordato explained), then he didn’t get the point (thinking Cordato meant the actual product rather than the idea about the gap between costs and price), then ended up saying that the idea would be patentable–which means the law would stop market equilibration, since others could not jump in and imitate the entrepreneur.
This is not surprising, given that the very purpose of IP is to reduce what Rand mockingly referred to in Atlas Shrugged as “cut-throat” competition. Consider these quotes, by advocates of IP:
The “patent bargain” is an easily understood concept. Awarding an inventor twenty years exclusivity naturally entails considerable social cost — a cost that rises in direct proportion to the value of the covered invention. In certain instances — those where the patented technology is so useful that no substitutes exist — the award of a patent creates a complete economic monopoly. [Alan Devlin]
Governments adopt intellectual property laws in the belief that a privileged, monopolistic domain operating on the margins of the free-market economy promotes long-term cultural and technological progress better than a regime of unbridled competition. [Jerome H. Reichman]
A patent is a pretty significant monopoly, so we want to make sure we are giving it to the right people. [Beth Noveck]
This is what some libertarians are for. This is what Objectivists are in favor of. Can you believe it?
Of course, if you take IP seriously (like Tom Paine “Liberty” nickle-dropper, name-changing, scientistic quasi-cultist Galambos did), other absurdities are possible (see An Objectivist IP Argument for Taxation; Sheldon Richman, Question for Randian IP Advocates). If we really enforced IP, all human life would die out.
It’s mind-boggling that some libertarians have been led down this rabbit-trail–but it’s time for it to end. Fess up, jettison your errors, and move on.
Down with IP!
[Mises]
- See Objectivists Hsieh and Perkins on IP and Pirating Music; Objectivist Greg Perkins on Intellectual Property; Perkins on Pursuing Insufficiently Abundant Intangible “Values”; Objectivist Law Prof Mossoff on Copyright; or, the Misuse of Labor, Value, and Creation Metaphors; Kinsella v. Schulman on Logorights and IP; Objectivists: “All Property is Intellectual Property”; Pledge for a Webcast on Intellectual Property by Adam Mossoff; Hsieh and Mossoff on IP and Sewing Machines. [↩]
- See Rand on IP, Owning “Values”, and “Rearrangement Rights”. [↩]
- Inventors are Like Unto …GODS…. [↩]
- See, e.g., Pledge for a Webcast on Intellectual Property by Adam Mossoff; and his paper Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent ‘Privilege’ in Historical Context. [↩]
- Locke on IP; Mises, Rothbard, and Rand on Creation, Production, and “Rearranging”. [↩]
- Owning Thoughts and Labor [Rothbard and Hoppe on 1988 Panel], Mises Blog (Dec. 11, 2006); Objectivist Law Prof Mossoff on Copyright; or, the Misuse of Labor, Value, and Creation Metaphors; also Locke, Smith, Marx and the Labor Theory of Value. [↩]
- Hume on Intellectual Property and the Problematic “Labor” Metaphor. [↩]
- Hume on Intellectual Property and the Problematic “Labor” Metaphor [↩]
- McElroy’s “Contra Copyright, Again” [↩]
- “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” 35–36 [↩]
- Justice and Property Rights: Rothbard on Scarcity, Property, Contracts… [↩]
- See A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p.158 n120; also Tucker & Kinsella, Goods, Scarce and Nonscarce. [↩]
- I mention this in Cordato and Kirzner on Intellectual Property. [↩]
{ 50 comments… read them below or add one }
Most arguments against liberty are confused and incoherent. Arguments for IP are no exception.
Testing comments
That was pretty short and to the point.
One should ask IP proponents why the duration of a state-granted monopoly should not be set arbitrarily to let’s say 2 years non-renewable [copyright and patents]. That would “incentivize” IP holders to work on their time-to-market something fierce and flush out patent trolls.
Stephan Kinsella,
I’m glad you pointed us all to this speech, although I am grateful I don’t have to depend upon you for my understanding of it.
In your very first objection, you misstate his reference to Locke. What he said is that Locke was wrong to conclude that rights to IP were justified by a labor theory. Instead he refers to AR’s principle that it is the intellect that is the origin of all values.
I believe the quote was as follows:
leading to the famous Rand premise that “All property is fundamentally intellectual property.”
If you missed the first issue, I can’t have much confidence that you’ve translated the remainder any more accurately.
But what I found especially interesting is his knowledge of your arguments, and that the scarcity argument for property rights originated with Jeremy Benthem’s arguments for utilitarianism.
And to think that your scarcity argument is found at the root of both Bentham and Marx.
Enlightening!
Wildberry:
I misstated nothing. I said “Mossoff says (or implies; I can’t recall) that Locke believed IP was a natural right.”
In the Youtube version, Part 3 of 8, at about 3:20-3:44, Mossoff says Locke recognized IP as property, and strongly implies that Locke viewed this as a natural right (the preceding few seconds is about Locke’s view of the natural right to property)–this is exactly what I said in my main post. And, as I said in the main post, this contention is false, as shown by Ronan Deazley and Tom Bell.
As for your comment, ” What he said is that Locke was wrong to conclude that rights to IP were justified by a labor theory. Instead he refers to AR’s principle that it is the intellect that is the origin of all values.”
Yes, in my main post above, I explicitly said:
Apparently you did not even read my post or listen to Mossoff’s lecture.
The recognition that property arises because of scarcity is not utilitarian or Benthamite–or Marxian. Rather, the Randian argument itself is closer to utilitarianism (witness the tortured argument for why a finite term is justified) and even somewhat Marxian (in its reliance on a labor theory of creation if not a labor theory of value).
The principled libertarian rejection of IP is completely unlibertarian and does not rely on labor-ownership as a basis of the homesteading principle.
Once again, Wildberry, your arguments completely fall apart.
@Stephan Kinsella April 20, 2011 at 3:52 pm
Yes, you are right. I missed that the first time around. He said “Locke recognized IP as property”.
I don’t want to get into a food fight with you about what Locke said or didn’t say about the relationship between IP and property. It is sufficient apparently, to acknowledge that you and Mossoff agree that a (physical) labor theory of property is not sufficient to support the fundamental principle that IP is in fact a natural property right.
Yes, I did both. I was focusing on the main thrust of his lecture, that the treatment of IP from the founding and then through later court cases, and including contemporary libertarian objections to IP (in which context he mentions you by name) were/are plagued by a misunderstanding, according to Mossoff, about the nature of man and the fundamental nature of intellectual labor and values.
I find this entire subject of natural rights moot. You have agreed that an author owns his original manuscript. How one arrives at that conclusion apparently involves more than one path of reasoning. Personally, I arrive there through the principles of self-ownership and the private means of production. I fail to see why this needs to be continually debated, as if it is critical to establish who has the better reasons to justify a common holding.
I am simply saying that I find it interesting that your theory of property, which rests on the concept of scarcity, is also at the foundation of Bentham’s utilitarianism, which is a foundation for Marxism. All three views proceed from a premise that presupposes scarcity as the initial condition, which you may rightly deny exists in the case of “ideas”, but which you then falsely equate with IP.
Not surprisingly, your conclusion that an author may only choose to keep his work secret or give it away (after the first sale, perhaps), is an outcome that is remarkably similar to that of the “greatest good for the greatest number” line of reasoning. In your view, the greatest good (of individual liberty) is served by the gratuitous disclosure by the author, since you seem unwilling to justify any reason to secure his rights beyond non-disclosure.
The right only to withhold the very thing that has been produced for the purpose of disclosure, leaves authors with little else than the more “communal” motivations; doing it for the good of the community rather than the profit-for-private-production reasons common to the non-socialist views of the importance of private property.
I see a similarity between this view and Marxism. The irony, as Mossoff points out, is that this position is being taken by the likes of you in the name of supposed private property rights of libertarianism. Apparently I am not alone in seeing a contradiction here.
I’m having a little trouble following your construction here, but I gather you are saying that the rejection of IP ownership rights based on labor-ownership is libertarian because of the homesteading principle?
If homesteading is the only way you allow property rights to be secured, then who homesteads the original manuscript?
If that property is homesteaded by the author, then doesn’t he have a property right in it?
If he has a property right in it, then isn’t he entitled, under libertarian property theory, to make separate transfers of the various economic rights that ownership implies?
If this can be done by contract, what is the reason that you deny that it can be done by operation of law? Aren’t we dealing with a same set of rights here?
If IP is not “real” property, how is it that you can agree that IP rights can be created by contract? Doesn’t a contract presuppose ownership, and doesn’t ownership presuppose property rights?
Your reliance on contracts as an “out” for your contradictions in the treatment of property rights simply ignores the externality issues raised by Mises and elaborated by Coase.
Have you ever addressed this issue? I admit I may have missed it in your extensive writings.
Again, I appreciate you pointing to this resource. I found it interesting and useful.
Yes, I know I am right. You are mistaken, and confused, as usual.
hahah, NOW you don’t.
what is the difference between physical and mental labor? this is all a smokescreen. you are all very confused.
not good enough, apparently.
complete nonsense. you are saying nothing.
who cares?
It is not. You are distorting, daft, or cannot read.
Stephan,
Mental labour contains mentallium particles and these cause the creators to go mental when someone copies their work.
@Stephan Kinsella April 20, 2011 at 7:33 pm
Very responsive, as usual.
He will run again and… write another one on the horrors of IP.
? run? me? I answered him in detail. He is the one running.
As I was saying…
If homesteading is the only way you allow property rights to be secured, then who homesteads the original manuscript?
If that property is homesteaded by the author, then doesn’t he have a property right in it?
If he has a property right in it, then isn’t he entitled, under libertarian property theory, to make separate transfers of the various economic rights that ownership implies?
If this can be done by contract, what is the reason that you deny that it can be done by operation of law? Aren’t we dealing with a same set of rights here?
If IP is not “real” property, how is it that you can agree that IP rights can be created by contract? Doesn’t a contract presuppose ownership, and doesn’t ownership presuppose property rights?
Your reliance on contracts as an “out” for your contradictions in the treatment of property rights simply ignores the externality issues raised by Mises and elaborated by Coase.
Have you ever addressed this issue? I admit I may have missed it in your extensive writings.
Wildberry,
The ownership of manuscript follows from the ownership of the paper and ink, rather than from the act of writing the novel or copying it. Therefore, in the typical case (using their own paper and ink and absent a contractual relationship), the author owns the original manuscript and the copier owns the copy.
The rest of your post is a confused amalgamation of ad hoc claims that have no relation to arguments your opponents on this site are making.
I find it hypocritical of you (if you’re the same Andras I debated in the past) to mention running away. I have yet to find an IP proponent, including you, that does not run away from a debate and/or provides a coherent explanation of their position.
As Stephan accurately observes in AIM, there are two main approaches in pro-IP arguments. The first one is based on natural rights, however the way IP proponents present it, it’s always self contradictory. The other ones, to which you appear to belong, claim that IP has beneficial effects (i.e. utilitarian approach). The problem with these claims is they are never accompanied by a definition of IP or a method of evaluating the said benefits, or they outright ignore that IP also has some detrimental effects.
Referring to this, I also find it hypocritical when you on one hand present some beneficial situation as an argument for IP, yet when Stephan or Jeffrey present another detrimental situation, you dismiss it by a sleight of a hand. You can’t even show a consistent methodology, yet alone arguments.
All in all, it’s just a big bluff. How a scientist subscribe to this I am at a loss. If you’re so convinced that you’re right, then provide scientific support for your position.
@Peter Surda April 22, 2011 at 11:26 am
Regardless of HOW you justify ownership, the manuscript is owned by the author.
Therefore, the exact same conditions of copyrights can be created by contract between the parties to the contract. You could specify the meaning of “copying”, you could circumscribe the production of derivative works, and you could define a fair use doctrine.
In other words, in such a contract the owner can transfer any combinations of rights bundled in his ownership rights of the manuscript, and limit use in any way that is agreed to by both parties. The author could accomplish this by simply copying and pasting the text of the statutes into the contract and getting the acquiring party to sign, isn’t that correct? All of this could be made a condition of disclosure, if the other party agreed, right?
It would only be binding on the parties to the contract, yes, but it would be binding against breach of the conditions by the parties. Do you disagree?
If you don’t understand any other part of my post, you can limit yourself to this part.
Wildberry,
There is no therefore. You can put any condition whatsoever into a contract. It does not require ownership. Other than that, it is correct, you can replicate the behaviour of IP in a contract, for the parties to the contract.
Again, this is all correct.
To call this “transfer” is misleading, because the ability to put conditions into a contract does not require ownership of anything.
So, we have now concluded that IP is not a contract (a contract can mimick IP, but that does not follow from the ownership of media apart from the human bodies themselves). Next, we need to show that IP is not trespass either.
While it is true that some types of copying require the copier to physically alter the source (and therefore, if the owner of the source disagrees, constitute trespass), it is also possible to copy something without altering it, for example, by passively intercepting radiation or waves reflected by the object (otherwise known as hearing and seeing), or by using a copy, rather than the original, as a source (for example, if a burglar manages to break into Schulman’s house and read his novel and then recite it to me afterwards). Copies created this way, and also copies made out of these, are not trespassory and their use, including for the manufacture of other copies, do not violate the author’s property rights.
In order for IP to make sense, you would need to redefine trespass as some sort of causal relationship that does not require physical interaction. Which, when phrased this way, many IP proponents find absurd (Stranger, for example, calls it “nonsense”, yet he does not recognise that by saying that he’s refuting himself). Of course, it still does not fix the problem of self-contradiction, so a lot of other IP proponents’ arguments are still off the table.
@Peter Surda April 23, 2011 at 5:39 am
You say two interesting and comprehensible things:
And:
A contract is a mutual agreement to perform some act (or refrain from acting) for consideration.
On the facts we are discussing, the agreement is for author A to transfer or convey the manuscript (or a copy of it) for consideration by B, and B in exchange agrees to make some payment, and refrain from doing prohibited acts as specified in the contract.
Both parties are bound to perform according to the agreement, which may include some specified consequences for breach.
A contract presupposes the ownership of those things that are the subject of the contract, in this case, a manuscript (or copy) and money.
Please kindly explain how the subject of the contract between A and B can be for something that is not owned by either A or B.
Wildberry,
You are mixing together two separate arrangements (or contracts). The first one is the transfer of the manuscript or copy for remuneration. This can only be done by someone who posesses the said manuscript (or copy), and is only legal if he is the owner of the said object.
The second one is an arrangement to refrain from a certain action (copying the manuscript/copy). There is no requirement for possession or ownership of the manuscript (or copy) to enter into such contract. Anyone can do it, IP or no IP. Let us take as an example Alongside Night by Schulman. Although I don’t have a copy, nor have I read it or know what it is about, I can still enter into a contract with you, and we can agree that if you copy it without my permission, you owe me a dollar. This contract is possible and valid regardless of IP.
This already refutes your argument that such contracts are a transfer of economic rights, or have to do with rights in the manuscript/copy at all. But I’ll go even further and I’ll demonstrate that there does not even have to be a causal relationship between the manuscript/copy and the contract. For the contract described above to be valid, none of the following are necessary:
– Schulman having written Alongside Night
– Schulman claiming to have written Alongside Night
– anyone having written Alongside Night
– me thinking that someone wrote Alongside Night
– me thinking that it’s possible that someone wrote Alongside Night.
Let’s take a book called “Across Day” by Schulman. I may quite well know that there is no such book, yet it is still perfectly valid for me to enter into a contract where you promise to refrain from copying it. As for a sensibility of such a contract, obviously from the very narrow point of view, it’s a really stupid one (for me). However, I might have motives other than the contract itself. For example, I might laugh at confusing people, or find it strategically advantageous for them to think I’m stupid. Or I just might be a speculator and think that if enough people know about me making such contract(s), they will alter their behaviour and cause a change of market prices of some goods which I bought options for prior to the contract.
It might sound far fetched, but I am performing a reductio ad absurdum. It utterly demolishes your arguments and your “economic rights” nonsense. As a sidenote, it also demolishes Schulman’s “logorights”, because I clearly showed that a thing that, according to his own theory, does not exist, has a logos nevertheless.
Surda is just amazing here. Fantastic application of Rothbardian contract ideas to this issue.
Thanks Stephan, this would not be possible without a fantastic teacher, the works published by the Mises Institute, and last but not least, my opponents, however confused they may be.
@Peter Surda April 24, 2011 at 6:58 am
With such high praise from the master, I feel I should be intimidated by your lengthy post before I read it. Let me humbly forge ahead…
Well, a single contract can say more than one thing, right? So you agree on the first point, that transfer of the manuscript for money presupposes ownership of those two things. Good.
Of course not, but, because A already owns the manuscript, he can place any conditions he wishes on B for A’s promise to disclose it to B for the money B pays, assuming B agrees.
And because B owns his body and free will, he can make a promise to do, or refrain from doing as he chooses. If he did not own himself, he could not make such a promise.
So far, everyone owns what they are trading. I guess I could stop here, but let’s see what else you are offering…
My argument is that contracts presuppose ownership. Have you refuted that?
When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. What you say here is irrelevant. See above.
As usual, it is difficult to understand what you are arguing against here.
As Kinsella himself points out, the sale of mere hope is valid as the subject of a contract, provided the object of that hope comes into existence.
You can only make such a contract with someone who owns the ability to bring it about. So, to use his example, I can buy whatever catch you obtain when you haul your net. I can only make such a contract with someone who owns the means to deliver that catch.
So as I have said, which stands untouched by your creative writing, a contract presupposes ownership.
As a side note, nonsense built upon nonsense is still nonsense.
“Wildberry”:
Except you are equivocating on what “the manuscript” means. we woudl mean by it a scarce object impatterned a certain way. You are referring to a bundle of things, one of which is “the pattern.”
You don’t own free will. What does this even mean?
This is confused. This is not what contracts are about. You can “trade” things but the things traded include conditional transfers of title to owned things; but the conditions that trigger these transfers are not owned.
of the thing title to which is transferred. If I give you $100 of my future money IF it rains, then neither of us owns the rain, the condition, but yes, I have to own the $100 to transfer it to you.
that is not what I say at all. The sale is valid, whether the object comes into existence or not. If we contract now regarding a future event we both realize its existence is inherently uncertain.
Wildberry,
A single sheet of paper, and a single “yes” can create more than one contract. However, from the point of view of legal analysis, it is crucial to comprehend what exactly the contracts are.
There is no “because”. Please stop making stuff up. The latter is not a consequence of the former, and sometimes there is not even a causal relationship of any kind between them. That was the whole point of my argument and it looks like you either missed it or are ignoring int. Confront it.
Yes, this is correct. But the condition of non-copying does not require that either A or B possess or own the manuscript, so you cannot use the words “because”, “therefore” and “transfer” when referring to them. Confront it.
So far, you have committed a non-sequitur and ignore the whole point of my argument.
No. Your argument is that if you put a noun into a contract, it requires that one of the parties own whatever the noun is referring to. It’s a rhetorical trick.
Yes, I did. I showed that there is no need to own whatever arbitrary nouns in contract refer to, or even for the referred object to exist.
It is irrelevant in the narrower sense, in that your argument is already refuted. But in the broader sense, it explains a more fundamental error you’re making. You’re putting together two unrelated things.
@Stephan Kinsella April 24, 2011 at 3:01 pm
Hello Mr. Kinsella. Happy Easter.
Well, I don’t see that I am. I am calling it a manuscript, and it is what it is. If I own it and you want me to disclose it, then I believe I have the right to offer that disclosure under the terms I want and to which you agree. What else is needed?
I thought one of the key holdings of the Rothbard Title Transfer Theory was that human will is inalienable.
For example see here: http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/nineteen.asp
Let us take a seemingly more difficult case. Suppose that a celebrated movie actor agrees to appear at a certain theater at a certain date. For whatever reason, he fails to appear. Should he be forced to appear at that or at some future date? Certainly not, for that would be compulsory slavery. Should he be forced, at least, to recompense the theater owners for the publicity and other expenses incurred by the theater owners in anticipation of his appearance? No again, for his agreement was a mere promise concerning his inalienable will, which he has the right to change at any time. Put another way, since the movie actor has not yet received any of the theater owners’ property, he has committed no theft against the owners (or against anyone else), and therefore he cannot be forced to pay damages. The fact that the theater owners may have made considerable plans and investments on the expectation that the actor would keep the agreement may be unfortunate for the owners, but that is their proper risk. The theater owners should not expect the actor to be forced to pay for their lack of foresight and poor entrepreneurship. The owners pay the penalty for placing too much confidence in the actor. It may be considered more moral to keep promises than to break them, but any coercive enforcement of such a moral code, since it goes beyond the prohibition of theft or assault, is itself an invasion of the property rights of the movie actor and therefore impermissible in the libertarian society.
I presumed you knew what he was talking about. Would you like to explain?
I am not arguing that the conditions are owned. That is completely irrelevant. What I am saying is that the subject matter of contracts presupposes the ownership of that subject matter.
In the facts we are discussing a manuscript (or copy) is exchanged for money, under certain conditions of use. Under those conditions, a given price is offered. Under different conditions, the price would be calculated differently.
In any case, no contract can be formed between parties who do not own or control the subject matter of the contract. Do you have an objection to that representation?
We agree then, the subject matter of the contract, $100 must be owned before it can be transferred under contract. However, you raise the example of a wagering contract, which is beyond the scope of our discussion.
In a typical contract, both parties offer a promise for a promise, with sufficient consideration. In a contract for the exchange of goods, the goods themselves are the basis for the bargain. This exchange may be conditioned in any way that is legal (i.e. non-voidable) and mutually agreeable. Do you disagree?
Not at all? A contract where the subject does not come into existence, or where the means of doing so are illegal, or where it is a violation of public policy, i.e. a wagering contract, is a hair-splitting issue that is not relevant to this discussion. Wagering contracts generally are voidable. They are distinguished from the “sale of hope” example, where one of the parties has the ability to bring the subject matter of the contract into existence; i.e. the fisherman will haul the net and transfer what it contains, which may be nothing.
In the case we are discussing here, both the manuscript and the consideration paid for it exist. Neither can be the subject of the contact for exchange, with or without conditions, unless they are owned or controlled by the principals. Do you disagree?
Wildberry:
What is “a manuscript” exactly? Esp. nowadays. Is it a “file” transmitted over the Internet?
That does not mean you “own” free will. Free will is a capacity. Do you own capacities? For example, you have the capacity to lift weights, and to remember. Do you own “memory” and “weight-lifting”? Rothbard never said such a silly thing.
Depends on what his contract was. If he agreed to pay damages in the event he did not perform, ten he has indeed alienated title to some of his money.
No. Paying damages has nothing to do with whether he has committed theft or received any property. It is whether or not he contractually transferred some of HIS money based on some condition.
Unless they made sure that the actor agreed to pay damages in the event he did not show up. Which would be a standard provision of such agreements, and understood, implicit.
Again, you misapprehend the nature of contracts and Rothbard’s title transfer theory.
The “subject matter” (in idiosyncratic your sense) is always whatever alienable property is conditionally transferred.
You have yet to define what a “manuscript” is, but fine.
Your question is incoherent.
@Stephan Kinsella April 25, 2011 at 12:49 am
Do you really take issue here? The manuscript in question is an original work of authorship that the author produced with his own private means, and which has not been shared with anyone. For simplicity, let’s assume it is written on paper with ink. That is the point of departure.
You have said that you do not object to the assertion that this work (manuscript) is the property of the author, and as such, he has the right to1)keep it secret, or 2) disclose it, in which case the author no longer has rights to it any more than the recipient. To use your words, the author cannot whine about others using the information. Isn’t this your position?
No I don’t own “capacity” in general, i.e. “all capacity”, but I do own my own particular capacities because they are derived from my ownership of self. In the absence of slavery or the rights of others, I have free will to act as I please, subject only to the laws of nature, and can therefore exchange my promise to act for valuable consideration.
Yes, he has alienated his money, but not his will. He can promise a future act, but not his will to act. Will is inalienable.
Put another way, since the movie actor has not yet received any of the theater owners’ property, he has committed no theft against the owners (or against anyone else), and therefore he cannot be forced to pay damages.
Paying damages has to do with whether he has breached a valid contract. Rothbard and you take a different tack on this than I and standard contract theories do. I would say that a valid contract is enforceable according to the relevant theories of remedies. Of course, consideration is a requirement for a valid contract, as is legality, so in some ways I suppose both approaches can reach the same outcome, since a promise without consideration is unenforceable.
The fact that the theater owners may have made considerable plans and investments on the expectation that the actor would keep the agreement may be unfortunate for the owners, but that is their proper risk.
Interestingly, given there is no police or courts in the ancap world you envision, you are left with self-help remedies in the event the actor promises and doesn’t deliver either his services or the damages. The personal costs of enforcement would be considered transactions costs, do you agree?
The theater owners should not expect the actor to be forced to pay for their lack of foresight and poor entrepreneurship. The owners pay the penalty for placing too much confidence in the actor. It may be considered more moral to keep promises than to break them, but any coercive enforcement of such a moral code, since it goes beyond the prohibition of theft or assault, is itself an invasion of the property rights of the movie actor and therefore impermissible in the libertarian society.
You do realize you are debating Rothbard here, right? I copied him verbatim and gave you the link. Hmmm. He misapprehends his own theory of contracts?
We agree then. In this case the subject matter is a manuscript and money in exchange, under limitations of use that replicate the rules of copyright. Good.
See above, OK?
Allow me to attempt to facilitate your comprehension.
First, we are not talking about non-existent things, so we can dispense with any further discussions of that issue, correct?
Second, I am saying that a contract presupposes the ownership of the subject matter.
The subject matter of the contract under discussion is a manuscript and money.
Here, the author owns the manuscript (undisclosed original work of authorship).
The buyer owns the money (which he has agreed to pay and the author has agreed to accept).
They both agree on specific conditions of use of the manuscript.
They reduce this agreement to a written document and both sign it.
The author performs by tendering the manuscript.
The buyer performs by tendering the money and abiding by the terms of use.
Failure to abide by the terms of use is a breach of the agreement, and results in damages liability against the buyer and in favor of the author.
Such breaches of the terms of use may be specified as conditions subsequent, triggering specified damages, or the payment of a performance bond, etc. that have been made part of the contract.
That’s the way it works, do you agree? Do you have any issues with the operation of such a contract?
Nymberry:
Just making sure. You guys is slippery.
Untrue. It’s just not alienable by mouthing of words (making a contract). It is alienable by commiting acts of aggression. this is just why it’s permissible to jail a bad guy.
Wrong. Technically speaking it’s not possible to “breach” a contract. This is the mentality of the enforceable-promises view of things. Think of the “damages” as a performance bond. Read up on “efficient breach” theory of contract.
Yes, and Evers. Read Evers and Rothbard. I elaborate on this too.
nonsense.
nonsense. this is stupid statism.
this is not true, but what has this to do with anything?
Nonsense. Try to ask a coherent question. Then you will see.
If you mean by “manuscript” a scarce owned object.
NOt really limitations. Just triggers for the transfer of money payments.
“the” subject matter? sounding crankish already.
Not really. They agree that IF X uses it it in certain ways THEN he transfers $Y to the other guy.
Of course, why the hell would I buy a $15 book if it might subject me to millions of dollars in penalties? No thank you. Such onerous penalties would doom these sales. So of course full-use books would emerge, just as even iTunes had to change to DRM free.
not a breach, just a contemplated action that results in a payment of money damages.
not sure what you mena. it’s not up to me. but the point is this can’t bind third parties.
Liberty (‘will’, whatever) is an inalienable right – full stop. Let alone contract, it isn’t even alienable due to violence. Even in prison, inmates still possess their right to liberty. Remember that by definition, liberty is freedom delimited by the rights of others, e.g. to life. Prison is a contraction of an individual’s freedom until such time as they are rehabilitated and their threat to others’ lives (and privacy, etc.) returns to normal.
@Stephan Kinsella April 25, 2011 at 2:35 pm
Well, it appears to me that you have finally come kicking and screaming to the point where you and I agree on the following:
1. Whether under existing contract theory, or Rothbard’s TTTC, a contract may be formed between an author and a buyer that incorporates the terms of usage that is the equivalent to copyright terms.
2. Such a contract presupposes the ownership of the subject matter of the contract; an exchange for the manuscript for money.
3. Regardless of whether you apply contracts, torts or TTTC theories, if the condition subsequent occurs (prohibited use), money would flow from the buyer to the author; damages or the payment of a performance bond.
4. It does not bind third parties to those terms.
5. Sales of books as we understand it will likely cease because sales under these conditions are doomed.
Let’s be clear on this last point. Regardless of the “technical solution” employed to compensate the author for the breach (or read “failure to act in the proscribed way” if you prefer) the amount of that payment will be calculated on some basis, and by your estimate would amount to “millions”. Let’s assume that figure.
This payment is an externality that will have to be accounted for in the cost of the book. For example, the price of the book to the buyer would be $15 plus the cost of the performance bond. Because it is a form of insurance, it will be priced as a function of the liability times the actuarial probability that payment will be made. This will likely settle at something close to the liability itself, and so, as you say, sales will be doomed.
And so, as you say:
So a long time ago, I said that in the absence of copyright protection, authors would be producing for an external market, and given the choice they would not do it.
Let’s revisit the options you introduced earlier. 1) keep it secret and deny public access 2) disclose it and grant public access.
Both options are subject to the economic problem of externalities, where the cost of production, including these external costs, will be borne by the producer or the consumer, or both. You seem to argue that it is viable for them to be solely the cost to the producer.
I think we have shown that option 1) is nearly impossible unless disclosure is never made. Even if a contracting system could result in maintaining controlled access (secrecy), the transaction cost would be so high that a single buyer and seller are unlikely to reach an accord.
Even if they did, the entire process would have to be repeated for a second buyer and each one that follows. Each would have their own performance bond which for each the cost would approach the potential liability. Books now cost millions instead of $15.
This leave option 2. The author doesn’t care about profit, and abandons his desire to recover costs (capital investment) plus profit, and releases it freely (i.e. ideas are free). He is producing for an external economy, and according to the rule of bankruptcy, leaves the market. Producers do not voluntarily choose to be slaves to external economies.
Under 1) books are produced but not sold, or under 2) books are free, and eventually are not produced.
This brings us to this final comment:
Although I agree that the industry in both music and book sales is evolving and adapting to the impacts of new technology, this in no way disturbs the fundamental premise that the musical artists own the products of their own production. This iTunes/DRM story is more about the effectiveness of one strategy over another than about the legitimacy of copyrights. That question is not touched by this story.
In the absence of any copyrights, iTunes is still left only with the problem of how to profit from a song that sells for 99¢. They are not dealing with the problem of the production of songs for external economies. If that 99¢ didn’t find its way in some proportion back upstream to the original producers, then it is unlikely that production based on a profit motive would exist.
You would not insist that a manufacturer of bread would still produce if his loaves were available for free, yet you have no problem reaching this conclusion in regard to IP. How do you explain the difference, in economic terms?
So after all is said and done, I have asked you this question many times now; How do you account for the need for producers to produce for external economies in a non-IP market?
To assert that these externalities will be internalized through entrepreneurial activity does not appear to have a pathway in your vision of a market without IP.
This amounts to an assertion that a free market can develop without a concept of private property. Have you ever addressed this issue in your writing? I have not seen it.
Wildberry, you seem to imagine that without copyright, author and readers will stare blankly at each other refusing to do business. Given author can produce writing readers want, and readers can supply money author wants, to conclude that these two parties will refuse to make an agreeable exchange is a grievous failure of imagination (no doubt due to copyright brainwashing).
Try to imagine the possibility of multiple simultaneous contracts. Each reader offers $10. The author offers a sequel. How many readers’ offers would the author consider equitable? 1,000? Whatever the number of readers, the quality/quantity of writing, the money offered/invited, exchanges remain possible. You do not have to cleave to the 18th century model of printing copies and selling copies. It is possible to exchange writing for money DIRECTLY.
@Crosbie Fitch April 25, 2011 at 7:06 pm
Let me just address the most grievous of your assumptions. We can talk about my brain washing another time.
What you suggest is not difficult to imagine. Now try to apply this fantasy, that everything just works out, to the realities of the market place.
You are a new author. No one has heard of you. You have written a highly technical work that has taken several years to complete. You know, under the non-IP rules, that once you disclose it, you have one shot to make back all that you will make on your investment. If it was so easy to get from there to where you imagine 1,000s of buyers willing to offer real money, sight unseen, for your book seems just a little bit unrealistic.
You can’t sell it to a publisher and let them take care of advertising and publicity, because they only have one shot too, since copyrights don’t exist in your fantasy.
So I suppose you can do what Kinsella and other’s imagine, you can give it away, and accept that this world you imagine, authors must resign themselves to work for external economies. And from there, all you have to do is imagine that this will have absolutely no effect on the decision to write the next book, or for some author somewhere realizing that, unlike other endeavors, in the case of writing, you don’t own what you make.
No rational person is going to spend their time producing for external economies. But of course it is easy to just imagine that not to be the case. It is possible for pigs to fly, but it must not be profitable, one assumes, since the market does not regularly produce flying pigs. Can you imagine a scenario where they are? Good for you.
It’s an iterative process, going from ‘undiscovered & unloved’ to ‘discovered & commissioned’. Initial portfolio works will be published (given away) as promotional loss leaders, and this then transitions, as the interested audience swells and its commission becomes significant, from loss to profit. Unless of course, no-one’s interested to incentivise further work from the artist.
Remember, there is no choice in this. The monopoly of copyright has ended. When you can no longer sell copies you must sell work instead – to those who want it produced. That is a free market.
You’ve already recognised that without copyright commerce in intellectual work is impossible via the intermediary mechanism of copies. That’s why I’m pointing out that the future involves exchanging the work – not copies of it.
@Crosbie Fitch April 26, 2011 at 11:22 am
What does this mean?
Wildberry,
The subject matter of the contract of sale of the manuscript is the manuscript and money. The subject matter of the contract of prohibition of copying of the manuscript is not the manuscript, but the potential copier. So stop confusing the issue.
Even if this was right (it isn’t), still the agreement not to copy a manuscript is not a use of that manuscript. Only in the metaphorical sense, which has no place in a scientific debate. Stop using confusing language and admit your error.
No, that’s not the way it works. I refuted it several times already.
To paraphrase a famous saying: an error repeated thousand times becomes a lie.
Crosbie,
Actually, it’s worse. According to Wildberry, author and readers would stare blankly at each other and look for excuses not to deal with each other. Because that is what Wildberry understands, that’s all he ever does: look for excuses.
@ Peter Surda April 27, 2011 at 5:19 am
On the subject of creating consusion, this is priceless. Who knows what you are trying to say?
Wildberry,
That was at least the second reformulation of my argument (i.e. I already made it three times at least in total). First you misrepresent it, then you ignore it and then complain that you don’t understand it. You’re a fraud, Fraudberry. Your pretense of knowledge follows a predictable path. Now that you’ve appealed to emotions, the only step left is to cowardly run away. You’ve exhausted your repertoire. But who knows, maybe you’ll learn some new tricks and humour us.
And now the fourth time: you are presenting two contracts as if it was one. There is no “restricted sale contract” or other made-up-adhocery. There are two contracts:
– the sale contract of the manuscript. Requires possession of the manuscript to be possible, and ownership to be legal. The manuscript is the subject of the contract.
– the contract to avoid copying of the manuscript. Does not require possession or ownership, and might not even require a causal relationship. The manuscript is not the subject of this contract.
So stop making up stuff.
Exactly. I have no idea how you (Stephan) have the patience to keep debating with Luddites.
It’s more along the lines of an entertainment factor.
I honestly can’t tell if Wildberry has ignored all of the material, and ignores all of the responses (I tried to debate with him last week, to no avail) or he is just out and out trolling.
The reason I wonder if he is trolling, is that someone with such a low capacity to comprehend surely must have to labor 12 hours per day to support a modest lifestyle, and wouldn’t have so much time to be the one man Stephan Kinsella fan club. Then again, he could be on welfare, and the joke is on all of us who pay taxes.
DF,
You made a suugestion which I asked you to explain. Did you?
Also I’d like to remind everybody that while it’s all fine and dandy to debate a theoretical framework for ethical IP under libertarian dogma, the negative effects of existing IP law are large and wide ranging.
Right now there are lawyers and groups suing successful capitalists for products that the plaintiffs had no hand in creating and had produce no competitive product. There are millionaires right now that did nothing but sue other people for being successful.
IP laws are a multi billion dollar drain on our economy. This is stifling competition and favoring companies who invest in lawyers and bureaucrats over ones that invest in engineers and products.
Laws related to maintaining copyright are becoming increasingly draconian and punitive. People are being sued tens of thousands of dollars for distributing songs which can be listened to for free on any radio or downloaded for pennies from websites legally. Individuals are being threatened, harassed. DRM laws have ruined companies, caused people to be sent to jail for sharing nothing but information, and are a affront to property rights and personal liberty.
In a world were we now have the ability to freely share all of human knowledge and the collected works of all humans from all of recorded history with all people alive today… for pennies per person… we have governments propping up fascist laws to protect the profitability of a handful of politically connected corporations running obsolete business models that originated when we required people to actually print and physically transport media.
They are the buggy whip manufacturers of our time and their profitability is now enforced by law. Houses are raiding, property is seized, old women and families are terrorized by lawyers and law enforcement for their children breaking laws that harmed no person. The government is engaging in secret international negotiations to force these evils on third world nations and undermine constitutional protections. Obama and friends are seeking ways of leveraging copyright enforcement schemes for wiretapping and monitoring of individuals.
Companies are no longer able to produce hardware and software products freely. They need to pay patent fees, support design decisions that undermine the quality of their products, increase prices, and are forced to undermine the ownership rights of their customers. Corporations are using patents as shields to stifle innovation and competition.
The loss of individual liberty and economic activity directly and indirectly to IP and IP enforcement is staggering. It’s large, it’s ongoing, and it is increasing.
Damn this is good, Nate-m. You and Surda are on FIE YA.
You are so right nate-m. Upon reading the Piracy book I reviewed a couple of days ago, I started thinking that maybe compulsory licensing would be a workable solution if abolition was not an option. This would eliminate large chunk of the negative effects of IP with a sweep. It solves the “problem” of “inventors” who can’t come up with a usable business strategy, it satisfies the utilitarians, and even Gene Quinn’s request for openness. The only ones who’d protests are patent trolls (who are not a liked by anyone anyway) and natural rightsers (who are just self-contradictory fanatics and I don’t think much can be done about that).
Up next: the producers of tortellini, pelmeni and wonton sue each other for patent violations.
Yep; I argue for a compulsory license here http://mises.org/daily/4018 —
Remove Patent Injunctions/Provide Compulsory Royalties
Paying royalties is one thing. This is similar to a tax. It impedes and puts a drag on efficiency. Worse still is the prospect of an injunction, which can simply shut a company down. Quite often this is what a competitor will seek. They do not want damages or money: they want to dominate the market and eliminate competition. Or the threat of injunction is used to basically wring money from an alleged infringer (e.g., the $600 million RIM (BlackBerry) had to pay, even though the patents were under appeal at the PTO, due to the threat of an injunction).
If the purpose of the patent system is to provide some incentive to innovators, then receiving a monetary payment should be sufficient. Patent injunctions should be abolished entirely. The only remedy should be an award of damages (for past infringement) or a compulsory license (ongoing royalties based on future “infringement”).
This would prevent patentees from shutting down competitors. At most, they could impose a small “tax.” Litigation costs, insurance premiums, and the ability of patentees to extract unreasonable royalties from alleged infringers would be radically curtailed. On the other hand, because patentees would still be able to seek reasonable royalties, there would still remain a substantial incentive to file for patents.
The compulsory licensing approach is not new. Some countries impose compulsory licensing on patentees who do not adequately “work” the patent.[33] The United States already provides for compulsory licensing in certain cases, as the US government threatened to do in the Cipro anthrax drug case.[34] Also, in the wake of the recent eBay case, some courts are awarding some form of ongoing royalty of compulsory license instead of an injunction.[35]
I suggest rather than a compulsory license/Internet levy from the people to reward all those corporations that so greedily exploited the people’s liberty for the last three centuries, that instead THEY are fined to compensate the people for the liberty and opportunities they’ve lost. Abolishing copyright and patent is the LEAST to be done. Why should the people pay AGAIN for the restoration of their liberty?
A compulsory license is a mulct – for liberty that is the people’s by nature, by right.
I’m disappointed any libertarian would suggest paying a ransom as a ‘solution’. In any case, as with a monopoly, it is still thermodynamically inefficient – collecting money from all in order to disburse to all (minus 50% admin, and 49% to legacy privilege holders). I suppose at least the injustice and corruption is a little more economically obvious.
Crosbie,
it’s a utilitarian argument. Like would you prefer living in US or North Korea.
@nate-m April 24, 2011 at 7:21 am
In light of your star pupil status, I can only sheepishly offer my humble response.
I am wondering how you think any of these millionaires found themselves in a position of being able to sue someone else for something? Doesn’t this presuppose they must have owned something in the first place? How can you sue someone if you have not right to do so in the first place? Aren’t you assuming quite a few conclusions here?
Although it is obviously true that there are costs associated with the enforcement of rights, I have no idea how you can conclude that these costs outweigh the benefits of having these rights. I don’t have the data to support that argument either way, therefore, how you can be so sure of your conclusions here? Do you have some data, or you just “know its true”?
Aren’t you discounting the capital investment that necessarily preceded their availability on these websites? If you included these costs in your estimates, wouldn’t the outcome you claim be effected? And more importantly, if you don’t, then aren’t you consuming in a market that is external to the original producer? How do you account for that, economically?
This may all be true, but it all begs the question as to whose rights are being violated.
All of this presupposes the existence of the information you want to possess, and says nothing about the process that necessarily preceded its existence. You are implying that all of the knowledge of the world, which you feel so freely entitled to, was simply laying around on the ground waiting for you to use it. While this may be true to some degree, it certainly is not entirely true. I don’t believe even Kinsella’s paper, Against IP was laying around before he capitalized its production.
Isn’t this true for all private production? Isn’t my profitability as a hotel owner enforced by the law of exclusive use and possession of private property? Are you proposing that all private property laws be abolished for the reasons you give here?
Old women and crippled children are being terrorized by lawyers! That is awful! There ought to be a law!
Injustice is injustice. I agree. Because something specifically is unjust does not mean that everything is therefore generally and absolutely unjust. When people act unjustly, they should be stopped. We need to distinguish when that is the case. Personal outrage and inflammatory rhetoric is not enough.
Yes, and people who merely want a little exercise are being excluded from other’s private property! This is insane!
I suppose it is redundant of me to suggest that the question-begging here is monumental. As you probably know, although it is an inconvenient truth in the context of IP debates, rights to act are limited by the rights of others, so all the hyperbole in support of unlimited rights for one person is simply offset by the loss of rights in another. Of course, it would be inconvenient to consider that issue. That is complicated. Ideology is simple.
FYI, it is an issue of the boundaries of rights and the existence of economic externalities. Unless you are willing to deal with that issue, all the horrors you can mention are simply one side of the same coin. Coins have two sides.
Crosbie I am simply suggesting getting rid of injunctions. Then only royalties would be left. This is an improvement
A slave might say that having liberty in exchange for diverting 99% of their future income to their master (a transferable title) was an improvement to captivity.
Beware of suggesting ‘improvements’ that the ©artels might just take you up on.