This is included as ch. 4 of Stephan Kinsella, ed., The Anti-IP Reader: Free Market Critiques of Intellectual Property (Papinian Press, 2023).
***
From the Mises blog. Archived comments below.
David Gordon has a great article up today on LewRockwell.com, Sam Konkin and Libertarian Theory, which devotes a good deal of space to discussing Konkin’s role in the anti-IP movement. David is absolutely correct here:
Konkin’s work on IP deserves at least equal recognition as his better-known defense of counter-economics and agorism; and, to the extent that anti-IP views come to prevail among libertarians, I predict that Sam Konkin will be a name we shall often hear.
It was great to see Konkin’s amazingly clear and perceptive thoughts on this issue, way back in 1986 before it seemed that relevant. I learned about Konkin’s views on IP a few months ago—from Lew Rockwell’s post Remembering Samuel Edward Konkin III, I think, where Lew wrote:
This weekend, … I was going over [Konkin’s] Wikipedia articles, and realized I had never read what turned out to be a pioneer article mentioned there, Copywrongs, which I published today on LRC. [Samuel Edward Konkin, III, “Copywrongs,” The Voluntaryist (July 1986), reprinted as “Copywrongs,” LewRockwell.com (Nov. 15, 2010)]
I noted this piece in my C4SIF blog post, Copywrongs. What’s ironic is that one of the strongest libertarian defenders of (a variation of) IP is J. Neil Schulman,1 who was a big fan of Konkin—he included an afterword to Schulman’s classic libertarian sci-fi novel Alongside Night. Schulman thinks it significant that the anti-IP Konkin “never successfully challenged” Schulman’s Rand-inspired, confused defense of IP, but this seems to me to be an odd negative appeal to authority.
Gordon is right to credit earlier libertarians such as Wendy McElroy, Murray Rothbard, and even Benjamin Tucker for their rejection of the basis of IP. I mention these, and other significant influence in my own thinking, including Tom Palmer, in notes 37-38 and accompanying text of my Against Intellectual Property (first published 2000). [Update: LeFevre was also good on this issue, as early as 1966: LeFevre on Intellectual Property and the “Ownership of Intangibles”.] I myself did not firmly come out against IP in print until about 1995 (Roderick Long, too, who is also great on IP2 —and, in fact, is debating Schulman on IP in New Hampshire at PorcFest 2011 June 20-26 2011). These and others are also linked on the C4SIF Resources page, including Rothbard’s key anti-IP contributions, Knowledge, True and False and Man, Economy, and State and Power and Market, Scholars Edition, pp. liv, 745-54, 1133-38, 1181-86.
Earlier libertarians, like Tucker, basically had the right approach (though Tucker was weak on land); but to have a sound, coherent approach to IP you must be informed by libertarian and really Austrian insights. (Spooner was out of his gourd on IP (I discuss him briefly in Against Intellectual Property, text at notes 32 and 48), as were Rand and Galambos; as was even Proudhon, who otherwise railed against “property” as “theft” [update: this may be incorrect, as noted now on the updated post linked above]). The austro-libertarian opposition to IP is already implied in Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe’s political and economic writings. It is implied in Mises’s recognition that ideas and recipes are infinitely replicable, and in his understanding of the role of ideas and knowledge in action: that it is a guide to action, but not a scarce means of action. It is of course also present in both Rothbard’s rejection of state patent and copryight, and Hoppe’s views of property rights and scarcity. The anti-IP aspects of their ideas lay somewhat dormant or unappreciated until the full brunt of the IP system started to be felt with force in the mid-90s as a result of the rise of digital copying and information, the Internet, file sharing, and so on. Tucker, Mises, Rothbard, Konkin, Palmer, McElroy, et al.—they are true anti-IP pioneers. We should all be grateful to them for their intellectual leadership, which helps to clarify our understanding of yet another facet of the criminal state.
[Update: for more on McElroy’s role in developing the anti-IP case, see my article “The Great IP Debate of 1983,” Mises Daily (July 18, 2011).]
Update: See Classical Liberals and Anarchists on Intellectual Property.
Brian Doherty, Intellectual Property: Dying Among Libertarians?
April 1, 2011 at 5:45 pm-
Wow, Copywrongs is a stellar article!
April 1, 2011 at 7:51 pm-
WOW!
What a fascinating article! 1986! Thank you for pointing to it!
Royalties are one side of the story. The other side is total suppression of information. If someone really had a true property right to every information he could demand that no information be exchanged anymore. After all property rights are exclusion rights.
This one is fantastic too:
- April 1, 2011 at 7:56 pm
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Corrected version:
WOW!
What a fascinating article! 1986! Thank you for pointing to it!
Is not a producer entitled to the fruit of his labor? Sure, that’s why writers are paid. But if I make a copy of a shoe or a table or a fireplace log (with my little copied axe) does the cobbler or wood worker or woodchopper collect a royalty?
A. J. Galambos, bless his anarchoheart, attempted to take copyrights and patents to their logical conclusion. Every time we break a stick, Ug The First should collect a royalty. Ideas are property, he says; madness and chaos result.
Royalties are one side of the story. The other side is total suppression of information. If someone really had a true property right to every information he could demand that no information be exchanged anymore. After all property rights are exclusion rights.
This one is fantastic too:
Photons leap from the pages to our eyes and our hapless brain processes the information. Utterly innocent, having committed no volitional act, we are copyright violators. We have unintentionally embarked on a life of piracy.
April 2, 2011 at 12:27 am-
Only the copying of IP to non-human media is problematic for some reason. I’ve asked a few about what they thought about hypothetical memory-recall devices and the implications such machines would have for copyright (since you could experience yourself watching a movie/listening to a song/etc. that you had formerly seen/heard but for which you did not purchase a licensed copy).
It seems to me obvious that if you want to have IP law, and it’s to apply to copying that it should apply to people’s brains too. So we obviously need to develop the ability to erase people’s memories so that we can correct for this very horrible infringement device.
April 2, 2011 at 4:33 am-
Reply to Samuel Edward Konkin III’s “Copywrongs”
- April 2, 2011 at 5:01 am
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Every time Stephan Kinsella writes that my defense of logorights is drawn from Rand and Galambos, he’s being deceptive. Yes, I base my logorights case on the Law of Identity. Rand didn’t invent that. But my theory of logorights derives from a general theory of property rights that SEK3 and I discussed extensively, but one which he died never having written about. Logorights is drawn from SEK3′s own theory that all property rights are an extension of one’s Egosphere.It’s probably the reason he never got around to writing an answer to my Copywrong rebuttal. I was using SEK3′s own theory. (Victor Koman and John Fast also recall conversations with SEK3 about his theory of the “Egosphere.”)
- April 2, 2011 at 5:09 am
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For those of you not on Facebook my reply to Samuel Edward Konkin III’s “Copywrongs” is the last part of The Libertarian Case for IP at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/
April 3, 2011 at 7:35 pm-
I don’t follow your argument. You say:
“So let’s look at the cases where you make copies of something I made and still keep my name on it. That is no longer plagiarism.
It’s now a different form of fraud, which in the art world is called ‘counterfeiting’ and in the world of other commercial products — such as designer clothing or luxury watches — is called ‘forgery’.”
This seems just a diversionary bait-and-switch, as is your mention of Sandra Bullock’s character in The Net being stripped of her property through an actual act of fraud. You just claim that copying is fraud by referencing “counterfeiting” and “forgery,” without arguing your way there. At best, it seems an attempt on your part to refer to existing positive law concerning these things as if it were natural law, and so it gives you an argument from authority – the authority of the state. The state created this system of privilege through legislation, so you can’t use a legal definition of counterfeiting and forgery to make your argument.
Forgery and counterfeit are words, however, that we would still use on a moral level to indicate fraud. This type of fraud is akin to plagiarism, as you mentioned. All these things are essentially misrepresentations. If someone claims that a knockoff of a Rolex is a Rolex, that is a fraudulent representation. That is entirely different from someone copying the design of a Rolex and making one just like it by themselves. A forgery in art is, likewise, a fraud perpetrated on the buyer. Some piece is represented as being created by a certain person when in fact it was not. Someone sells a print of a famous painting claiming it is the original, or a clever artist actually paints a representation of a famous rare work so as to pass it off as genuine.
Then you talk about how your identity is tied to your work, and commercial branding as a result. You mention how a famous person imparts value to something cheap by signing their name on it. But so what? You seem to miss the distinction that a copy of this thing or a book or a movie or a design is not any kind of fraud by misrepresentation merely because it is a copy. It only becomes fraud if you’re selling, say, baseballs “signed by Babe Ruth,” which he in fact did not sign. But if someone manufactures thousands of baseballs with merely a facsimile of his autograph on it, and it is not represented as an authentic autograph, then clearly there is no commercial fraud. Babe Ruth’s estate, for example, does not own the image of his autograph – at least that’s the default position from whence you must try to argue to your position that they do.
Your brand is a commercial phenomenon. Yes, people will buy Tiger Woods golf balls and Elizabeth Taylor perfume. Good for them. Obviously, people other than Tiger Woods and Elizabeth Taylor cannot legally or morally claim that they are selling those brands when they are not. But if they sell the same underlying product without the name (which is just window dressing anyway), there is no fraud if there is no misrepresentation. Heck, there would be no fraud if that stuff was sold as “the same golf balls that Tiger Woods sells” either, or “compare to Liz’s ‘Paradise Evening’.” That might stir up a hornet’s nest of salivating lawyers, but it wouldn’t necessarily be fraud on the consumer.
I only got as far as that on that linked page. I see no reason to read any further. Glancing at the rest, it seems like a lot of lawyering to me. IMHO, if some idea about property can’t pass a simple desert island test (meaning an imagined society starting fresh), then there is no substance to it. No IP regime is going to fly in the absence of this present immense institutional structure to enforce it and subsidize it through socializing its costs. Thus, IP arguments always seem to come off apologies for the status quo.
April 4, 2011 at 4:45 pm-
@Zorg April 3, 2011 at 7:35 pm
This seems just a diversionary bait-and-switch, as is your mention of Sandra Bullock’s character in The Net being stripped of her property through an actual act of fraud. You just claim that copying is fraud by referencing “counterfeiting” and “forgery,” without arguing your way there. At best, it seems an attempt on your part to refer to existing positive law concerning these things as if it were natural law, and so it gives you an argument from authority – the authority of the state. The state created this system of privilege through legislation, so you can’t use a legal definition of counterfeiting and forgery to make your argument.
According to both Rothbard and Hoppe, people are free to contract with others concerning only property they own. In addition, they both acknowledge that there is both property itself, and title to property. Finally, title to property or property itself cannot be claimed by another unless is it explicitly transferred by the owner, but each are independently alienable.
Also, most here, including Kinsella and other opponents of IP in the context of copyright, agree that an author has good and quiet title to his original manuscript. If we presume that title and the manuscript itself is comprised of both the tangible medium of fixation, (paper, ink) and the “intellectual content”, or the original work of authorship, then the owner would be capable of transferring only that title he wishes to transfer, and no transfer of title to the work can be implied simply because you have received an instantiation in tangible form (i.e. book) unless you have received title to that work by consent of the author.
Assuming the author transfers it to you under the presumption of copyrights (which is in fact the case in all such transfers at this moment), then the author is entitled to transfer subject to any limitations which are legal. If he transfers on the condition that title to the work is not transferred, to make a copy would be an assumption of title to property you do not hold.
What argument do you make that the “copier” has better title to the work than the oringal author, or alternatively, what severs the title that exited prior to transfer?
If you wish to presume the absence of IP, such that the transfer of the tangible copy is a complete and total transfer of all title to both the tangible medium and the intangible work, then you cannot also presume that the author would release it to you under the same conditions as under copyright. You would have to surmise how such an author would handle the problem of not wanting to be a producer for an external economy.
You may depend on contract theory. If so, then you must also presume that all such transfers would be only accomplished under contract. If only parties are subject to enforcement of contract, then the author must also consider this externality. Quite quickly, you arrive at a natural emergence of property rights. Coase was written the landmark paper on this problem of internalizing external costs and benefits.
If you argue that there cannot be property title to intangible goods, then how do you explain, say an easement? Is that not an intangible property right that limits private property rights (i.e. the right to exclude trespassers) in the donor land?
In other words, is the concept of property rights a human device, or do you think it is a “natural law” that lies beyond the limits of human experience? I’m sure you are aware that Mises wrote that there is no such thing as “natural law”, since nature is indifferent to the concerns of man. He called property a human device.
As an aside, fraud in my view is a completely separate issue. Fraud is an issue between a perpetrator and a victim. In the case of copyrights and trademarks (and patents), there is a third-party claim to property that is also being infringed upon, regardless of whether a particular copier and a particular buyer are engaged in a fraudulent transaction. In either case (with or without fraud), the infringement can exist independently.
IMHO, if some idea about property can’t pass a simple desert island test (meaning an imagined society starting fresh), then there is no substance to it.
As Kathleen Touchstone discusses in her book and the paper posted on this site, the very concept of society starting fresh from the Crusoe model is erroneous. She argues the Primary Social Unit is mother and child, and that the one universal truth concerning the origins of society is that we all begin as children, with dependence and obligations of mother/child establishing the foundations of natural rights theory, not “man alone” models of Crusoe.
Your assumption that society starts with Crusoe presumes that participation in society is voluntary. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the apparent attraction for the Crusoe model is that it represents the ultimate state of ancap utopia, where Crusoe’s rights (although the concept of property for man alone is meaningless) are unlimited, only to the extent that he must conform to natural laws. Then along comes Friday, and suddenly Crusoe’s range of actions are limited on account of Friday’s natural rights.
This is how property works, universally. Therefore the argument that assigning rights in the intangible IP limits the rights of private property is mere tautology. All property rights are constrained by the limits of action imposed by the rights of others.
April 4, 2011 at 6:05 pm-
“Also, most here, including Kinsella and other opponents of IP in the context of copyright, agree that an author has good and quiet title to his original manuscript. If we presume that title and the manuscript itself is comprised of both the tangible medium of fixation, (paper, ink) and the “intellectual content”, or the original work of authorship”
but that is the problem. you are assuming away the problem. You are question begging. there is not title to “intellectual content” as a separate thing.
- April 4, 2011 at 7:13 pm
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Stephan,
I am not assuming it. First, that is the legal concept that already exists. I may refer to it as a data point for clarity of definition. As you know, I don’t mean ANY intangible good. I mean within the meaning of the IP laws, specifically copyright.
Second, that is the very essence of the issue we are contending. You agree the author has title to the manuscript, but can only transfer title as determined by the tangible good. You define away the view that there CAN be any such thing as title to an intangible good.
Our differing views on property is exactly the point of distinction between your position and mine.
- April 4, 2011 at 7:30 pm
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“As you know, I don’t mean ANY intangible good. I mean within the meaning of the IP laws, specifically copyright.”
Copyright is about intangible goods. About pattern rights. Nothing else.
“You define away the view that there CAN be any such thing as title to an intangible good.”
You are arguing backwards: “IP rights” do not have to be defined away because they do not exist. What does exist are statutory ip laws.
- April 4, 2011 at 7:30 pm
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“What argument do you make that the “copier” has better title to the work than the oringal author, or alternatively, what severs the title that exited prior to transfer?”
I don’t argue that anyone has “title to the work” (the specific information) per se. That is something that you assume from the beginning. The copier doesn’t have title to the original work, which is the written manuscript (or digital file) because it is in the possession of the author. It would be wrong to steal the author’s manuscript from his house or computer. But the copier would not even know this work existed if the author had not published the work for the whole world to see. If the information then is placed into the public domain, it (the information) is clearly not anyone’s exclusive property by right. The idea is absurd because you chose to release the information and NOT keep it to yourself. The fact that you want the maximum profit from its dissemination is completely irrelevant to the property claim. That desire doesn’t create a right which is not otherwise there (except by contract).
“If you argue that there cannot be property title to intangible goods, then how do you explain, say an easement? Is that not an intangible property right that limits private property rights (i.e. the right to exclude trespassers) in the donor land?”
I didn’t argue that. I don’t think I mentioned “intangible goods.” Contracts can create titles to “intangible goods.” That is why an author can try to include a copyright provision with publisher/distributor, or end-user contracts if he wants. Maybe authors and publishers will want to form a group that blackballs copiers in the absence of IP laws. Who knows what they might try in a free market.
What IP proponents are talking about, though, is a supposed property right in “the work itself,” as you just said, meaning that the claim is rooted in natural law (or whatever substitute you want to call on), and not a contractual issue. That means that its a fundamental right prior to any specific agreements, just like claiming virgin land that you homestead or your right to your life, etc.
“the very concept of society starting fresh from the Crusoe model is erroneous. She argues the Primary Social Unit is mother and child,”
There’s nothing erroneous about the concept of society starting fresh. I didn’t claim that the family (or mother-and-child) was not the fundamental *social* unit, so I don’t see the relevance. If you are trying to say that individuals have no rights and that only “society” does, then I would disagree strongly. Other than that, I don’t know why you keep bringing this up.
- April 5, 2011 at 10:49 am
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@Zorg April 4, 2011 at 7:30 pm
Contracts can create titles to “intangible goods.” That is why an author can try to include a copyright provision with publisher/distributor, or end-user contracts if he wants. Maybe authors and publishers will want to form a group that blackballs copiers in the absence of IP laws. Who knows what they might try in a free market.
Apparently, no one knows. Why don’t you try to make something up and we’ll see how it works. You have no IP rights, so you contract with a publisher, who does what? Blackballing copiers? What is the transaction cost for that? You cannot ignore the consequences of your proposal. Give me some of your ideas of how the impacts are mitigated in your IP-free world.
<blockquoteWhat IP proponents are talking about, though, is a supposed property right in “the work itself,” as you just said, meaning that the claim is rooted in natural law (or whatever substitute you want to call on), and not a contractual issue. That means that its a fundamental right prior to any specific agreements, just like claiming virgin land that you homestead or your right to your life, etc.
First, what is a “natural right”. Nature doesn’t care about human concerns. Second how do you derive your right to homestead? You just assume it as a right? Where do you derive your right to life in the face of someone who wants to take it? I think you will find that rights are a human device, as is property. In this regard, the nature of property rights in IP is no different than any other property right, as it fundamentally arises from a covenant regarding self-ownership and private property rights. You cannot make a distinct case for IP being excluded from the concept of property rights that is consistent with any other theory of property rights.
There’s nothing erroneous about the concept of society starting fresh. I didn’t claim that the family (or mother-and-child) was not the fundamental *social* unit, so I don’t see the relevance. If you are trying to say that individuals have no rights and that only “society” does, then I would disagree strongly. Other than that, I don’t know why you keep bringing this up.
Yes, I understand. You miss the point. It is not the concept of starting fresh. It is the idea that humans begin to define rights on the basis of “man alone”, the Crusoe model. Man does not begin or exist alone. Rights are a function of the need and desire for cooperation, and property rights exist for the purpose, among other things, to internalize externalities.
“Natural rights” do not find their beginning when Friday shows up; they find their beginning in the PSU. A theory of rights that proceeds from that assumption, rather the “man alone” arrives at different conclusions, because cooperation is not voluntary, in the sense that all humans are part of a social framework, and it is from this framework that rights arise. That is relevant.
- April 4, 2011 at 3:31 am
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Simple questions for IP proponents:
Why limit copyright terms? Why limit patent terms?
After all if those both were property rights, than why should there be a time limit?Why only an “IP right” to certain areas of information arrangements (eg “creating” a story)? Why shouldn’t someone who invests many hours in designing his garden in a special way have the same rights to this design as someone who invests many hours in designing a story or technical gadget?
- April 4, 2011 at 8:08 pm
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There’s a time limit on IP rights because, over time, rights dissolve into their constituent parts due to the positronic quantum entropy inverting the space-time potential. Eventually, the rights-parts get so diluted that they melt into the background radiation, and so we must acknowledge that they have returned to the void from which they sprung. : )
- April 6, 2011 at 10:14 pm
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LOL
I overlooked your comment. The hilarious thing is that I am actually reading very much about quantum physics and nuclear physics as a hobby. Maybe those people at the LHC should ask if someone owns the “IP rights” to crashing hadrons… You never know!
- April 4, 2011 at 6:57 pm
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You see, Wildberry? It’s what I’ve been saying for close to three decades now. The people who demand unlimited right to copy deny that what they demand the unlimited right to copy even exists. By their reasoning — since all they believe exists are physical objects — two books with different words in them have no meaningful distinction. All that matters — all that exists as property — are the paper, binding, and ink. Their case breaks down at the metaphysical/ontological level far before questions of human action and the moral questions of property rights even arise.
- April 4, 2011 at 7:18 pm
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Oh come on.
So you believe that every hairdresser has a right to the hairstyles he “creates”?
Every gardener has a right to the design of “his/her garden”?
How do you acquire a right to information ordering (“ip rights” are nothing more than “rights” to patterns)? What’s the exact path?
“All that matters — all that exists as property”
What else other than physical objects does exist that is scarce? Who is to decide what constitutes a pattern that falls under copyrights?Where do “ip rights” stop? Why is someone infringing an “ip right”, if he tells a story created by another person to a third person or makes paper copies of it but not if he himself thinks about that story, imagines it in his brain? Which part in the information processing pipeline is exactly the copyright infringement?
Why should long established property rights be cut by new patents (a person excluded from using physical property he had for long time, just because someone gets a patent to the use of object classes)?
- April 4, 2011 at 7:57 pm
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Who said that information doesn’t exist? We’re saying that you don’t have a property right in the material in order to *exclude* others from using it once you release it to world. This is so because it is not a scarce thing anymore. Not only can two people use the same information, BILLIONS of people can use the same information at the same time while no one is deprived of it. It does not need to be economized. It is virtually free, so the reasons we acknowledge property rights in the first place don’t apply.
Obviously, it is NOT the so-called property you are interested in; it’s the money you can earn from a state-enforced monopoly privilege excluding others from using it. If it was the “property,” you wanted to keep and hold so that no one would ever get to see it or use it, then you would never release it to anyone, would you? : )
You presumably made an agreement with a publisher or consumers on compensation, so what is your beef with third parties who have nothing to do with those transactions? What you are saying is that you have a right to release information and keep it at the same time so that no one else can ever use it. I don’t know what that is, but it sure ain’t property. It’s a demand to control others. It can’t even be enforced without draconian measures. And suppose you find a “violator”. What is it they have stolen from you – the “right” to read your words without coughing up a few bucks? How can you even enforce this idea without sinking into a pit of ridiculousness?
Get over yourself.
- April 4, 2011 at 8:34 pm
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Neil, in the IP version of Godwin’s law, has to drop the term “ontological”, though it adds nothing here.
If the IP advocates things physical things and force are so unimportant, let them enforce their IP rights in the ethereal realm. But no, instead, they always seek to enforce IP rights with PHYSICAL force against lowly PHYSICAL goods, like money, bodies, paper, ink, printing press.
- April 4, 2011 at 10:23 pm
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@Stephan Kinsella April 4, 2011 at 8:34 pm
If the IP advocates things physical things and force are so unimportant, let them enforce their IP rights in the ethereal realm. But no, instead, they always seek to enforce IP rights with PHYSICAL force against lowly PHYSICAL goods, like money, bodies, paper, ink, printing press.
First, who said these things are unimportant? As you know, the copyright scheme, at least, is to enforce rights by way of the tangible fixation while recognizing property rights in the intangible work.
You seek to enforce your rights to the copy without showing how you came to own them, and deny the very existence of the information that is the true object of your desire to copy. You simply deny property in all but the tangible, which eliminate the possibility of internalizing the benefits of IP production.
What do you make of Demsetz’s treatment of property rights?
He says,
“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”
And,
”Internalizing such effects referst to a process, usually a change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting persons.
If an author’s rights to the content of his work are externalized by denying rights to it, then how does your theory of property rights “internalize the externality” of the benefits of his work accruing to the copier rather than himself?
Yet you do not deny the property rights in other intangible goods, for example an easement? Why the specific denial for IP? Scarcity? You create non-scarcity through free duplication of something that you seem to agree was originally scarce. Like all scarce resources, title can only be claimed by one contender at a time, and title cannot be transferred merely by possession. Possession and title are independently alienable.
Denying any rights to the intangible work is simply a technique to justify your claimed rights to it without showing transfer of it by the owner, but simply by the act of disclosure. If disclosure was understood to be a release of all rights to it, how can you assume it would be disclosed under the conditions of existing copyright. Your access to the original to copy would be highly constrained, which would change the entire economic calculation of the cost of obtaining a copy. This cost must be borne by the producer and consumer as an internalization of the cost of production.
Your contention that the total cost of IP in terms of enforcement, administration, etc. would be lower appears to run counter to intuition. Those costs appear to be transferred to the process of production, under your theory, which the author will seek to recover in order to profit from the work.
If you take the total revenue of all books sold in a year, less current production costs, and compare that number to the total cost of all litigation resulting from infringement claims of all kinds, which number would be bigger?
If you add to the cost of production the cost of self-protection of the original rights of the author, how would that change the cost/benefit analysis result? If you know, (I suspect you don’t) then what is the basis for your claim that the cost of IP always outweighs the benefits?
April 8, 2011 at 8:45 pm-
“since all they believe exists are physical objects”
This is one of the dumbest things I have ever heard. To avoid an confusion, existence and property rights aren’t exactly the same thing.
- April 8, 2011 at 8:48 pm
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“Their case breaks down at the metaphysical/ontological level far before questions of human action and the moral questions of property rights even arise.”
You are the one that brought ontological considerations to the table. The anti-IP case has never involved questioning the existence of anything.
- April 4, 2011 at 7:15 pm
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Of course, I agree.
Getting them in a corner to admit that is half the fun, though, don’t you think?
- April 4, 2011 at 7:22 pm
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You are nowhere to state that you got anyone in a corner. But you may live in your self-created illusion.
You did not deliver any kind of consistent and profound ethically acceptable theory of IP that is NOT based on statutory law.
At least be honest enough to accept that.
- April 8, 2011 at 8:49 pm
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By which you mean putting words in our mouths so all of a sudden we are making metaphysical/existential claims, even though we never left the realm of ethics and economics.
I’m ready to call this a straw man.
- April 4, 2011 at 8:24 pm
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Zorg wrote, “Who said that information doesn’t exist? We’re saying that you don’t have a property right in the material in order to *exclude* others from using it once you release it to world. This is so because it is not a scarce thing anymore. Not only can two people use the same information, BILLIONS of people can use the same information at the same time while no one is deprived of it. It does not need to be economized. It is virtually free, so the reasons we acknowledge property rights in the first place don’t apply. ”
So, in other words, if a woman sunbathes on a public beach you have the right to photograph her and publish the photographs on the Internet merely because she left the privacy of her home? And, by photographing her and publishing her photos without a release you’ve deprived her of nothing, right?
The exposure of private property does not transfer any property right — that is, the right to take an action with respect to a property — without the consent of the property owner.
“You presumably made an agreement with a publisher or consumers on compensation, so what is your beef with third parties who have nothing to do with those transactions? What you are saying is that you have a right to release information and keep it at the same time so that no one else can ever use it. I don’t know what that is, but it sure ain’t property. It’s a demand to control others. It can’t even be enforced without draconian measures. And suppose you find a “violator”. What is it they have stolen from you – the “right” to read your words without coughing up a few bucks? How can you even enforce this idea without sinking into a pit of ridiculousness?”
But, if there is no property right in the words I’ve written I commit fraud if I make a contract with anyone to publish it. I have no rights to make a subject of a contract. So the moment I expose what I’ve written to any second party — such as a publisher — the publisher has as much right to use what I’ve made as I do, since no private property exists. The publisher needs not make a contract with an author since the author has no property rights in the created work.
You know what? You’re a thief, a parasite, a communist. Up yours.
- April 4, 2011 at 9:49 pm
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So, in other words, if a woman sunbathes on a public beach you have the right to photograph her and publish the photographs on the Internet merely because she left the privacy of her home? And, by photographing her and publishing her photos without a release you’ve deprived her of nothing, right?
I suppose this does not violate her rights. What does “depriving her of nothing” have to do with libertarianism? It’s not about “not depriving people” of things, but about aggression.
“You presumably made an agreement with a publisher or consumers on compensation, so what is your beef with third parties who have nothing to do with those transactions? What you are saying is that you have a right to release information and keep it at the same time so that no one else can ever use it. I don’t know what that is, but it sure ain’t property. It’s a demand to control others. It can’t even be enforced without draconian measures. And suppose you find a “violator”. What is it they have stolen from you – the “right” to read your words without coughing up a few bucks? How can you even enforce this idea without sinking into a pit of ridiculousness?”
But, if there is no property right in the words I’ve written I commit fraud if I make a contract with anyone to publish it.
another use loose of “fraud.”
I have no rights to make a subject of a contract.
Contracts are just transfers of title to property–often bilateral and contingent. I can give a gift; I can make a loan; I can bet on a race; I can pay you to paint my fence; I can pay you for your share of Exxon stock.
So the moment I expose what I’ve written to any second party — such as a publisher — the publisher has as much right to use what I’ve made as I do, since no private property exists.
You would think sci-fi authors would have more imagination! There are many ways to arrange these things. The publisher, here, can transfer money-damages to you if they fail to do xyz.
The publisher needs not make a contract with an author since the author has no property rights in the created work.
I can make a contract to paint your fence, and this does not mean I own my painting-labor either. The payment is the transfer: it is conditional on my performing a given action, service, labor. I own my body; this lets me control it and choose what actions to perform; this gives me the ability to paint your fence, or withhold this service. Knowing this, you induce me to paint by transferring money and making it conditional on my performing the action. It does not mean I own my action or my painting or my “labor.” You can say I am selling my service but this is sloppy — it’s just a shorthand way of describing that our contract used my ability to perform or withhold the service (which is based on my ownership of my body) to get you to agree to compensate me.
The point is: the ability to be creative and form contracts does not imply ownership of some “thing” sold on both sides of the contract.
- April 4, 2011 at 10:43 pm
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@Stephan Kinsella April 4, 2011 at 9:49 pm
Do you recall an ancient (i.e. 1950′s) performer known as Professor Irwin Corey?
The point is: the ability to be creative and form contracts does not imply ownership of some “thing” sold on both sides of the contract.
In the example you give, the painter “owns” his services and the other guy owns the money. Parties cannot enter a contract for goods or services that they do not own. Contracts doe not “imply” ownership, they require it.
Even unde the title theory of contracts, title cannot be transferred if it is not owned.
So I don’t know what you are saying here. Contracts can have something as their subject other than “goods” and “services”, using your example? There is nothing “sloppy” about the statement, “selling services” since it is done every day by contract or otherwise.
No rational person would trade money for services that the other party does not own, and more that a person would trade services for money a person doesn’t own.
Property rights are at the heart of contract theory.
I can make a contract to paint your fence, and this does not mean I own my painting-labor either.
If you don’t own your painting labor, how can you enter into a contract to transfer it for money?
Huh?
- April 4, 2011 at 11:28 pm
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In the example you give, the painter “owns” his services and the other guy owns the money. Parties cannot enter a contract for goods or services that they do not own. Contracts doe not “imply” ownership, they require it.
Completely wrong. You have no basis for stating this.
Consider: I agree to pay you $100 tomorrow if it rains. You pay me $30 if it does not. Does this mean you or I own the rain?
If I give you $100 gift, do you need to give me something you “own” to receive it?
I can make it a gift. It can be unilateral. Or, I can condition it: I give you $100 IF you apply for college. See? Doesn’t mena you “own” “applying to college.”
If I want your candy bar, I want title to it so I can eat it. You want my money. So we exchange titles to owned things. But if I want you to give me a massage, it’s not such an exchagne. IN this case it’s more like the gift situation, except there’s an onerous and conditional aspect: I give you $50 IF you massage me. Does not mean you own the masage or the movement of your hands. you control it, because you own our body. but so what?
If you don’t own your painting labor, how can you enter into a contract to transfer it for money?
You’re not transferring it. You’re getting money by fulfilling a trigger for the transfer of property. This is not that hard.
- April 5, 2011 at 11:13 am
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@Stephan Kinsella April 4, 2011 at 11:28 pm
Completely wrong. You have no basis for stating this.
Consider: I agree to pay you $100 tomorrow if it rains. You pay me $30 if it does not. Does this mean you or I own the rain?
Isn’t this your “sale of hope” example? By paying you $30, I own the future $100, provided it rains. Presumably you own the $100. Right to enforcement arises if the condition precedent of “rain” is met. It is not necessary to own the rain.
The painter may not own the paint, but he does own the ability to direct his own body to apply it to the fence. In the service of painting, he is agreeing to use his means of production for consideration.
Standard contract theory is the basis for my stating this.
Is there really a reason to go through the gift example? Let’s just say that in order for me to make a gift of something, I must own it. Your right to this gift is conditional on how the gift was conveyed, and perhaps whether you changed your position in reliance on it.
As for the massage, it is exactly the same as the example for the painter.
You’re not transferring it. You’re getting money by fulfilling a trigger for the transfer of property. This is not that hard.
Excuse me, but performance is in fact a transfer. When the labor has run its course, the payor has a painted fence. He is transferring his consideration for the purpose of getting an “unpainted fence” transformed into a “painted fence”. The painter used his own private means of production to affect this change. He can only do this because he and he alone owns his personal will to act, and agrees to do so (perform) in exchange for money.
If this is not so, then what is the meaning of “self-ownership”, which you clearly support in other contexts?
April 11, 2011 at 2:17 pm-
The painter may not own the paint, but he does own the ability to direct his own body to apply it to the fence.
I would say that, abstractly, a contract between you and me is your promise to constrain your future behavior in some way in exchange for my promise to constrain my future behavior in some way. As a concrete example, I will scratch your back if you then scratch my back.
We are naturally completely free to act in any way. You start making contracts with other parties in order to gain the benefits of constraining their future actions in exchange for constraining your own future actions. I won’t take a walk or play solitaire, I’ll scratch your back. Although this may be the point on which we disagree, I think that behavior, not property, is the fundamental subject of contracts.
Perhaps the claim is that ownership of your self/body/person is a prerequisite. However, pragmatically speaking “you” appear to have more control over your body and behavior than any other intelligence. I believe that I’m speaking to the intelligence that controls the body because my own body is the thing in the universe over which I have the least lack of control. “You” seem like the most credible way to get your body’s future behavior constrained.
I’d say ownership of my body follows from this, rather than the reverse. Ownership of other things external to my body is the result of explicit and implicit contracts that constrain the future behavior of my body.
- April 11, 2011 at 3:22 pm
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@ ESV April 11, 2011 at 2:17 pm
Behavior may involve acting with objects, and some objects may be property. The ownership of property affects the terms of the bargain.
If the painter owns the paint the price may be different than if he does not. Same behavior, howerver.
April 8, 2011 at 5:56 pm-
I will pay $50 for Wildberry to massage you.
- April 5, 2011 at 1:08 am
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“The exposure of private property does not transfer any property right — that is, the right to take an action with respect to a property — without the consent of the property owner.”
Not sure how the picture-taking example relates to copyright, but in this statement here you are just assuming that you have a right in the material in the first place. That is the issue under debate.
Doesn’t it strike you as odd that you are talking about “property” that you have no control over and which is, in fact, impossible to have control over without leading to absurdity? It defies the very word you choose to represent it. You cannot control other people’s eyes and minds. You just can’t make far removed third parties pay you for the privilege of reading your words when you have no contract with them. Not only that, you don’t even have knowledge of them reading your work without your permission. You don’t even know if they exist! You can’t tell by any normal means whether your “right” was violated and someone “stole” something from you or not. This “right” of yours is practically unenforceable. This basic fact makes a mockery of the arguments put forward to defend the concept as property.
“The publisher needs not make a contract with an author since the author has no property rights in the created work.”
If there were no contract, you wouldn’t give them what you wrote. How can you be saying there is no way to make a contract regarding writing and publishing here?
Your rights are perfectly safe. It is in your ability to create something that people find worth paying for, that gives you the potential to make money at it. You own yourself, your body, your time, etc. And you have the ability to make agreements with others toward a particular end. In writing for a wide audience, you are performing a service which has a good potential for profit as the publisher just has to keep producing copies of the original work. Knowing all this, you can negotiate a contract in advance that pleases all parties.
But you simply cannot bind people with whom you do not have a contract. You can’t send something out into the world and then say, “Don’t look.” That doesn’t make any sense. If your real argument is that you want a contract with everyone in the world who might read what you wrote, you’ll just have to figure out a way to get everyone to agree with you. Otherwise, you are making an impossible demand on people you don’t know and never will know. There’s no connection between you of an economic nature. You *published* something and put it out there. At that point, it’s beyond your control in every way who sees it, reads it, loans it to a friend, or shares it with 10 friends or a 100 or a billion; so therefore in no way can it be called property. It’s completely beyond your grasp. And what’s more, you made it that way!
Suppose someone reads a copy of your work without permission, without paying. You find out. Now what? Are they given the chance to return the “stolen property” to you? How would they do that? Can someone un-read a book? Wipe their memory? What? I suppose you will want to punish them since it is not even possible for your “property” to be “returned.” So what are the “damages”? The price of the book? And what does it cost to hire enforcers to find this awful “thief” who has scandalously read your words without paying? More than the price of the book? That’s a safe bet, eh? So, again, you’re in the land of crazy when the ideas behind IP get exposed to reality.
April 5, 2011 at 12:14 pm-
Dear J. Neil Schulman,
So, in other words, if a woman sunbathes on a public beach you have the right to photograph her and publish the photographs on the Internet merely because she left the privacy of her home? And, by photographing her and publishing her photos without a release you’ve deprived her of nothing, right?
I presume that your argument is supposed to mean that such an action violates the lady’s rights. So, let me ask you:
What if instead of photographing her, I would draw a picture? What if I wrote about seeing her on my blog? What if I photographed someone photographing her? What if I wrote a poem describing her, and then sold the poem and someone photographed the poem? What if when her employer sees the photograph decides to fire her because she’s supposed to be in a hospital?
I presume that you would say that some of the above do not violate her rights. In the unlikely case you consider all of the above a violation of her rights, just say so and we can skip right to the next stage.
Assuming some of the above are a violation of her rights and some are not, that brings up the question how do you distinguish among them? It has been my observation that if IP proponents try to solve this puzzle, they will entangle themselves in more and more convoluted explanations and then at a later stage when they are unable to answer anything coherently, they stop answering. Can you do better?
April 12, 2011 at 10:18 am-
I really liked this Peter, good work….
What if instead of photographing her, I would draw a picture? What if I wrote about seeing her on my blog? What if I photographed someone photographing her? What if I wrote a poem describing her, and then sold the poem and someone photographed the poem? What if when her employer sees the photograph decides to fire her because she’s supposed to be in a hospital?
Still chuckling.
- April 4, 2011 at 8:31 pm
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I don’t need statist copyright to own what I make. I own it by natural right.
I don’t need the state to enforce my rights. That’s why God and Mr. Colt gave us guns.
The dishonesty of the communists in this forum is that they insist that an image of a thing is not a scarce thing, and that making copies deprives no one of anything. They further insist that exclusive use of a property only exists by state monopoly action.
Nonsense because every created thing starts out as unique and therefore scarce.
April 4, 2011 at 11:36 pm-
The dishonesty of the communists
Labeling people AND incorrectly using a label simultaneously only serves to illustrate how little of a valid argument you actually have.
They further insist that exclusive use of a property only exists by state monopoly action.
No. By definition use of physical property requires exclusivity. That is I cannot use a spoon to eat if your using it to eat at the same time. It just doesn’t work. Property rights is the tool you use to determine who controls it.
This is very simple. It requires no sort of existential mental acrobatics. No grandiose abstractions or twisting of definitions. It requires no weird analogies and pained logic to understand or get the point across. A child can understand this. It’s a simple universal truth of existence:
To use a physical object means that you have to be in control of it.
You can have de facto property rights that exist entirely outside of a formal framework, or you can have property right laws that formalize it. Sometimes they even exist in conflict of one another. The state is a purely optional apparatus.
It’s the so-called “Intellectual Property” can only exist within a state. The reason for this is that there is no substance to ideas or stories or concepts. You have the physical objects that you create, like a book, but the story contained in the book and concepts are abstract. They have no physical properties at all. They only exist as abstractions… as concepts in the mind of the beholder. There is no such ‘exclusivity’ requirements to use a idea.
And since ideas and concepts have no substance to them, they only exist as abstractions, then the only way your ‘patent rights’ can be manifested is through violations of other people’s property rights.
Sure you can enter into agreements and do transfers of labor of title and all sorts of things like that. That happens all the time. You can sell me a painting you made and have me promise not to xerox it or scan it into a computer. All that stuff is perfectly and 100% valid and can exist without a state. If a person violates that agreement then they should compensate the other party based on whatever they agreed on prior to the exchange. All that stuff is perfectly fine and dandy.
But things like patents can only exist by forcing your agreements onto people that never actually agreed to it.
For example:
If you invent a new headlight and you sell that idea to a automobile manufacturer and demand that in exchange for letting see the idea that they pay royalties when they use it… that’s a perfectly valid exchange if they agree to it.
However, if I am walking down the street and see a headlight and then decide to use the same idea in my product. then it’s completely invalid to expect that your agreement with the manufacturer somehow allows you to control my behavior. That’s not how contracts work… that is now how agreements work.
It would be a violation of my rights for you to storm into my factories and force me to stop making headlights that copy your invention and to sue me for it. And that is _EXACTLY_ what patents are designed to allow you to do.
To enforce violation of private property rights in a widespread manner requires a state mechanism backed by force.
There is, very simply, no other way it can exist.
Nonsense because every created thing starts out as unique and therefore scarce.
That’s not really a logical defense of ‘IP’.
- April 5, 2011 at 4:49 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
I don’t need statist copyright to own what I make. I own it by natural right.
Do you agree that IP always requires the theft of physical property (apart from the cases, of course, where IP and physical property rights result in the same outcome)? Do you agree that IP is contradictory to physical property? Do you agree that if you have a society that values physical property, it cannot have IP?
- April 5, 2011 at 5:01 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The dishonesty of the communists in this forum…
my claim is very simple: IP theories presented to me are self-contradictory and/or incoherent (i.e. it is impossible to determine what they mean). Since I attempt to make falsifiable arguments, if I was wrong, it would be trivial to refute me. As a falsificationist, I don’t particularly care if IP is correct or not. I’m interested in refuting theories.
I have debated many IP proponents, and the debates always end up with them running away from a debate. So I wonder why am I being labelled as being dishonest.
I would be willing to debate any IP proponent in a public online debate, with the only rule being that the one who does not answer questions loses. Would you be willing to take up the challenge?
- April 8, 2011 at 9:00 pm
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“I own it by natural right.”
A proof or any sort of support for this would be nice. You’re just insisting it.
“I don’t need the state to enforce my rights. That’s why God and Mr. Colt gave us guns.”
Something isn’t a right just because you call it that and shoot everyone that disagrees.
“The dishonesty of the communists in this forum”
Wow, I’m swimming in the irony. You call us dishonest at the same time you call us communists. No, you’re right, we really are all communists. It’s not dishonest or misleading at all for you to engage in some sort of red scare to bully people out of reconsidering this problem.
“they insist that an image of a thing is not a scarce thing, and that making copies deprives no one of anything”
Once again, putting words in our mouths. The anti-IP case never relies on claiming making copies “deprives no one of anything”. Illegalizing slavery deprives the slave masters of their jobs, so by your reasoning it must be unjust to do so.
“They further insist that exclusive use of a property only exists by state monopoly action.”
Oh right! I forgot we are attacking property, not arguing what is property and what is not!
You are literally assuming your conclusion, which is that ideas are a type of property. This is utter nonsense because no conflicts over the use of ideas can ever arise. Also, the anti-IP case never relies on saying the state is necessary to enforce IP. It would be equally unjust if carried out by a privately funded firm.
“Nonsense because every created thing starts out as unique and therefore scarce.”
You don’t know what scarce means, do you? Scarce has nothing to do with physical size of the supply, and so that at some point there is one copy of something is utterly irrelevant. What matters is one person’s use of an idea does not interfere with others’ use of that idea unless he trespasses on their physical property. Economic scarcity is not the physical size of the supply, it is an indication of rivalry and, thus, the potential for conflicts of use to arise. As should be obvious, ideas are never scarce and no conflicts over their use can ever arise. The conflicts addressed by IP are always over physical, scarce resources, as all conflicts are.
- April 4, 2011 at 8:50 pm
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “How do you acquire a right to information ordering (“ip rights” are nothing more than “rights” to patterns)? What’s the exact path?”
From The Libertarian Case for IP at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/
—————————————————————–
Earlier in this discussion, I referred to the necessity of imposing a logos on material objects as a precondition to creating them as property.That is not the question under discussion.
Having established that an object receiving an imprint from a Person’s logos becomes that Person’s property – has it been established as well that the logos which the Person is imposing also can be owned as a separate property?
The answer is yes.
Here’s how it happens.
When a logos is imposed on matter, creating a new property, the logos becomes a material quality of the property it is imposed upon. Simultaneous with the creation of a new property, the logos becomes the trait of that property to display the logos itself, which includes the possibility that the logos can be copied onto other matter and make that property as well.
Starting from the creation of a new property, the First Owner has total and exclusive ownership of that property and all its different parts, qualities, and traits: all its different properties.
One of the properties included in this total ownership of the created property is therefore the logos itself.
Consequently, if the First Owner – or any subsequent owner of the total property – decides to break the property into bundles of rights–and maintain ownership of some of those rights while selling others – this is perfectly within that owner’s prerogatives.
Now, this next point is crucial:
Placing any restrictions on how the owner may dispose of the property–or its constituent properties–would deprive that owner of the exclusive and total ownership which belongs to a first owner.
You cannot attack the rights of a total owner to divide up rights to that property without destroying the concept of property being exclusively that owner’s.
And, a property right not exclusively owned is not a property right at all.
Once the property is broken up into separate properties – each property requiring a separate right to exploit that quality or aspect–each property right from the original bundle of rights can be traded separately.
Remember: rights – being moral sanctions of what action a Person may take with respect to a property – adhere not to the property itself, but to the owner.
If you declare that property rights are inherent in the property rather than in the owner, then you are reduced to the absurdity of saying that property–apart from the actions of its owner–is capable of committing moral or immoral acts.
Thus, is is perfectly within the prerogatives of that owner to maintain ownership to the rights in the logos – the logorights–in that property, by valuing it, claiming it, defending its boundaries, and continuing to control it.
—————————————————————–- April 5, 2011 at 1:43 pm
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That does not explain anything regarding the supremacy of either pattern property or physical property:
A owns objects X, Y and Z for a long time.
B “creates” a “new combination of instances of the classes the objects X, Y and Z belong to”
Why should A lose ANY RIGHT to his physical property just because B mixed something?
Please answer this question as specific as possible.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:17 pm
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Exactly. Why does the person who creates a certain logo on his property all of a sudden own all the other property that has that logo on it?
How does this not literally conflict with the homesteading principle?
- April 4, 2011 at 9:04 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “Neil, in the IP version of Godwin’s law, has to drop the term ‘ontological,’ though it adds nothing here. If the IP advocates things physical things and force are so unimportant, let them enforce their IP rights in the ethereal realm. But no, instead, they always seek to enforce IP rights with PHYSICAL force against lowly PHYSICAL goods, like money, bodies, paper, ink, printing press.”
There, in a nutshell, is the fallacy from which Stephan Kinsella’s anti-propertarian case arises. He doesn’t know what a property right is. He thinks a property right is something physical.
Rights are moral definitions. All rights are non-material. You can’t point to a right. All boundaries are “ethereal.” The referent of a “right” is a human action. All rights are non material — non physical — yet human beings exert force to maintain their rights.
Stephan Kinsella — like every dialectical materialist before him — only sees material objects as having any reality. Therefore he does not believe rights exist apart from physical objects. He believes property rights are physical things.
Insane.
- April 4, 2011 at 9:36 pm
- April 5, 2011 at 12:17 pm
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Dear J. Neil Shulman,
Stephan Kinsella — like every dialectical materialist before him — only sees material objects as having any reality.
This has been an oft-repeated misinterpretation of Stephan’s arguments. His argument is not that rights immaterial objects should be denied validity because they are somehow unworthy. His argument, just like mine, is that such an approach would contradict the rights in the material objects. So unless you denounce rights in material objects, you cannot have IP. That’s a contradiction that IP proponents need to resolve. Can you do that?
- April 5, 2011 at 1:35 pm
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You don’t get:
Rights to patterns means there a no physical property rights any more except those rights to patterns.
For example your “privacy rights” (woman sunbathing and so on): How far would you go regarding a “privacy/IP/pattern right” of that woman? Should nobody even be allowed to draw pictures of her? Should nobody even be allowed to THINK of her?
- April 5, 2011 at 2:19 pm
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Should nobody even be allowed to THINK of her?
That’s a V-Chip for you. Also, you’re not permitted to use her as an example. That is if the IP-proponents draw their arguments to their logical conclusion.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:03 pm
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“like every dialectical materialist before him”
Funniest moment of my day.
Give up on IP and you’re a full-blown Marxist, didn’t ya know!
- April 5, 2011 at 10:55 am
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@Stephan Kinsella April 4, 2011 at 9:36 pm
This is nonsense. A property right itself is not a physical thing. It is a right to control a scarce resource. And yes, all rights are property rights, as Rothbard said, and all property rights are rights to scarce resources. You do the cute trick of saying “good ideas is purty scarce” but that is equivocation; you well know we mean rivalrous; would you say “good ideas are rivalrous”? What?
If “good ideas”, by which I mean “valued” original “works”, are not rivalrous, why do we have contention for ownership between the author and the copier? The copier is claiming title to a “right to act” which is also claimed by the author.
Isn’t that rivalrous?
- April 5, 2011 at 11:11 am
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If “good ideas”, by which I mean “valued” original “works”, are not rivalrous, why do we have contention for ownership between the author and the copier?
There is no contention on ownership.
The mythical author wants the right to prevent the “copier” from acting on the “copier’”s own property.. that is a book or recording under his control. Even if the copier entered into no prior agreement with the author and had no dealings with the author prior to this.
That’s copyright. That’s the contention.
- April 5, 2011 at 1:32 pm
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@Dear J. Neil Schulman,
“So, in other words, if a woman sunbathes on a public beach you have the right to photograph her and publish the photographs on the Internet merely because she left the privacy of her home? And, by photographing her and publishing her photos without a release you’ve deprived her of nothing, right? ”Oh my.
That reminds me of the problems Google got with Streeview in some states:
“In 2010, Google announced that it might cancel Google Street View service in the European Union due to unmanageable requests of the European Commission”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Street_View#Privacy_issuesAh the IP supporters and minarchists: Defenders of the state…
- April 5, 2011 at 3:09 pm
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nate-m,
All your questions and objections are answered in The Libertarian Case for IP. Click through to http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/ and read it. I’m not going to reprint the entire thing here.
Peter Surda,
“Do you agree that IP always requires the theft of physical property (apart from the cases, of course, where IP and physical property rights result in the same outcome)?”
No.
“Do you agree that IP is contradictory to physical property?”
No.
“Do you agree that if you have a society that values physical property, it cannot have IP?”
No.
“His argument is not that rights immaterial objects should be denied validity because they are somehow unworthy. His argument, just like mine, is that such an approach would contradict the rights in the material objects.”
A logos is not immaterial. The libertarian/propertarian case for IP is for ownership of information “objects” that possess material identity. They exist as material things independent of the things that carry them. Their value exists independent of the things that carry them and removing them removes that portion of the value of the carrier dependent on the logos.
“my claim is very simple: IP theories presented to me are self-contradictory and/or incoherent (i.e. it is impossible to determine what they mean). Since I attempt to make falsifiable arguments, if I was wrong, it would be trivial to refute me. As a falsificationist, I don’t particularly care if IP is correct or not. I’m interested in refuting theories.”
It was trivial to refute you.
“I have debated many IP proponents, and the debates always end up with them running away from a debate. So I wonder why am I being labelled as being dishonest.”
I’m not running away.
“I would be willing to debate any IP proponent in a public online debate, with the only rule being that the one who does not answer questions loses. Would you be willing to take up the challenge?”
I’ve been answering questions on this topic for thirty years. If you come up with a question I haven’t answered a million times before, and isn’t already answered within The Libertarian Case for IP, I’ll answer it.
- April 5, 2011 at 3:38 pm
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Wonderful, J. Neil Schulman, a reply,
It was trivial to refute you.
I see no refutation. You just answered some questions. There were preliminaries to determine how you approach the matter. Every IP proponent uses different arguments, so this is necessary to establish some basic claims so I know how to demonstrate that you’re contradicting yourself.
You said that you do not agree with my claim that IP is always theft of physical property (apart from the cases where IP and physical property rights are identical, i.e. IP is redundant). So, if you wouldn’t mind, could you provide such an example? I claim that such an example does not exist. This is a falsifiable argument so certainly it should be no problem if I was wrong.
You said you do not consider IP contradictory to physical property. So, if you wouldn’t mind, could you show me an example of a situation that involves IP but does not involve physical property?
A logos is not immaterial.
If that is your argument, then my argument is that in that case it only covers property that is already owned by someone as a consequence of physical property rights, i.e., back to my primary claim, is either redundant or contradictory to them.
They exist as material things independent of the things that carry them.
This is one of the core confusions of IP proponents. They are not independent, they are a different way of interpreting the same phenomenon. Sometimes, undoubtedly, a different interpretation can be helpful. But you cannot hold both interpretations to be simultaneously relevant. If they were independent, it would be (just like I said above) possible to show a situation where logos is present, but things that carry it are not. If you cannot show such an example, then the whole “logos theory” is just stealing things that carry logos from the person who owns them and giving them to another person (“creator of logos”). Can you resolve this contradiction? Do you deny rights in physical goods?
As an analogy, a hypothetical right to a job is not something that is independent of physical property rights. If someone claimed that there can simultaneously be a right to a job and physical property rights, they would be contradicting themselves. Or, to up the ante, if someone was claiming that racial purification was not killing. These are all rhetorical tricks and are easy to challenge.
It was trivial to refute you.
Again, you did not refute anything. You just answered some questions (for which I give you credit, because a lot of IP proponents don’t do that). However, you still have not established an argument that is clear enough and not self-contradictory.
If you come up with a question I haven’t answered a million times before, and isn’t already answered within The Libertarian Case for IP, I’ll answer it.
Once again: can you show an example of IP which does not involve theft of physical property (apart from the cases when it’s redundant, of course)? If you want, I can rephrase it: can you show a situation where IP does not have a redistributive effect? Can you show a situation where you interact with IP (or “logos”) in some way and it is not covered by IP-less property rights?
Also, in a previous thread where we handled the question regarding fair use, I asked you if it is is moral to violate people’s rights for educational or satirical purposes, you did not reply. But I assume you missed it.
- April 5, 2011 at 6:08 pm
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@ J. Neil Schulman April 5, 2011 at 3:09 pm
You just have to love this one from Peter Surda:
Every IP proponent uses different arguments, so this is necessary to establish some basic claims so I know how to demonstrate that you’re contradicting yourself.
LOL!! First, he assumes his conclusion that you are contradicting yourself even before he knows what you are saying!! You have love when the truth sneaks out unintended.
Second, I have found that Peter can make incomprehensible nonsense out of anything that is said,and then formulates a personal challenge that you should have to try to straighten it all out. When you don’t bother, you are “running away”. He is modeling his behavior for Anti-IP Libertarian, who does the same, but with less skill and more venem to make up for his apprenticeship to Peter.
I tell you, sometimes it is a laugh a minute around here! The rest of his post merely illustrtes this point.
- April 5, 2011 at 6:31 pm
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@Wildberry: If you do not like this blog why stay here? Just to leave your dishonest nonsense?
“LOL!! First, he assumes his conclusion that you are contradicting yourself even before he knows what you are saying!! You have love when the truth sneaks out unintended.”
No, he just hasn’t been presented ANY logical IP theory yet. Therefore he assumes that Schulmans theory is like the others.
Schulman can try to show how consistent his theory is.“Second, I have found that Peter can make incomprehensible nonsense out of anything that is said,and then formulates a personal challenge that you should have to try to straighten it all out. When you don’t bother, you are “running away”. He is modeling his behavior for Anti-IP Libertarian, who does the same, but with less skill and more venem to make up for his apprenticeship to Peter.”
Just because you are not able to comprehend logical statements and consequences does not mean these are wrong.
Your whole fuzziness on IP is the problem. Also you are not honest enough to answer questions. Instead you are running away.
Please answer this: Are statutory laws rightful?
and this:
A owns objects X, Y and Z for a long time.B “creates” a “new combination of instances of the classes the objects X, Y and Z belong to”
Why should A lose ANY RIGHT to his physical property just because B mixed something?
Please answer this question as specific as possible.
- April 5, 2011 at 8:03 pm
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Wildberry,
First, he assumes his conclusion that you are contradicting yourself even before he knows what you are saying!!
My experience shows that the chance that an IP proponent is not contradicting himself is slim. Nevertheless, if I did not allow for the possibility, I would not participate in an exchange of arguments. Such an exchange would not be a debate, it would be preaching, and I have no interest in that.
If you think that I am wrong, feel free to prove it. I have repeatedly challenged you for that. You however, have apparently the exact opposite approach. You even refuse the acknowledge that a contradiction disproves an argument.
Second, I have found that Peter can make incomprehensible nonsense out of anything that is said…
No, Wildberry, you do that. I formulated my arguments using formal constructs such as set theory and propositional logic. You just babble nonsense and avoid confrontations. Where are the answers to my questions? Nowhere. You don’t have them and you’re not interested in them. You prefer to remain in error and brag about it.
When you don’t bother, you are “running away”.
Formulating questions and attempting to answer them is the cornerstone of scientific inquiry. Avoiding it is the cornerstone of demagoguery.
In other words, I’m curious and you have an inflated sense of ego.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:13 pm
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“LOL!! First, he assumes his conclusion that you are contradicting yourself even before he knows what you are saying!!”
That is obviously not what he meant. He is saying it is impossible to refute a non-argument.
“You have love when the truth sneaks out unintended.”
Such as you being unable to comprehend Peter?
“Second, I have found that Peter can make incomprehensible nonsense out of anything that is said”
I don’t think you’re trying too hard to comprehend any of it.
“and then formulates a personal challenge that you should have to try to straighten it all out”
Yeah! I mean, how silly Peter expects you to support the viewpoint you express. Your viewpoint is not the “default” correct one. You have to support your case just as much as anyone else does. The failure of Peter or anyone else to support his case does not prove your own case.
“When you don’t bother, you are “running away”.”
Yep, that’s exactly right. No, you really do have to support your own position.
“He is modeling his behavior for Anti-IP Libertarian, who does the same, but with less skill and more venem to make up for his apprenticeship to Peter”
When someone has nothing relevant to say to the real intellectual matter, he changes the subject and starts to gossip about the people debating him.
“I tell you, sometimes it is a laugh a minute around here!”
Your posts are several laughs a second.
“The rest of his post merely illustrtes this point.”
Duhh, of course it does!
- April 5, 2011 at 3:15 pm
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Wildberry,
Ideas can’t be owned. A material logos can be.
Neil
- April 8, 2011 at 9:22 pm
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Which can only actually mean that when a person creates a logo he instantly gains rights to everything else, both now and in the future, that has that logo on it, homesteaders be damned!
- April 5, 2011 at 4:24 pm
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@ J. Neil Schulman April 5, 2011 at 3:15 pm
I’m not sure what post this refers to, but to clarify, I have been on a rant about conflating “ideas” as in “ideas are free” and “IP”, which specifically excludes idea from protection.
I think for all practical purposes, logos and “original works of authorship” are roughly equivalent in actual fact, although you have a unique system of reasoning your way to that conclusion.
Is that a fair representation?
- April 5, 2011 at 6:43 pm
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@Wildberry:
You wrote:
“Natural rights” do not find their beginning when Friday shows up; they find their beginning in the PSU. A theory of rights that proceeds from that assumption, rather the “man alone” arrives at different conclusions, because cooperation is not voluntary, in the sense that all humans are part of a social framework, and it is from this framework that rights arise.
So you do not accept that individual rights are the basis of a free society and that cooperation is always voluntary (else there is no cooperation)? Ok, now I get why you have such confused ideas about IP.
- April 6, 2011 at 3:16 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You do the cute trick of saying “good ideas is purty scarce” but that is equivocation; you well know we mean rivalrous; would you say “good ideas are rivalrous”? What? And I notice you dodged my point that you denigrate the importance of scarcity and physicality yet when you seek to enforce IP rights your side always always wants to enFORCE (hint hint) it in the physical, scarce realm: the IP extorter wants to take others physical money, to use the statist courts’ physical force to compel his victims to obey his dictates and not use their physical bodies or other resources in the physical, real world contrary to the IP dictator’s commands. ”
Another clear example where Stephan Kinsella lies about what I advocate then attacks the Straw Man he invented.
Kinsella attacks me for defending ownership rights in ideas; I have not done so.
He attacks “my side” for advocating use of the State to defend property rights. You won’t find me in print doing so.
He says that I ignore both the concepts of scarcity and rivalrousness in property rights; I have exhaustively shown how a logoright, to meet the qualifications as ownable property, is both scarce and use without permission is rivalrous.
So on and on and on he repeats the same crap without ever addressing my actual case.
- April 6, 2011 at 3:29 pm
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Peter Surda,
Why do people buy books? Admittedly some home decorators buy books without respect to the writings within them because bookshelves full of books make the homeowner look smart. But for the most part, it is the content of the book — not the paper, ink, and binding — that is the reason people buy books. Remove the words and the utility disappears and a book ceases to be a book.
The material identity of a book is dependent on the composition of words. The composition of words — the logos — is, in fact, the book. The paper, ink, and binding is the carrier of the book.
The book exists as a material object independent of the paper, ink, and binding.
And that is what is owned by the author, no matter how many copies are made.
It is a single, scarce thing no matter how many copies are made. Only the author, as owner, is entitled to make copies, unless the owner authorizes others to make copies.
It is owned by its author unless the author sells or licenses his property rights.
Unauthorized copies are rivalrous with the authorized copies. The authorized copies are non-rivalrous because they are authorized uses of the property.
The State is not required for this property to exist. The State’s copyright laws are a nationalization of private property for the purposes of diminishing the ownership of the property rights by restricting the owner’s property rights through regulation.
Eliminate copyrights and the natural property rights still exist.
Eliminate the State and such rights will be enforced in private arbitration among civilized people who respect the right to private property. In a free society murderers, robbers, rapists, pirates, thieves, and other scum will be defended against.
April 6, 2011 at 3:34 pm-
I don’t buy books for the content. I can read the content on a computer screen. I buy a book specifically for the paper, ink, and binding because it’s easier on the eyes than an electronic format.
- April 6, 2011 at 3:38 pm
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Why do YOU and other people look at a garden? Ah, the garden design.
After you the designer of the garden should have a copyright (just because you give it another name doesn’t make it something else than a copyright) on that garden.
After you everybody should have a copyright on information patterns he/she designed.
- April 6, 2011 at 3:46 pm
- April 6, 2011 at 5:57 pm
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
kindly note that you have not answered to my questions. Instead, you switch to an entirely different flow of argumentation.
Why do people buy books?
For the argument’s sake, let’s agree that because they find them valuable.
The material identity of a book is dependent on the composition of words.
This is a non-sequitur. Merely because an object has value to someone and that value is derived from certain features, it does not follow that the features build an identity as something that’s independent of the object itself. It merely means that by re-interepreting the object through the features we gain a new, maybe more useful, insight, but you cannot have new rights without sacrificing the old ones, because both approaches cover the same area.
I may value that it does not rain. That does not mean that the absence of rain has an identity (like Thor or Zeus or whatever) that is separate from the water in the air.
The book exists as a material object independent of the paper, ink, and binding.
This is the same non-sequitur. The same argument could be used to “prove” that all kinds of imaginary concepts, like magic or god, exist. Let me go back to my example where I showed how inventing new words (“right to work”, “racial purification”) does not create new objects, merely reinterprets the existing ones. That is why right to work requires the violation of contractual relationships, that is why racial purification requires killing, and that is why IP requires theft. It’s a simple logical error where you assume that two different interpretations mean that there are two distinct phenomena being referred.
To put this into a formal argument, I’m going to use the set theory. We have set A, and set B. I claim that A is a subset of B, because all elements that are in A are also in B. If it was not correct, then it would be possible to show an element that is in A, but not in B. You claim that it’s not correct, but cannot produce an example of such an element. What is your response?
And that is what is owned by the author, no matter how many copies are made.
Another non-sequitur. This claim boils down to the formal construct that if X performs action A (creation of an original), and Y performs a causally related action B (creation of a copy) against X’s wishes, he is violating X’s rights. That claim is incoherent.
Unauthorized copies are rivalrous with the authorized copies.
Exactly. And economists call such a situation a mix of substitutes and externalities. Not a violation of rights. If it was, then all competition would be illegal.
I’m still expecting your reply with an example of a situation of IP which is neither redundant nor contradictory to physical property rights. That is a crucial point, because IP proponents that produce similar arguments typically also support physical property rights, and if my argument is right, they are contradicting themselves. So kindly explain how that contradiction is resolved, or show an example where the contradiction (or redundancy) does not occur.
- April 6, 2011 at 6:34 pm
- April 6, 2011 at 9:42 pm
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Peter Surda wrote,
“Dear J. Neil Schulman,
“kindly note that you have not answered to my questions. Instead, you switch to an entirely different flow of argumentation.”
I do not note that. I answered your questions. You don’t like the answers so you pretend I haven’t answered them. Intentional deafness is one of the oldest debating tricks. Not working.
“Why do people buy books?
“For the argument’s sake, let’s agree that because they find them valuable.”
No. You’re skipping over the essential point, in an attempt for those reading this not to notice your attempt at sleight of hand.
This is not a debate about value. It’s a debate about what things are. You and Kinsella are trying a reductionist argument, that the composition does not exist independently, and can not be observed and used, as a separate thing apart from the objects which carry them. It’s a stupid argument, but it’s all you have.
“‘The material identity of a book is dependent on the composition of words..’”
“This is a non-sequitur. Merely because an object has value to someone and that value is derived from certain features, it does not follow that the features build an identity as something that’s independent of the object itself. It merely means that by re-interepreting the object through the features we gain a new, maybe more useful, insight, but you cannot have new rights without sacrificing the old ones, because both approaches cover the same area.”
Aside from the murkiness of the above paragraph you’re again ignoring my actual argument — which isn’t a non-sequitur or disgression but is a direct answer to your badly asked question — and you’re shifting the discussion away from whether the composition is a real thing that determines the difference between one mass of paper, ink, and binding and another mass of paper, ink, and binding.
Long before we get to the question of why anyone wants a book is the question about what the book is.
You and Kinsella refuse to debate that question, instead shifting to questions of subjective value.
Let’s use your challenge that I’m “reinterpreting” what a thing is.
Let’s take two boxes. One is made of paper mache and the other is made of steel.
They are both boxes. Both have different physical qualities that give them different utility. For example, if someone who weights a few hundred pounds tries to sit on the paper mache box it collapses; the steel box does not collapse. Therefore the paper mache box is useless as a chair; the steel box is useful as a chair. The steel box has “chair” as one of its possible uses.
Someone who values a chair must first make the distinction between an object that can hold them up and an object that collapses under them. The reality of what the thing is and what it can be used for precede the question of anyone making a value judgment.
With a book, the composition is what makes the two masses of paper, ink, and glue different, and determines what it can be used for.
The composition is a different and separable property from the book.
You can’t separate the capability of a steel box to hold someone up from the steel box itself — so “holding-upedness” isn’t a property that can be owned separate from the steel box — but the composition in the book can be separated out.
The composition can be printed and bound within a mass of ink, paper, and glue.
The composition can be extracted from the mass of ink, paper, and glue and put into digital storage, where its words can be read aloud by software or displayed on a screen for reading.
If it’s a story the story can be transferred into other media, such as a stage play, an audio drama, a movie; continuing characters can be used in a TV series or even more written stories.
It takes a particularly stubborn ideologue to twist and ignore reality so as not to see the obvious: the common and primary purpose of binding paper and ink into books is to carry the composition so someone else can read it. Remove the composition you remove much of the utility — and yes, someone’s subjective value could be affected by the objective change in what the thing is.
“I may value that it does not rain. That does not mean that the absence of rain has an identity (like Thor or Zeus or whatever) that is separate from the water in the air.”
Answered above.
“‘The book exists as a material object independent of the paper, ink, and binding.’
“This is the same non-sequitur. The same argument could be used to “prove” that all kinds of imaginary concepts, like magic or god, exist. Let me go back to my example where I showed how inventing new words (“right to work”, “racial purification”) does not create new objects, merely reinterprets the existing ones. That is why right to work requires the violation of contractual relationships, that is why racial purification requires killing, and that is why IP requires theft. It’s a simple logical error where you assume that two different interpretations mean that there are two distinct phenomena being referred.”
This is just a repetition of your fallacy. Already answered above.
“To put this into a formal argument, I’m going to use the set theory. We have set A, and set B. I claim that A is a subset of B, because all elements that are in A are also in B. If it was not correct, then it would be possible to show an element that is in A, but not in B. You claim that it’s not correct, but cannot produce an example of such an element. What is your response?”
B can be removed from A as a separate thing. B remains intact. A is now something else without the inclusion of B. The removal of B removes much of the utility of A since A was dependent on B for much of its utility. B, however, retains all its utility. This is a proof that the utility of “B” is what’s being traded as a good.
“‘And that is what is owned by the author, no matter how many copies are made.’
“Another non-sequitur. This claim boils down to the formal construct that if X performs action A (creation of an original), and Y performs a causally related action B (creation of a copy) against X’s wishes, he is violating X’s rights. That claim is incoherent.”
Your repeated use of non-sequitur is imbecilic since you evidently don’t understand that a non-sequitur is a statement that doesn’t follow. The only thing that’s not following here is you.
“‘Unauthorized copies are rivalrous with the authorized copies.’”
“Exactly. And economists call such a situation a mix of substitutes and externalities. Not a violation of rights. If it was, then all competition would be illegal.”
Competition is a secondary issue. The primary issue is whether there is a violation of property rights. Counterfeit goods compete in a market with the real things. A forged Picasso competes fraudulently with a real Picasso. And an unauthorized copy of a novel competes fraudulently with a copy authorized by the author.
“I’m still expecting your reply with an example of a situation of IP which is neither redundant nor contradictory to physical property rights. That is a crucial point, because IP proponents that produce similar arguments typically also support physical property rights, and if my argument is right, they are contradicting themselves. So kindly explain how that contradiction is resolved, or show an example where the contradiction (or redundancy) does not occur.”
A logos is that which makes one physical object different from another. Add it to a physical object and it takes on the material identity and material utility of the logos. Remove it and the physical object loses the material identity and material utility of the logos.
Things do not just exist. They also have identity and utility. If I pulverize a car it can no longer be driven. The pile of dust has all the physicality of the original car but its logos — its identity — has been removed.
Understand this and you’ll understand why your question is nonsensical. There is no property to exist without the logos which gives it form and material identity. Property does not and can not exist without material identity. It is the material identity which creates a thing as distinct and ownable as property.
This is why I call you anti-IP advocates communists, thieves, and parasites. You hate and reject precisely what makes property distinct as property — then blinding yourselves to the difference, you claim the right to take that which you start by denying as existing.
- April 6, 2011 at 10:27 pm
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Your whole theory sounds exactly what Ayn Rand thought about IP. You just gave this another name.
Let’s try again with the question-answer-thingy:
Imagine you were a “caveman” living with two other cavemen. One of you learned somehow how to start a fire (let us call him Firestarter).
One day one of the others sees Firestarter making a fire and learns that ability too.
This ones name is Learner.The third one who has not done a thing until now is called Waiter.
So what happens according to your theory?
Is Learner now allowed to make fire without asking Firestarter?
Is he allowed to teach Waiter?
What if Learner had learned starting fire without watching Firestarter?Please answer these questions as specific as possible.
- April 8, 2011 at 5:59 am
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You keep conflating ideas with material identity. All your questions are paralogical — beside the point, missing the point, and addressing your own straw man.
- April 6, 2011 at 10:42 pm
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Neil,
Based on your response to Peter, the challenge from Kinsella is laughable. It is no contest!
Thank you for handling them both so deftly!
- April 7, 2011 at 2:45 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
first, kindly note that again you avoided answering questions. You refer to superfluous aspects of the problem and ignore the core fallacies.
I do not note that. I answered your questions. You don’t like the answers so you pretend I haven’t answered them. Intentional deafness is one of the oldest debating tricks. Not working.
So where you have show an example of IP that is neither redundant nor contradicts property rights?
You’re skipping over the essential point, in an attempt for those reading this not to notice your attempt at sleight of hand.
I am not “skipping” over it, I’m just providing a different interpretation, because that’s what I thought you were getting at. Apologies, the mistake is mine. We can also agree on a different interpretation, for example that the reason for buying the book is a specific feature of that book and that feature is causally related to author’s activities. Now, here come the crucial questions, once again: why do causally related features create an identity that is separate from the carriers, why do they create rights, and why do these rights take precedence over rights in the carriers themselves? Also, which causally related activities and which features are relevant?
It’s a debate about what things are.
Not really. It is a debate what things can be and what they cannot be (logic). Whether they are is a different question (metaphysics).
You and Kinsella are trying a reductionist argument, that the composition does not exist independently, and can not be observed and used, as a separate thing apart from the objects which carry them. It’s a stupid argument, but it’s all you have.
This argument is the cornerstone of a scientific inquiry and argumentation itself. Without it no two assumptions can contradict each other, because you just say that if you interpret one assumption differently, it creates a new entity that does not contradict the other one. It would be impossible to refute any claim. Or, to paraphrase Ayn Rand, contradictions would exist.
Even if you disagree with the purely formal construct (and, apparently, also from the point of view of IP) at this moment, I can show how it demonstrates the burden of proof that lies on you. Yet again, I’ll refer to the example with “right to job”.
Let’s take a hypothetical proponent of a “right to job”. I would begin with asking him if he agrees that “right to a job” violates physical property rights. He would say “no”. He would then continue with saying that a right to “job” is a moral imperative (just like you say that IP is a moral imperative) just like physical property rights. My counterargument would be that it is just a reinterpretation of the contractual relationships, and therefore is either redundant (when it coincides with voluntary contracts) or violates physical property rights (where it does not conincide with voluntary contracts). So that means the two assumptions are contradictory. Also it is obvious that the moral aspect is irrelevant to the validity of my claim. I would also say that by showing an example where they do not contradict each other it is possible to disprove me. Then the hypothetical proponent would then continue by saying that my argument is stupid.
That about sums up our debate so far.
you’re again ignoring my actual argument — which isn’t a non-sequitur or disgression but is a direct answer to your badly asked question — and you’re shifting the discussion away from whether the composition is a real thing that determines the difference between one mass of paper, ink, and binding and another mass of paper, ink, and binding.
I am not ignoring your argument. I am challenging its relevance on double counts. The first count is that it has nothing to do with my claim of you contradicting yourself. You’re essentially saying that if your claim is morally justifiable, you can contradict yourself.
The second is that if I reformulate it into a formal claim, it results in “common features and a causal relationship create an identity, therefore they create rights, and the rights take precedence over other rights”. I asked you to take a stance to this claim.
You and Kinsella refuse to debate that question, instead shifting to questions of subjective value.
Again, we’re not refusing to debate the question. We wonder how it fixes the self-contradiction (which IP proponents ignore) and how can it be made into a coherent formal claim (which IP proponents also ignore).
You can’t separate the capability of a steel box to hold someone up from the steel box itself — so “holding-upedness” isn’t a property that can be owned separate from the steel box — but the composition in the book can be separated out.
Of course you can “separate” the “hold-upedness”, just like you can “separate” the book’s contents. You just learn from the old box and create a new piece of furniture that shares this feature with it. You create a new object that is causally related and shares the same feature (or at least one that’s similar enough). Admittedly, “hold-upedness” might not be as thrilling feature as a text, but that is an empirical issue. People have figured out how to propagate certain, maybe more valuable, features more efficiently than others.
None of this proves that what you’re doing is not a reinterpretation.
The composition can be printed and bound within a mass of ink, paper, and glue. The composition can be extracted from the mass of ink, paper, and glue and put into digital storage, where its words can be read aloud by software or displayed on a screen for reading.
Again, you can do this with any aspect of objects: you just create a formal standardised representation of the feature and a method of decoding and encoding it. The alleged difference between text and “hold upedness” is in the level of standardisation. If the language was not standardised, a text would be facing the same difficulties of propagating as “hold upedness”, or in other words, storytellers would be facing the same “difficulties” as
furniture manufacturers in propagating the essence of their work.It takes a particularly stubborn ideologue to twist and ignore reality so as not to see the obvious: the common and primary purpose of binding paper and ink into books is to carry the composition so someone else can read it.
It takes an unbiased mind to realise the essence of assumptions and logical operations.
B can be removed from A as a separate thing. B remains intact. A is now something else without the inclusion of B. The removal of B removes much of the utility of A since A was dependent on B for much of its utility. B, however, retains all its utility. This is a proof that the utility of “B” is what’s being traded as a good.
This is not set theory. You are making a new claim instead, that utility is the essence of objects. First of all, that does not disprove my claim that even if you consider utility to be relevant from the point of view of rights, you would still always need to sacrifice physical property rights. Furthermore, it leaves the question unaddressed why is this in any way relevant from the perspective of property rights.
Your repeated use of non-sequitur is imbecilic since you evidently don’t understand that a non-sequitur is a statement that doesn’t follow. The only thing that’s not following here is you.
That is precisely my point. Your statements do not follow. It does not follow that “identity” is separate from the objects that carry it, or that this creates new rights, or that these rights would take precedence over physical property rights, or that there are situations where physical property rights are unaffected.
The primary issue is whether there is a violation of property rights.
Which you derive by a non-sequitur and fail to define in a coherent manner.
Counterfeit goods compete in a market with the real things. A forged Picasso competes fraudulently with a real Picasso.
This is a distinction that follows from what the the buyer of the Picasso (original or copy) wants, rather than from what Picasso (or his heirs) want.
And an unauthorized copy of a novel competes fraudulently with a copy authorized by the author.
Again, that is for the buyers to decide, not for the author.
A logos is that which makes one physical object different from another. Add it to a physical object and it takes on the material identity and material utility of the logos. Remove it and the physical object loses the material identity and material utility of the logos.
Can you add or remove it without altering the physical object? If not, then you’re just reinterpreting.
They also have identity and utility.
And this should be relevant from the point of view of property rights because?
Understand this and you’ll understand why your question is nonsensical.
Understand the self-contradictions and non-sequiturs in your claims and you’ll understand that you do not have a coherent claim.
Property does not and can not exist without material identity.
So, all objects have features, and some are causally related and similar from a certain perspective. Why does this in any way disprove my claims, and why is this relevant to our debate?
This is why I call you anti-IP advocates communists, thieves, and parasites.
Now you switched to the emotional perspective, claiming that if you take a specific moral stance, it fixes the logical errors you’re committing.
You hate and reject precisely what makes property distinct as property — then blinding yourselves to the difference, you claim the right to take that which you start by denying as existing.
Now you’re projecting. You’re making the assumption that because you’re the one being emotional, I’m the one being emotional too.
So, let us summarise your claims:
(1) objects have features
(2) sometimes, the features are useful, similar enough and causally related
(so far we are in agreement)
(3) this creates new rights
(this is a non-sequitur)
(4) these rights sometimes address situations that are not covered by physical property rights
(this is a self-contradiction)
(5) opposing these rights is akin to communism
(this would only follow if claim 4 was correct)See? There’s no hate, there’s no “anti-IP advocacy”. There’s just cold hard logic.
- April 7, 2011 at 3:35 am
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Things do not just exist. They also have identity and utility. If I pulverize a car it can no longer be driven. The pile of dust has all the physicality of the original car but its logos — its identity — has been removed.
Its “identity” has been “removed”? This is an overly metaphorical way of describing the situation. Scarce resources may be used by man as a means of action to achieve goals. As Rand herself explained, one cannot create anything metaphysically but rearranges owned things to make them more useful, more valuable to the actor. In this way man creates “wealth”–he transforms his property into more valuable configurations. Thus I take raw material that i own–glass, plastic, steel, rubber–and, using knowledge about causal laws rearrange this material into a more useful configuration: a car. It is my car. I own it not because I “created” or produced “it” but because I already owned the factors that I transformed. I transformed it because I prefer a certain configuration–because it is more valuable or useful to me. Because I regard it as wealth. If someone destroys the car they have made it less valuable to me. That is why I want a property right in the car, and for this right to be respected and defended: so that others cannot do things with or to my car that I do not want done to it.
I cannot say whether it is useful to try to use metaphors to describe what is wrong with destroying others property, metaphors like “you removed the logos from my car!’ or “you removed the identity from my car, you … you identity-sucker you!” If someone stabs me I do not shout “you removed some of my identity! Give it back!” If someone points a gun at me I do not say “Hey, don’t you dare take away my logos!” But maybe you do. Maybe it helps you to think of things in these odd ways. It is in any case irrelevant: the fact that you find it helpful to describe trespass as “identity removal” does not suffice to establish property rights in “logos”.
Understand this and you’ll understand why your question is nonsensical. There is no property to exist without the logos which gives it form and material identity.
Well in your car case: presumably the raw material I use to make the car are owned property, right?
If I want a sword I take some iron ore and using knowledge of causal laws to guide my action (which some people insist on calling “labor”, as if it’s anything more than human action) I rearrange the iron ore into a sword, I suppose you could say the sword “has” a logos, and that is what makes it valuable to me. Ho-kayyy. I guess you can think of it this way if it helps you. But it’s not necessary or especially enlightening. Of course the sword has a different configuration and utility to me than the raw iron ore did. That is why I transformed it. Hellooo. Above you say there is no property to exist without the logos. Well I had to own the iron ore before I made the sword out of it, do I not? So I did have property “without the logos,” and “adding a logos to” the iron-ore-property, or, as normal people would say, transforming the iron ore, adds no property rights. I already owned the ore. I own what I reshape it into, of course. I don’t own the sword because I breathed a logos into it. I couldn’t have the sword at all unless I already owned the stuff I used to make it.
- April 7, 2011 at 12:48 pm
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@Stephan Kinsella April 7, 2011 at 3:35 am
If I want a sword I take some iron ore and using knowledge of causal laws to guide my action (which some people insist on calling “labor”, as if it’s anything more than human action) I rearrange the iron ore into a sword, I suppose you could say the sword “has” a logos, and that is what makes it valuable to me. Ho-kayyy. I guess you can think of it this way if it helps you. But it’s not necessary or especially enlightening. Of course the sword has a different configuration and utility to me than the raw iron ore did. That is why I transformed it. Hellooo. Above you say there is no property to exist without the logos. Well I had to own the iron ore before I made the sword out of it, do I not? So I did have property “without the logos,” and “adding a logos to” the iron-ore-property, or, as normal people would say, transforming the iron ore, adds no property rights. I already owned the ore. I own what I reshape it into, of course. I don’t own the sword because I breathed a logos into it. I couldn’t have the sword at all unless I already owned the stuff I used to make it.
I think you agree, from this example alone, the property rights you describe arise from the right of self-ownership and the private ownership of the means of production. In your example, you are simply describing how you (self-owner) and your private means of production (property) are employed in a production process (production) to transform raw materials into some other useful good (product). You own the product of your own production because you used your privately owned means to produce it.
Using your example, what is actually happening here is that you are also using things which you don’t own, because they are un-ownable public domain. For example, the air needed to fire your forge, the “recipe” for forging metal objects, the skill to actually affect the desired change, and the “idea” of sword. You use these things, which you do not own, yet you claim this does not disturb your ownership of the property called “sword”. I agree.
When you transfer the sword to a buyer, you transfer rights to all of the tangible goods that compose the sword, which is consistent with the “title transfer theory”, i.e. once transferred, there is no longer any rights to it left with you; it is a complete and total title transfer of a tangible good.
By the same process, an author composes a book by combining things in the public domain (ideas, historical facts, recipe for composition, letters of the alphabet, etc.), with personal capabilities (cognition, experience, language skills, creativity, etc) and tangible goods (paper, ink, letters, words, grammatical sentences, and/or machine readable 1s and 0s resulting from keystrokes).
You have no dispute with the concept that the final product is an original manuscript, owned entirely by the author. The manuscript was produced by the means of production which combined self-ownership with the public domain. When the author makes a copy from the original manuscript, he owns that too, because the manuscript is the means of production for the copy.
If a copy is copied, that original copy is the means of production. There is no contention here, as I understand the issues. As long as the author does not transfer the originals of copies to anyone else, his complete ownership is undisputed.
If the author transfers the title to you as a book, your claim is that you own at that point, all rights to the book and its contents, in exactly the same way that when you transfer a sword, the producer retains no property interest in it. Your interest is severed when it is transferred.Therefore according to you, when the author sells a book, his interests in his original work are also transferred. Isn’t this correct? Since you now own the book, it is your property, and you can use it as you see fit, without any residual obligations to the author. The act of copying your copy is legitimate, and has no impact on the author’s rights. Therefore, any enforcement of the author’s claim to “your” book is aggression.
So the question remains, is there anything about the comparison between “sword” and “book” that makes them distinguishable? If not, then a theory of property can simply assume that only tangible goods exist, and therefore any transfer of a tangible good is a complete and total transfer of title, with no “partial” transfer that distinguishes the tangible and intangible content. I believe your argument would be that there is nothing about the sword that implies a partial transfer of title. You own “all of the sword” and transfer that title without limitations.
If we assume your example of a hand-crafted sword, and also assume a praxeological framework of analysis, the buyer desires the sword because of the desire to have the “swordness”, presumably because of its utility as a weapon. No one would buy a hammer that wants a sword, even though much of the production process would be the same. Given the metal and forge, how did it come out a sword instead of a hammer?The producer, through his own capabilities and means, developed a rational plan to produce swords and not hammers. “Sword” started as an idea, and then became a tangible good, in that order. The idea of sword is fundamental, but the process of actually transforming raw materials into a sword is complex, as I said above. This is one reason why most of us would buy a sword, rather than make it ourselves. We buy toasters for the same, reason.
We buy books, why? Because of the “bookness” in books. Describing “bookness” is the thrust of Shulman’s treatment of the concept of logos, as I understand him. I think of it, in the context of copyrights, as being equivalent to “an original work or authorship”.I do not think you deny the existence of the intangible work. You are claiming that when a physical fixation of the “bookness” is transferred to you, that it severs any title the author may claim in the “bookness” part, by virtue of the fact that this work was fixed on a tangible good which you now own. This implies that all attributes of private property are bundled and inseparable from the tangible good (i.e the bound paper part of “book” and the “bookness” that made that fixation possible cannot be separated).
Of course, this leads to absurd conclusions, such as, you would presumably be equally willing to pay the same price for a blank book, or a book with random letters in it, as you would for a great literary work. After all, they are both indistinguishable from an analysis of the tangible goods; both have paper, glue, ink, and letters in them. Likewise, you would buy a hammer if I called it a sword, and you wouldn’t know the difference?
Hoppe said in his Against Fiduciary Media, to paraphrase, (https://www.mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/Q11_2.PDF ) that title to property and property itself are separate, yet there must be a correlation between the two. His objection to fiduciary media amounts to what he calls the creation of “title in search of property”. He also said that transfer of title cannot be presumed without express consent by the original owner.
So the issue returns to exactly Shulman’s point. If the author owns the original manuscript, what is “it” that he owns? Whatever “that” is, he has title to it. It cannot be transferred without his consent.
Are titles to property a single thing, or can there be alienability of one aspect of a given property into distinguishable titles? For example, you can own a parcel of land, but sell mineral rights, or transfer your right to exclusive use through easement, etc.
The sword is composed of many elements, but the buyer acquires the entire sword. If the sword is copied, it is actually and physically necessary that the same process that the sword-maker went through to produce it is carried out. This makes the cost of copying the sword at least as high (assuming equal knowledge, skill, and access to raw materials) if not higher than the original. Therefore, the “make/buy” calculation of a buyer must take this into account. It is not necessary to protect the recipe for sword production (although it may be desirable) because the cost of copying makes the calculation favor “buying” over “making” for most people.This is also true for land, but because land cannot be copied at any cost; it is naturally unique. Therefore there is no recipe for that. Tucker once wrote something like, it is the cost of copying which determines if a good is scarce or not. This is nonsense, of course, since the cost of copying is a function of technological advancement. Technology does not change the fundamental ethical basis of property rights. Once it was very expensive to copy a book, because it had to be hand-lettered. In that time, all books were scarce, according to Tucker’s logic. The low marginal cost of duplication today has nothing to do with the arrangements of fundamental property rights.
The corollary to the sword example for the author, would be the process of creating “bookness”. Shulman has produced a detailed analysis of what this “thing” is using a unique approach, but no matter what you call it, how you conceptualize its origins and existence, it is that “thing” which is the subject of copyright laws. He calls it logos, I call it “original works of authorship” in the copyright context.
Is it possible to alienate the title to the intangible “work” and the title to the tangible “book”, which combine to make “bookness”? We know they both exist, and we know that one precedes the other. The work must precede its fixation. How can we “prove” that the work can exist without the fixation? Imagine disappearing ink in a book you bought. In three days, the ink disappears to reveal random splotches of ink in their place. You still have the tangible good, and it still has all of the tangible elements, so what is missing? The “work” of course!
Why can’t you just replace it yourself, restore it to its prior state? Because it requires a means of production, which originally was owned by the author. If the “bookness” that you paid for was suddenly incomprehensible, would you have a problem with that? Of course! That is because what you want, what you calculated was worth your money, was the part that is now missing. The original work or authorship is missing, therefore it must exist.
It appears that there is something that is bundled into the “bookness” of the book beyond the paper and ink. If these things are bundled, they are separable, and they are therefore alienable, and the owner may transfer title to each as he sees fit. You cannot claim title to property without the consent of the author.
Yet when you copy the indelible ink of a book, and reproduce it in exactly the same pattern, which preserves the comprehensibility and meaning, and use it as you see fit, you are claiming to have severed the authors title to his own property. You have claimed better title to it than the author. You have obtained the “sword” without investing in the same means of production required to produce the original.
In any other context of property rights, this would be unethical, yet you seem to reason your way to an exception, and insist that the author should sever his rights and cede them to you without consent.Your theory of property means that the author, once he distributes a fixation of his work, surrenders absolute title to both the good, and the means of production, because the copy cannot exist without an original to copy from. The original manuscript IS the means of production. What you are proposing is equivalent to the situation where when you buy the sword, you also buy the means of production or the next sword you desire.
This is unjustifiable from an ethical standpoint, and is a violation of Austrian economic theory of the private ownership of the means of production, so is economically unjustifiable, as it requires an author to produce, for the most part, for external economies. Given a choice, he will not do so, for producers to not voluntarily choose slavery.
Ethically and economically, your argument is bust.
- April 7, 2011 at 1:35 pm
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with no “partial” transfer that distinguishes the tangible and intangible content. I believe your argument would be that there is nothing about the sword that implies a partial transfer of title. You own “all of the sword” and transfer that title without limitations.
Sure you can have a ‘partial’ transfer of ‘rights’. I can sell you a sword along with a contract saying that your forbidden to actually use it and if you do then you owe me 10x as much. It’s a insane contract, but I suppose it’s a valid one.
And just like that you can sell a book to me and make me agree to never copy it. If I agree to that and then copy it anyways then I am the one that is the asshole.
But none of that explains why any of these transfers and these agreements affect people that don’t agree to it. That is there is no logical way why our agreements between selling and buyer of goods actually has any bearing on anybody else’s behavior or goods.
Copyright says that if you broadcast a song over the radio then it’s illegal for me to record it and then play it back to a friend. That is a fact on how copyright works yet it does not fit into anything your describing above. Patent law says that if I discover how your radio broadcasts works on my own then I would still owe you patent fees if you had a patent registered with the government.
That is were your arguments break down. ‘Intellectual Property law’ does not just affect two parties transferring a deed or product. It affects everyone universally completely regardless of any sorts of agreements or transferring of anything.
Lets go back a bit:
Say I hired you as a painter to paint my fence. And you said ‘sure’, but I would have to agree to the fact that any fence painting resembling your unique aesthetics in the future must be done by you for the next 75 years. That’s rather insane, but say I agree to that and then hire you to paint the fence.According to ‘Intellectual Property’ concepts then that would give you the ability to sue Stephan if he was walking by, saw my fence, and then decided to copy it for himself in his yard. According to how ‘Intellectual Property’ works then that gives you the full right to get a injunction against Stephan and, if a Judge agreed to it, then destroy his fence in order to ‘protect’ your original work.
THAT is why Intellectual Property is a violation of property rights and has nothing to do with protecting your property at all. The function provided by IP is to provide a legal mechanism which you can use to control the actions of people with their goods regardless of any previous dealings with you in the past.
- April 7, 2011 at 2:55 pm
- April 7, 2011 at 3:44 pm
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@nate-m April 7, 2011 at 1:35 pm
That is there is no logical way why our agreements between selling and buyer of goods actually has any bearing on anybody else’s behavior or goods.
You ignore the key difference between contracts and property rights. Property rights affect everyone within a “jurisdiction” whether that means legal or simply social boundaries. Whether property rights arise around a particular thing is dependent upon the transaction costs of reaching an agreement. In the case of copyrights, the transaction costs in terms of negotiation and enforcement would be high in the absence of property rights. Property, like contracts, are a human device.
Copyright says that if you broadcast a song over the radio then it’s illegal for me to record it and then play it back to a friend.
Wrong. That is why it does not fit. You are succumbing to the propaganda about what the law says and how it operates. Such a use is not prohibited, any more that recording a TV show on your VCR and playing it for a friend is prohibited. On the other hand, a public performance, especially if you collected money for it, would be prohibited. Do you see the difference?
Patent law says that if I discover how your radio broadcasts works on my own then I would still owe you patent fees if you had a patent registered with the government.
I don’t know whether you mean to raise the issue trade secret or simultaneous invention, but in either case, they are specific, very unlikely circumstances which don’t undermine the fundamental principle and concept of IP.
That is were your arguments break down. ‘Intellectual Property law’ does not just affect two parties transferring a deed or product. It affects everyone universally completely regardless of any sorts of agreements or transferring of anything.
See my distinction between contract agreements and property rights above. Universal applicability is exactly the purpose of property. Why would you criticize the concept on the basis of it fulfilling its purpose? As with all rights, conflicts are generally between two people, one who has rights, and one who has allegedly violated them.
THAT is why Intellectual Property is a violation of property rights and has nothing to do with protecting your property at all. The function provided by IP is to provide a legal mechanism which you can use to control the actions of people with their goods regardless of any previous dealings with you in the past.
Why construct such a convoluted example? First, IF I have established some property rights that were “legal” though insane, I have a right to enforce them, right?
The question you are begging is “what rights are legitimate?” If I got you to agree to be your exclusive painter for 75 years henceforth, you couldn’t hire another painter without compensating me for breach of our agreement.
Even if I try to make your example analogous to IP, it fails. I’m not sure if it would be worth it to either of us to try to show you why. The main point you seem to be making is that IP rights have effect without the need for a specific contract. That is correct, but it is simply an attribute of all property rights and all laws; they are applicable to everyone without the need to prior agreement with a potential violator. You don’t have a contract with everyone in your neighborhood to establish your right not to be murdered. That is the simply the way rights work.
The only way to completely get away from that fact is to live on a desert island, where the only thing you have to worry about is surviving against natural laws and forces. As soon as one other human shows up, you are limited in your range of absolute freedom by that person’s rights. The more people, the more limited. The more rights, the more limited. These are simple basic facts about rights and property and defense of them.
The fact that you seem to believe that rights in IP are not legitimate must be made on some grounds other than attacking the way all rights operate.
- April 7, 2011 at 4:25 pm
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@Stephan Kinsella April 7, 2011 at 2:55 pm
I don’t know what you are getting at. get on with it.
I’m saying this: “You own the product of your own production because you used your privately owned means to produce it.
yes, Austrians call this the general conditions of action or free goods. so what? This is a good thing.
OK so far so good.
bravo
Progress.
material. scarce. not “tangible.” but whatever.
I am trying to distinguish “tangible” from “intangible” for a reason. Don’t blow it off. I don’t know what you exactly define as “material” or “scarce”, so I want to discuss property in terms of this distinction. You know why. This is particularly important in the context of copyright. Does “whatever” mean you follow, don’t want to bother mapping the terms, or what?
Unless it’s not. Anyway if rights are left they are rights to control this scarce good. They are part of property rights: rights to control a scarce good.
Why would it not?
If by scarce you mean rivalrous, and by rivalrous you mean contestable as to ownership (exclusive use/possession), are you saying that there is no possibility of rights to control intangible goods? I gave you two examples; easements and “works”. These appear to be both “scarce” and intangible. Any problem?I said: By the same process, an author composes a book by combining things in the public domain (ideas, historical facts, recipe for composition, letters of the alphabet, etc.), with personal capabilities (cognition, experience, language skills, creativity, etc) and tangible goods (paper, ink, letters, words, grammatical sentences, and/or machine readable 1s and 0s resulting from keystrokes).
not the same at all. this is metaphysical nonsense.
Don’t blow me off. This is an exact corollary to your sword example. What’s the difference? You just agreed above, and even cited your own work, at least in part to show prior agreement that this is what is going on, yet here you want to now take exception? Why?
Wrong. I never call it “a product.” I talk about ownership of scarce resourcs. Fail.
I’m calling it “a product” for the same reasons you called “sword” a product. I am asserting that the author is the owner of his own production, which is in fact a scarce resource. If it is an original manuscript, there is only one in the entire universe. If it has upon its pages an “original work or authorship” it is as scarce a scarce can be. What’s your beef?
I said: The manuscript was produced by the means of production which combined self-ownership with the public domain. When the author makes a copy from the original manuscript, he owns that too, because the manuscript is the means of production for the copy.what?
See above “metaphorical nonsense” for the decoder ring, if you can’t follow. It is in fact a production process that works like this: The author does everything every other producer does and makes an original manuscript, at some personal and capital cost. That manuscript is a producer good, not a consumer good. From this original producer good, consumer goods can be made inexpensively compared to the original. Like all production, the first product is very expensive. Mass production makes the marginal cost of each consumer product very low compared to the cost of that first original.
Think of it as a tool die. From this die, many other copies can be made inexpensively. When you get one of the copies, you do not also get the tool die. If you want that, at the very least you have to go through the trouble and capital expense of making one.
Copying an original work is assuming ownership of the “tool die” and competing on the basis of externalizing the cost of the producer goods in order to gain access to the consumer goods. How is such an arrangement consistent with any theory of Austrian economics?the rest of your post is compleat gibberish.
I presume you got bored or didn’t want to deal with the conclusions and preferred to blow me off with your sarcasm and dismissals. That’s ok, here is the last paragraph:
“Your theory of property means that the author, once he distributes a fixation of his work, surrenders absolute title to both the good, and the means of production, because the copy cannot exist without an original to copy from. The original manuscript IS the means of production. What you are proposing is equivalent to the situation where when you buy the sword, you also buy the means of production or the next sword you desire.You cannot homestead another’s property. It’s that simple.
- April 9, 2011 at 8:50 am
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@WildBerry
You ignore the key difference between contracts and property rights. Property rights affect everyone within a “jurisdiction” whether that means legal or simply social boundaries.
The jurisdiction and social boundaries for property rights… is the property. Is the physical property itself. That’s the jurisdiction. The physical item. Beyond that there is no affect my property rights have on other people. You can have conflicts and problems with property rights in the form of something like ‘water rights’ or what to do with radiation pollution or noise pollution… but that is still extremely limited to in that it is how physical property can affect another adjacent piece of physical property.
Are you arguing that since ideas have no physical boundaries then ownership of ideas should be universal? That your owned concepts have to be respected by every man, women, and child on planet earth and that is their job to make sure that they do not violate your IP?
That’s is so impractical a concept and contradicts physical property rights to such a extent that it boggles the mind.
Wrong. That is why it does not fit. You are succumbing to the propaganda about what the law says and how it operates. Such a use is not prohibited, any more that recording a TV show on your VCR and playing it for a friend is prohibited. On the other hand, a public performance, especially if you collected money for it, would be prohibited. Do you see the difference?
Yes. If I play back the music for one friend then that is legal. But if I play it back in a bar I own and then strangers dance to it then that’s illegal. If I play it back for 20 friends then that is illegal.
How does this make sense? How does copyright apply universally here… what is the natural boundaries here?
Is it morally correct to play recorded music for 2 friends? How about 4 friends? How about 10 friends? Is it ok if it’s inside, but not ok if it’s outside… or is it only illegal if I charge a cover and it’s outside with 20 or more friends.
Is it a violation of your property rights to play the music back in the park or on the bus? Is it morally justifiable to play back the music in a commercial establishment that I do not own, yet immoral to do it in a place that I do?So far pro-IP-ists seem to say that is morally incorrect to play music back in a way that many, in a off chance, conflict with a author’s ability to make money from the playback, but it’s ok as long as it’s not done in a manner that the copyright owner can collect royalties under IP law and this is entirely natural state of affairs and people should be able to understand this. This is extremely arbitrary, however, and confusing. It seems odd that you would think that this is some sort of fundamental right here. It does not resemble natural or fundamental rights in any way. (‘natural rights’ being defined as rights that logically exist in a de facto manner universally outside of de jure law)
I said:
Patent law says that if I discover how your radio broadcasts works on my own then I would still owe you patent fees if you had a patent registered with the government.
To which you replied:
I don’t know whether you mean to raise the issue trade secret or simultaneous invention, but in either case, they are specific, very unlikely circumstances which don’t undermine the fundamental principle and concept of IP.
I raised the issue of patents. I gave a example of how patents work. If you have a patented mechanism for broadcasting radios signals and I try to use the same methods then it’s illegal for me to do so. This is completely regardless of whether or not I copied you or came up with it independently.
That is were your arguments break down. ‘Intellectual Property law’ does not just affect two parties transferring a deed or product. It affects everyone universally completely regardless of any sorts of agreements or transferring of anything.
Your bolstering my arguments. This is entirely unlike any sort of property rights in existence.
Why construct such a convoluted example? First, IF I have established some property rights that were “legal” though insane, I have a right to enforce them, right?
I assume this is in reference to the painter-of-the-fence example.
This is not convoluted at all. My example of your ability, under IP Law, to have a judge decide to give you the ability to destroy another person’s fence, or get a injunction against them, to protect your original work is a 100% valid application of current IP law and understanding.
If you painted a mural or some other artistic depiction on a fence that is legally recognized as original work and somebody else copied it for their own because they thought it looked cool then it’s a violation of your copyright.
The only convolution there is related to me attempting to flesh out how you would think that this sort of IP would function outside of a jurisdiction of a state government’s enforcement of IP.
It seemed to me that you were drawing close to the argument that IP is justifiable through contract law. This is a classical logical approach to forming a pro-libertarian viewpoint of IP. That is agreements between authors and purchasers form the basis of ethically justifiable IP-related restrictions.
I was wrong in thinking that you were choosing this logical path to defend IP. Obviously, the IP-exists-as-extension-of-contracts argument is one you 100% reject outright.
The question you are begging is “what rights are legitimate?” If I got you to agree to be your exclusive painter for 75 years henceforth, you couldn’t hire another painter without compensating me for breach of our agreement.
The question I am begging is:
How is IP like property rights when ‘Ideas and Concepts’ have no attributes that in anyway, shape, or form resemble physical goods. It is my contention that the nature of physical goods and their usage form the logic behind ‘property rights’. Since ‘ideas and concepts’ have no similar nature then it is illogical to apply property rights to ‘ideas and concepts’.Even if I try to make your example analogous to IP, it fails.
Well the function I described 100% accurately depicts how copyrights can be applied, today, in a fence painting scenario. If you painted a mural on the fence or painting in a way that was considered ‘original work’ then you could get injunctions and other rulings against people that violate your copyrights.
What your rejecting, obviously, is that libertarian-friendly forms of copyright/patents can be made justifiable through the logical extension of contract law. Your arguments for the justification of IP is entirely based on your belief that IP is based on actual property rights. Which is something that I reject outright as being illogical.
That is you effectively saying that:
* IP rights are property rights because IP rights are property rights.
* Since IP is property rights, IP is therefore are applied universally because property rights are applied universally.
(Or at least ‘universally’ within some amorphous societal boundary concept.)I am looking for some substantial argument on the legitimacy of IP under the scope libertarian dogma* and how IP can be achieved without the use of state force and the violation of property rights. You fail on the ‘legitimacy’ aspect** and I don’t understand how your arguments lend themselves to indicating how IP restrictions can be achievable without the state and violation of property rights.***
*(which stipulates that legitimate rights are based on extensions of property rights)
**(I reject IP-as-property-rights as being illogical)
** (IP restrictions cover accidental, unintentional, and independent (in the case of patents) duplication of ‘products of the intellect’ IN ADDITION to purposeful/intentional copying.) - April 11, 2011 at 5:42 am
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Wildberry,
Such a use is not prohibited, any more that recording a TV show on your VCR and playing it for a friend is prohibited.
Even assuming this is completely correct, it was only clarified after this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc Furthermore, this is something that is specific to US. In some other countries, time shifting and sharing with friends is still illegal, and there are also no fair use exceptions (albeit violations thereof are not prosecuted that much).You are succumbing to the propaganda about what the law says and how it operates.
Liar. You misrepresent every argument that you allegedly address, avoid responding to questions, then when you can’t do anymore, you lie, and when your lies are exposed you just vanish from the thread and start the whole process elsewhere.
- April 7, 2011 at 3:17 am
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I am not sure if Neil will read the following, but I suggest anyone wondering what exactly is wrong with Neil’s argument read the following comment.
Neil, you wrote:
This is not a debate about value. It’s a debate about what things are. You and Kinsella are trying a reductionist argument, that the composition does not exist independently, and can not be observed and used, as a separate thing apart from the objects which carry them. It’s a stupid argument, but it’s all you have.
You say it’s not “about value,” yet you continually say a thing “is” a thing if it “has value”. So it is a debate about the relevance of vale. Your argument is an ontological one: you want to say that there “are” different “types” of “things”. You basically argue that so long as we humans have come up with a concept (and a corresponding word in language denoting that concept) to usefully comprehend some aspect of life or reality, then that means that the “thing” the word refers to must “exist.” So however human consciousness arranges the evidence of the senses into concepts determines ontologically the “types” of “things” that exist. So in your view there is a universe consisting of “things” of a wide variety of types–not only physical objects and scarce goods, but other “things” like “novels” and “poems” and “recipes” and “ways of arranging one’s cape”.
You realize from your libertarianism that we have to have property rights in scarce resources: this is the classic non-aggression principle: do not initiate force (physical) against the property of others–that is, do not invade the borders of others’ bodies or justly acquired scarce resources; do not use these things without their permission.
Then, you realize that praxeologically, and catallactically, these scarce goods “have value”. Now the Austrian realizes this is a subjective phenomenon: value is not a substance, it is not intrinsic; it is relational, and it is demonstrated in action. Rand is crankish when she talks about man “creating values.” Values are not some “things” that “exist” or that man “creates”. Rather, man creates wealth by rearranging the scarce goods he owns–as Rand elsewhere recognized when she was thinking carefully. To do this he only needs to have a property right in his body, and in the scarce goods he transforms and makes more valuable.
Anyway, Neil, you then say: aha, well if scarce resources are ownable, what “other” “ontological types of things”? Apparently intuitively realizing it would be unworkable to make every “thing” you can come up with a linguistic or conceptual “name” for ownable, you attempt to find some kind of limitation. You see a universe of ontological types of “things”. You know one subset of things is ownable: scarce goods. You assume that not every type of thing is ownable. So you see the universe as divided into two sets of things: ownable things, and non-ownable things. The set of ownable things includes physical resources, human bodies, and so on. Hmmm, what other “types of things” might be included in the set of ownable things?
Well, you reason, scarce resources are “things”, and “have value.” Being a “thing” and “having value” must be sufficient for being “ownable”! Voila!
This is the key fallacy in your argument, in my view. This strange assertion just comes out of nowwhere. Why in the world would “thingness” be sufficient for ownability? Where does this even come from? Or “thingness” coupled with “having value”? Why is this sufficient for ownability? What does it even mean to “have value”? This is not an Austrian notion. Things do not “have value.” Things, rather, are valued, by some actor who demonstrates by or in his action that he does value them. The Randian re-working of this precise Austrian idea is her inferior, confused formulation that “values” are things man “acts to gain and/or keep”; apparently by this she means the goals or ends of action; she conflates values with goals, and then says you can own values–i.e., we own our goals, which is crankish and confused. Apparently you have been influenced by Rand’s confused ideas in this respect.
It is not “thingness” or “having value” that makes a thing ownable. Rather it is the fact that the thing is useful to or desired by some human actors as a means of action (it is a “good”), and that it is a type of thing over which there can be conflict (it is a scarce or rivalrous good). If it is such a type of good, then it is not possible for more than one actor to employ the good as a means of action. Libertarians believe in property rights assigning ownership rights in such goods precisely as a means of overcoming the problem of violent conflict that would otherwise arise in the contest to use such scarce goods as means of action.
It is therefore not “thingness” or “having value” that makes a thing ownable: it is its being a particular type of thing: a thing that can be a means of action; a thing that is scarce (rivalrous). Mises explains exactly why the means of action are necessarily scarce. This is basic Austrian economics. As for having value–the ownable things, the means of action, are necessarily valued by a given human actor when they are selected as means of action. It is not that they “have value” that makes them ownable but simply their scarcity and the fact that there can be conflict over the use thereof–and conflict is possibly only when at least two actors each desire to use the same particular scarce good.
So you are just wrong to say that scarce goods are ownable because they are “things” and “have value,” and “therefore” all other “things” that “have value” are included in the set of ownable things in the universe. You are leaving out the rivalrous characteristic of the scarce goods that is the very reason for the need for property rights in such things in the first place. Merely being “a thing” is not sufficient for ownership, whether or not the thing “has value” (whatever this un-Austrian notion means).
- April 7, 2011 at 3:03 pm
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@Stephan Kinsella April 7, 2011 at 3:17 am
I am not sure if Neil will read the following, but I suggest anyone wondering what exactly is wrong with Neil’s argument read the following comment.
This is not a rebuttal of any substance. I can say that I HAVE read both Kinsella and Shulman, and there is in FACT something wrong here.
You realize from your libertarianism that we have to have property rights in scarce resources: this is the classic non-aggression principle: do not initiate force (physical) against the property of others–that is, do not invade the borders of others’ bodies or justly acquired scarce resources; do not use these things without their permission.
Using “these things” without permission is exactly the point. It begs the question as to whether these “things” are “ownable” as property.
Rand is crankish when she talks about man “creating values.” Values are not some “things” that “exist” or that man “creates”. Rather, man creates wealth by rearranging the scarce goods he owns–as Rand elsewhere recognized when she was thinking carefully. To do this he only needs to have a property right in his body, and in the scarce goods he transforms and makes more valuable.
It appears you are making a distinction without a difference. What is the difference between the concept of “creating values” and “scarce goods he transforms and makes more valuable”? If your distinction is “value(s)”, both seem to be implying wealth is created by the value created through private production. If it is “scarcity”, then you are assuming your conclusion that only “scarce” goods can be owned, and “scarce” means “tangible”.
Why can’t intangible goods be scarce? If rivalry is your criteria, then infringement is as much of conflict of claims in ownership as with any other property dispute. Two people cannot claim exclusive title to property at the same time. If that property is an intangible good, that good is rivalrous.
So you see the universe as divided into two sets of things: ownable things, and non-ownable things. The set of ownable things includes physical resources, human bodies, and so on. Hmmm, what other “types of things” might be included in the set of ownable things?
Isn’t that the issue? Air is tangible but not ownable. Ideas are intangible but not ownable. “Works” are intangible but ownable. Easements are intangible but ownable. If property is a human device, then one problem is determining what can be owned and what cannot.
Well, you reason, scarce resources are “things”, and “have value.” Being a “thing” and “having value” must be sufficient for being “ownable”! Voila!
The fact that something has value makes it potentially rivalrous. Air has value, is tangible, but cannot be owned. Why? If something has no value, it is not likely to incite competition for exclusive use. If it has value but cannot be owned, it is not rivalrous?
How is the conflict over a bubble of air resolved by two drowning men? Your concept of rivalry is no more definitive of property that what you argue against here.
Property is a human device, and can arise by contract or by assigning rights as property. The decision to justify some “thing” as property is a function of transaction costs. It is at least as economic in its foundations as legal or ethical. If transaction costs are low, rights tend to be defined by contract (negotiation between parties), if they are high, they tend to result in an assignment of property rights.
Recall, property is a human device, and is employed in the service of human cooperation. One aspect of this cooperation is economic exchange and assignment of liability. This is entirely consistent with your theory of property in every other context except IP, for which you attempt to make a special case based on an equivocation of the “public domain” and “private property”, otherwise known as the “ideas are free” line of reasoning.
Why in the world would “thingness” be sufficient for ownability?
It is not sufficient. Any honest reader can plainly see that you are creating your own fallacious argument, attributing it to Shulman, and then arguing against it. I believe this is called a “straw man”.
All agree that if the “product” is the result of self-ownership and private means of production, whatever “it” is, is “owned” by the producer. It is only when something is being transferred that the issue of property rights arise. Before it is transferred, it is subject to other standard rights to defense of property and self, which are not contended.
It is not “thingness” or “having value” that makes a thing ownable. Rather it is the fact that the thing is useful to or desired by some human actors as a means of action (it is a “good”), and that it is a type of thing over which there can be conflict (it is a scarce or rivalrous good). If it is such a type of good, then it is not possible for more than one actor to employ the good as a means of action Libertarians believe in property rights assigning ownership rights in such goods precisely as a means of overcoming the problem of violent conflict that would otherwise arise in the contest to use such scarce goods as means of action.
Nothing in this statement eliminates the possibility that this “useful thing” can also be an intangible good. A “work” possesses each of the attributes of property, by your own words. You are simply stating the quality of property, not resolving whether a “work” is also legitimately property.
Also, there is nothing that proves that property must be tangible to be scarce. “Original works” are scarce in every meaning of the word. Infringement itself is a conflict of ownership claims. That conflict cannot be resolved simply by waving away the possibility of the author’s rights to the work.
It is therefore not “thingness” or “having value” that makes a thing ownable: it is its being a particular type of thing: a thing that can be a means of action; a thing that is scarce (rivalrous). Mises explains exactly why the means of action are necessarily scarce.
I didn’t read Shulman to claim that “thingness” is sufficient to prove “ownership”, quite the contrary. This is, in my view, a restatement of “ideas are free”.
There are many things (air, letters) that are both things and non-ownable. They are part of the concept of “public domain” and are therefore categorically non-ownable. Yet some things are ownable. You define ownable property as tangible, that is all. I can define myself as rich, but I don’t stay at the Waldorff or buy Gucci shoes. A definition is not reality.
This is basic Austrian economics. As for having value–the ownable things, the means of action, are necessarily valued by a given human actor when they are selected as means of action. It is not that they “have value” that makes them ownable but simply their scarcity and the fact that there can be conflict over the use thereof–and conflict is possibly only when at least two actors each desire to use the same particular scarce good.
You are chasing your tail. Things are selected for their value to the selector. If you don’t have them because you don’t own them, then you attempt to trade something you do own for them. Presumbably you select them because you desire to act on the basis of your possession and use of them, as means to some other goal. You pay for them because you calculate that your life is improved by giving up something you do own for something you don’t own. If they are “unownable”, no need to pay.
You define “works” as unownable and claim your right to title to them as if they are “things” in the public domain. “Title” means exclusive use and possession, no title means universal use and possession. The fact that the author comes along and challenges your ownership rights makes them, by your own definition, rivalrous. The only way to avoid this is to simply define them into the public domain. “Ideas are free”.
- April 7, 2011 at 4:21 pm
- April 7, 2011 at 4:59 pm
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@Stephan Kinsella April 7, 2011 at 4:21 pm
Wildberry, you are just amateur and clueless and not worth replying to.
Gee, Stephan, no offense taken…
But I gave JNS a clear, coherent set of objections to respond to; he ducks and weaves and refuses to engage, as usual (and as expected). No wonder. I would too, if defending such obvious, unlibertarian nonsense.
Well, he doesn’t seem shy, and I find him forthright and articulate. You seem to insist in forcing the conversation continually back into your own construct. It is boring after awhile. You have no imagination or willingness to do anyting but defend your own ideology.
I may be an amateur, but you are simply an ideologue. You are more interested in “winning” than truth. You and Charlie Sheen share that endearing quality.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:31 pm
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“But for the most part, it is the content of the book — not the paper, ink, and binding — that is the reason people buy books. Remove the words and the utility disappears and a book ceases to be a book.”
This is your straw man. That you think you need to explain this to any of us is embarrassing.
We get it. Ideas are valuable. Value does not imply property rights. By your argument, since your neighbor keeping a disgusting and cluttered yard diminishes the value of your property, you are justified in using initiation of aggression to force him to clean his yard up.
“And that is what is owned by the author, no matter how many copies are made.”
Because…
“It is a single, scarce thing no matter how many copies are made. Only the author, as owner, is entitled to make copies, unless the owner authorizes others to make copies.
It is owned by its author unless the author sells or licenses his property rights.”
Stating your position does nothing to support it.
“Unauthorized copies are rivalrous with the authorized copies.”
Exactly. The conflict arises over physical copies holding the idea, not the idea itself. No one ever argued that copies are non-rivalrous.
“The authorized copies are non-rivalrous because they are authorized uses of the property.”
This makes no sense. If they are non-rivalrous why aren’t they free? Of course they’re rivalrous. If you are using an authorized copy I can’t be using it.
“Eliminate copyrights and the natural property rights still exist.”
Assuming of course that the natural right *ever* existed!
“murderers, robbers, rapists, pirates, thieves, and other scum”
Pirates are people that plunder ships, steal things that actually have property rights, and murder. If you are seriously likening them to a college kid sitting behind his laptop browsing torrent web sites, then you really have been brainwashed.
- April 6, 2011 at 4:10 pm
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“Neil, you have lost. Everyone knows it.”
Nuts.
- April 6, 2011 at 4:13 pm
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J. Murray wrote: “I don’t buy books for the content. I can read the content on a computer screen. I buy a book specifically for the paper, ink, and binding because it’s easier on the eyes than an electronic format.”
Proving my point that the book exists as a unique material object independent of the paper, ink, and binding, and has utility to J. Murray apart from the paper, ink, and binding that carry it.
Challenge to J. Murray: would you still buy the paper, ink, and binding if the authored content — what is really the book — wasn’t printed and bound within it?
- April 6, 2011 at 4:45 pm
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You are wrong: Value is subjective. If someone values a certain information pattern more than another that does not prove/mean that this information pattern itself is a property without its material instantiation. After all you buy the PHYSICAL book.
- April 6, 2011 at 7:10 pm
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Proving my point that the book exists as a unique material object independent of the paper, ink, and binding, and has utility to J. Murray apart from the paper, ink, and binding that carry it.
This is still the same non-sequitur. That two objects are equally suitable (or just like in the case of a book versus monitor, one is slightly more suitable than other) for a specific purpose of a specific person and that they share a causal relationship does not mean that there is a third object, their “identity”, which they share, nor does that mean that such an identity would be ownable, nor that this ownership would take precedence over the ownership of the media that it’s embedded in. The argument it a compound of several unexplained and unfounded implications.
If it was true, then all objects that are simultaneously substitutes and exernalities (i.e. those that are similarly suitable for a specific purpose and are causally related) would be illegal. That includes all competition. A newcomer would be infringing on an encumbent’s rights.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:32 pm
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“Proving my point that the book exists as a unique material object independent of the paper, ink, and binding”
Good for you. No one ever challenged that point, and it is irrelevant to the discussion.
- April 6, 2011 at 4:19 pm
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J. Murray wrote: “I don’t buy books for the content. I can read the content on a computer screen. I buy a book specifically for the paper, ink, and binding because it’s easier on the eyes than an electronic format.”
Or to put it another way, what is the “it’s” that’s “easier on the eyes”?
- April 6, 2011 at 6:12 pm
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Reading off paper is more satisfying than reading from a directed light source like a computer monitor. I could also opt to purchase the information on a CD or via MP3 download.
To answer the above question (as I’m capable enough to find the reply button and use it), would I buy the book without the words? The answer is – it depends.
What purpose was I seeking to make the purchase? If I sought to purchase the book in which to read the story and found it was blank, I have cause to sue the author, publisher, or bookstore (depending on who engaged in the fraud) for fraud and obtain recompense for the cost of the book. The book was advertised and sold under the express claim of what it contained, by failing to provide the written story as I expected and was promised for return of my money. If the content was there as I expected, there would be no fraud, even if the content was sold by a party other than the original author and the original received no compensation as I received the goods promised. Now, fraud would be present if the retailer or publisher made public that the original author would obtain a royalty on the purchase, but not against the original author, but myself, as I had made the active choice to support the author (as I am apt to normally do) and included that in the value judgement. In this case, the retailer or publisher (again, whoever is the responsible party) is now required to recompense me for the full value of the book as I was defrauded of the expectations of the terms of the purchase. At no point is the original author due any relief as none of his property was in any way harmed during this transaction nor were any contracts made with him.
If you’re asking if I would buy binding and paper with nothing in it, then yes, I would, if I were seeking a journal I keep at my bedside I use to jot down dreams to flesh out for future stories if the previous one was filled. And I would even do so with the cover of a claimed work if I was aware of the contents being blank pages and made a voluntary purchase with that in mind as I may actually like the cover design.
- April 6, 2011 at 8:59 pm
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J. Murray wrote, “The book was advertised and sold under the express claim of what it contained, by failing to provide the written story as I expected and was promised for return of my money. If the content was there as I expected, there would be no fraud.”
So the presence or absence of the content makes the book a different thing.
Very good. Now you know why it’s not just the paper, ink, and binding which are things. The content is a separate thing — and can be owned independent of the things that carry it.
- April 6, 2011 at 10:10 pm
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You do not seem to understand what makes an object interesting for potential buyers: It is the object itself with all its attributes. Content is just an attribute that many people weigh very high. But that does neither make that attribute a type of property itself nor does it prove your theory.
If people buy a certain wooden desk they also buy it many times because the like its design. But that does not mean that someone owns that design (that information pattern).
Your “logorights” would mean, that EVERY DESIGN (information pattern) was owned by someone and that there could not be any kind of physical property anymore outside this “information pattern property rights”.
So let me ask you again: What about recipes? What about garden design? What about hairdos? What about clothes design (someone has to be the first person who wore trousers and a shirt – does that mean nobody could wear trousers and shirt anymore without asking that first trousers/shirt-combining person?)
- April 6, 2011 at 4:24 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “Neil, you have no case, but warmed over Randian confusion.”
Ayn Rand never wrote the phrase, “Material identity.” That’s original J. Neil Schulman thinking there.
And, no, I don’t claim a logoright on the phrase, which is an IDEA and can’t be owned.
- April 6, 2011 at 4:42 pm
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@J. Neil Schulman
Please define what exactly makes a certain information pattern property of the “designer” of this information pattern?
Where does the transformation from non-property idea to property information pattern start?
If a cook mixes ten ingredients together and “creates” a new recipe does he/she have a “logoright” to that recipe?
Who decides what could become a “logoright” and what not?
- April 6, 2011 at 4:54 pm
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Anti-IP Libertarian,
You’re asking for the entire case. Read The Libertarian Case for IP at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/
- April 6, 2011 at 5:22 pm
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No, I asked you to answer my questions. You can do that here. Linking to an essay of yours is no answer to my specific questions.
- April 6, 2011 at 9:01 pm
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Do you also want me to spoon feed you and tuck you in?
Or do you not know how to click?
- April 6, 2011 at 10:02 pm
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Do not be a coward and run from questions asked HERE by pointing to somewhere else. Answer them here and not somewhere else. If you do not want to discuss HERE than stick to your blog. Else answer this:
Please define what exactly makes a certain information pattern property of the “designer” of this information pattern?
Where does the transformation from non-property idea to property information pattern start?
If a cook mixes ten ingredients together and “creates” a new recipe does he/she have a “logoright” to that recipe?
Who decides what could become a “logoright” and what not?
- April 6, 2011 at 5:02 pm
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote: “You are wrong: Value is subjective. If someone values a certain information pattern more than another that does not prove/mean that this information pattern itself is a property without its material instantiation. After all you buy the PHYSICAL book.”
I used the word utility, not value. The utility of paper, ink, and binding observably changes when you add or remove the information object which is the composed content. Yes, the subjective value decision that a user makes about the utility of a thing may change as well, but the change in the thing’s material properties by adding, subtracting, or changing the material content is what distinguishes one book package from another.
This is such an obvious point that I think it requires a self-imposed idiocy not to understand it.
If you see two physically identical books and open them up and can’t understand that it’s the words that make it a book — that the words of Atlas Shrugged make it a different physical object than the words of A Tale of Two Cities — then I have no further interest in continuing the discussion. A two-year-old child can tell the difference. An OCR scanning program can tell the difference. I don’t believe you can’t tell the difference.
- April 6, 2011 at 5:27 pm
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So what? A book consists of physical substances ordered in a special way that means something to us. If one decides that a certain object (the book) is useful for him and values that usefulness then maybe he will buy the book.
But how does that prove in any way that one has a right to each and every instantiation of a certain information pattern?
Imagine you combined two objects A and B which are instantiations of classes Y and Z in a certain way.
How does your act of combining those objects A and B allow you to decide whether or not I am allowed to combine my objects M and N which are instantiations of class Y and Z.
How do you defend patents? - April 6, 2011 at 7:20 pm
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
This is such an obvious point that I think it requires a self-imposed idiocy not to understand it.
What is obvious is that multiple different objects can be equally or similarly suitable for some purpose and that we can interpret the commonalities in a way that simplifies communication or the conduct of business.
What is not obvious however is that if there is a causal relationship between them, that somehow creates an “identity” and new rights that should take precedence over other rights. It’s a complete non-sequitur.
- April 6, 2011 at 9:52 pm
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If other things serve, and you can obtain them without violating someone else’s property rights, then do so. Otherwise, keep your bloody hands off.
- April 6, 2011 at 10:36 pm
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As there does not exist a consistent and logical theory of “intellectual property rights” there can not be any violation of “intellectual property rights”.
A few questions for you:
If you look at objects (for example a book) you process them with your cognitive information processing system. In this process copies of information are stored in your memory. These copies are processed many times, information is changed, patterns formed and so on.
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?What if we go a step further and include other types of human action in this information processing, eg writing information down (you read a book and write a summary about it).
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?What if you exchange that information with other people (you tell them the content of the book)?
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?Were does the infringment start?
- April 7, 2011 at 3:17 am
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“As there does not exist a consistent and logical theory of ‘intellectual property rights’ there can not be any violation of ‘intellectual property rights.’”
You’ve just proven that you’ve never read A Libertarian Case for IP. I do not argue in favor of “intellectual property rights” anywhere in it.
If you’d read it you’d discover the answers to all your other questions.
- April 7, 2011 at 4:17 am
- April 7, 2011 at 4:25 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
You’ve just proven that you’ve never read A Libertarian Case for IP.
If you don’t mind me asking, where does it provide an example of IP that is neither redundant nor contradictory to physical property rights?
- April 7, 2011 at 1:11 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
If other things serve, and you can obtain them without violating someone else’s property rights, then do so. Otherwise, keep your bloody hands off.
You are making a circular argument, othewise know as begging the question. Furthermore, you do not confront the argument.
If there is a causal relationship between two objects and they have a common feature, does that mean that the one who created the latter would require the permission of the one who created the former? Why? And if yes, how can one objectively determine which common features are relevant and which are not?
- April 7, 2011 at 3:12 am
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Peter Surda,
Your answer to everything is “That’s a non-sequitur.”
I don’t argue with computer programs. I want you to pass a Turing test before I answer you further.
- April 7, 2011 at 3:28 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Your answer to everything is “That’s a non-sequitur.”
Your answer, on the other hand, is to actually commit the non-sequitur. Just like now, instead of confronting my claims, you start to metaargue.
I don’t argue with computer programs.
So instead of arguing, you preach. I’m not interested in listening to preaches, I’m interested in science.
- April 7, 2011 at 4:14 am
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Re Turing test:
okay, that’s pretty funny, even if it’s a dodge. ha. Neil, write a sequel to Alongside Night–use that skill and wit!
And don’t ask me if I’ll pay for it or whether I’ll “steal” it since I don’t believe in IP–I’ve already bought Alongside Night twice: once in paper, once in kindle, and since they both have the same logos, I think I should only have had to pay once, so I’m owed a free copy of the sequel. (Kidding. I’d buy it.)
April 7, 2011 at 9:34 pm-
“I want you to pass a Turing test before I answer you further.”
ROFL!
Ok, there seems to be no sense in discussing with Mr. “just visit my website – everything’s there” Schulman.
- April 8, 2011 at 4:10 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
I want you to pass a Turing test before I answer you further.
I could counter that I want you to pass a high school math test. But based on our conversation, I don’t think the cause of your reactions is in the incapability of logical thought, rather it is your emotional attachment to the issue that is preventing you from applying logic.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:35 pm
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“I used the word utility, not value. The utility of paper, ink, and binding observably changes when you add or remove the information object which is the composed content”
So you’re making a utilitarian argument?
If utility is not equivalent to value, then you’re invoking an empty concept. I would be supremely amused if the person who called us “communists” and “dialectical materialists” is invoking a concept of objective value.
- April 7, 2011 at 3:07 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote: “Do not be a coward and run from questions asked HERE by pointing to somewhere else. Answer them here and not somewhere else. If you do not want to discuss HERE than stick to your blog.”
It’s not cowardice to refuse to succumb to inane challenges by someone too lazy to click to another site and READ. You are demonstrating that you do not have the slightest interest in actually understanding the opposing viewpoint. If you had some interest you’d read the whole thing so a logical case, from first premises to evidence to conclusions, could impact upon your brain. But, no, you’re too interested in defending your ideology of grabbing freebies and fuck the people who make them so there’s something for you to grab.
“Else answer this: Please define what exactly makes a certain information pattern property of the ‘designer’ of this information pattern? Where does the transformation from non-property idea to property information pattern start? If a cook mixes ten ingredients together and ‘creates’ a new recipe does he/she have a “logoright” to that recipe? Who decides what could become a ‘logoright’ and what not?”
The answers to these questions are about six or seven thousand words which I’ve already written and given you the link so you can read it. Read it. Or don’t read it. You can lead a horse to water but you can’t make it drink.
- April 7, 2011 at 2:53 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You say it’s not “about value,” yet you continually say a thing “is” a thing if it “has value.”
Still making up quotes of things I never said and debating the straw man.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:36 pm
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Surprise, you’re the one with the straw man.
IP opponents think only physical things exist!? They think a book is just the pen, ink and paper!? Give me a break!
- April 7, 2011 at 3:00 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “As Rand herself explained, one cannot create anything metaphysically but rearranges owned things to make them more useful, more valuable to the actor.”
It’s nice that Rand said that. But it does you no good since I do not say that and disagree with it. You repeatedly claim that my logorights case is nothing “but warmed over Randian confusion.” The confusion is yours. You can’t understand the difference between Rand’s case for intellectual property rights and my case for property rights in a thing’s material identity.
One can indeed create new things metaphysically. That is the root of my case.
- April 7, 2011 at 9:36 pm
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“One can indeed create new things metaphysically. That is the root of my case.”
Oh my. You should talk to famous physicists at once about your “ability” to create “entirely new things which are not part of the universe already”.
- April 7, 2011 at 10:20 pm
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“One can indeed create new things metaphysically. That is the root of my case.” Are you sure it’s not “ontologically”? That sounds even more impressive.
But in any event: http://blog.mises.org/14045/locke-on-ip-mises-rothbard-and-rand-on-creation-production-and-rearranging/
As Rand wrote:
The power to rearrange the combinations of natural elements is the only creative power man possesses. It is an enormous and glorious power—and it is the only meaning of the concept “creative.” “Creation” does not (and metaphysically cannot) mean the power to bring something into existence out of nothing. “Creation” means the power to bring into existence an arrangement (or combination or integration) of natural elements that had not existed before.
She was not alone in this insight. In Man, Economy, and State, Rothbard wrote:
Men find themselves in a certain environment, or situation. It is this situation that the individual decides to change in some way in order to achieve his ends. But man can work only with the numerous elements that he finds in his environment, by rearranging them in order to bring about the satisfaction of his ends. With reference to any given act, the environment external to the individual may be divided into two parts: those elements which he believes he cannot control and must leave unchanged, and those which he can alter (or rather, thinks he can alter) to arrive at his ends. The former may be termed the general conditions of the action; the latter, the means used. Thus, the individual actor is faced with an environment that he would like to change in order to attain his ends. To act, he must have technological ideas about how to use some of the elements of the environment as means, as pathways, to arrive at his ends. Every act must therefore involve the employment of means by individual actors to attempt to arrive at certain desired ends. In the external environment, the general conditions cannot be the objects of any human action; only the means can be employed in action.
Lest Objectivists accuse Rothbard of “plagiarizing” from Rand, note the words of Mises in The Theory of Money and Credit (citing J.S. Mill’s Principles of Political Economy, sec. I.5.1-I.6.1):
It should never have been called in question that the transportation of persons, goods, and information is to be reckoned part of production, so far as it does not constitute an act of consumption, as do pleasure trips for example. All the same, two things have hindered recognition of this fact. The first is the widespread misconception of the nature of production. There is a naive view of production that regards it as the bringing into being of matter that did not previously exist, as creation in the true sense of the word. From this it is easy to derive a contrast between the creative work of production and the mere transportation of goods. This way of regarding the matter is entirely inadequate. In fact, the role played by man in production always consists solely in combining his personal forces with the forces of Nature in such a way that the cooperation leads to some particular desired arrangement of material. No human act of production amounts to more than altering the position of things in space and leaving the rest to Nature.
No offense, Schulman.
- April 8, 2011 at 5:56 am
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Rand understood what creation is but missed drawing the conclusion that since a thing’s identity — its nature — defines it as an entity, changing the nature and identity of a thing to give a previous existent new properties is, in fact, the creation of a new thing. It’s not creation ex nihilo but it is creation metaphysically and ontologically.
- April 8, 2011 at 6:51 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
what you call a thing’s identity is merely an interpretation of some aspect of that thing through a human for a specific purpose and then analysing the interpretation based on some standard. The only way for it to exist is in people’s heads. You can twist your metaphors how you want, it’s not going to change it.
It’s also not going to change how you run away from debates. If it helps you, I would be willing to take a turing test but can’t find any that provides certifications. Would it be sufficient if I pass a series of captchas of your own choosing? Or was that just a cheap trick?
- April 8, 2011 at 9:39 pm
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“One can indeed create new things metaphysically. That is the root of my case”
Aha! So it is in fact the IP *proponent* that has to turn philosophy on its own head to make his case.
The opponents don’t need to reconsider the most fundamental questions of existence to save our case.
Maybe this is why you think we’re making ontological claims.
- April 9, 2011 at 4:56 am
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“The opponents don’t need to reconsider the most fundamental questions of existence to save our case.”
Heh, good one.
- April 9, 2011 at 6:27 am
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“The opponents don’t need to reconsider the most fundamental questions of existence to save our case.”
They must merely ignore the most fundamental questions of existence to make their case.
- April 9, 2011 at 7:12 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
once again, the arguments that are brought to your attention are not about metaphysics. They are about logic. Metaphysics does not beat logic, it does not permit you to contradict yourself.
- April 9, 2011 at 2:31 pm
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If I could nitpick a little, I would say that metaphysics has nothing to do with “creation”. All that could mean is that the total amount of something changes with respect to time (total mass, total number of particles, etc.), which hardly captures the meaning of creation. Creation proper has no meaning from a metaphysical point of view, there is only deterministic change and no way to separate changes into “creation” and some other type of change. One could either say that this particular piece of matter is moving around in time, or one could say that one piece of matter popped into and out of existence instantaneously, and then another peice of matter that is exactly the same except located at a slightly different place pops in and out of existence. One of those seems far more absurd than the other, but metaphysics makes no distinction.
I submit that creation is a concept of action, and the reason why the second interpretation is absurd is because we categorize that moving object as a singular means of action, and cateogorize it as the same means at each instant in time. Creation means the separation of physical reality into additional means to ends. Creation is not a metaphysical but a praxeological concept.
- April 9, 2011 at 2:17 pm
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“They must merely ignore the most fundamental questions of existence to make their case.”
I haven’t ignored them I’m just still convinced of the answers to those questions that are in line with common sense.
Questioning the nature of existence might be a useful thing to do, but if you’re going to do it the legitimacy of intellectual property is not exactly your biggest issue. I for one might start with asking why any conservation theorems in physics exist if creation is something different from rearranging. After all, such a claim seems to be in direct conflict with conservation theorems.
But frankly I think I’m admitting to much of a meaning to “create new things metaphysically”, which I suspect is just academic jargon. I do not know what this is supposed to really mean, or imply, especially in the context of ethics or economics. Even if you can “create new things metaphysically” it is still a non-sequitur to say you own the things you create.
- April 7, 2011 at 5:06 pm
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Nate-M wrote, “But none of that explains why any of these transfers and these agreements affect people that don’t agree to it. That is there is no logical way why our agreements between selling and buyer of goods actually has any bearing on anybody else’s behavior or goods. ”
Wildberry, pay attention here. This is why my logorights case is distinguishable from ordinary defense of intellectual property and statist copyrights.
Your argument about de-bundling of ownership is correct so far as it goes. I discuss this very point extensively in The Libertarian Case for IP.
But Kinsella and his fellow travelers — Nate-M being one of them — argue that parties who are not restricted by contract with the first owner have no obligation not to make copies.
IF the only property right for the author/first owner were one created by contract, they would be CORRECT.
The logorights case is for a property right existing by virtue of the creation of a new thing, and that property right is independent of — not based on — contracting with any second or third party. It binds all non owners to respect the property right by nature of it being someone else’s property.
One might make a case that the property needs to have a visible claim mark — equivalent to posting land with No Trespassing signs — to protect third parties from accidental infringement. That posting is what a “copyright notice” serves to function as in current copyright law.
But nonetheless, the posting notice is a mere courtesy, not a requirement. The assumption must be that the burden is on the copier to determine whether what they wish to copy is unowned before they attempt to stake their homestead claim on it by the act of copying.
Copying something which is unowned by you — unless it can be determined to be unowned by anyone — is an act of invasion. It is aggressive. It crosses the boundaries of someone else’s property. It violates the principle of private property. It is the essence of anti-libertarianism.
There is no case for anti-IP libertarianism, just as there is no case for anti-propertarian libertarianism.
Those who argue against the rights of property owners are negating their libertarianism.
- April 7, 2011 at 5:20 pm
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Copying something which is unowned by you — unless it can be determined to be unowned by anyone — is an act of invasion. It is aggressive. It crosses the boundaries of someone else’s property. It violates the principle of private property. It is the essence of anti-libertarianism.
H.C.
Copying and duplication of ideas is a fundamental requirement to existence in a modern society that has any hope of progress. Very simply put: you cannot function without it. If you think it’s evil to copy concepts and duplicate ideas freely then have fun going off and living naked in a cave somewhere, because that is pretty much the only way your going to avoid it.
Presumption of liability for a action that does not deprive anybody else of anything is idiotic.
- April 7, 2011 at 6:59 pm
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@ J. Neil Schulman April 7, 2011 at 5:06 pm
I get your point. One of the problems here, given the diversity of backgrounds and adherence to any reasonable argumentation discipline, is the insistence that everything be translated into the particular logical framework with the approved Rothbardian labels. As I have said to you elsewhere, I believe your argument is consistent with a corollary put in legalistic terms.
In the case of Kinsella, et al., there is a strong defensive posture of only accepting the terms he uses, I think because his is a carefully constructed house of cards and is susceptible to any significant disturbance. For example, he insists on using the term “material” goods, which is completely ambiguous compared to the tangible/intangible concepts of the IP legal conceptual framework of copyright laws.
Your system works for me, with a very few exceptions.
One distinction I would make is that you seem to be arguing that property is a “natural phenomena” that arises as a result of certain actions, what you refer to as the creation of logos.
I hold that property is a human device, and can be defined just about any way we choose. The issue is one of which definitions are ethically justifiable, and economically sound?
From an ethical standpoint, there are a number of ways to frame the establishment and legitimacy of rights in one’s own production. Your logorights is a system of symbology that arrives at the same conclusion as a justification that departs from self-ownership and private ownership of the means of production. Without too much trouble, I believe, the concepts between the two pathways can be reconciled.
The thrust of the pro and anti IP debate here is not really about that, IMHO. It is really about disdain for anything other than the Ancap vision, and Kinsella’s generating a following based on his conclusion that IP is just another example of the State “dripping with evil”.
You cannot even get Kinsella to engage on the economics of law issues. He dismisses Mises himself regarding the issue of production for external economies, with a dismissive “he didn’t live long enough to arrive at the Rothbardian wisdom of Ancap”, in effect.
This is why when it comes to approaching the exact point of divergence, it gets emotional and personal. Kinsella has a good deal riding on his position of anti-IP, and he will never give that up, no matter how reasonable or logical arguments against his view are expressed.
One point of divergence is the acknowledgment that intangible property is legitimate. That really screws them up. Kinsella will avoid that issue like the plague.
Another is the external economies issue. He denies the effect based on a more fundamental denial of any rights to the products of personal production. As I have said, to some inflammatory effect, to advocate against IP is to favor slavery. You have made this point eloquently in our own terms.
As to your point about contracts and privity of parties being bound, I understand this point very well. What is not well understood is the distinction between rights established by contract and by property rights. Contracts are an operation of consent and intent of negotiating parties. Laws are rules of conduct, and interpretations of liability for acts. Contracts require privity, laws do not. Laws require jurisdiction. That is the critical distinction.
All of the authors most cited here agree that once property is established, brought into existence, or created by operation of law, it operates according to property law concepts. Nothing about Rothbardian property is really contrary to the existing legal structure, with a very few exceptions: the inalienability of will and transfer theory of contracts being ones where he takes a different road. But these are really minor, but perhaps important distinctions. Everything else is just ideological fluff, and a general attack of the “enemy” the State.
What I can say having read your article and reading your posts here, I agree with a very large percentage of your views. But I prefer to plant them in existing legal framework, which drives people nuts here. They would much rather make up what the law says and does, and then attack the phantoms of their own creation.
I worked for weeks to get Kinsella to admit that the “ideas are free” line of argument was a direct contradiction to what the law says and does. The best he would offer is an admission that yes, IP does not protect ALL ideas, thank God, but ideas are just a symbol for information, so I guess that means “information is free” too.
In summary, I don’t really adhere strongly to a theory of “natural rights”, unless you say that everything and anything mankind can come up with is “natural”. Therefore I hold not that intellectual property rights arise as the result of some natural condition or act, but that, having been created, for example, original works of authorship, and that work having economic value as a product of the means of private production, is a legitimate subject of property rights. There are many ways to arrive at that conclusion, and you have seemingly added one. It is from that point, however, that the real trouble begins.
My point of departure is best described by Mises’s ideas about property, production, and external economies, and Hayek’s ideas about the goal of economic policy and the law being as much a topic for economists as lawyers.
I believe I get your drift, and have enjoyed exposure to you thinking and writing. I strongly agree with your conclusions, for the most part. Kinsella’s criticisms are mostly empty, mean spirited, and ideological. You will not solve that here, and likely, never.
- April 7, 2011 at 7:44 pm
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In this instance I agree with Rand, Rothbard, and Konkin, that there are indeed natural rights — rights that follow from natural laws — laws that are scientific or observably axiomatic in that their negation is self-negation. The specific case I’m making does follow from the Law of Identity so favored by Rand (and Rothbard and Konkin) but it’s an application of the Law of Identity that Rand, Rothbard, and Konkin never made … and I have.
All property rights stem from the nature of what a thing’s properties are — the properties defining its nature and identity.
This is the ontological case that removes property rights from the chaotic solipsism of replacing what things are objectively with what people desire subjectively.
- April 7, 2011 at 8:32 pm
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Neil, this is really funny. It’s almost hard to believe you think you are serious with this utter nonsense.
- April 9, 2011 at 2:51 am
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Yeah. For a long time I was a strong advocate of copyright restrictions and their potential benefitial powers. Very specifically with software and technology, which I am most familiar with. Things like the GPL, copyleft, and the ‘dot communist manifesto’ (which I saw as partially ironic), were interesting. Seemed like a interesting way to establish rules of cooperation and a baseline of acceptable behavior that helped people establish the ability to trust one another’s actions in business dealings and cooperation on the internet.
I also saw the potential useful ‘necessary evil’ of things like patents. Were you trade a monopoly for a short term for long term societal benefit. Yeah sure it’s a sacrifice for people today, but by putting term limits on patents then your not only building a framework for financially rewarding innovative people, but giving them the economic need to re-invest their profits into more innovations so that they can continue to have useful income once their initial patents wore out.
All this made perfect sense. OF COURSE your a asshole if you deprive a author of his ability to make a living. I was even pretty much convinced on the need for patents with medication as a means to secure new finance for new drugs.
All this seemed like one of those sacrifices we all have to make in individual liberty in order to keep society safe. Like I cannot drive like a a-hole down the road naked and drunk while menacing people with my automobile by seeing how close I can come to them at 100mph before they fall down. We all make lots of sacrifices in our freedom to do as we please in order to exist in society. If a sacrifice is worth it then I can be convinced of this and and then it should be established.
I saw a lot of injustice and whatnot with IP laws, but that is something that probably can be reformed, not abolished.
All this stuff makes perfect sense. If I believed it a while ago, then I can believe it again.
But all this metaphysical mumbo jumbo with property rights to ideas and concepts is a joke. None of it makes sense. Ideas and concepts are not the same as physical goods and it is not only inappropriate to treat them as physical goods… IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. It’s a illogical and just not a good argument. It has far more in common with spirituality, pixie dust, and unicorn farts then it does with actual hard reality and flies in the face of basic natural rules human interaction and needs.. as well as flying in the face of historical evidence of real progress. People not only want to copy, they NEED too. Copying is good. Sharing is good. It’s a requirement to be able to have any progress at all.
Yeah sure IP Law is a violation of property rights. But we all must make compromises to live in the world all the time. Misunderstanding and conflicts abound. It’s just a question of if it is a good sacrifice or not. Not that people have natural right of ownership of ideas. Nobody is ever going to probably convince me with that line of reasoning. It just does not pass the smell test.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:45 pm
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“I get your point. One of the problems here, given the diversity of backgrounds and adherence to any reasonable argumentation discipline, is the insistence that everything be translated into the particular logical framework with the approved Rothbardian labels”
So what, you’re gonna psychoanalyze us now?
I reached an anti-IP position at a time when all I knew about Rothbard was a few awesome quotes about anarchy. I have been making music my whole life and it was just too hard for me to take seriously the notion that I have any legitimate claim to control how people hear or play the notes I happen to stick together and release.
Then I made this simple realization: when you take someone’s car, they’re down a car. When you download a song off the internet, no one is down a song. That was the fundamental difference that first pushed me away from IP. This was long before I had ever heard the name “Kinsella” or even “Hoppe”, and I had yet to read even an article by Rothbard.
No we’re not sheepishly following libertarian writers, we are using our brains to think about this problem.
I possess no insistence so your diagnosis is dead wrong.
- April 7, 2011 at 8:21 pm
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“One might make a case that the property needs to have a visible claim mark — equivalent to posting land with No Trespassing signs — to protect third parties from accidental infringement. That posting is what a “copyright notice” serves to function as in current copyright law. ”
actually, Neil, “current copyright law” does NOT have such a function for “copyright notice”. You don’t know what you are talking about, which is very typical of advocates of IP–they don’t even know what they are advocating. Copyright notice is in fact unnecessary. Copyrihght is AUTOMATIC. No registration is needed. No copyright notice is needed.
It would be nice if advocates of IP at least understood the nature of the system they support.
But nonetheless, the posting notice is a mere courtesy, not a requirement. The assumption must be that the burden is on the copier to determine whether what they wish to copy is unowned before they attempt to stake their homestead claim on it by the act of copying.
Exactly–the vision of the world of the IP advocates is one where we live by permission, not by right. You cannot do anything unless you first clear it with an IP–sorry, “logorights”–attorney. What utter totalitarian nonsense.
Copying something which is unowned by you — unless it can be determined to be unowned by anyone — is an act of invasion. It is aggressive. It crosses the boundaries of someone else’s property. It violates the principle of private property. It is the essence of anti-libertarianism.
Of course, copying means learning. The IP advocates are against learning, emulation, competition, progress. It is utterly evil and absurd. And yet another instance of legal ignorance: patent law has NOTHING TO DO with copying. The patentee need not show copying to show infringement and in most cases of patent infringement there is no copying at all. Neil will now say that well he is not in favor of patent–he is favor of “logorights,” whatever this weird notion is. Yet he is against abolishing patent law right now, since it is some kind of approximation of “logorights” for him and something is better than nothing.
- April 8, 2011 at 6:07 am
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Kinsella, I damn well know the current copyright law and nothing I wrote said a copyright notice was required under current law. Another of your straw-men rants meant to distract and deceive.
“Exactly–the vision of the world of the IP advocates is one where we live by permission, not by right. You cannot do anything unless you first clear it with an IP–sorry, “logorights”–attorney. What utter totalitarian nonsense.”
So it’s totalitarian to require permission to use someone else’s property. You can take their car without permission because requiring permission is totalitarian. You can break into their house, Goldilocks, eat their food and sleep in their beds, because, after all, we wouldn’t want to live in a totalitarian society where you need permission to use someone else’s property.
This discussion has reached the point of my having to respond to such idiotic arguments it’s submarginal for me to continue responding to blasts of dumb filibuster.
- April 8, 2011 at 1:36 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Copying something which is unowned by you — unless it can be determined to be unowned by anyone — is an act of invasion. It is aggressive.
Preventing copying (unless covered by a contract or unless you are owner of the target media, i.e. when IP is redundant) is always an act of in of invasion and aggression too, because it needs to violate the property rights in the media. So unless you admit you are abandoning property rights in physical goods (the media), you’re contradicting yourself.
Admit it, dear J. Neil Schulman, you’re running away from a debate because of cognitive dissonance. Your theory is falling apart and in order to prevent it from hitting you, you make up an excuse and stop replying. If you call me a thief, then I’m calling you a coward. Well, at least you’re not alone, all the other IP proponents I debated before you did that too.
- April 7, 2011 at 7:28 pm
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Stephan Kinsella writes, “But I gave JNS a clear, coherent set of objections to respond to; he ducks and weaves and refuses to engage, as usual (and as expected). No wonder. I would too, if defending such obvious, unlibertarian nonsense.”
I engaged and refuted your nonsense twenty years ago. You’ve come up with nothing new. So you claim I haven’t answered you, which is a good trick since it’s unreasonable to expect an audience to have followed the debate for that long.
Then you claim victory, patting yourself on the back.
You know what your entire theory is, Kinsella? It’s the Goldilocks Theory of Property. If you can get away with eating the bears’ porridge and sleeping in their beds without being eaten, you declare you own the bears’ cabin.
You know what? I believe in the Right to Arm Bears. Prepare to be eaten the next time you pull that shit, Goldilocks.
- April 7, 2011 at 7:47 pm
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nate-m writes, “Copying and duplication of ideas is a fundamental requirement to existence in a modern society that has any hope of progress. Very simply put: you cannot function without it. If you think it’s evil to copy concepts then have fun going off and living naked in a cave somewhere, because that is pretty much the only way your going to avoid it. Presumption of liability for a action that does not deprive anybody else of anything is idiotic.”
Nate-m both attacks the straw man of idea-ownership (which is no part of the material identity theory of property rights and which I explicitly deny) then falls back on some sort of social utilitarianism — exactly the attempt to negate individual rights that I would expect from a communist.
- April 7, 2011 at 9:48 pm
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Answer the following and do not be a coward by running away from that question as you did many times here:
If you look at objects (for example a book) you process them with your cognitive information processing system. In this process copies of information are stored in your memory. These copies are processed many times, information is changed, patterns formed and so on.
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?What if we go a step further and include other types of human action in this information processing, eg writing information down (you read a book and write a summary about it).
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?What if you exchange that information with other people (you tell them the content of the book)?
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?Were does the infringement start?
If you are not able and/or willing to answer this (or other) questions asked HERE then why should ANYONE be interested in discussing with you HERE?
- April 8, 2011 at 6:16 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote,
“If you look at objects (for example a book) you process them with your cognitive information processing system. In this process copies of information are stored in your memory. These copies are processed many times, information is changed, patterns formed and so on.
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?”No.
“What if we go a step further and include other types of human action in this information processing, eg writing information down (you read a book and write a summary about it).
Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?”No.
“What if you exchange that information with other people (you tell them the content of the book)? Is this a type of infringement in your “logorights” theory?”
No.
“Where does the infringement start?”
When you make unauthorized copies onto an observable medium and make a market out of doing so.
“If you are not able and/or willing to answer this (or other) questions asked HERE then why should ANYONE be interested in discussing with you HERE?”
I answered your questions. Now I am no longer interested in discussing this here.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:39 am
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Neil,
I have watched this happen to a number of people who try to offer an alternative view to the “official doctrine” supported by Kinsella. The dogs come out, the language gets abusive, and the purpose of the exchange shifts to running you off. I can think of several individuals who have been treated this way just in the past year or so.
This is not an honest exploration of the subject, but the rabid defense of an ideology. Like all good anarchists, when rational discourse fails to intimidate you into silence, the fire bombs come out.
People like Kinsella, Surda, and the latest addition, this Anti-IP Libertarian dude, are happy that you vanish. Mission accomplished. I personally, am not. Well done.
Regards,
- April 8, 2011 at 11:24 am
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Wildberry,
you slimy coward. I warned J. Neil Schulman in advance that people run away from debates from me. He said that is not his nature. I totally smashed his arguments by cold logic. His reaction was to get emotional, refer to me as a thief and communist then then run away from debate. This only took him about three days. And I did not even say that IP should be opposed! I only said that his arguments are flawed.
Your demagoguery would do well in the employ of the state propaganda. But here on the internet the likes of you cannot use force to prevent your lies to be exposed. You can only try to spread more lies. And that is why I will persevere in exposing the magnitude of the lies and fraud you’re perpetrating. An open an honest debate is something you detest, so that’s what I’ll insist on.
Answer the questions I gave you.
Oh, and one more thing. I’m not happy that J. Neil Schulman is leaving. It is a loss for both sides, because at least one of us is in error and he’s not interested in figuring out who.
- April 8, 2011 at 11:42 am
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Surda,
Thank you for making my point clear to all. Who are you to warn anyone? People avoid you because you are unpleasant and a waste of effort. I have watched you achieve this outcome with any number of poeple by now. You think way to highly of yourself to imagine it is anything other than repulsion.
You are interested in the truth? What a load! No self-respecting person is going to long suffer the abuse and personal attacks that you, Kinsella, and this dude AIPL heap upon bloggers here.
Just becaue you act like an ass doesn’t make you one, but through your perseverence you have removed all doubt.
Your condut is disgusting.
- April 8, 2011 at 12:31 pm
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Wildberry,
shame on you for lying like this. I have been nothing but courteous to J. Neil Schulman. He on the other hand, referred to me and my arguments as stubborn ideologue, stupid argument, imbecilic, thief, communist and parasite. I challenge you to provide me a single example of my behaviour towards him you’re describing. Can you find one? You’re a liar and a fraud.
The bigger fraud of you presenting yourself as “open” and unbiased although it’s exactly the opposite. I have yet to see where you admit your error after it has been exposed. You’re the one who presents himself as unerring, not me. You’re the one not willing to accept your opponent’s arguments, not me. You’re not the one making falsifiable arguments, I am. You’re not the one who is attempting to debate, I am. You’re the fraud and closed minded, not me.
I would call you pathetic, but instead you’re dangerous. You’re dangerous because you advocate the use of fairy tales and flawed logic to initiate force. This needs to be exposed before people fall for your tricks.
- April 8, 2011 at 10:19 pm
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“People avoid you because you are unpleasant and a waste of effort. I have watched you achieve this outcome with any number of poeple by now. You think way to highly of yourself to imagine it is anything other than repulsion.”
All I can say is that it seems like Peter is actually supporting his case (regardless of whether it is right or not) and you’re getting mad because he’s doing a good job of it. I know this “you’re an ego-maniac” ad hominem way too well. It’s as though using one’s own faculties of critical thinking is tantamount to being an ego-maniac.
April 8, 2011 at 11:55 am-
It’s ironic because I’m anti-IP (for many of the same reasons those here are *hugs*) but there’s no doubting the behavior of my fellows is hysterically bad. I seriously laugh at most of the posts here. Not one of them knows how to argue well or seemingly at least give the impression there has been some sort of argumentative dialectic involved. Some intelligent doofball like Kinsella accidentally stumbled onto a decent argument then regurgitates it into their hungry beaks and they’re off to vomit his ideas on the blog, with even poorer manners. He gets the big part right then erroneously assumes every little part of the argument is biblically apodictic without giving the appearance of actually having thought about it. It’s embarrassing and, as always, angry internet guy is angry. Almost hard to believe none of you are scholars. Puzzling, really.
- April 8, 2011 at 12:33 pm
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Kindly provide an example of any flawed argument I may have made. I have no problem in rectifying an error. That’s why I’m here.
- April 8, 2011 at 12:58 pm
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You’re not too bright, are you?
- April 8, 2011 at 1:53 pm
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I tend to miss the obvious, but please elaborate.
- April 8, 2011 at 3:06 pm
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@ Peter Surda April 8, 2011 at 11:24 am
Wildberry,
you slimy coward.
I didn’t have to do much research.
- April 8, 2011 at 4:25 pm
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Wildberry,
I didn’t have to do much research.
this (“slimy coward”) is a reaction to a well-documented behaviour of yours, your constant avoidance of answers, your lies and your portrayal of yourself as a victim and an unbiased observer, although you’re the exact opposite.
It’s a reaction to you claiming that I made a personal attack against Schulman, which I didn’t. He on the other hand used derogative terms on me. He fell into his own trap. I never expected that he’ll take up my offer for a debate, much less then he renegs on his own words after just three days (or was it two?). As a scientist, I find this regrettable, but on a personal level I don’t care. He’s probably just suffering from cognitive dissonance, having a deep emotional attachment to the issue. Cognitive dissonance is a very human trait. I can’t really blame him for being human.
On the other hand, you’re a fraud, a coward and a liar. You pretend to sympathise with people merely because it serves your purpose of manipulating them. You’re portraying yourself as neutral while being unwilling to accept other people’s premises. You’re portraying yourself as educated and open minded although what you’re presenting is just smoke and mirrors hiding a big empty nothing.
And I’ll repeat this until you either admit it or stop this disgraceful behaviour, whichever comes sooner. I’m not a fan of banning. Fraud needs to be exposed rather than hushed up. People need to learn to detect this behaviour so that they don’t fall for it when another trickster approaches them.
Your con is over, Wildberry. I’ll continue following your posts here and use your own words to expose your true colours.
- April 8, 2011 at 8:29 pm
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“Some intelligent doofball like Kinsella accidentally stumbled onto a decent argument then regurgitates it into their hungry beaks and they’re off to vomit his ideas on the blog, with even poorer manners.”
Dude, I think you just won the bad manners contest.
- April 8, 2011 at 10:24 pm
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“Not one of them knows how to argue well or seemingly at least give the impression there has been some sort of argumentative dialectic involved.”
Says the person who responds to Peter’s patient request to provide actual details with “You’re not too bright, are you?”
Way to keep that argumentative dialectic going!
- April 8, 2011 at 9:52 pm
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“The dogs come out, the language gets abusive”
Oh I’m sorry, we’re just getting called “communists” left and right.
“and the purpose of the exchange shifts to running you off”
So you’e got our intentions figured out?
“This is not an honest exploration of the subject, but the rabid defense of an ideology”
Indeed it is not. The IP proponents offer hardly anything substantial and fall back on a rabid defense of ideology. For example, they call us communists and start diagnosing the unhealthy obsession with Rothbard we must have. They also concoct laughably stupid straw men such as “IP opponents believe only physical things exist”.
“Like all good anarchists, when rational discourse fails to intimidate you into silence, the fire bombs come out.”
I’m so glad you said this and hope everyone on this site remembers you by it. You are the one that thinks all anarchists are violent criminals that sabatoge peaceful interactions. Good to know.
Comparing fierce argumentation to throwing fire bombs? Only from a statist…
- April 9, 2011 at 11:33 am
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Well, I’ve tried all day to post replies here, and they don’t post.
Anybody have an idea why? how does one get captured by the spam filter for this site? - April 9, 2011 at 2:15 pm
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Maybe the spam filter has learned to recognise lies?
- April 8, 2011 at 9:16 pm
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“When you make unauthorized copies onto an observable medium and make a market out of doing so.”
So it’s ok to copy it and make it available to millions online at no cost?
So you don’t have property in the thing unless a copier charges for the copy (it sounds like you added that as a condition)? Or you just decided not to enforce it or what?No sarcasm or meanness. I’m interested in the answer because I just don’t hear advocates ever giving one that, to me, seems like it’s consistent with the claim or property. It often sounds as if the “property” is continually coming into and going out of existence, and/or its status as property depends on the mood or intention of the creator (or the calendar).
You don’t have to leave the conversation. Just take a break and regroup. I think the short answers to questions really help. We should all try to ask short pointed questions and give short, to the point answers. I sympathize with you feeling like these exchanges are getting out of control and too frustrating for you because you face opposition.
But even though you called me a “commie parasite” (or some such) before, I am sincerely interested in hearing your short responses. I promise not to call you a dirty low-down fascist monopolist or an ego-driven property-rights-infringer of squalid character, murky ancestry, and questionable ethics (or some such). : )
- April 7, 2011 at 9:45 pm
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@J. Neil Schulman:
Your whole theory is FLAWED: You argue that there is some sort of identity (aka essence aka logo) in each object that is “created” and to which (the identity) someone has a property right.
But this identity only goes so far that it is restricted to THAT object only. So by your “theory” you have not shown anything on (transfer of) property rights regarding the linkage between an “original” (your “logorighted” object) and a copy. To the contrary that means that each COPY is a work with its OWN identity itself which has another owner.
- April 7, 2011 at 9:56 pm
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Some addition:
You seem to believe in what is called (ontological) essentialism. The problem seems to be that you think that certain properties of objects are aspects which can be owned. Therefore other objects with these properties (copies) are after your theory owned by the “creator of the essence”. That would also mean that each and every child was the property of their parents…
- April 8, 2011 at 6:12 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “You seem to believe in what is called (ontological) essentialism. The problem seems to be that you think that certain properties of objects are aspects which can be owned. Therefore other objects with these properties (copies) are after your theory owned by the “creator of the essence”. That would also mean that each and every child was the property of their parents…”
There’s nothing mystical about the argument I’m making. A thing is the sum total of its properties. Its utility is the sum total of what it can be used for by human actors.
Create an observable entity with new properties and the new properties make it a new thing.
If that new thing can be copied, that’s proof that it’s a distinct thing … and can be owned by who made it.
Done.
I am out of here.
- April 8, 2011 at 9:53 pm
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You didn’t address his actual point, which is that your argument leads to the conclusion that everyone is owned by their parents.
- April 10, 2011 at 6:16 pm
- April 8, 2011 at 6:01 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “But this identity only goes so far that it is restricted to THAT object only.”
Demonstrably wrong if the object can be hosted elsewise, independent of its first appearance. The very ability to copy it proves its independent existence as a separable thing.
April 9, 2011 at 4:01 am-
Regarding your identity-thingy:
Either you state that only physical things exist. Than everything you own in an object is in that object. The identity is only in the object itself. The essence of an object is the object itself with all its properties. None of these properties is an object itself.
Or you state that you believe in a duality in this universe, that there is an object and a separate essence which you own and that this metaphysical essence which is the thing which is re-instantiated via copying in other objects (in copies) is your property and therefore you own those copies too.
There can only be those two positions. Tertium non datur!
Which one do you believe in?
- April 8, 2011 at 4:53 pm
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Peter Surda,
I answered all your questions. Read up this thread.
- April 9, 2011 at 4:25 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
I answered all your questions. Read up this thread.
Calling me a communist or a thief is not an answer. That’s just a way of saying that the debate is frustrating you.
Where is the example of an IP that is neither redundant nor contradictory to physical property rights? Where is the explanation why causality + similarity + utility create property rights, and why does this only happen sometimes and not in other cases? Where is the proof that you’re not claiming that reinterpretation creates a separate phenomenon? Where is the proof that what you’re referring to as “identity” is something else than standards+encoding+decoding?
Where are all the other answers?
Or, let me turn this around completely and give you the power to fix this once and for all. Let us assume that all the assumptions you are making are coherent and not self-contradictory, i.e. a falsifiable while yet unfalsified theory. Can you construct a counterargument, which when true, would invalidate the theory? If someone was saying that A and B are different phenomena, how would it be possible to disprove it? If someone was saying that certain actions violate rights, how would it be possible to disprove it?
Prove that you can overcome your emotions.
- April 8, 2011 at 5:21 pm
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Why is it that my posting is not showing up, I wonder?
- April 8, 2011 at 11:13 pm
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Sweatervest wrote, “You are literally assuming your conclusion, which is that ideas are a type of property.”
I say for the umpteenth time in this form: NO. Nowhere have I ever written that ideas are or can be property, or that anything intangible in someone’s mind or a mere product of someone’s subjective value can be property.
The case for logorights is for ownership of things that can be observed as existing as objects independent of the other things that carry, transport, and display them.
Deal with this.
- April 9, 2011 at 3:29 am
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J. Neil Schulman,
things that can be observed as existing as objects independent of the other things that carry, transport, and display them.
Yet, when challenged, you cannot provide a single example for this.
- April 9, 2011 at 5:59 am
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Peter Surda wrote, “‘things that can be observed as existing as objects independent of the other things that carry, transport, and display them.’ Yet, when challenged, you cannot provide a single example for this.”
Atlas Shrugged
CasablancaYou want several hundred thousand more examples, or will these two do?
Atlas Shrugged exists on paper, and as a Kindle edition without paper. In both cases it’s Atlas Shrugged, even though the carrier is different — proof that its an observable object independent of its carriers.
Casablanca has existed on film, on VHS tape, DVD, and Blu-Ray. Four different carrier media yet in all cases it’s still Casablanca — observably existing independently of its carriers.
Can you really not understand this?
These are real, observable things. Not ideas. Not interpretations. Not something existing only subjectively. Objectively existing and mathematically quantifiable things.
- April 9, 2011 at 6:37 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Atlas Shrugged
CasablancaCan you provide an example of Atlas Shrugged or Casablanca that is independent of a medium? You can’t. Because by even writing or speaking the words, you are using a medium.
Atlas Shrugged exists on paper, and as a Kindle edition without paper. In both cases it’s Atlas Shrugged, even though the carrier is different — proof that its an observable object independent of its carriers.
It only answers that the similarity can be observed on more than one carrier, not that it can be observed without any carrier at all. You’re not answering the question I’m asking.
Casablanca has existed on film, on VHS tape, DVD, and Blu-Ray. Four different carrier media yet in all cases it’s still Casablanca — observably existing independently of its carriers.
Ditto.
In summary, you are answering a different question that I’m asking. You are answering whether two objects can share some commonality that can be considered useful from some perspective (because, in your opinion, this results in rights). But that’s not what I’m asking. I’m asking if the commonality can be interacted with without being imprinted on any media at all.
Once again, the question is not about metaphysical existence. The question is about implications of assumptions.
And, because rights in carriers (physical media) are already fully covered by physical property rights, IP can only be redundant or contradictory to them. It is completely irrelevant whether the IP has metaphysical existence or not.
Can you really not understand this?
I understand this perfectly. You do not comprehend the question.
Once you comprehend what I’m asking, you’ll realise your whole theory falls apart.
- April 9, 2011 at 10:40 am
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@ Peter Surda April 9, 2011 at 6:37 am
… that it can be observed without any carrier at all.
Of course! All you are asking is that Neil make the intangible appear on the table like some kind of majic show! All that is needed to satisfy you is to make something intangible, tangible. You sound like an Grand Inquisitor accusing someone of witchcraft! LOL.
You deny your insistence that all property is only tangible, and insist that to disprove it, we merely have to violate the laws of physics! Right!
Some people actually think you are defending a case. It’s a screamer!!
- April 9, 2011 at 2:00 pm
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Wildberry,
let me remind you how your lies and fraud discredited you already.
All you are asking is that Neil make the intangible appear on the table like some kind of majic show!
Yet again, you twist the flow of debate and make up stuff that you then attribute to others. Neil said that IP does not contradict rights in physical goods. You stated previously that it does not matter. So why are you complaining to me? We two agree on this. Neil does not.
I on the other hand did not state that the intangible does not exist.
You deny your insistence that all property is only tangible, and insist that to disprove it, we merely have to violate the laws of physics! Right!
No you dumb liar. You admit by this sentence the very thing Neil is denying. The difference is that he needs it to be false it because it’s the basis of his argument. You’re just making stuff up on the go and then just randomly put it into sentences that oppose me.
Some people actually think you are defending a case. It’s a screamer!!
And some people actually think that your “arguments” should be taken seriously. They should not. It’s just random stuff that has no relevance for the debate.
- April 9, 2011 at 12:13 pm
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@Peter Surda April 9, 2011 at 6:37 am
I’m asking if the commonality can be interacted with without being imprinted on any media at all.
This is all you need to know about Peter’s “falsification”. Here merely poses a question that assumes impossibility.
The concept is tangibility. It is not “material” or “physical” or anything else. Intangible is the word, and that is why that PARTICULAR word is used as the term of art for this subject.
Now, intangible means not perceptible by human senses, in case you don’t have a dictionary handy. Yet intangible things can be experienced, and their existence can be demonstrated, as Neil has succinctly shown. Intangible things exist, they are not “phantoms”. But you cannot directly perceive them, unless you can read my thoughts, OR, now wait for it…they are made TANGIBLE! This is done by fixing them onto a tangle medium.
Now, though you deny the requirement of metaphysics to make your case, this is not actually correct. You claim that causality extends to infinity, and so you say that thoughts are neurons, and neurons are atomic, and no one creates atoms, so there is no such thing as property in intangible things, there are only physical things, which are already covered 100% by property rights. Got it.
Yet you don’t deny the existence of an “idea”. Can you show me an idea that is not imprinted on any media at all.
Now don’t be a coward and run away. I am asking you a direct question. If you don’t deny the existence of ideas, then show me one.
I’m asking if an idea can be interacted with without being imprinted on any media at all. As soon as you show me, we can move on to a discussion as to whether ideas can be owned as property.
Don’t be a coward and run away from our debate, now. That would be self-contradictory to your previous statements.
- April 9, 2011 at 2:11 pm
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Wildberry,
let me remind you again how your lies and fraud have been exposed before and how you discredited yourself.
Here merely poses a question that assumes impossibility.
Anyone can feel free to provide a counterexample that would disprove the impossibility. That is how falsification works.
Yet intangible things can be experienced, and their existence can be demonstrated, as Neil has succinctly shown.
All he has shown that they can be experienced when attached to a medium. He has not shown how they can be experienced without a medium.
This of course does not on its own disprove the metaphysical existence of intangibles (as you fraudulently misrepresent my claims). But I don’t care about metaphysical questions. They have nothing to do with my arguments.
Neil said IP does not contradict physical rights. That has nothing do with the question whether it exists from a specific metaphysical point of view. He was probably unaware at the time when he said “no”, but he fell into his own trap.
I would really appreciate if IP proponents confronted the contradictions instead of hiding behind metaphysical bullshit.
And you, Lieberry, drop the pretense. You’re not a supporter or defender of Neil’s arguments. You’re just want to be acknowledged for your nonexistent qualities. Not gonna happen.
- April 9, 2011 at 2:29 pm
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He’s not saying that the intangible story doesn’t exist. None of us are. That would be absurd. He’s saying you can’t separate it from whatever medium it is instantiated within at the moment so as to refer to it as an “object” on its own. Clearly it is not an object, although it obviously does exist.
He’s saying that property rights are already established in physical media, so that when you imprint the information which constitutes the story it doesn’t change the fact that the disc (or whatever) already existed as property.
He’s saying that this means that IP is therefore contradictory to established property rights in physical media.
Don’t pretend like you don’t understand that. Come on!
Deal with what he’s saying. Agree to the point he makes so that you can proceed to the next point in the argument. That’s what an argument is, eh? Perhaps you don’t disagree here, but you will disagree with the next point that: Because it is not an instantiated thing or object on its own, we shouldn’t treat it as property since, being that way, it is infinitely reproducible in its essence, unlike everything else we call property.
- April 9, 2011 at 3:04 pm
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“You claim that causality extends to infinity, and so you say that thoughts are neurons, and neurons are atomic, and no one creates atoms, so there is no such thing as property in intangible things, there are only physical things, which are already covered 100% by property rights. Got it.”
I can’t speak for Peter, but I’ve never gone down the road of methodological monism in order to prove my anti-IP case (and I doubt Kinsella the Hoppe-ian has either), and I have at least seen Peter invoke the basic points of this argument. Either way, at most this is a straw man that only defeats a poor presentation of an anti-IP case and does not defeat the anti-IP case itself.
Here is the argument: property is only meaningful where conflicts arise, conflicts imply rivalry (economic scarcity), and intangible things are not rivalrous, therefore no conflicts arise over their use, and therefore intangible things cannot be property. I don’t see any metaphysical claims there. There’s definitely no need to ponder what “creation” really means, which only ever became relevant because of the naive but popular conception of property as “I made it so I own it”, a conception of property at least I have made a point to avoid.
- April 9, 2011 at 3:14 pm
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@Peter Surda April 9, 2011 at 2:00 pm
let me remind you how your lies and fraud discredited you already.
This should be good…
Neil said that IP does not contradict rights in physical goods. You stated previously that it does not matter. So why are you complaining to me? We two agree on this. Neil does not.
I have no idea what you are trying to say here. What does “contradict rights in physical goods” mean? All rights limit other rights in some way. Rights in the self limit your actions (i.e. your rights of use) of your own property. Rights in IP also limits your rights of use, that is should you acknowledge their existence, in theory, in principle. Do we agree or disagree about that?
I on the other hand did not state that the intangible does not exist.
OK, that’s good. An idea is intangible. It exists. Can you demonstrate that to me without using any tangible medium please?
I said: You deny your insistence that all property is only tangible, and insist that to disprove it, we merely have to violate the laws of physics! Right!
No you dumb liar.
This sounds emotional, HAL.
You admit by this sentence the very thing Neil is denying. The difference is that he needs it to be false it because it’s the basis of his argument. You’re just making stuff up on the go and then just randomly put it into sentences that oppose me.
Sorry, your are incomprehensible. Do you deny that only tangible things can be regarded as property? Yet you acknowledge that intangible things exist, but cannot be regarded as property in your view? Your reason is that tangible property is already covered 100% by property rights. Is that correct?
I recall that Neil said that “things” can be created that did not exist before was the basis of his argument. You can’t seem to figure out what these “things” are. Explain it to me.
And some people actually think that your “arguments” should be taken seriously. They should not. It’s just random stuff that has no relevance for the debate.
What debate? You can’t seem to stay focused on a single point, much less conduct a debate.
@Peter Surda April 9, 2011 at 2:11 pm
let me remind you again how your lies and fraud have been exposed before and how you discredited yourself.
You are not the boss nor the judge of me. I hardly need to be reminded of what you think, if I can call it that.
Anyone can feel free to provide a counterexample that would disprove the impossibility. That is how falsification works.
Fine. Then show me an idea. You are the author of the question. Answer it.
All he has shown that they can be experienced when attached to a medium. He has not shown how they can be experienced without a medium.
Are you trying to be obtuse or does it come naturally?
Can you have an idea? That is how it is experienced without a medium (in the meaning of this discussion. Please don’t refer to neurons, that is just a distraction). If you want to convey your idea to me, how will I experience it? That is called communication. That’s the way the universe of human beings works. Are you a human being? Then you understand what I am saying. If not, then you fail the Turing test.
This of course does not on its own disprove the metaphysical existence of intangibles (as you fraudulently misrepresent my claims). But I don’t care about metaphysical questions. They have nothing to do with my arguments.
Are you sure your arguments exist? I’m beginning to wonder.
Neil said IP does not contradict physical rights.
Like I said, I don’t grok you. You are making up new terms which have not been defined by you, as far as I know.
That has nothing do with the question whether it exists from a specific metaphysical point of view. He was probably unaware at the time when he said “no”, but he fell into his own trap.
That makes at least two of us, genius. What are you talking about?
I would really appreciate if IP proponents confronted the contradictions instead of hiding behind metaphysical bullshit.
My life revolves around your appreciation.
And you, Lieberry, drop the pretense. You’re not a supporter or defender of Neil’s arguments. You’re just want to be acknowledged for your nonexistent qualities. Not gonna happen.
I am a supporter of ideas and concepts that I can understand and withstand my analysis as truthful. As for my nonexistent qualities, and my needs for acknowledgement, you certainly are in no position to judge.
You ask nonsensical questions, but don’t answer simple ones. You try to lead people into traps that you construct out of nonsense, and require nonsense to “prove” your point, whatever that is. You are a Mad Hatter.
- April 9, 2011 at 5:28 pm
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@Zorg April 9, 2011 at 2:29 pm
He’s saying you can’t separate it from whatever medium it is instantiated within at the moment so as to refer to it as an “object” on its own. Clearly it is not an object, although it obviously does exist.
Is a concept or idea an “object”? I don’t know what this means as you use the term.
I am using, as my concept for this discussion, an “original work of authorship”. Until it is fixed onto a tangible medium, it is intangible. You agree an intangible thing “exists”. If it exists, it exists separately from whatever medium it may be fixed upon. The fact that it is fixed on paper, does not change the fact that it can also be fixed in digital media. Therefore, will you agree that a “work” is an object that is seperable from the object it is fixed upon? If so…He’s saying that property rights are already established in physical media, so that when you imprint the information which constitutes the story it doesn’t change the fact that the disc (or whatever) already existed as property.
What happens when this object is “fixed” (if that is what you mean by “established”) in a tangible (if that is what you mean by physical) media? The tangible media has been transformed in a particular way, do you agree? The tangible medium has been changed to that of being what it was before (say a blank book) into what it is now (say a book with War and Peace fixed upon it). Does that “change the fact that the disc (or whatever) already existed as property? No it doesn’t change that fact.
If I have paper, I own it. If I fix a novel upon it, I still own the paper. If I sell the paper to you under the presumption that I am transferring the title to the paper with the object on it for use in a particular way, does that AUTOMATIALLY MEAN I HAVE TRANSFERRED THE INTANGIBLE OBJECT? Why?
It seems that even under Rothbard or Hoppe, one cannot assume they have obtained the title to property unless the owner has specifically transferred it. When did this happen in the example above? When did it transfer under any other assumption than under the presumption of copyrights? In the albescence of copyrights (which does not currently exist) you cannot presume that the original owner would transfer it to you under the same conditions that you assume you have it. So under your own theory of property, explain how you obtained title to the intangible object along with the paper (or disk, or whatever).
He’s saying that this means that IP is therefore contradictory to established property rights in physical media.
Yes, I do understand. He is saying that a theory of property which recognizes that the self-ownership and private ownership of means of production does not apply to intangible objects, because once they are fixed on a tangible medium, the title to the intangible object also automatically transfers, because that is the only way he can remain consistent with a theory of property that declares that tangible objects always trump intangible one. He assumes that there can be no theory of property that does not simply operate on the principle of “tangibility rules”. This is unsupportable in any other area of property theory. Yet he will not admit this self-evident fact.
All rights are limited in their range of action by other rights. That is simply a statement of what a right is. It is a defensible limitation on the actions of others.
No pay careful attention, I have never claimed that defending a right establishes my right to another’s property. What I say is that defending my rights imposes limites on the range of actions you may take with YOUR OWN PROPERTY. If you violate my rights, you still OWN your own property, but you have violated my rights, nonetheless.If you swing a bat that you own so that you violate my property rights, I do not OWN your bat. But your rights of use to your bat are limited by the very existence of my rights not to be hit by your property as the result of your actions.
So if this is what you mean by “conflicts with physical property”, then yes, any right conflicts with the physical property of another to the extent that their use of their property infringes upon my rights. That is a general statement describing the operation of rights, and is not specific to IP rights.
Don’t pretend like you don’t understand that. Come on!
I am not pretending. Why would I want to waste my time doing that?
Agree to the point he makes so that you can proceed to the next point in the argument.
Based on my explanation above, do I agree or disagree with Peter’s position? I have no idea, honestly.
That’s what an argument is, eh? Perhaps you don’t disagree here, but you will disagree with the next point that: Because it is not an instantiated thing or object on its own, we shouldn’t treat it as property since, being that way, it is infinitely reproducible in its essence, unlike everything else we call property.
You know you are shifting arguments here, right? You are now arguing that property rights are dependent upon something called “infinite reproducibility”?
I understand what you really mean is rivalry, I think, but that is another line of reasoning what I won’t go into now. - April 9, 2011 at 5:29 pm
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@sweatervest April 9, 2011 at 3:04 pm
Fair enough.
Here is the argument: property is only meaningful where conflicts arise, conflicts imply rivalry (economic scarcity), and intangible things are not rivalrous, therefore no conflicts arise over their use, and therefore intangible things cannot be property. I don’t see any metaphysical claims there. There’s definitely no need to ponder what “creation” really means, which only ever became relevant because of the naive but popular conception of property as “I made it so I own it”, a conception of property at least I have made a point to avoid.
Here are your assumptions:
-property is only meaningful where conflicts arise
-intangible things are not rivalrous
-no conflicts arise over their use
-intangible things cannot be propertyEach of these points is debatable. If they are debatable, they cannot be assumed. So I have studied the arguments you summarize, and disagree with each of these assumptions, and not surprisingly, come to different conclusions.
No amount of personal abuse is going to change that simple fact. If you really want to know more about what I think, fine. If not, fine.
- April 10, 2011 at 5:06 am
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Lieberry,
This should be good…
No, it is terrible that someone as corrupted as you has the audacity to continue posting.
I have no idea what you are trying to say here.
Just another demonstration how stupid you are, since even after months of debates you can present a claim like this.
What does “contradict rights in physical goods” mean?
It means that any and all rights that follow from “IP” either contradict a right in an already owned physical object, or they affirm it (thus being redundant).
All rights limit other rights in some way.
There it is again. You say that my objection does not matter. Neil, however, disagrees.
All that IP can do is either be irrelevant or steal. There is nothing else it can do. Since Neil supports rights in the physical he’s contradicting himself.
Do we agree or disagree about that?
We agree that all rights impose limits on action. But that has nothing to do with my claim. That’s something you made up in order to avoid confronting my argument directly.
OK, that’s good. An idea is intangible. It exists. Can you demonstrate that to me without using any tangible medium please?
.
I did not say ideas exist either. It’s all metaphysical bullshit that IP proponents use to hide their self contradictions.You deny your insistence that all property is only tangible, and insist that to disprove it, we merely have to violate the laws of physics! Right!
No, I do no such thing. Again, this is metaphysical crap that is completely irrelevant to my claim. It does not matter whether the intangible metaphysically exists or not, the self-contradiction is not affected by it.
This sounds emotional, HAL.
It is a sign of utmost disrespect I have for you, due to your constant use of lies and fraud.
Sorry, your are incomprehensible.
Sorry, you’re stupid. I already reformulated my arguments several times and you show no sign of comprehending the question. Maybe you should go back to school and learn how to read.
I recall that Neil said that “things” can be created that did not exist before was the basis of his argument. You can’t seem to figure out what these “things” are. Explain it to me.
I don’t care whether “things” are “created” or not. I’ll only repeat that it’s metaphysical nonsense trying to mask the contradictions that follow from combining this with other claims the IP proponents are making. It’s not my fault that IP proponents mix self-contradictory claims. I’m not telling them to abandon the concept of immaterial creation. I’m just telling them they are contradicting themselves.
You can’t seem to stay focused on a single point, much less conduct a debate..
Lieberry, you slimy coward. I always, or at least almost always, provide a direct reaction to whatever my opponents are claiming. You on the other hand have jumping to a completely different topic, just like you do here, as the main method of “argumentation”. And now you claim that I can’t stay focused? Shame on you.
You are not the boss nor the judge of me.
If you don’t want people to judge you then don’t interact with them. If you don’t want to make them angry then don’t lie to them.
Fine. Then show me an idea. You are the author of the question. Answer it.
Once again, you dumb and dumber. I did not say that idea does not exist, nor that it exists. I said that if you consider the immaterial relevant from the purposes of rights, then you need to sacrifice other rights. But the deontological IP proponents, like J. Neil Schulman, want to have both, so they need to contradict themselves. It is up to them how to resolve the contradiction. They are free to say that they have no problem in abandoning rights in the physical goods. I don’t think they’ll do it, precisely because that would require a utilitarian, rather than deontological, approach.
Like I said, I don’t grok you.
Because you’re a moron. IP opponents on this site get my argument. For deontological IP proponents, I can at least assume that the reason why they still don’t get it is due to cognitive dissonance. But you don’t have such a limitation. You’re just objecting out of principle regardless of arguments.
What are you talking about?
You misrepresent my claim as “immaterial does not metaphysically exist, therefore it cannot have rights”. That’s a lie. I never said that. Rather I said that if you want to have rights in the immaterial, they either need to be redundant or contradictory to rights in physical goods. Whether my opponents want to have rights in the immaterial or physical, I don’t care. That’s for them to decide, not me.
I am a supporter of ideas and concepts that I can understand and withstand my analysis as truthful.
So that’s what your trail of lies, fraud and cowardice is supposed to represent? I had no idea.
You ask nonsensical questions, but don’t answer simple ones.
I answer all questions. Show me an example of a question that I did not answer! I also ask trivial questions. However, cognitive dissonance is preventing my opponents from comprehending them, yet alone from answering them. As for you, you are a category on its own.
- April 10, 2011 at 6:32 am
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Wildberry,
Each of these points is debatable.
No, they are not. There is no such thing as an intangible action, intangible rivalry or intangible conflict. Those are oxymorons.
But by all means, if you think otherwise, show me! Oh wait, you said that would violate the laws of physics.
April 10, 2011 at 10:09 am-
Wilberry is the intellectual equivalent of a Cleveland steamer.
- April 12, 2011 at 6:21 pm
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“No amount of personal abuse is going to change that simple fact.”
Now where did I personally abuse you?
“If you really want to know more about what I think, fine. If not, fine.”
I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt that you don’t mean what you literally said here, but just to clarify I don’t care at all what you think, you are a complete stranger to me. I am interested in the truth, not what other humans are capable of stating.
“Here are your assumptions”
They were not assumed. I dedicated much time to establishing those points on threads I know you participated in.
“property is only meaningful where conflicts arise”
Of course it is. I dare you to even start to conceive of “property” where there is no conflict. Property is about exclusion. The whole meaning of “I own this” is captured in “I can exclude others from using this”. What relevance or even meaning would exclusion have where no exclusion ever needs to happen? Where there are no conflicts of use, there is literally no way to even identify something as an act of exclusion. In order to meaningfully exclude, someone has to request or try to use something. There has to be a conflict of use.
“intangible things are not rivalrous”
You are the one that keeps using the word “intangible”. All I ever said was that ideas are non-rivalrous, which I specifically supported. The act of using an idea cannot conflict with another’s use of that idea unless such use trespasses on another’s physical property. If it can, then it should easy to cite an example of such. I really don’t care if there are “intangible” things, whatever that may mean to you, that are rivalrous. That is totally irrelevant to this discussion, which is about ideas, and the fact that they are non-rivalrous goods. That’s all I ever said.
“no conflicts arise over their use”
This is a literal repitition of the previous point, since rivalry means potential conflicts of use. I have provided my burden of proof. You are capable of disagreeing with anything you want. You can sit here and say, “Well I think 2 + 2 = 5″. You don’t invalidate a position by suggesting that you might believe another one. I have backed up my reasnoning to believe this. You need to back up your reasoning to not believe it.
“intangible things cannot be property”
I never, ever said that. All I said is that ideas cannot be property, which is not an assumption but is a logical consequence of the first two “assumptions” you listed here. If I assume that property is only meaningful when conflicts arise, and assume that not conflicts arise over the use of ideas, then it is not an additional assumption that ideas are not property. It is a logical consequence of the two assumptions. To clarify, neither of those two first points are assumptions. I have offered support to them over and over and over.
“Each of these points is debatable.”
This is a meta-argument (thank you Peter for exposing me to this word). If they really are debatable, then you’d just go ahead and debate them instead of promising me that such a thing is possible (what better way to prove your claim!). This reminds me of when my friend said, “But Keynesian economics is derived from logic”. I’m sure it is!
“If they are debatable, they cannot be assumed.”
So your claim that they are debatable is not your assumption? Are you saying it is not debatable that those statements are debatable? If it is, then you fall into the same trap you think I’m falling into.
“So I have studied the arguments you summarize, and disagree with each of these assumptions, and not surprisingly, come to different conclusions.”
So!? Why do you think this is relevant at all to any discussion!? What does it bring to the table for you to respond to arguments with, “Well I disagree, so there.” Your act of disagreement doesn’t prove anything!
I would like to make extra emphasis on the fact that you took this much space to tell me you disagree with me, and didn’t offer *a single word* to justify that disagreement. I know full well that you disagree, and I submit that you have no good reason to disagree, which is the only explanation I can think of for someone taking so much time to say “I disagree” and no time at all to say why.
I would love to see a theory of property rights that doesn’t immediately make all of the insights that you listed off as my “assumptions”.
- April 12, 2011 at 7:42 pm
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@sweatervest April 12, 2011 at 6:21 pm
>blockquote>Now where did I personally abuse you?
Fine. If I improperly associate you with the general tone of rudeness that is so common here, allow me to offer my deepest and most sincere apology.
They were not assumed. I dedicated much time to establishing those points on threads I know you participated in.
“property is only meaningful where conflicts arise”
Of course it is. I dare you to even start to conceive of “property” where there is no conflict. Property is about exclusion. The whole meaning of “I own this” is captured in “I can exclude others from using this”. What relevance or even meaning would exclusion have where no exclusion ever needs to happen? Where there are no conflicts of use, there is literally no way to even identify something as an act of exclusion. In order to meaningfully exclude, someone has to request or try to use something. There has to be a conflict of use.
We are in agreement then; So far so good.
“intangible things are not rivalrous”
You are the one that keeps using the word “intangible”. All I ever said was that ideas are non-rivalrous, which I specifically supported.
If this is all you said, then I agree. To clarify, both ideas and “original works” are intangible “things”. Ideas are not rivalrous, but “original works” are. “Intangible work” is important, unless you will agree that once a work is fixed in a medium, it is always fixed somewhere, and its origin can be traced back to a single original attributable to a specific author. This is my understand of why Neil refers to logos/MCP as “material”.
The act of using an idea cannot conflict with another’s use of that idea unless such use trespasses on another’s physical property. If it can, then it should easy to cite an example of such. I really don’t care if there are “intangible” things, whatever that may mean to you, that are rivalrous. That is totally irrelevant to this discussion, which is about ideas, and the fact that they are non-rivalrous goods. That’s all I ever said.
OK, if that is all you are saying, fine, but since “ideas” are not the subject of copyright or other IP, and are not ever property, then I am waiting for the punch line.
“no conflicts arise over their use”
This is a literal repitition of the previous point, since rivalry means potential conflicts of use. I have provided my burden of proof. You are capable of disagreeing with anything you want. You can sit here and say, “Well I think 2 + 2 = 5″. You don’t invalidate a position by suggesting that you might believe another one. I have backed up my reasnoning to believe this. You need to back up your reasoning to not believe it.
I haven’t figured out yet what you are arguing. I agree ideas are non-rivalrous and there is no conflict over use (in a scarcity sense).
“intangible things cannot be property”
I never, ever said that. All I said is that ideas cannot be property, which is not an assumption but is a logical consequence of the first two “assumptions” you listed here. If I assume that property is only meaningful when conflicts arise, and assume that not conflicts arise over the use of ideas, then it is not an additional assumption that ideas are not property. It is a logical consequence of the two assumptions. To clarify, neither of those two first points are assumptions. I have offered support to them over and over and over.
“Each of these points is debatable.”
This is a meta-argument (thank you Peter for exposing me to this word). If they really are debatable, then you’d just go ahead and debate them instead of promising me that such a thing is possible (what better way to prove your claim!). This reminds me of when my friend said, “But Keynesian economics is derived from logic”. I’m sure it is!
Yes it is, but that is not a dirty word.
“If they are debatable, they cannot be assumed.”
Sorry, but now I’m really confused. That is a tautology, but it doesn’t stop some from assuming things instead of debating them. Where are you heading? It seems so far we are on the same side of the argument.
I know full well that you disagree, and I submit that you have no good reason to disagree, which is the only explanation I can think of for someone taking so much time to say “I disagree” and no time at all to say why.
Disagree with what?
Drum roll….All that is fine as an argument for why ideas should not be property, which I support, and I don’t know who DOES think ideas should be property. Where I disagree with the “ideas are free” line of argument, is not that I think that ideas are property, but that IDEAS CANNOT BE EQUIVOCATED WITH THE CONCEPT OF IP, ESPECIALLY THE COPYRIGHT CONCEPT OF “ORIGINAL WORK.”
So, did I mistakenly assume that you were leading up to a grand conclusion that says, “therefore, IP cannot be property? If so, we just wasted a bunch of time restating the obvious.
I would love to see a theory of property rights that doesn’t immediately make all of the insights that you listed off as my “assumptions”.
And finally, if ideas are not property, then this entire discussion concerning the qualities of ideas is irrelevant to the discussion of property, unless you are simply giving a negative example of something.
This is a real problem with this format of discussion. It is easy to get lost between different bloggers and the train of thought and what is being asserted, etc.
I am addressing these assumptions, which you summarized nicely at the beginning or our discussion, relative to the equivocation inherent in the “ideas are free” line of reasoning, as it is applied to the argument against IP rights. If you aren’t making such an equivocation, if you hold that an “idea” is not the same thing as an “original work of authorship”, then we are aligned. If you mean to assert that because of all the things you can and have said about ideas is an argument against IP, then I repeat, we reach completely different conclusions.
Sorry, somehow we got our wires crossed here. If you want to understand where I’m coming from, go back and substitute “ideas” with “IP”, and you can see what I meant to convey. It is the equivocation I am objecting to. Sorry…
I have come to the conclusion that this entire discussion of whether there are property rights in IP is simply a diversion, anyway. It seems that no one disagrees that the original manuscript of an author is the property of that author, so the whole issue is moot. Why it has taken months and thousands of words to arrive at that point I don’t really don’t know.
Shall we take a mulligan?
- April 9, 2011 at 2:54 pm
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“The case for logorights is for ownership of things that can be observed as existing as objects independent of the other things that carry, transport, and display them.
Deal with this.”
I have already dealt with this for the “umpteenth” time. You are either claiming that one has ownership over the nonphysical aspects of a logo, or you are making the even more absurd claim that as soon as you design a logo you gain ownership rights to every physical object, now and in the future, that either resembles or has a part that resembles your logo (how does one decide where to draw the line of resemblence?). I am giving you the benefit of the doubt that you are not saying you can trump someone’s homesteading claim to physical property because they drew your picture on it. Claiming you own the abstract picture, absurd as it may be, is far less absurd than claiming you all of a sudden gain ownership to anything by drawing anything on anything, except for the thing you’re drawing on.
What exactly qualifies as a “logo”? Can I claim that symmetry is a logo I created and sue anybody that produces highly symmetric goods? Whatever line you draw in the sand dividing a “logo” from anything else is entirely arbitrary and invokes subjective value.
If you think I’m being pedantic, this causes real problems. Apparently Intel tried to get a trademark claim to the letter “i”. It makes me think of Futurama, when a Momcorp commercial ended with, “Mom, love and screen door are registered trademarks of Momcorp”.
One thing I think the IP opponents are forgetting to do is point out how silly of an avenue this is to go down anyway. Why do you need property rights to protect logos? If someone designs a logo and then sells good products and in turn instills value in that logo then other people can either copy this logo and admit openly that they are not the real deal, which makes the whole endeavor pointless anyways (first of all who would do this, and second of all why should the original designer care?), or they can copy the logo and con people into thinking they are the real deal, and they are guilty of fraud no matter what “logorights” people talk about (and they defraued the customers, not the logo designer). It’s a supremely silly way to deal with something that well-defined physical property rights deals with just fine.
Talking about logorights suggest that there would be some sort of problem without them. What problem would that be?
- April 10, 2011 at 5:10 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The case for logorights is for ownership of things that can be observed as existing as objects independent of the other things that carry, transport, and display them.
And the case against logorights is that all these situations you mentioned are already covered by the rights without logorights. So, logorights either contradict them or are redundant.
Deal with this.
- April 8, 2011 at 11:18 pm
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After I have stated my intention not to participate in this forum, Sweatervest — who has until now been silent in this discussion — shoots out 17 messages that merely replicate challenges I’ve already answered.
Not going for it, Sweatervest. Read my article. Read my previous comments in this forum.
My time is too valuable to repeat myself endlessly.
- April 9, 2011 at 3:07 pm
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“After I have stated my intention not to participate in this forum, Sweatervest — who has until now been silent in this discussion — shoots out 17 messages that merely replicate challenges I’ve already answered.”
Oh right I’ve been lurking in the shadows waiting for you to give up! I’m sorry I don’t stalk these forums and discovered this thread after you ran away from it.
“Not going for it, Sweatervest. Read my article. Read my previous comments in this forum. ”
You mean the ones where you call me a communist and Kinsella a dialectical materialist?
“My time is too valuable to repeat myself endlessly.”
Trust me, I know what it’s like. You keep claiming that we have denied the existence of intangible things. How many times do I have to explain how off the mark this is? I probably sound like a broken record on these threads by this point!
- April 9, 2011 at 12:51 am
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It’s very unlikely people who disagree with IP will go along with using force against others in order to enforce it.
Why if I run an ISP would I give you any information about the people who use my ISP to find out about infringement? They are paying me money, but you are giving me nothing but a headache as I will have to get rid of a paying customer to enforce your so called rights.
The proof that IP will never work is demonstrated by the fact that those who would never steal will regularly download or copy without a thought. Even those who give lip-service to IP will often violate it (I’ve had numerous discussions with people who advocated IP with their arguments but readily admitted to being pirates).
You don’t have to force most people to accept physical property because not accepting it means that they cannot logically expect others to respect their own property. The same is true regarding laws against violent crimes. Most people do not want to be attacked.
The truth is for individual violators looking to get a free movie/book/game/etc. IP is largely already dead. It’s remains are primarily hindering others from developing their own books/movies/games based on those who came before them that don’t meet some strange criteria or destroying the lives of the few people convicted for sharing.
The rules say it’s ok to make a parody, but not ok to make extension to another’s writing like a sequel, translation or adaptation. And if you come up with an idea for how to improve a patented device, you either have to wait or try to sell it to the person who has the patent.
- April 9, 2011 at 6:12 am
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In the open seas there have often enough been pirates.
In the old west there were often enough cattle rustlers and horse thieves.
In the inner cities gang members often get away with drive-by murder.
In many cultures men get away with raping women, killing women, and ritually mutilating their genitalia.
Slavery still exists today.
Cannibalism still exists today.
The argument that people see nothing wrong with violating other people’s rights is not a libertarian argument against rights.
If you wish to do away with property rights and support those who violate them, please have the courtesy to stop calling yourself a libertarian or a propertarian. It’s communism so demented even Marx and Lenin would have puked.
- April 9, 2011 at 1:56 pm
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1) Certainly, however who would accept that piracy on the sea is ok when it comes to their own stuff? And yet people do accept that what you call IP that the “create” can be freely shared/copied.
2) Same argument as above. Who would advocate for their own cattle to be stolen?
3) No one wants to be raped or killed or mutilated. No one wants to be a mistreated and beholden to another’s orders with no right to refuse or to be eaten. This is why constructing arguments against all of these things is very simple. This is why having a “non-aggression principle” makes sense. The fact some cultures allow these things is indeed very bad, but the reason other cultures left them behind is that the reasoning behind it was easy to explain.
4) I didn’t say that people seeing “nothing wrong” is a “libertarian argument.” It is probably somewhat utilitarian. I’ve got no problem if you want to label it as whatever, but it is consistent with human action. People act in their own best interest. IP will never be in the best interest of everyone (not even in the long run).
5) I call myself a libertarian because I believe in the non-aggression principle and voluntarism. But I think we must have different definitions of aggression. Unfortunately IP is really another axiom you put above non-aggression which enforces your opinion as to what it means. And so you must tell me that I’m a communist simply because I don’t agree that your idea of IP will ever work. - April 9, 2011 at 3:13 pm
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“If you wish to do away with property rights and support those who violate them, please have the courtesy to stop calling yourself a libertarian or a propertarian. It’s communism so demented even Marx and Lenin would have puked.”
Please stop paying lip service to the political philosophies that actually favor individual liberty and admit that you are, at least concerning this issue, a fascist calling all of your adversaries “commie bastards”.
You sound like a full-blown liberal right now. Why don’t you just start calling us “neo-confederates” and “rascists”? I’m tempted to post Tom Woods’s interview in response to this.
- April 9, 2011 at 6:24 am
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“The proof that IP will never work is demonstrated by the fact that those who would never steal will regularly download or copy without a thought.”
“Those who would never steal” also without a thought approve of government agents taking the private property of “tax cheats,” imprison people who refuse to be drafted, and allow adults to feel up four-year-old girls going for a ride on an airplane.
I hold libertarians who claim to believe in private property rights to a higher standard.
- April 9, 2011 at 2:08 pm
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I think this is a pretty good point. You said yourself people approve of slavery elsewhere and I’m sure this is without thinking as well. But you have a good argument that can convince people over time against it (we know it works because it worked in many countries peacefully).
Unfortunately, to this point there is no argument that has convinced people that government is not a “necessary evil”. And most people still think it’s doing things like protecting them and supporting the poor, etc. Even Wildberry believes in the state, and he agrees with you on the subject of IP.
In any case, you can hold libertarians to any standard you want but you have to convince us first, just like with anyone else. I’m not convinced. If I recall correctly that your system doesn’t even have term limits on IP, I think it’s far worse than our current system (from a utilitarian perspective, even if it is more consistent).
- April 9, 2011 at 3:27 pm
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@Matthew Swaringen April 9, 2011 at 2:08 pm
Even Wildberry believes in the state, and he agrees with you on the subject of IP.
Don’t put words in my mouth. I oppose mercantilism, so any aspect of the State, or state, or self-government (state is a bit ambiguous, yes?) that embodies that quality I am opposed to.
Neil, to my understanding, has developed an argument for property rights in intangible works. As far as I know he has not depended on any form of IP laws to make his case for property rights in what he descirbes as “logos”.Therfore, unless I misunderstood Neil, it is not accurate to presume that we agree, as I don’t know if that is the case.
However I can say that I support the concept and principle of IP rights. I support this concept as I understand them to be derived from self-ownership and private ownerhip of the means of production, from an ethical point of view, and the issue of internalizing external economies from an econmic point of view.
If Neil supports those positions, the we are in agreement.
- April 9, 2011 at 3:33 pm
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“state is a bit ambiguous, yes?”
No. See Hoppe.
- April 9, 2011 at 4:13 pm
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I wasn’t responding to Hoppe.
- April 9, 2011 at 4:14 pm
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Sweatervest,
I wasn’t resonding to Hoppe.
- April 12, 2011 at 6:26 pm
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Of course you weren’t. That’s probably why I suggested that you read Hoppe!
Was this serious?
- April 9, 2011 at 4:00 pm
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I didn’t put words in your mouth. You inferred things from my statement that I didn’t say. I never said you support everything the state does, however… I’ve not seen where you disagree with the state on IP, since most of the time when you reply to me you defer to existing law.
- April 9, 2011 at 4:31 pm
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@Matthew Swaringen April 9, 2011 at 2:08 pm
Fair enough. Thanks for clearing that up.
There are many areas where I disagree with the current operation of the law, the CTEA for example. But we have rearely discussed that here. We are debating the fundamental legitimary of the concept and principles of IP as a property right.
As I understand Neil, he is making an argument for the legitimacy of property rights on the basis of self-ownership, etc. He seems to specifically avoid depending on existing concepts of law. It is interesing and thoughtful, and he arrives at the same conclusion I reach on that specific point; that rights in original works of authorship are justifiable and legitimate. I do not honestly now where his concepts of logorights and the concept of copyrights intersect beyond that.
On that point, there is vast confusion and equivication of terms. Much of this is given considerable precision in the language and conepts of the law itself.
Therefore, I do refer to the law, just as I would refer to the dictionary, to define terms and usage. I can’t figure out why anyone objects to that as a point of departure, escpecially Kinsellsa, who makes it well known that he is an IP lawyer, so why not depend on the usage that is already defined? I am not speaking a foreign language.
As far as others, most seemingly get their understanding of what the law says and does from Kinsella, Tucker, or what they’ve heard, and end up arguing against these strawmen born of their own misunderstandings. The most blatant example is the “ideas are free” line of reasoning.
I dont expect anyone to know what the law actually says, but if I refer to it, anyone is free to see if what I say is accurate. What is wrong with me proceding from that point of departure?
- April 9, 2011 at 5:07 pm
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Pointing to the law for the definition of “IP” is problematic in some ways because it was established over a long course of time and the writers of portions of it had vastly different opinions on the justifications for it and it’s purpose.
It was largely written in the US on utilitarian grounds, to provide some measure of incentive to produce. This is not like your “basis of self-ownership” at all, which seems to pose causality (I caused it to be therefore I own it) as the basis of ownership. The utilitarian grounds in the reason for limited terms on IP. This is also why the exemptions are created for it (like parody).
However, I don’t think saying “this is what the law is” answers the questions. It tends to beg for answers to more questions, like why is parody ok when some authors/artists might hate parody and find it insulting? Or how much humor must a parody have to be considered a parody and not a sequel or other type of adaptation that isn’t legal. But then the question must be asked, why can’t I write a sequel to someone elses story? If the authors dislike of parody is not important, should their dislike for others writing sequels be considered?
Or what if I do make an improvement to an existing patented device? Is my only rightful choice to ask for the original one who held the patent to pay me for the enhancement?
If one is arguing from a utilitarian basis I think they really need to make the case that these things all benefit, but I haven’t seen that case made sufficiently. And if one is arguing from a natural rights perspective or self-ownership, then I think it’s important to make as few assumptions as possible.
I agree with you when you say that “scarcity” as a condition is an assumption, but it is less of an assumption than causality, and imposes fewer limitations and doesn’t result in internal contradictions.
Lets take causality as the assumption.
1) I make a wheel out of stone that I procured. I own the stone and thus the wheel. I also came up with the idea “wheel” and thus I own the wheel pattern.
2) Someone else sees me, and uses their own stone to make their own wheel. I see their wheel and tell them they owe me for making that copy.At this point I made not 1 but 2 assumptions
1) That causality is sufficient for ownership
2) That ownership of a pattern supersedes ownership of an objectBut why must pattern ownership be greater than ownership of something physical? On what grounds did I make this assumption? But if I don’t make this assumption there is an unresolvable conflict. Is it made on the basis of necessity? For if I don’t have rights to deny others to use their stone to make wheels I have no ownership of the wheel?
But why is this necessary at all? In what way does his making a wheel just as I did infringe upon my right to make wheels? It does not.
I would argue that the idea that I can own “wheel” creates unnecessary conflict. It doesn’t prevent aggression but in fact demands it. Whereas before I had come up with this concept of ownership rooted purely in causality I could peacefully coexist with others without denying them the use of that which they had procured, now I must take to the streets and demand others help me by not making wheels without my permission and that they use force against their neighbors if they see them making wheels without permission.
- April 10, 2011 at 5:35 am
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Wildberry,
We are debating the fundamental legitimary of the concept and principles of IP as a property right.
We’re not debating the legitimacy of IP. We’re debating the logical coherence of arguments that IP proponents make.
I objected to this misrepresentation already many times and looks like IP proponents still don’t get it. They think we’re blaspheming. The sooner the IP proponents realise this the sooner the issue can be resolved.
- April 10, 2011 at 11:44 am
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@Matthew Swaringen April 9, 2011 at 5:07 pm
Pointing to the law for the definition of “IP” is problematic in some ways because it was established over a long course of time and the writers of portions of it had vastly different opinions on the justifications for it and it’s purpose.
When I refer to a definition of a word and quote from the dictionary, you don’t question the motivations of the authors of the dictionary. Think of it like that.
However, I don’t think saying “this is what the law is” answers the questions. It tends to beg for answers to more questions, like why is parody ok when some authors/artists might hate parody and find it insulting? Or how much humor must a parody have to be considered a parody and not a sequel or other type of adaptation that isn’t legal. But then the question must be asked, why can’t I write a sequel to someone elses story? If the authors dislike of parody is not important, should their dislike for others writing sequels be considered?
You are asking a good question, and the answer is a long essay. If I did that, I would be explaining to you all of the assumtions and defining all the terms so you could understand what I am saying, and then the rationale is for having them that way rather than the other possibilities.
If someone else explained all of that already, I would refer you to that. You wouldn’t expect me to retype that work again for you here, you would read the link. That is all I am doing when I refer to the law. That, and objecting when others misstate what the law says and does as a basis for attacking the straw men they are thus creating.
If I answered you questions in detail, I would largely be just restating the way the current law operates, and at the most, perhaps highlight some things that I disagree with. But it is somewhat premature for me to do that before you had an understanding of the definition of certain terms, like “parody” and “adaption”. Obviously, if those terms had very broad meaning, it would raise questions like yours. If they were defined very narrowly, then they would not serve their purpose. Familiarity with the law helps facilitate those discussions. Otherwise, I can only give you general answers.
Generally, the concept of protected works conflicts with other rights, like First Amendment free speech. Also, free association means that we must be free to use and exchange information and knowledge to a large degree. Therefore a doctrine of “fair use” is an important part of copyright laws. It is an extensive and detailed doctrine, and includes an exception for parody. Parody is defined in a way that makes it applicable to things like the recent “Friday’ phenomena.
Also, the legal treatment of “copying” is complex. But Neil’s description of a “check sum” is useful, if you are familiar with that term. The term of art in the law is “substantial similarity”.
The point I am making is that there are answers to your questions, but I can’t explain them in detail in this forum. If you wanted to go further, you have to learn something about how the law operates. Otherwise we have to be content with general answers not specific ones.
Also, it is difficult to switch back and forth between copyrights and patents, except at a very high conceptual level. Otherwise you have to talk specifically about one area, because each operates with its own specific terms and concepts.
But why must pattern ownership be greater than ownership of something physical? On what grounds did I make this assumption? But if I don’t make this assumption there is an unresolvable conflict. Is it made on the basis of necessity? For if I don’t have rights to deny others to use their stone to make wheels I have no ownership of the wheel?
In theory, you are describing the patent system, and if you make other assumptions, like an advanced economy, “legal enforcement”, etc., your example holds.
The application of “wheel” might be patentable, which would establish monopoly rights in you as the inventor. But also in this particular case, this happened long ago, and since the invention has long been in the public domain, and under the principles of the existing law, once in the public domain, it can never be protected as a new patent. Something in the public domain cannot be “unique”.
But why is this necessary at all? In what way does his making a wheel just as I did infringe upon my right to make wheels? It does not.
I wish I knew how to give shorter answers… You are raising the issue of external economies. Whether it should or should not create conflicts, and how conflicting rights should be resolved, involves ethical, legal, and economic questions.
The general argument is that granting limited monopoly rights provides the incentives for inventors to invest in innovation and development. We all benefit from wheels, in your example. That is a good thing. But monopolies are a bad thing. So the compromise between the two is a limited term (and theoretically a difficult threshold for getting the patent in the first place)
I would argue that the idea that I can own “wheel” creates unnecessary conflict. It doesn’t prevent aggression but in fact demands it. Whereas before I had come up with this concept of ownership rooted purely in causality I could peacefully coexist with others without denying them the use of that which they had procured, now I must take to the streets and demand others help me by not making wheels without my permission and that they use force against their neighbors if they see them making wheels without permission.
You are making huge assumptions about the nature of man, society, and economics here.
In general, conflicts arise between humans. Depending on the nature of the two humans in your scenario who each make wheels, left to their own devices they will bargain or fight. Civilized humans (big assumption) prefer bargaining. The costs are lower. To resolve conflicts in general, individual rights are established before conflicts arise, or as a result of resolving a conflict, rights are defined in a certain way. Remember, property rights, like all rights, are a human device.
If you assume that you have patent rights in “wheel”, then you have to ask the utilitarian, economic question, how should property rights be allocated in this situation? Both have claims: the inventor for exclusivity, and the public for free use. Patent law is a compromise between these two conflicting claims.
- April 10, 2011 at 1:00 pm
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I’m familiar with checksums. They change if the data is encoded/encrypted and they can’t be “decoded” back into the original data. It’s theoretically possible (though would be extraordinarily rare) to have 2 files with the same checksum that are different.
“You are making huge assumptions about the nature of man, society, and economics here.”
I don’t think so honestly. I made kind of 2 arguments in that paragraph. The first implied I thought people could not believe in IP.
1) That it is entirely possible for people to not believe they can own the design of “wheel.”The second was about what is necessary if people do believe in IP.
1) If there is ownership of “wheel” it necessitates restrictions on the use of others ownership of their own materials that could be used to make wheels.
2) If there are restrictions, it necessitates people to help me restrict others who aren’t going to restrict their own actions willingly.“Depending on the nature of the two humans in your scenario who each make wheels, left to their own devices they will bargain or fight. ”
This makes the assumption that the humans see a reason to bargain or fight. It sounds like you are proposing that at least the creator of the wheel believes he owns it. I’m asking “why must this be so?” I’m assuming it can not be, or at the very least it can not be among most people.“To resolve conflicts in general, individual rights are established before conflicts arise, or as a result of resolving a conflict, rights are defined in a certain way. Remember, property rights, like all rights, are a human device.”
The right of “IP” wasn’t formed in this way. It came as a much later development and when it came was used for censorship or to grant privileges. This is the way those who created it saw IP.They didn’t see it as a “right.” My argument is that IP doesn’t in fact resolve conflicts but creates them, for the 2 reasons I gave above, that it makes demands on third parties for enforcement and limits the property rights of others who made no contract.
“you have to ask the utilitarian, economic question, how should property rights be allocated in this situation? Both have claims: the inventor for exclusivity, and the public for free use. Patent law is a compromise between these two conflicting claims.”
I only have to ask the utilitarian question that you pose here if IP already exists and I think it is valid. I don’t think the inventory has a claim for exclusivity. “Naturally” anyone who could reverse engineer or read some instructions about his device would be able to remake it.There is no law inherent in physical reality that limits the scope of use. There are in fact physical laws that limit the use of scarce resources. Once they are used they are many times forever changed.
Physical property rights are about allocation of scarce resources because of these physical laws.
Now I can still ask the utilitarian question here. What if I think that IP is beneficial moreso than it’s restrictions? What if i think it would make people better off as it would make for more inventions or books/etc?
Well, I can certainly think this, but if I’m going to advocate the use of force against others to limit how they use their property, I think I better have some substantial evidence that exclusivity is promoting the “general welfare.” I’ve seen no such evidence.
- April 10, 2011 at 1:16 pm
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inventory = inventor
Bad hands.
- April 9, 2011 at 4:03 am
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@Wildberry:
“The dogs come out,”
Yeah, you lost your credibility, honesty and so miles ago. Your trolling became boring.
- April 9, 2011 at 3:50 pm
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Peter Surda wrote, “Can you provide an example of Atlas Shrugged or Casablanca that is independent of a medium? You can’t. Because by even writing or speaking the words, you are using a medium.”
That’s it? That’s your objection?
Find me a plot of land that doesn’t exist without being carried by land.
Find me a toaster that exists without being a toaster.
Your demand is that something exist without existing.
Absurd nonsense.
The point is that Atlas Shrugged and Casablanca exist independent of the other things that carry them, and the proof that they exist independently is that they can exist on different carriers.
I’ve been criticized on this forum for demanding to go back to first premises. Now everyone can see why this is necessary. Your epistemology is junk.
- April 9, 2011 at 5:14 pm
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I made a reference earlier to a hypothetical memory recall device. Given that ultimately everything we see (whether from a PC monitor or a live performance) interacts with the brain do we have no right to our own memories if it violates IP?
Atlas Shrugged and Casablanca only have a meaning for the human mind. Without humans the pattern that makes up those books would matter no more than any pattern in the world.
- April 10, 2011 at 9:25 pm
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You are so right.
But that’s something people who have ZERO knowledge of physics and information theory won’t get: They believe in some metaphysical nonsense.
- April 10, 2011 at 3:14 am
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J. Neil Schulman,
again and again you hide behind metaphysics and fail to resolve the logical contradiction.
If you cannot show an example of how to interact without a logo without a carrier, then all rights in logos are either redundant or contradictory with regards to physical property rights. For the purposes of this argument, it is completely irrelevant whether a metaphysical toaster, plot of land or a book exist.
The point is that Atlas Shrugged and Casablanca exist independent of the other things that carry them, and the proof that they exist independently is that they can exist on different carriers.
Again, you are answering a different question. I’m not asking if they can be demonstrated on more than one carrier, but on less then one. If they cannot, your theory is self-contradictory. QED.
Your epistemology is junk.
Epistemology does not fix a self-contradiction. By the way, how do you know what “my epistimology” is? You don’t. You’re confusing the combination of your own assumptions and my logic as “my epistimology”. For the purposes of my argument, I’m not making any assumptions that you are not making either.
- April 10, 2011 at 4:03 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
by the way, let me ask you this: if there is more than one copy of the bible, does that mean that god exists?
- April 10, 2011 at 6:49 pm
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“The point is that Atlas Shrugged and Casablanca exist independent of the other things that carry them…”
They don’t exist independent of a carrier though. That’s why you have to sell them as story-on-medium. You don’t sell blank media and you don’t sell the idea of the story of Casablanca.
The fact that you can conceptually separate the story from the medium is irrelevant. It actually argues against your case since you MUST sell the story when you sell the carrier (since that’s the only way it exists for any of us) – UNLESS, of course, you have a contract with the buyer that says otherwise.Everyone agrees that Story exists and that Author created it. Everyone also agrees that Story is conceptually not medium. But, Story is entirely dependent upon medium in order to exist for and be sold to the buyer as Casablanca or Atlas Shrugged.
“…and the proof that they exist independently is that they can exist on different carriers.”
That’s what proves that they are not the author’s property once sold. The stories themselves become non-rivalrous goods once published while the carriers are rivalrous goods. That’s why you get the price you do on them and not on “Story,” because you can’t sell Story. Billions of people can all possess and use Atlas Shrugged or Casablanca as they *necessarily* are carried on innumerable particular carriers which any one of those billions of people can own individually, demonstrably without any conflict in the use.
I can read Casablanca in the USA while someone else reads it in China and the author reads it at home. There is no conflict in the use of the same story, hence no need or justification to claim an exclusionary right in it. Mr Copier does not take Story away from Author or Buyer. The story was released into the public domain on particular media by the author in exchange for money. The story necessarily goes with its carrier as it has no other way of existing or being sold as a property to the buyer which he can own.
The author/publisher makes them this way. The author’s exclusive property, the story, is transformed into mass produced instances of the story which people buy. He is compensated by many people for producing one work. He is the master copier capitalizing on a mass market for profit. Buyers have no other legal entanglement with the author after buying the book. The author has capitalized on a way to sell cheap media at an exorbitant price – by imprinting an interesting story onto it. That’s it as far as law and economics – the author’s desire for monopoly control over what he has freely sold notwithstanding.
Don’t tell me that you don’t need contracts and that it’s a default position that you never intended to sell the story itself. You are UNABLE to sell the story to anybody apart from media. And no buyer of “the story of Casablanca” is buying blank media. They’re buying the story of Casablanca obviously. You MUST sell people story-on-media or else you can’t ever sell the story in the first place. You must change your exclusive property – the original story – into numerous instances of that story-on-medium so that you can sell the same story to many individuals and then they can own it and use it. It has become their property without a doubt. In the absence of a contract, the story (which the buyer bought because it was that story) is embedded within its medium and is not separable to the buyer. That would destroy what the buyer bought if you took the story back. You can’t take it back. You released it. Sold it. Over and over and over.
You’ve made it property for them to own. That’s why they paid you. It’s a fair exchange.
- April 9, 2011 at 4:06 pm
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Wildberry,
Not a criticism but a clarification.
I’m not claiming property rights in anything “intangible.” An information object is tangible. It can have a calculable numerical checksum. It can be detected by multiple observers. It is observable as the same thing when transferred from one carrier medium to another. These are all proofs of the “tangible.” I am arguing for property rights in tangible things.
Neil
- April 9, 2011 at 4:22 pm
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Wildberry,
Apologies. I just caught your post in which you said just this.
Neil
- April 9, 2011 at 4:36 pm
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Sweatervest writes, “I for one might start with asking why any conservation theorems in physics exist if creation is something different from rearranging.”
It’s an epistemological/ontological rather than physics distinction.
Neither Rand nor I are arguing that creation is the production of new particles, although recent experiments at Cern suggest that this may have occurred on the subatomic level. See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42497555/ns/technology_and_science-science/.
There is a distinction to be made between an existent and an entity. An existent merely exists; to become an entity — a thing — it has to have an identity: properties that make it distinct from other entities.
“Rearranging” is creation only when the properties of a thing are reordered such that a new “entity” — a new “thing” — first appears. If this new thing — this never-before-existing entity — can be observed by multiple observers then it exists as something real.
That’s the case for creation of something objectively new and real, and this epistemological/ontological case precedes a possible claim based on libertarian ethics that this new thing can be owned as property.
A full case — such as the one I’ve made in The Libertarian Case for IP — deals with satisfying all the necessities for identification of a thing as ownable property.
- April 12, 2011 at 6:39 pm
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“It’s an epistemological/ontological rather than physics distinction”
You’re drawing arbitrary lines in the sand. It’s not okay for one theory to contradict another just because they occupy different “genres” of knowledge. Physics says matter is conserved. That means matter cannot be created or destroyed. If “ontology” says something different, then one of them is wrong. They can’t both be right. I.e. an ontology that refutes conservations theorems would necessitate an entirely new theory of physics before anything.
“although recent experiments at Cern suggest that this may have occurred on the subatomic level”
This is perhaps *the* most ridiculous interpretation of this experiment I can think of. No, they’re not saying they created a new particle. They’re saying they just saw a particle for the first time. It was there before, we just didn’t detect it. Physics does not deal with creation. As I have explained above, physics and metaphysics assigns no meaning to creation. It is a praxeological concept, which means also that it is equally meaningless in an ontological or empistemological discussion.
“There is a distinction to be made between an existent and an entity. An existent merely exists; to become an entity — a thing — it has to have an identity: properties that make it distinct from other entities.”
Precisely the point I made above about creation being a praxeological concept concerning the cateogorization of reality into means for ends. If you think you’ve found an “error” in my reasoning, you have not because I agree with you on this.
“That’s the case for creation of something objectively new and real, and this epistemological/ontological case precedes a possible claim based on libertarian ethics that this new thing can be owned as property.”
It is still a non-sequitur to jump from creation to ownership. As someone else has pointed out here, you did not create your body, so if you think creation is the criterion for ownership then you owe your parents a lot of resititution.
Which is why, as I have argued, any discussion about creation in the context of ownership is confused and obstuse to the point that it only mystifies what is otherwise a very simple problem. There’s no need at all to go down some rabbit hole trying to figure out what “creation” is, because ownership has *nothing to do with creation*.
The concept of creation makes sense even to an isolated person acting in self-sufficiency (for example the man deserted on an uninhabited island). The concept of ownership is utterly meaningless in that situation. The two have nothing to do with each other. Creation has nothing to do with ownership, and ownership has nothing to do with creation.
- April 9, 2011 at 5:23 pm
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Matthew Swaringen wrote, “Without humans the pattern that makes up those books would matter no more than any pattern in the world.”
Without humans, terrestrial discussion of any property or property rights doesn’t exist at all. That does not, however, negate the existence of real things.
- April 9, 2011 at 6:01 pm
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It doesn’t negate the existence of physical things. But patterns such as the writing in a book only have meaning insofar as there is someone to read it. The slight variation in the location of ink within the book would be unrecognizable to the environment itself or creatures without the capacity to read.
Do you own part of my memory if it was reading a book you wrote?
- April 9, 2011 at 7:27 pm
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Matthew Swaringen wrote, “But patterns such as the writing in a book only have meaning insofar as there is someone to read it.”
And a chair is only a chair if there’s an ass to sit on it.
“The slight variation in the location of ink within the book would be unrecognizable to the environment itself or creatures without the capacity to read.”
So if that slight variation in the location of ink within the book is so unimportant, you don’t need to copy it, do you? If any other slight variation will do so why not just make your own ink scribblings?
“Do you own part of my memory if it was reading a book you wrote?”
Of course not. But if you reconstitute every jot and tittle from memory onto a new physical medium, and sell it, then what you have taken money for is stolen goods.
- April 9, 2011 at 9:44 pm
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I like your sense of humor.
Neil, if you think anyone who is opposed to IP is saying that we think books are unimportant I think you are mistaking our position for something it isn’t. In fact I’ll go further than this and say that it’s not books that are important, but the individual ideas that books are composed of. And yet IP advocates (wisely) stop short of making ideas ownable.
The very nature of the discussion we are having is over ideas. The nature of my post is virtually making my own ink scribblings on this particular subject.
I think the fact I’d spend time (or anyone else here would spend time) debating this shows that we all find some value in these ideas, whichever side we may take. But value is not a sufficient criteria for ownability. Pursuant to our other interests it may be sufficient to give us reason to buy or support something.
Despite my views on IP I spend more money on media than probably anything else. The reason I am opposed to IP is not because I am so frightened of being prosecuted for copying a few files or sharing a game with a friend. I am opposed to it because I think it destroys wealth and makes all of us worse off.
“Of course not. But if you reconstitute every jot and tittle from memory onto a new physical medium, and sell it, then what you have taken money for is stolen goods.”
Thank you for answering. Now, the only thing I’d want to know is why media other than the brain itself should be treated differently? I might say if I believed IP that self-ownership negates other forms of property.
But this seems very arbitrary to me, much like the assumption I referred to with Wildberry concerning the conflicts between IP and physical property. If self-ownership is more important than IP, why cannot any physical ownership be more important than IP?
The idea of someone else owning parts of my memories is certainly horrifying, but should “memory-sharing” devices ever be developed, and should the idea of IP still exist… I worry that this assumption about self-ownership will fall behind the interests of IP owners for similar reasons to the demands on restrictions on my use of physical property.
I know that this idea is very much in the realm of science fiction, and perhaps I’ve watched a bit too much Ghost in the Shell, but I still think the argument is valid to some degree. I see now with various treaties and laws that have been proposed that the government seeks to be able to cut off websites for IP infringement. I see the inevitable next step from the other side to be using encryption to keep out the prying eyes of government. And then what new measures will be passed?
You said earlier that you held libertarians to a higher standard, and in the same way I expect libertarians to be very wary of more government. And yet due to it’s nature IP demands more government.
- April 10, 2011 at 2:33 am
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Matthew Swaringen wrote, “Now, the only thing I’d want to know is why media other than the brain itself should be treated differently?”
We don’t know that the brain is “media.” We really don’t know how human beings store and access memories. We don’t know if memory is separable from human identity.
What we do know is that the brain is owned and what it in the brain belongs to its owner.
I would not contest nor challenge the “ownership” of something I’d created that resides — if it even does — in someone else’s brain or mind.
Only if they put it “out there” again, intact in an externally observable medium, so that it correlates to my created property and can be objectively and quantitatively identified as such, would I even think there’s a basis for a question.
- April 10, 2011 at 4:32 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
We don’t know that the brain is “media.”
Of course we do.
We really don’t know how human beings store and access memories.
We know brain does it and that’s sufficient for Matthew’s argument.
We don’t know if memory is separable from human identity.
But unless the identity is separable from all objects that are already owned, your theory requires a self-contradiction.
- April 10, 2011 at 11:02 am
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JNS won’t touch the contradiction. It’s been brought up several times and he keeps passing on it.
- April 10, 2011 at 12:25 pm
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There is no contradiction.
The “identity” is separable, but not seperable as a tangible object. Therefore it is a nonsensical question.
As a demonstration of the absurdity, I asked Peter to show me an idea without using any tangible media. He claims to answer all questoins, but he didn’t answer that one.
Neil’s argument about the proof of separability is self-evident.
So where is the contradiction?
- April 10, 2011 at 1:04 pm
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Wildberry, I don’t think Peter argues that you can show an idea without tangible media. He wouldn’t answer your question because it’s not an argument we would make. I think it’s fairly obvious, and this is the reason I asked the question that I did.
I am not exactly sure how you can shrug this off as “no contradiction” though if you believe the brain is just another medium. If it is and you own IP then you own a portion of my brain, the part that allows for me to recall some words you write that you think that you own.
- April 10, 2011 at 1:37 pm
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@DixieFlatline
JNS won’t touch the contradiction. It’s been brought up several times and he keeps passing on it.
It does not seem that he can comprehend the point. Either that or he is so intellectually dishonest that he knows he cannot address it without admitting the contradiction.
@Wildberry
The “identity” is separable, but not seperable as a tangible object. Therefore it is a nonsensical question.
Yes. This is the PART of the point he is trying to make. Your about 2/3rds there.
As a demonstration of the absurdity, I asked Peter to show me an idea without using any tangible media. He claims to answer all questoins, but he didn’t answer that one.
He answered that question a hundred times. I will try to make it plain by attempting to accurately paraphrase him in another manner:
Question: Show me an idea without using any tangible media.
Answer: I cannot. A idea cannot be expressed, used, or documented without some form of tangible media. Therefore if you have ‘rights to a idea’ then it’s either always going to conflict or be redundant to the property rights of the owner of the physical media. Therefore a IP system is always going always exist in perpetual violation of private property rights.
Niel appears to believe that IP can exist without contradicting private property rights. Since Peter fails to comprehend how this can happen it is up to Niel to address Peter’s point by logically showing how IP can exist without this inherent violation.
So far Neil has failed to do this. He seems to have chosen to try to turn the argument back to whether or not IP is moral and other such issues. From what I can tell this does not address the contradiction.
- April 10, 2011 at 1:47 pm
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Wildberry,
There is no contradiction.
Of course there is. Either you can experience the “intangible” without the “tangible”, or any rights in the “intangible” expropriate the “tangibles” (or are irrelevant, but that would require that IP proponents and opponents agree on the assignment, which they clearly don’t). It’s a totally trivial claim, yet IP proponents will go at great length to avoid confronting it.
Although you don’t mind the expropriation, you are also contradicting yourself because you said in the past that IP creates new rights (at least that’s what my memory tells me, if I’m wrong, I apologise). Well, obviously, it cannot create any new rights that are experience-able, so we’re back to the metaphysical bullshit.
- April 10, 2011 at 9:32 pm
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Our brain is just a media. Nothing else.
Our brain works with interconnected neurons. It is highly complicated. But it is not some metaphysical mumbo jumbo.
So physically speaking our brain is nothing more than an electrochemical machine. In cognitive science the brain is seen as a part of a whole information processing complex.
If you state that the brain is owned by its owner and therefore no “IP” infringement can happen than the SAME GOES for every other information processing device.
So why the heck do you make an illusionary difference?
- April 11, 2011 at 6:16 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “Our brain is just a media. Nothing else.”
Not even a processor? No imaging? No connection to the external world? Just media?
*snort*
“So why the heck do you make an illusionary difference?”
Because evidently my brain does things yours doesn’t.
- April 9, 2011 at 10:04 pm
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J. Neil Schulman is the intellectual equivalent of a dirty sanchez.
- April 9, 2011 at 10:13 pm
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That was unnecessary, I wish I hadn’t looked that up. :/
April 10, 2011 at 1:05 am-
To be fair, his “The Libertarian Case for IP” article was terrible, but his response to SEKIII’s Copywrongs article was ok.
- April 10, 2011 at 2:35 am
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Snake Pliskin. I heard you’re going to be dead.
- April 10, 2011 at 3:02 am
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No no no. He’s just overly emotionally attached to the issue.
- April 10, 2011 at 6:42 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
And a chair is only a chair if there’s an ass to sit on it.
But the chair will continue to exist even if there are no people. Just the meaning and utility of it will be lost.
- April 10, 2011 at 7:19 am
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So if ownership of ideas was a property right, what do you suppose would be reasonable licensing fees for the meaning and utility of the chair would be?
After all, it would be violent to deprive the descendants of the inventor of the chair from their inherited property.
- April 10, 2011 at 11:18 am
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@ Wildberry
Peter simply asked if you agreed that we cannot experience the story apart from a medium.
Do you agree?
- April 10, 2011 at 12:19 pm
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@Zorg April 10, 2011 at 11:18 am
Peter simply asked if you agreed that we cannot experience the story apart from a medium.
Do you agree?
Of course. Peter insists on using the word “immaterial”, yet I have always insisted that the relevant term is “intangible”. That means inperceptable relative to human senses. I don’t know what he means by immaterial.
So naturally, if somthing is intangible, it cannot be experienced by others unless it is fixed upon some tangible medium. Transmission by way of tangible medium is a requirement for communication. However, as a fellow human being, you agree that we may both experience things that are not communicated. If that were not the case, concepts like “concept” would have no meaning.
And, to anticipate your next question, IP rights, like ALL rights, limit the rights of action by others at the boundaries of those conflicting rights. That is the way ALL rights operate, including IP rights. That is not stealing your property. Rights make no claim on the ownership rights of other’s proeprty, only on the limits of use.
OK?
- April 10, 2011 at 1:32 pm
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Wildberry,
Of course.
Well done.
Peter insists on using the word “immaterial”, yet I have always insisted that the relevant term is “intangible”.
I don’t insist on using the world immaterial, you insist on using the world intangible. The word is irrelevant however, it has no influence on my argument.
And, to anticipate your next question, IP rights, like ALL rights, limit the rights of action by others at the boundaries of those conflicting rights.
Yes, this is correct. However, I already explained to you that this is a misrepresentation of my claim, and you know it because I told it directly to you several times already. But let us now skip over your lies and go back to the argument.
Since you cannot experience IP (or, anything for that matter) without a medium (which you yourself admit), IP cannot do anything else then change rights in the alteration of media. It can only be irrelevant or justify theft. Just like, for example, a right to a job, healthcare or other “rights” are either irrelevant or contradict property rights.
You claim that an application of a rights sometimes results in an overlap with an application of a different right. But I claim that application of IP always results in an overlap with an application of a different right. Neil disagrees. So he’s contradicting himself. You might not mind it, because you’re using some indecipherable utilitarian approach, but Neil is using a deontological approach so for him it’s a fatal error.
- April 10, 2011 at 2:53 pm
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@Peter Surda April 10, 2011 at 1:32 pm
Since you cannot experience IP (or, anything for that matter) without a medium (which you yourself admit), IP cannot do anything else then change rights in the alteration of media.
I don’t agree with this statement. Humans can experience things without communicating them to other humans. The author experience some act of “creation” that another human cannot perceive until this “creation” is expressed in a tangible form. This expression can be conceptualized as an “original work of authorship”. Concepts can be communicated on the basis of the common human experience, which can be given symbolic meaning through the use of words which represents common human experience.
Nonetheless, I presume you mean “communicate”, not “experience”. Words matter.
It can only be irrelevant or justify theft.
Wrong. It may also be relevant. The existence of intangible “works” is relevant and does not justify theft. You have no rational basis for your claim that only your two alternatives are available to the exclusion of others.
Just like, for example, a right to a job, healthcare or other “rights” are either irrelevant or contradict property rights.
Therefore, also wrong. A certain right may be relevant to some purpose or action, or limitation thereto. Defining that relevance and the legitimacy of a purpose or action is a specific argument. All rights are not equivalent. One thing that all rights share, however, is that all rights must “make room” for all other rights, even those as basic as a “right to life”. If that room is not granted or enforced, then the right cannot exist.
You cannot use your right to life to justify harvesting another’s organs to save your own life, for example. When one’s right to life conflicts with another’s right of self-ownership, we make up ethical rules to justify treating one as supreme over the other. This is a general statement concerning the operation of all rights, including IP rights.
You claim that an application of a rights sometimes results in an overlap with an application of a different right.
Yes. If there is a conflict, one right must be supreme. It is stated in terms of a limitation of action, or of the exercise of a given right.
But I claim that application of IP always results in an overlap with an application of a different right. Neil disagrees. So he’s contradicting himself.
All rights have boundaries. Where the boundaries of two rights “interact” (I presume this is what you mean by “conflict”), rules must be adopted to define the preferred outcome. My right to life ends at some boundary of another’s right to their own life. That boundary is passive until there is an actual conflict, in which case the facts surrounding that specific conflict are relevant to the rules for resolving the conflict.
You might not mind it, because you’re using some indecipherable utilitarian approach, but Neil is using a deontological approach so for him it’s a fatal error.
Well, Neil is perfectly capable of speaking for himself, but I do not understand him to be saying what you claim. As for my approach, I’m not surprised you find in indecipherable. If I claim “sometimes” and you claim “always” and Neil disagrees, then it looks like both Neil and I disagree with your “always”. Ethics implies a duty to honor the ethical rule. I think there is no contention of that basic principle. Therefore, if Neil’s argument attempts to establish property rights on some ethical basis, it follows that it establishes a duty for those who acknowledge its legitimacy.
I understand you to be saying (in line with Kinsella) that although you acknowledge the property rights in an original manuscript, for example, you deny the owner’s right to transfer a limited title to the purchaser of a book, because you believe that all rights pass with the tangible good upon which the work is fixed.
Apparently, both Neil and I object to that premise. What I hold is consistent with Hoppe, of all people, who makes it clear that property and title to property are separable, and that title transfer theory does not imply otherwise. So it is you who contradicts himself, because you insist that there can be no separation between property, and title to it. You only hold this view for IP, and not for other forms of property. You fail to explain why.
My understanding of Neil’s argument is that he establishes a rational basis for rights to arise in the intangible “works” that are the subject of copyright. He does not go further than that, but to say that these “works”, which he generalizes under the concept of “logos”, establish legitimate means for claiming ownership by the “creator”.
I tend to prefer the terminology of “original work” and the economic concepts of “production” and “privately owned means of production” Such usage comports with Mises treatments of the economic analysis, and existing IP laws. This is the basis for any utilitarian arguments that I’ve made, which you have likely misunderstood.
- April 11, 2011 at 1:20 am
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Lieberry,
I don’t agree with this statement.
How about expressing yourself clearly? What you are now saying that while the copiers cannot experience the intangible without a media, the author can. Which is also wrong, because the author also needs to use some media, at least his brain, and this is typically also accompanied by external stimuli (in fact I think the absence of external stimuli is rare, you’d need to be in an isolation tank).
Words matter.
Yes they do, so stop using them to confuse and start using them to debate. “Communicate” presupposes intention. “Experience” does not. IP covers experience, not only communication.
It may also be relevant.
It cannot be relevant because it does not change the outcome. Do not convolute words again Lieberry.
You have no rational basis for your claim that only your two alternatives are available to the exclusion of others.
You have no rational basis on your claim other than leading the flow of arguments astray and confuse.
A certain right may be relevant to some purpose or action, or limitation thereto.
Once again, Dummberry. I do not object to the claim that all rights limit the amount of which actions are not illegal. Stop misrepresenting the issue. There are three sets of actions: (L)egal, (I)llegal and (N)ot addressed by law. I claim that in the absence of IP, the set N is empty, so IP can only shift the elements between sets L and I (=theft). Neil says that N is not empty (he requires it for his theory to be correct), yet has not provided any example.
If there is a conflict, one right must be supreme.
Therefore, IP is always theft, because it is always in conflict with the ownership of the medium and cannot be interacted with without a medium. Thank you for confirming my argument.
All rights have boundaries.
However, not all rights are always in conflict with other rights. A hypothetical right to an ownership of apples, for example, is not always in conflict with a hypothetical right to an ownership of peaches. But some rights, like IP, are always in conflict with other rights, i.e. the media. In special corner cases, they are irrelevant, because both rights result in the same outcome. For example, if I use my paper to type a novel that I made up, I own the physical paper already so the application of IP is redundant. If other people take the paper, they are violating my rights anyway, IP or no IP.
So stop convoluting the issue.
you deny the owner’s right to transfer a limited title to the purchaser of a book
We make no such claim. Stop making stuff up and derailing the flow of arguments.
- April 10, 2011 at 12:54 pm
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FWIW, this is just my own summary of the question as I see it and as I understand the arguments:
1) Property is a concept which excludes all others from access to and/or control of something (tangible/intangible) so that only the owner may possess, use, change, dispose of it by right without interference (so long as he does not violate the property rights of others). This serves the purpose of keeping the peace and allowing production and trade to flourish without destructive conflicts over scarce goods. We must know who has the right to use certain things exclusively so that we can have conflict-free (in this respect at least) production and trade.
Something which could be used by many people at the same time without necessitating conflict over a scarce good would not be property. No exclusionary rule would be required as the good is not diminished no matter how many others use it. That something is not an economic good since it doesn’t need to be economized. In the economic sense, it is abundant, not scarce. It leads to no rivalry over exclusive use because its use by anyone is not exclusive by nature.
2) IPers claim that a writer/songwriter/designer owns an intangible pattern that they created in their minds. But since it has no tangible existence in the world apart from their own minds, they cause it to take physical form in books, CDs, digital files, etc., which they sell for money, thus engaging in production and trade. They claim that since the created pattern is conceptually separable from the media which they sell (consider a blank book as opposed to War & Peace), that they always (?) own the pattern as personal property even as they sell innumerable instantiations of it via media of some kind. This gives them the right to exclude all others from unauthorized use of the pattern regardless of any other property claims in tangible books, computer discs, devices, that people other than the author own which might carry a copy of the original pattern.
3) IPers further claim that it is a crime against them to copy (meaning for others to use in some way) the pattern they published to the world without their express or implied consent. They claim the pattern must be attached to some media which they or an agent sold that is authorized (or through some other agreement such as licensing). They claim the right to stop by force any unauthorized person from using their published pattern, since to them it is still their property. This leads to the desire to enforce the purported right against violators. Some type of compensation, restitution, or punishment is sought. Otherwise, the “right”would be meaningless.
4) Anti-IPers argue that these intangible patterns, while they do exist and are original works of creativity and expression, and while they do have economic value when attached to a medium, the copies of that pattern are not property once published/sold since they then become non-rivalrous, meaning that possession/use by one person does not impair the possession/use by another in an economic sense. Now the medium (book, CD, device) is rivalrous as only one person at a time may use it exclusively while the original pattern is not rivalrous – being able to be used by very many people at the same time without impairing anyone’s use of it.
An unpublished work is automatically in the possession of its author by nature, or whomever he chooses to share it with. A published work, however, is publicly released onto media in exchange for money and is therefore no longer exclusively available to the originator such that he can claim his use of it is injured by the existence of innumerable copies possessed by others. In fact, he intentionally caused this to happen. The economic decision was made to release the work to the public on particular rivalrous media in exchange for money.
The economic exchange with the consumer is finished once the medium carrying the work is sold to him – unless, of course, there is a contract. In the absence of a contract, there is no property right in the work itself once the work-on-medium is sold. People are always free to create contracts which may then bind another if they willingly agree to terms.
- April 10, 2011 at 2:52 pm
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Don’t confuse my use of language or arguments with those of other IP advocates, including Ayn Rand or Wildberry; and absolutely do not take the formulations of opponents of IP, since they’re incoherent.
A logos — an object with material identity existing independently of other objects that carry and/or display it — is neither immaterial nor intangible. It can be owned because it is a real thing. It is owned when a new thing is made that has not previously existed.
All IP opponents ignore the prime fact that someone other than them created it, and what they debate is how they can argue against the property rights of the creator so to use that which they did not make and which would not exist for them to use without that other.
This is a debate not for libertarians but for pirates attempting to get away with their crimes.
I will succumb to quoting Ayn Rand for once. You God damned moochers.
- April 10, 2011 at 3:51 pm
- April 11, 2011 at 12:44 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
All IP opponents ignore the prime fact that someone other than them created it…
How does this fix the self-contradiction? It doesn’t. You’re using it to hide instead.
- April 12, 2011 at 6:46 pm
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I also never, ever said that. There are no many problems going on here, the worst one being that this is confusing IP with plagiarism, and the two have nothing to do with each other.
- April 10, 2011 at 3:20 pm
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@J. Neil Schulman April 10, 2011 at 2:52 pm
Like I said, you are more than capable of speaking for yourself. You have indeed nailed the essential issue for IP opponents here.
I wonder if you could clear up one area of confusion for me? You say a logos is “neither immaterial nor intangible”.
If a logos is seperable from the media that carries it, then if it is seperated, wouldn’t it exist as an intangible object? I ask this because copyright law establishes property rights in the intangible work which in the specific case of an “orignal work or authorship”, is the “expression” that is fixed.
An expression is intangible unless it is fixed, yet a logos is not intangible. Can you clear this up for me?
- April 10, 2011 at 3:40 pm
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Wildberry Comment: @J. Neil Schulman April 10, 2011 at 2:52 pm
“Like I said, you are more than capable of speaking for yourself. You have indeed nailed the essential issue for IP opponents here. I wonder if you could clear up one area of confusion for me? You say a logos is “neither immaterial nor intangible”. If a logos is separable from the media that carries it, then if it is separated, wouldn’t it exist as an intangible object? I ask this because copyright law establishes property rights in the intangible work which in the specific case of an “orignal work or authorship”, is the “expression” that is fixed. An expression is intangible unless it is fixed, yet a logos is not intangible. Can you clear this up for me?”
If a car drives from land onto a ferry, it is separated from the land, but it doesn’t cease to be a car. It doesn’t dematerialize from the land that carries it and miraculously reappear on the ferry.
Likewise, a logos being transferred between carrier media doesn’t cease to exist as a real independent thing.
The only case where your objection might have real-world application would be if someone memorized a logos and at some future point reconstituted it onto an objectively perceivable medium.
But I suppose all property will have to survive this test of “intangibility” at the point the Star Trek transporter becomes real, and real things can become temporarily intangible.
- April 15, 2011 at 9:36 am
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“If a car drives from land onto a ferry, it is separated from the land, but it doesn’t cease to be a car. It doesn’t dematerialize from the land that carries it and miraculously reappear on the ferry.
Likewise, a logos being transferred between carrier media doesn’t cease to exist as a real independent thing.”
But what someone could copy your car and produce their own you wouldn’t own that, and that has nothing to do with the car staying a car. We’re talking about a single car, not the set of all cars. If someone could copy your car, you would not own all the copies. It would involve a trespass on your car to make the first copy but then people could make additional copies without any conceivable damage or trespass on any of your property.
- April 15, 2011 at 3:18 pm
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@sweatervest April 15, 2011 at 9:36 am
But what someone could copy your car and produce their own you wouldn’t own that, and that has nothing to do with the car staying a car. We’re talking about a single car, not the set of all cars. If someone could copy your car, you would not own all the copies. It would involve a trespass on your car to make the first copy but then people could make additional copies without any conceivable damage or trespass on any of your property.
Pardon me for intruding. This is the “magic bagel” analogy Tucker used earlier. I suppose it is fun to speculate about these things, but in reality what you suggest is impossible. There are no magic bagels, and there are no cars that can be copied without the cost of replicating the manufacturing process. Without an automobile factory, this is a pretty costly proposition.
By analogy, try making a copy of a novel without having an original to copy from. You would have to go through some significant production effort to get the copy, even if it was only a matter of typing it out from your photographic memory. Of course even that wouldn’t be there to draw from if you didn’t have the original to memorize.
Yes somehow you think the analogy is that while cars are not cheap to copy, books are, if cars were cheap to copy, no one could cry foul if you did it? Without an original to copy from, books are also expensive, or possibly impossible except under the most fantastic of assumptions concerning being able to produce a copy without an original.
I suppose two unrelated people with the exact same fingerprints or the exact same genetic pattern is theoretically possible too, but its low probability makes fingerprints and genetic analysis useful as forensic tools.
Likewise, the similarity or lack of it, is a useful forensic tool in the determination of whether a given copy was in fact derived from an original.
I see a utility in ceasing to use the term “IP” and beginning to use the term Media-Carried Property — MCP.
This should make it clear that driving your car onto someone else’s ferry doesn’t give the ferry owner title to your car.
April 10, 2011 at 3:55 pm-
MCP. Wow. Now there are rights in the “properties” of things. There is no end to where this is heading, as things have lots of properties!
Neil envisions a real thing as a bucket that holds a substance–information. The information is of course immateral but he thinks it is ownable since when a thing “carries” this information then the owner of the thing values the thing more. This is simply does not follow at all.
April 10, 2011 at 4:03 pm-
Stephan Kinsella wrote, “MCP. Wow. Now there are rights in the ‘properties’ of things. There is no end to where this is heading, as things have lots of properties!”
A true statement, for once, and one I made three decades ago in my article Informational Property: Logorights.
“Neil envisions a real thing as a bucket that holds a substance–information.”
Back to normal, you misstate my position.
Corrected to: “Neil envisions a real thing as a bucket that holds another real thing: a logos.”
April 11, 2011 at 12:45 am-
Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Media-Carried Property
And since all media is already covered by physical property rights, MCP needs to either contradict it or be irrelevant.
Confront it.
April 11, 2011 at 2:24 am-
A book that is transmitted via em waves to a reciever and then immediately deleted on the sender’s hard drive exists nowhere but in the signal until it hits the receiving antenna. Is the signal covered by property rights? Or does the book “not exist” for a while, not until such time as it is imprinted on a dvd?
- April 11, 2011 at 3:35 am
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Kid Salami,
if I remember correctly, EM radiation has dual characteristics (particle + wave). As particles, they are potentially owned by someone anyway, regardless of whether you interpret it is data encoded and sent at a specific frequency. Furthermore, it still does not follow that ownership of frequencies gives the owner any right to what the owners of receivers do. It would only mean that some EM interference might be illegal, not that the reception is illegal.
And last but not least, the arguments Neil is making are so far removed from your nitpicking that I have to wonder again why are you making them. I get it that it is possible to make coherent arguments for IP. But it is for the IP proponents to make them. Obviously, they don’t want to. It is the sacrifices that follow from a coherent IP theory that they are unwilling to make. Let them confront the contradictions first. You’re only confusing them. It almost sounds like you don’t want Neil to confront his contradictions.
- April 11, 2011 at 4:53 am
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All I did was ask you a question. I am once again accused of nitpicking or arguing for the sake of it or whatever? You don’t have to answer.
“if I remember correctly, EM radiation has dual characteristics (particle + wave). As particles, they are potentially owned by someone”
Ok, that’s all I wanted.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:59 am
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Kid Salami,
you’re a smart chap. Surely you must have been able to make an educated guess what I was going to answer before I even answered. So why ask?
- April 11, 2011 at 6:59 am
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Well sometimes you just can’t win. I think (in fact am sure) there is circularity in a theory where you assume that photons can be “owned”. I ask to make sure I’m not missing something or misrepresenting your position – apparently then I’m nitpicking. If I don’t ask and “guess” what you mean, then I’ll most certainly be accused of erecting a strawman.
- April 11, 2011 at 7:15 am
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Kid Salami,
I don’t get your point. You know I’m a falsificationist, so why are you asking me whether something exists?
- April 11, 2011 at 7:24 am
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YOu said
“And since all media is already covered by physical property rights”
I believe the signal to be one of these “media”. And I’m trying to determine whether you think EM waves are covered by “physical property rights”, or whether this is not, in your view, a “medium” as used by you in the quote above. One if these must be true mustn’t it?
- April 11, 2011 at 7:54 am
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Kid Salami,
And I’m trying to determine whether you think EM waves are covered by “physical property rights”, or whether this is not, in your view, a “medium” as used by you in the quote above. One if these must be true mustn’t it?
There are multiple ways to cover EM waves through property rights that do not require IP. I don’t really have a solid opinion which of those should be preferred. However, I tend towards the approach where the ownership of the receiver is the decisive factor from the perspective of property rights. Whether the EM waves as such are ownable is kind of a useless question, since without a receiver we have no way of knowing what is happening with them anyway. On the other hand, that does not answer your question if the book exists while being in transmit only.
I don’t know what else to tell you about this topic.
- April 12, 2011 at 6:47 am
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“Whether the EM waves as such are ownable is kind of a useless question”
Well, I agree – but I’m not the one saying, repeatedly, “all media is already covered by physical property rights”.
You can certainly save yourself from having to consider this “useless” question by declaring that an em signal is NOT one of these “media”. Then your statement above about all the “all media is already covered by physical property rights” can remain true. Or you can say that photons are “ownable” and so subject to property rights, as you suggested may be possible in some circumstances – I think this is absurd but it’s up to you. I don’t see a third alternative.
- April 12, 2011 at 7:38 am
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Kid Salami,
ok, I get your point. The thing is however, it’s not really up to me. If someone thinks that there should be rights in data in transit (which is already unclear, since Neil said that looking at things is not violating any rights, which of course begs the question why copying based on visual stimuli is, but that’s not important now), then I can retort that all media (including subatomic particles) are potentially owned. I’m not the one making the assumptions.
If my hypothetical opponent thinks that there should be rights in data in transit, then replying that all media including particles are potentially covered by property rights in the physical matter is appropriate and equally absurd (or not). It does not even need to be owned by the same person for the whole duration of the transit, it can also change ownership depending on who’s premises it’s passing (which I think is the simplest and most obvious solution). It’s like the question about homesteading dynamic processes, e.g. a river. The simplest solution is that you only have a claim on the water molecules while they are on your premises. You don’t have a claim against people who own the land down- or upstream. Maybe (I’m hesitant) you might have an easement claim against someone who’s upstream. But that is completely different from IP, because that is a claim against someone who’s “downstream”.
I think I have to apologise, I should be more aware that you’re also a curious soul in search of answers.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:20 am
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“ownership of frequencies”
Although I have no idea what you mean by this.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:00 am
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Kid Salami,
that is a hypothetical alternative right. It does not matter what exactly it means. My point is that it’s an alternative rather than amendment.
- April 11, 2011 at 7:00 am
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Then it’s not something you are suggesting is sensible yourself? Ok.
- April 11, 2011 at 7:26 am
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Kid Salami,
the question is irrelevant to me at this stage. It only becomes relevant when you can show how it fits into a context of other theories. There is no such thing as an assumption “as such”. That’s nonsense. Assumptions can only be evaluated in relation to other assumptions. I don’t care if a book “exists” while it’s being transmitted. What does it even mean? It’s just mumbo jumbo with no effect on the questions I’m asking.
- April 11, 2011 at 9:41 am
- April 11, 2011 at 9:39 am
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Hmm. I wonder if a light particle is ownable. It’s always traveling, cant be captured.
I would think ownership of a given EM spectrum itself makes sense–the right to use a given waveband in a given geographic area for data communication purposes.
But note that Neil says the EM waves themselves are the medium (and see my other post just now about storage media and data signals in a “carrier wave”). This is odd b/c normally we think of waves as themselves perturbations of some medium. For light, that’s the ether, which most physicists now reject, following Einstein’s special theory of relativity. If that is the case, there is no medium, really, and it seems odd to think of the waves and particles as a medium. When you encode information by EM what you do is modulate it somehow. So you are just sending out an EM wave.
BTW I lean to Beckmann’s view that there is in fact an ether–the gravitational field itself is the ether (see Bethell here http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/bethell4.1.1.html). So there is an ether, and the Em waves travel in the gravitational field ether. Or so Beckmann argues (persuasively IMO).
April 12, 2011 at 5:16 pm-
Beckmann’s book (Einstein Plus Two) is the most fascinating piece of physics literature I have read in my entire time being an undergrad physicist. All of a sudden modern physics wasn’t a jumble of confusing mysticism.
Totally off-topic I know, but that books totally changed my life as a physicist.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:43 am
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Kid Salami,
EM waves are a medium that can carry information objects — what I’m now tagging Media Carried Property — MCP. The carrier signal can transmit and receive MCP that can be used even without being recorded at the receiving end.
Examples of that are programs broadcast on television or radio to broadcast receivers, or sent from satellites to satellite dishes.
information objects sent through fiber optic cable can also be MCP.
April 11, 2011 at 7:19 am-
that can be used even without being recorded at the receiving end.
Nitpick:
They still must be copied. They must be received, recorded, duplicated, modified, amplified, etc etc. in order to be viewed by anybody. In the case of old analog televisions and radios this happens rather quickly using relatively primitive technology, but it still occurs.
With digital media it’s much more deliberate since your dealing with mathematical representation of information that must be stored in computer memory and processed several times before it becomes human readable.
- April 11, 2011 at 8:33 am
- April 11, 2011 at 6:23 am
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Peter Surda wrote, “And since all media is already covered by physical property rights, MCP needs to either contradict it or be irrelevant. Confront it.”
Please point to a physical property right. I’ve never seen any right before and I’d very much like to see one.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:36 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Please point to a physical property right. I’ve never seen any right before and I’d very much like to see one.
Obviously I meant that the right refers to physical material (i.e. material addressed by IP-less rights), rather than the right is somehow physical.
Kindly stop avoiding and answer. Where is the example of IP or MCP or logorights that neither contradicts rights in already owned material nor is redundant with respect to them?
I’ve been asking you the same simple question for six days. You have not shown a single attempt at answering it. If you’re correct, what are you afraid of? Are you afraid of contradictions? It’s like in the joke where Reagan calls Gorbachov and ask him how much farmers earn in Soviet Union, and Gorbachov retorts “But you oppress the black!”.
- April 11, 2011 at 9:47 am
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Neil, the property right is the relation between an actor and a scarce resource–it just means he is the owner of that scarce thing–that he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.
The problem with your theory is that it would assign to B a partial property right in a scarce resource that A has previously homesteaded: it gives B a veto right over how A might use his property. THus before IP or logorights, A owned the scarce resource–he had full property rights in it. After logorights, A and B are co-owners. By the magic of B inventing something with his own property, your logorights sytsem has assigned some of A’s property rights to B. This is redistribution of wealth, or theft, however you want to call it.
April 11, 2011 at 10:42 am-
@ Stephan Kinsella April 11, 2011 at 9:47 am
Neil, the property right is the relation between an actor and a scarce resource–it just means he is the owner of that scarce thing–that he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.
This sounds suspiciously like an admission that property is a human device, as “he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.” How does he get to do that? It is ordained from the heavens?
Also, your description is incomplete, because property rights also define the relationship between a property owner and other property owners. This is true of all rights, yet you want to make some kind of exception for IP rights.
The problem with your theory is that it would assign to B a partial property right in a scarce resource that A has previously homesteaded: it gives B a veto right over how A might use his property.
IP “theory”, does not assign property rights in A to B’s property. IP makes no claim on the property of others. This is misdirection, much like your “ideas are free” line of reasoning.
As you have previously said, conflicting rights create limitations of use; ALL RIGHTS. So unless you are arguing against all rights, you must accept that the presence of rights in A imposes limitations in the rights of B. Remove the rights in A, and B’s limitation s also vanish.
I think it is abundantly clear at this point, that you are arguing that you want to be free to use the property of others simply by denying their right to own it. You are demonstrating that in fact, rights and property are human devices which arise by consent of those who wish to cooperate with others. You wish to define them in a way that you get what you want for free.
You continue to insist that IP rights make a claim of ownership of other’s property, yet you don’t make the same claim for rights in other property. That appears to be a contradiction, to borrow Peter’s favorite phrase.
Speaking of which, Kid has, by one innocent question, falsified Peter’s claim with his own words and methodology, that “physical property is 100% owned” by getting him to admit that he thinks “particles” are also owned. Obviously there are particles that are not owned, so property cannot be 100% already covered by property rights.
I may be an amateur, but I can read the writing on the wall. All I can say is thank God you and your followers are merely a gnat on the ass of the real world. Thankfully, there is little to no chance that will ever change.
To borrow from Neil on this point; you are simply a member of the entitlement gang, with a case of the “gimmies”.
- April 11, 2011 at 1:37 pm
- April 11, 2011 at 3:08 pm
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Lieberry,
Speaking of which, Kid has, by one innocent question, falsified Peter’s claim with his own words and methodology, that “physical property is 100% owned” by getting him to admit that he thinks “particles” are also owned. Obviously there are particles that are not owned, so property cannot be 100% already covered by property rights.
Stop misrepresenting my claims. I did not say that particles are owned. I said that they are potentially owned. Just like, for example, the rocks on Pluto’s surface are potentially owned, just noone managed to get a hold of them yet so they don’t have an owner at the moment. If you are capable of receiving a particle, then the most straight explanation (albeit evidently not the only one possible) is that since the moment of reception it is yours. If noone is able to receive a particle, then the question of ownership is moot.
Furthermore, whether there is ownership in particles or waves or any other approaches (like transmitters or receivers) is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the rights are defined in a non-contradictory manner. Whichever you or Neil or Kid Salami pick I don’t care. Stephan and I for example disagree in how ownership of EM radiation should work. So what? That does not fix the self contradiction in Neil’s claims, nor does it prove any of the convoluted demagoguery you produce.
Stop lying and evading. I’m not going to rephrase my arguments yet again so that you can ignore them yet again. I’ve done this enough times already. You have had plenty of opportunities to ask for clarification. But you can’t do that can you Lieberry? Because that would require you to approach the problem with genuine interest and you don’t want that. You just want others to recognise your nonexistent greatness.
- April 11, 2011 at 2:38 pm
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Stephen Kinsella wrote,
“Neil, the property right is the relation between an actor and a scarce resource–it just means he is the owner of that scarce thing–that he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.”
Correct.
“The problem with your theory is that it would assign to B a partial property right in a scarce resource that A has previously homesteaded: it gives B a veto right over how A might use his property.”
A, as the original creator, is the original “homesteader,” if we must use the Lockean language. A licensed to B a specific use of A’s property. A retains all rights not licensed. Any C’s, D’s, E’s, etc have no right to use any rights that A retains, and only to use “B”‘s rights that A has not specifically made non-transferable.
“Thus before IP or logorights, A owned the scarce resource–he had full property rights in it. After logorights, A and B are co-owners.”
Not quite. B has licensed a specific and delimited usage of A’s property. A retains all unlicensed rights. To say that a license for usage is the same as ownership confuses the transaction.
“By the magic of B inventing something with his own property, your logorights sytsem has assigned some of A’s property rights to B.”
You just reversed the roles of A and B. B has invented nothing; A is the inventor.
“This is redistribution of wealth, or theft, however you want to call it.”
Every sale or other property transaction is a redistribution of wealth. Libertarians and propertarians only object to forced redistributions of wealth, not consentual ones.
I have no idea what you mean by theft in this context since your discussion is of a consentual arrangement between A and B, and the usual plea for the rights of C to take what is not his is not even addressed.
- April 11, 2011 at 3:31 pm
- April 11, 2011 at 4:14 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote: “A homesteads a scarce resource. Then he uses it in a certain way. It turns out this way is similar to how B has used his own property. There is no contract between B and A. What are you talking about?”
What are you talking about?
I write Alongside Night and own what I wrote. I don’t care whether you call me A or B. No one else has any property rights in it and because it’s already owned it’s not available for homesteading. Someone else writing and owning something else of their own has nothing whatsoever to do with this discussion.
- April 11, 2011 at 4:37 pm
- April 11, 2011 at 3:13 pm
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@Stephan Kinsella April 11, 2011 at 1:37 pm
The replies of the IP socialists are so predictable by now.
To quote BtM, “OK. We’re in agreement then.” You are talking about yourself, right?
If you object to the fact that IP gives a third party property rights in your already owned property, they say “well all rights have limits duuhhhh what’s the big deal?”
But by such reasoning you can jusify any crime. If A rapes B, and we object, saying this violates B’s rights to her body, well, you just say, “Well what’s the big deal? No rights are absolute!”
What a crock. The fact that no rights are absolute and yet we seem to be able to distinguish rape from other acts implies just the opposite. Precisely because such distinctions are necessary and evident, we define rights and protect them.
You are advocating that we abolish existing rights in IP, I am not. It is you who is advocating that we abolish the distinctions we currently hold as legitimate rights, so by analogy it is you who is justifying crime by ignoring the victim’s rights.
Or they say that there are always gray areas between adjoining property tracts. But in the standard case of Blackacre and Greenacre near each other, we already all recognize that there is a resource owned by B and one owned by G; that the tracts abut each other at a physical boundary that is of necessity gray, does not mean there is not Blackacre and Greenachre.
Yet at the same time you acknowledged this obvious fact, you deny the exact same relationship in IP by simply making the presumption that “we DO NOT already all recognize that there is a resource owned…”. The boundary is grey in both cases in exactly the same way, as it is grey at the boundaries of ALL rights. Since all rights are capable of conflict, we establish rules, which become laws. Good laws benefit both parties, bad laws harm both. Your proposal for outright IP abolition harms both producers and consumers of intellectual products, and you actually understand why. Where does that leave you, ethically?
I.e., the issue of transitions or continuums or gray areas only comes up when we know there are two definite areas and then a transition between them. If a dessert is next to a forest, they both still exist even if there is some transitino therebetween.
A poetic truism. By your analogy, then, all boundaries between abutting property rights have some grey zones, which implies what? That we must DISTINGUISH how to allocate those rights and limitations? OF COURSE!
Likewise, if we KNEW that we MUST HAVE a finite, nonzero patent term–that it HAS TO BE between zero and infinity, then perhaps we could not blame the Schulmans and other IP socialists from arbitrarily picking some number like 20 yeras–after all it is between zero and infinity, and “might be” close to the ideal peak of the Guassian Laffer Innovation Curve that only God can see.
What a zero. According to your reasoning, everything is arbitrary, and one thing cannot possibly be discerned from another. How does anyone see in all this fog? Your support of zero is well known. All opposition to your absolutism implies non-zero. That makes the score, Kinsella (and a very few entitlement hogs) zero, the rest of the civilized world, non-zero.
Since the issue you raise is actually an economics-of-law problem, I know you don’t mind if a few economists weigh in besides Rothbard, right? How about Mises and Hayek to name a couple? I for one do not favor an economic system that requires producers to produce for external economies. How about you?
They just assume, like central planning socialists always do.
Why, at this point in the discussion, are you so concerned about term, all of a sudden? Since you insist no rights can exist, what do you care how long the non-zero term is?
For those who see the logic of property rights in production, even where the product is an intellectual work, the issue of term is indeed a grey zone. As a result, it is a difficult problem, like all problems of the economics of law. Coase started us out and David Friedman has written a very interesting book on the subject. But for you, Stephan, don’t bother. No need to worry, since all rights in IP are illegitimate in the first place.
Save your time for more blogging. That’s what’s really important.
Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
That is a perfect statement of the communist ethic.
April 10, 2011 at 9:40 pm-
So were EXACTLY is the difference in practice between your “logoright” and what Ayn Rand thought about “IP”?
Please answer HERE as correctly and specifically as possible!
- April 11, 2011 at 12:42 am
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Dear, J. Neil Schulman,
That is a perfect statement of the communist ethic.
Since all the actions are already covered by physical property rights, what is it that you’re referring to as communist? There is nothing left. You’re using metaphysical nonsense to mask your contradiction. Confront it.
Every logos is an object made out of information.
Not all information is an information object.
- April 10, 2011 at 4:33 pm
- April 10, 2011 at 9:46 pm
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So someone orders the particles existing in this universe and is hereby changing information and therefore owns that changed information (=”logoright”)?
You think that your “logoright” is the only source of homesteading, don’t you?
There are millions of questions arising from that. A few:
1) Who decides what amount of information change (=pattern “creation”) is sufficient for homesteading?
2) As property is the right to exclude: How do you exclude people from using “logorighted” objects eg in their imagination?
April 11, 2011 at 10:00 am-
Given sufficient resolution, all information can be represented digitally, so there must be a minimum number of bits that are subject to IP. Though I might be wrong, I’d intuitively say that 1 bit is not enough. Nor 2, nor 3. It seems like *any* minimum number is arbitrary. Even if it were not, you could 0-pad your way to intellectual property.
So let me see if I have this right.
The anti-MCP advocates in this forum see nothing wrong with going into a Barnes and Noble store with their iPADs, going up to the children’s section, taking off the shelf a copy of The Berenstain Bears Get the Gimmes, using the iPAD’s camera to copy every page in the book, then shooting it out with Barnes and Noble’s security guards when they attempt to confiscate the iPAD.
- April 10, 2011 at 4:36 pm
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this ignores context, contracts, rules set by the owner of the (real, no offense) property. But right–there is nothing wrong per se with using non-scarce information. Information is not ownable. It’s not communist to say this.
Your position is transparently incompatible with libertarian property rights. It is incompatible with property rights in scarce means and with Lockean homesteading. YOu seek to supplant these libertarian fundamentals with your mystical weird theory about “material identity” and “logos” etc. Neil, it just makes no sense whatsoever, and almost everyone can see this. You are completely confused on this point.
- April 10, 2011 at 4:52 pm
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It ignores nothing.
Are you arguing that without prior notice — without a security guard requiring you to check your iPAD or leave it in your car — you have consented for Barnes and Noble to take ownership of your iPAD? That merely by bringing your property into their property they now own it?
How about the clothes you’re wearing and the money in your wallet? Do you grant a property right to Barnes and Noble the moment you walk into their store?
Or, is it possible for your sphere of ownership of your own things to remain yours even as you enter into someone else’s property?
No, you want it both ways. Your iPad remains yours yet you may use it as a burglar tool without consequence. You have the ethic of the Jolly Roger: what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is mine, too.
When I first created Alongside Night there was only one manuscript. It was a scarce object. All its bundle of rights due me from creating it were owned by me. That bundle of rights attached not only to the paper it was typed on but also to the thing which I created: the novel. I did not make the paper; I made the novel. The novel — not the paper — is the real, objective, discernible, observable, readable thing that I made. That bundle of rights included the human action of making copies, which I as the owner owned and still own.
Yet, in your Jolly Roger ethic, you can steal the thing of value — the novel — and because you’ve left me the paper you claim to have violated no property rights.
This is the argument of a buccaneer, a scoundrel, a grifter. Your quoting Locke on property rights in land doesn’t change that.
And anyone who isn’t blinded by having a Case of the Gimmes sees that.
- April 10, 2011 at 9:59 pm
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So YOU see nothing wrong with going through the streets and LOOKING at all the property you can see there and hereby (after YOUR THEORY) stealing and pirating all day long?
What about those poor house/garden/car owners who you rob with your eyes and your brain? Did you pay them? Why not? How could you!
I rather guess you even look at many monuments and process this information in your brain and EVEN speak about them. Did you ever draw a painting of something you saw? Shame on you.
PS: Did you even pay the royalties for using the Internet to the guy who invented it?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tim_Berners-Lee- April 11, 2011 at 6:08 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “So YOU see nothing wrong with going through the streets and LOOKING at all the property you can see there and hereby (after YOUR THEORY) stealing and pirating all day long?”
You know, you could at least pretend some familiarity with what I’ve actually written instead of making a fool of yourself by always attacking absurdities that are no part of my arguments and aren’t implied by them, or derivable from them, in the slightest.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:53 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
so, if I see something, remember it and then talk or write about it, does it violate other people’s rights or not? If it does, then Anti-IP Libertarian is right. If not, then you need to abandon IP.
Stop running away and confront the arguments.
- April 11, 2011 at 12:40 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The anti-MCP advocates in this forum see nothing wrong with going into a Barnes and Noble store with their iPADs, going up to the children’s section, taking off the shelf a copy of The Berenstain Bears Get the Gimmes, using the iPAD’s camera to copy every page in the book, then shooting it out with Barnes and Noble’s security guards when they attempt to confiscate the iPAD.
Well, since all your examples do contain the use of B&N’s physical property, your argument it a non-sequitur.
I kindly ask you again, confront the contradiction and the non-sequiturs in your arguments. I also noticed that my question on your article you refer to made it through moderation, but you left it unanswered.
April 11, 2011 at 8:05 am-
The fact that you feel the need to invoke such ludicrous scenarios suggests that you’re aware of how weak your position is. Peter and Stephan are showing you far more respect than you deserve.
- April 11, 2011 at 8:12 am
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Yes, I must at all costs satisfy myself that I’ve lived up to the standards of someone self-identified as “Beefcake the Mighty.”
- April 11, 2011 at 8:38 am
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OK, good, we’re in agreement then.
- April 11, 2011 at 11:04 am
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Beware, Neil, or Lord Buzungulus, Bringer of the Purple Light will be on your case next!
Stephan Kinsella wrote: “So some information is ownable. Some is not. What is the difference?”
See The Libertarian Case for IP at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/
April 10, 2011 at 5:28 pm-
Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
That is a perfect statement of the communist ethic.
It’s funny and a little sad you can’t see how ridiculous your calling such an obvious thing, “communist ethic”.
You’re arguing that you could have knowledge in your mind you have no right to use. You’re arguing that you do not have the right to use your mind freely, and you have the stones to call others communist. Your lack of self-awareness is fascinating.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:57 am
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The argument that “you can have knowledge in your mind that you have no right to use” has never been any part of my logorights theory, which is not about claiming property rights in what’s in other people’s minds but rights in Media-Carried Property (MCP). Of course people sign Non-Disclosure Agreements all the time wherein they can have knowledge that they have no right to use. But, again, that has nothing whatsoever to do with the MCP rights.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:40 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
But, again, that has nothing whatsoever to do with the MCP rights.
Exactly. Because the only thing MCP can do is to redistribute media (i.e. theft) or be redundant. Can you show me example where it doesn’t? You can’t. But you need it because otherwise your theory falls apart. Thus you continue to contradict yourself.
Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You’re arguing that you could have knowledge in your mind you have no right to use.”
But that’s not what you wrote before. You previously wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
You just added the words “in your mind” which were not in your previous statement.
You can have and use whatever knowledge you want “in your mind.” That is not the issue, and you repeatedly resort to this straw man to avoid addressing the property rights in externally existing and observable things.
- April 10, 2011 at 8:04 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You’re arguing that you could have knowledge in your mind you have no right to use.”
But that’s not what you wrote before. You previously wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
You just added the words “in your mind” which were not in your previous statement.
Well, this is redundant; how can you have knowledge that is not in your mind?
You can have and use whatever knowledge you want “in your mind.” That is not the issue, and you repeatedly resort to this straw man to avoid addressing the property rights in externally existing and observable things.
I cannot figure out why you focus on “observable” as some salient property of things that makes them ownable.
And how can you use knowledge that is not in your mind…. this is inconceivable.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:50 am
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “Well, this is redundant; how can you have knowledge that is not in your mind?”
The knowledge could be on a computer screen in front of your eyes, or in a book, just to give two examples.
“I cannot figure out why you focus on ‘observable’ as some salient property of things that makes them ownable.”
Because something being observable by more than one observer is one test of objective reality of a thing. Not necessarily the definitive test, or the only test. But it implies the real.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:02 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The knowledge could be on a computer screen in front of your eyes, or in a book, just to give two examples.
However, both examples are already covered by physical property rights, therefore IP needs to expropriate them or be redundant (if you are already the owner of the screen or the paper).
It would be really really great if you finally stopped running and answered the question.
- April 10, 2011 at 9:51 pm
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If you are arguing for a CONSISTENT theory of “IP” (aka “logoright”) then you have to go all the way:
There can be no exceptions for certain types of information processing just because you want that this way without creating inconsistencies (it’s the same with the statutory “fair use”-clauses).
Either you state that EVERY information processing against the will of an owner of “logorighted” property is infringement, or none.
Your “theory” sounds like: It is only forbidden to steal something if you are going to sell it.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:04 am
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All property rights are subject to rational boundaries and questions of what is and is not an infringement. If I put my foot on your car bumper to tie my shoe, is that a property rights violation as egregious as stealing your car? Is sticking a pizza card on your doorknob the same sort of invasion as breaking and entering?
Your all-or-nothing argument reduces to absurdity when applied to any property rights dispute.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:49 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
All property rights are subject to rational boundaries and questions of what is and is not an infringement.
However, if there is no case where a right does not overlap with other rights, then the right is either contradictory to them or redundant. Just like, for example, right to a job, right to healthcare and IP.
Face the contradiction.
Zorg (the villain from The Fifth Element? — there’s some psychological visibility!) wrote, “It actually argues against your case since you MUST sell the story when you sell the carrier (since that’s the only way it exists for any of us) – UNLESS, of course, you have a contract with the buyer that says otherwise.”
So unless you have en explicit contract stating otherwise, when you set foot on someone else’s property you’ve sold yourself into slavery. Got it.
April 11, 2011 at 12:28 am-
“Zorg (the villain from The Fifth Element? — there’s some psychological visibility!)”
Haha. No, just a happy coincidence. : )
“So unless you have en explicit contract stating otherwise, when you set foot on someone else’s property you’ve sold yourself into slavery. Got it.”
I have no idea how that relates to what I said. I have tried to stay away from using analogies to argue this. You should too since you’re not very good at it.
I was saying that in the absence of a contract, when you sell the book you are selling the story along with it. You cannot help but do this. It’s why people buy the book. It’s what gives the book value. To claim that you didn’t sell the story is just false. You keep selling it over and over again, and indeed expect to have a monopoly on the selling. The story is a necessary part of the book. It is the book. You can’t sell something and then claim you didn’t.
If you want to retain ownership, don’t sell. Selling means that you relinquish ownership of one thing in exchange for ownership of another (money). The blank media by itself is not what fetches a decent price for a book. You know that you are selling people the story. It’s no big mystery.
If there is confusion over the issue and you want to insist that you continue to have a right to control what happens after the sale, then by all means have people sign an agreement with you. That eliminates confusion, thereby solving the problem of disagreements concerning the rights involved. Shouldn’t this be considered as the most rational approach to the issue? Why refuse to spell out your rights and those of the buyer in clear English? Do you want an honest trade with the buyer or not? Do you want them to respect what you think is your right? Put it in writing, then they can choose to agree or not. Full disclosure. Tell them, “I am licensing this copy to you. You may not reproduce it. Agreed?” And you’re done.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:43 am
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Zorg wrote, “If you want to retain ownership, don’t sell.”
When I make my created works available for use am very clear about not including the right to make copies without my permission. I retain all rights not specifically sold or licensed, and so state in all released versions of the work, clearly demarcating my property rights.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:05 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
clearly demarcating my property rights
Your “demarcation” logically encroaches upon other people’s property, therefore is always theft or redundant.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:11 am
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Peter Surda wrote, “Your “demarcation” logically encroaches upon other people’s property, therefore is always theft or redundant.”
Absurd as usual, AbSurda.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:27 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Absurd as usual, AbSurda.
As usual, you avoid to answer because by answering you would prove that you contradict yourself.
- April 11, 2011 at 7:32 pm
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“I retain all rights not specifically sold or licensed, and so state in all released versions of the work, clearly demarcating my property rights.”
I was talking about using a contract as a way to protect the rights you say you have and want to retain. Your position forces you to assert some sort of natural right, so you want to express it to readers in a copyright notice. That’s fine as far as it goes. But others don’t agree that you can sell something and not sell it at the same time – unless you have a contract which specifies what is being sold and what isn’t. (I know, it sounds crazy, doesn’t it?)
So if you say you are licensing the story to the reader but not actually selling it, why not have a licensing agreement? Isn’t this a reasonable way to resolve the issue? Under the rubric of contract, you can bind buyers of your book to an agreement not to copy or make available for copying, or whatever you can get agreement on. What’s wrong with that? It would go a long way toward binding the conscience of the buyers, which is what you want.
You want them to help you protect the work.This actually addresses the problem as you see it. But in this case you are relying on your indisputable right as a sovereign individual to make agreements with those you do business with, rather than calling upon a dubious natural right to own the contents of the book even after selling it.
No one who is against IP can quarrel with this approach. A contract is for the purpose of spelling out the relationship between the two parties. In a contract, the parties are actually making their own law. To me this is more libertarian than trying to bind everyone in the world to your declaration that you retain ownership of that which you sell. Many people simply don’t see it that way, but get them to sign an agreement at the point of sale and at the very least you have put your stamp on their conscience.
One thing that has to be noted here is Kinsella’s continued, principled acknowledgment of Palmer’s good work on the anti-IP front. Apart from his work on this issue, Palmer is a true fiend who would never reciprocate the compliment and in fact regularly engages in smears against the Mises Institute (that is, when he’s not engaging in anal sex).
April 11, 2011 at 9:24 pm-
I don’t know that that last bit is relevant… it certainly helps to bring down the standards here, though.
Dear J. Neil Schulman,
If a car drives from land onto a ferry, it is separated from the land, but it doesn’t cease to be a car.
But it also does not change the ownership of the ferry. It can only be on the ferry with the ferry owner’s permission, otherwise the car driver is trespassing. Since you’re claiming that it’s the copier rather than the book author that is trespassing when a copy is created, you have produced just another non-sequitur.
The only case where your objection might have real-world application would be if someone memorized a logos and at some future point reconstituted it onto an objectively perceivable medium.
That would invalidate practically all patents. Furthermore, what if I used manual labour to copy a book, such as rewriting it by hand? That matches your description, yet I doubt you would be so lenient in permitting it.
Face it, instead if confronting the contradiction, you make up more and more nonsense.
All IP (or “logorights”) is either theft or irrelevant. I’ll repeat this as long as you keep avoiding this.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:45 am
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One of these days you’ll actually read The Libertarian Case for IP and won’t have to repeat asking questions I’ve already answered in full long before you got around to asking them.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:11 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
I read it. It deals with the justification of IP, not with the logical incoherence thereof. Even if I agreed with everything you say there, you’d still be contradicting yourself.
Now, where is the answer? Nowhere. You don’t have it. You think that your ethics protects you from self-contradiction. It doesn’t. That’s just religious fanaticism.
Come on, stop hiding and face me.
- April 11, 2011 at 6:29 am
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More clownish posturing by Peter abSurda.
- April 11, 2011 at 7:13 am
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And it would not be complete without more avoidance from J. Neil Schulman. I have reservations against calling people cowards unless they really earn it, so instead I’ll just say “told you so”.
The implications of this debate inevitably extend not to the narrow discussion of “IP” but to all property. This will happen because at some point technology will more than likely enable Star Trek like transporters in which matter is disassembled then reassembled elsewhere and “material identity” will be the defining feature of all property; or because human beings will enter into virtual realities where, once again, no property has a physical presence other than “material identity.”
In fact, any truly advanced technological civilization, if it has property rights at all, will regard an original “sample” as the only property worth having, since everything else will be replicable.
So, now’s the time to stake out the defining propertarian position for the rest of economic destiny. If the Stephan Kinsellas do manage to wipe out what they call IP and I’ll now be calling MCP, the future will eventually be one with no property rights at all.
- April 11, 2011 at 10:13 am
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J. Neil Schulman wrote, “If the Stephan Kinsellas do manage to wipe out what they call IP and I’ll now be calling MCP, the future will eventually be one with no property rights at all.”
The transporter/replicator machine itself is subject to property rights regarding physical objects that we all agree on. So to is the matter/material/feedstock that these machines use to assemble copies. The assembled object is, too. The operator/programmer/owner of the machine would assert property rights over their own body.
How does it follow that, in the world we are imagining here, no IP/MCP means no property rights?
- April 11, 2011 at 10:49 am
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Neil:
The implications of this debate inevitably extend not to the narrow discussion of “IP” but to all property. This will happen because at some point technology will more than likely enable Star Trek like transporters in which matter is disassembled then reassembled elsewhere and “material identity” will be the defining feature of all property; or because human beings will enter into virtual realities where, once again, no property has a physical presence other than “material identity.”
Exactly, and if you have your way your IP rights will then be used to attack people’s use of 3D printers, and so on — see https://c4sif.org/2011/03/white-paper-on-3d-printing-and-the-law-the-coming-copyfight/
What happened is this, Neil. The state and church used their power to censor speech when the printing press started threatening their scribe-controlling monopoly on ideas. This morphed into copyright law due to bad economics and rent-seeking by publishers etc. The state also granted monopolies to gain loyalty and reward sycophants; this morphed into patents due to bad economics and confusion about property rights.
Patent and copyright harm human life, but esp. for copyright the effects were not too great until 1990s when the Internet arose. Before then a book was always on a physical medium, so copyright law’s effect was fairly muted and int the background. With the liberation of information from physical media the effects of copyright started to be multipled. People started taking notice. It is more obviulsy evil now and that is why we are winning and you are losing.
And your side will surely push to stifle 3D printers and replicators if they ever become practical, in the name of IP. And thus gradually your belief in property rights in scarce goods will be gradually supplanted by your worship of property rights in ideal objects, gradually crowding out all property rights and killing the human race.
In fact, any truly advanced technological civilization, if it has property rights at all, will regard an original “sample” as the only property worth having, since everything else will be replicable.
This is ridiculous. It would be a boon to civilization if people could push a button on their 3D printer and have it create a car or mansion or food or clothes. Who cares if it resembles yours? I imagine in a real libertarian society there would be competition to be the most-imitated. People would brag, “yeah, I designed this table, and I have gotten 75 million ‘hits’ on facebook’s 3d printer sharing section. oh yeah, baby, people see how good I am.”
So, now’s the time to stake out the defining propertarian position for the rest of economic destiny. If the Stephan Kinsellas do manage to wipe out what they call IP and I’ll now be calling MCP, the future will eventually be one with no property rights at all.
In a world where we live in some hybrid internet space and have replicators and 3d printers etc., the proliferation of information and the sharability of computer programs will be a boon to society. Your system would do all it could to restrict the flow of information and the use of ideas.
Now you have morphed to MCP. Obviously you, like every other libertarian IP advocate I have encountered, don’t have a coherent system worked out. You say you oppose state IP law. Yet you don’t want to abolish it. when we ask what will replace it, you don’t know. At least you are working on it. Let me konw when you finally figure out the contours of this anti-Lockean system you want to foist on humanity.
- April 11, 2011 at 2:39 pm
- April 11, 2011 at 2:55 pm
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“Exactly, and if you have your way your IP rights will then be used to attack people’s use of 3D printers, and so on.”
Just like with a 2D printer, you have the right to use your 3D printer to make or make copies of things you own or have licensed.
- April 11, 2011 at 3:34 pm
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Exactly–you view us as living by permission, not by right. We have to get permission for every thing we do with our property. Horrible. Totalitarian.
I don’t need to “own” something to copy it. If I have heard of the idea of an airplane and can construct one with my own materials, I only need own them, not “the idea of an airplane”. Where do you get this? This is insane.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:05 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “Exactly–you view us as living by permission, not by right. We have to get permission for every thing we do with our property. Horrible. Totalitarian. I don’t need to “own” something to copy it. If I have heard of the idea of an airplane and can construct one with my own materials, I only need own them, not “the idea of an airplane”. Where do you get this? This is insane.”
You have the right to live using your own property. You need permission to use someone else’s. That’s libertarianism, not totalitarianism.
My argument is and has always been a defense of owning things, not ideas. You have an original idea for how to fly, fly. But just because you can look into a candy store window doesn’t transfer title of the candy to you. You want to use what someone else has created then buy the right from them or live within the means of your own innate genius. Your needs are not a claim on the property of others. That is totalitarianism. That is communism. That is not libertarian no matter how many infantile tantrums you throw.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:18 pm
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But just because you can look into a candy store window doesn’t transfer title of the candy to you.
If you buy that piece of candy and then examine how it was created or you learn from a third party how it was created then you can make as much candy as you want.
According to your view of property this would be a horrific violence against the confectioner.
- April 11, 2011 at 5:31 pm
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Imagine that I walk by the candy store and see, in the window, peppermint swirl candies (e.g., Brach’s Star Brites) on display for sale. I’ve never seen these before, but, because I know a little about making confections, I can guess, discern, or mentally “reverse engineer” how to make a peppermint swirl.
Could the maker of those candies claim a logoright on the design or construction of the candies?
If I go home and make peppermint swirls myself, using ingredients that I own, for my own private consumption, am I doing something wrong?
If I make them exactly as above and then sell them (thereby competing with the original seller), am I doing something wrong? Even if I use my own name, brand markings, etc.?
I realize that this is a very simple case. The complexity of a peppermint swirl is tiny compared to a novel. However, it seems like there must be some lower limit to the complexity that IP/MCP protects, lest we end up in the “Ug the First” situation. If a peppermint swirl is too low, could you explain what the lower limit of MCP complexity is, and give an example?
- April 11, 2011 at 5:39 pm
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Could the maker of those candies claim a logoright on the design or construction of the candies?
Yes. They if they the creator of the idea of the peppermint swirl then you would be violating their rights by making your own.
If I go home and make peppermint swirls myself, using ingredients that I own, for my own private consumption, am I doing something wrong?
Your engaging in violent theft if you do that.
At least according to Neil. If you were not a communist you would first have to go and get permission from the cook in order to sell copies of his candies.
- April 11, 2011 at 7:21 pm
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@ESV April 11, 2011 at 5:31 pm
People seem to get pissed around here when I refer to the law as the basis to establish some principle or other. Are you one of those? You don’t object if I refer to the dictionary to define a term, do you?
Assuming not, in the case of copyrights there is a lower limit; for example ideas, facts, formulas, short slogans and phrases are not protectable. They are and remain in the public domain, meaning no one and everyone owns them equally. Also in that domain are works that may have been protectable, but have expired; once in the public domain, always there. This is how public domain information accumulates over time, and why Shakespeare’s plays are in the public domain, even if they were written today, they could be copyrighted. This is below the threshold of “protected works”.
In the specific case of a literary work, unless an author meets the threshold of “original work of authorship”, the work is not protectable and remains below the threshold. Copy right requires, much as I understand the theory of logos to require, some actual intellectual endeavor on the part of the author, including some measure of creativity. A list of names in a phonebook is not protectable, because it lacks the creative element associated with authorship. A literary work is above the threshold. If you’ve ever read a book, then you know what I mean when I say that a literary work is like pornography; it is hard to describe, but you know it when you see it. Beyond a certain level of complexity, I don’t think any rational person would have difficulty understanding that it is above some threshold that makes it “an original work of authorship”.
You are specifically referring to a recipe, which is not protectable as a copyright, but might be under trade secret. But trade secrets can be reverse-engineered with no problem, so in your example, buying candy and reverse engineering it and making your own and opening a shop next door is not an issue for IP.
Think of the economics of a recipe. It turns out it is harder than most people think to make candy, and most people will just buy candy when they want it and buy it from somewhere that makes what they like. Everyone CAN make candy, but it is not trivial to make it come out exactly like that in the store. This creates a high threshold of “pain” in the make/buy decision, and so most people will buy it, and use their time elsewhere.
Likewise, a book is much easier to read than it is to write. It is easier to copy than to read. Although a book can be easily copied with currently available, cheap technology, copyrights prohibit that, except for certain uses, while this is not the case for a recipe, where copying is not prohibited. What is the difference between a book and a recipe?
Tucker wrote a daily about how “ideas are free” based on this very concept, the inexhaustibility of ideas and recipes. He came up with a “magic bagel” that could be copied magically. He concludes that if it is easy to copy, then it must be free, like his magic bagel. But of course in our world, there is no magic bagel. You have to actually mix dough, roll them and bake them in an oven. Actual work is involved. As a consumer of bagels, you make or buy, you can’t just copy.
Here is the way I look at it. In economic terms candy is a consumer product. The producer goods for candy is a kitchen, oven, and ingredients, and a recipe. Two people who have the same recipe and attempt to make an exact copy of the candy in the window, may be able to come close, in a very controlled and similar kitchen and oven, and with the same levels of skill as the original confectioner.
The original confectioner has an advantage if he has kept his recipe secret. If you want it, you have to reverse-engineer his process. That set of facts makes trade secret laws adequate to prevent the confectioner from being forced to produce for external markets. It is not that easy to copy his results, and if you do, you compete on other grounds not related to the candy, like location, presentation, etc. There is no “candy tools and die” that allows you to skip the “making candy part”, and go right to the “having candy part”. Just like in farming, you can’t skip the plowing and planting and skip right to the harvest.
Keeping with the production analogy, the author must first create an original manuscript. The production effort and resources that go into that effort is his capital costs of tooling and producing the first prototype. That original manuscript is in fact also a producer good, much like a tool die, which makes the marginal cost of additional copies very low, once you have the original manuscript “producer good” to make it from. Each copy that is produced as a consumer good is also a producer good, because it can serve as the “die” to make additional copies, without having to duplicate the effort and expense that the author expended to produce the original manuscript.
If you assert that when you buy a book, you are buying a producer good and not a consumer good, then you are asserting by analogy that when you buy candy, you are also own the kitchen and the recipe. In reality, you buy candy, which you consume. If you want to MAKE candy, you have to be prepared to invest in the candy-making enterprise. That is likely to be quite a bit more expensive that the nickel you pay for the candy.
Under copyright, the author licenses the consumer good, but not the producer good. Sale of a book is a limited license to consume the product, not to own the book “kitchen”.
If you assert that you DO own the “kitchen”, then you create a conflict, a rivalry between yourself and the author, and both will attempt to defend their rights. The pro-IP argument is that you bought the candy, not the kitchen. The anti-IP argument is that when you sell me candy, you sell me the kitchen.
- April 11, 2011 at 9:11 pm
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Nate-M wrote, “If you buy that piece of candy and then examine how it was created or you learn from a third party how it was created then you can make as much candy as you want. According to your view of property this would be a horrific violence against the confectioner. ”
Wrong. I’ve never made such a claim regarding candy or candy recipes.
But if you examine Alongside Night or learn from a third party how it was created, that doesn’t make you its author or entitled you to his rights of authorship.
- April 11, 2011 at 9:13 pm
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ESV,
Sell copies of Alongside Night as your own and tell people you “reverse engineered” it. I dare you. I double dare you.
- April 11, 2011 at 9:29 pm
- April 12, 2011 at 12:39 am
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Wrong. I’ve never made such a claim regarding candy or candy recipes.
So your concept of IP only extends to literary work? Cooks and engineers do not have any of the same ‘rights’ that authors and comedians enjoy, apparently.
But if you examine Alongside Night or learn from a third party how it was created, that doesn’t make you its author or entitled you to his rights of authorship
Obviously it doesn’t make you the original author. Not anymore then following a recipe for food makes me the guy that created the recipe.
There does not seem to be any point here.
- April 11, 2011 at 3:23 pm
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The question of what replaces statist law and regulation applies to every aspect of libertarian theory, not just replacing statist copyright and patent laws with natural-rights implementation of MCP.
I’ve already said that for now I’d be happy if libertarians abide by property rights in MCP of authors and inventors whose works they find valuable, with no enforcement other than social preferencing.
And yes — to preclude your having to search through messages where I refer to using guns to enforce my property rights — I’m using extreme and overblown language to give my arguments rhetorical impact. I’m both a dramatist and a comedy writer; it comes with the turf.
- April 11, 2011 at 7:51 pm
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“I’ve already said that for now I’d be happy if libertarians abide by property rights in MCP of authors and inventors whose works they find valuable, with no enforcement other than social preferencing.”
That’s great, but it weakens your argument. You want us to believe that your rights are being violated and your property is being stolen, but you’re fine with abandoning enforcement?
It doesn’t jibe.
Dear J. Neil Schulman,
This will happen because at some point technology will more than likely enable Star Trek like transporters in which matter is disassembled then reassembled elsewhere and “material identity” will be the defining feature of all property; or because human beings will enter into virtual realities where, once again, no property has a physical presence other than “material identity.”
You forget that in Star Trek there were not only transporters but replicators as well. They even were based on the same principles. They just made up some technobabble to explain why you can’t replicate living creatures. But even that was not entirely correct, there was an episode where a transporter accident created two Will Rikers. According your self-contradictory theory, that would actually only be one Will Riker with two bodies.
Who’s absurd now?
One of the defects of this form of discussion is that volume tends to win, irrespective of whether a response is new, on point, makes sense, and so forth.
One of the tactics of those who participate is always to claim victory, always to claim that their nonsensical challenges have never been answered, and to taunt anyone who fails to respond to even a single one of their comments.
This is a strategy not of argument but of filibuster.
Peter Surda, you have asked no real or understandable questions that I have not fully and adequately answered. I don’t know whether your thinking process is too compromised by nonsense to understand the answers, or whether content plays no part in your participation here and you get satisfaction merely by seeing your name on the screen.
Either way, let me state for the record that I do not consider you a serious participant in this discussion. My bona fides are well known; I know nothing about you that leads me to believe you have any intellectual authority on this topic. Your infantile taunts, added to your incomprehensibility of reason and writing, give a strong indication that you don’t.
There’s an old saw about rolling around in the mud with pigs. It gets you dirty and the pig enjoys it.
Enjoy the mudbath. You’re unworthy of my time and I’m ignoring your tactic of filibustering nonsense from now on.
- April 12, 2011 at 12:24 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Either way, let me state for the record that I do not consider you a serious participant in this discussion.
The feeling is mutual, but unlike you I’m not making up excuses to run away.
Your infantile taunts, added to your incomprehensibility of reason and writing, give a strong indication that you don’t.
You’re a religious fanatic who thinks that emotions beat logic. Your choice, not my problem.
- April 12, 2011 at 12:30 pm
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I’ll say it again, Peter: you and Stephan have shown this fool far, far more respect than he deserves.
- April 12, 2011 at 5:33 pm
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Agreed. Schulmann’s latest response to Peter is the kind of childish ad hominem I expect from a die-hard liberal (yes I know that is itself a kind of ad hominem, I hope you all call appreciate the humor!).
I see this very often where I dare to bring libertarian ideas to people who want nothing to do with them. Instead of debating what I say, they start giving me therapy sessions where they’re gonna “figure out” why I would think the ridiculous things I think.
- April 12, 2011 at 12:49 pm
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
I just realised what you said:
you have asked no real or understandable questions that I have not fully and adequately answered.
If your approach was genuine, you would have asked for a clarification upon not understanding a question. I do that all the time. However, you did not ask, you just made up an excuse for not answering it. Obviously, you are not interested in a debate.
Let me ask you this: if you claim to have the moral upper ground, are you permitted to contradict yourself?
Neil
You are such a comedian! Not a very good one though. Then again, filth is not really very funny.
Sione
Wildberry wrote:
“If you assert that when you buy a book, you are buying a producer good and not a consumer good, then you are asserting by analogy that when you buy candy, you are also own the kitchen and the recipe.”
No. The author sells the story when he sells the book. When I buy the book, all I have is the story. The medium of paper and ink is irrelevant. I can show that it is irrelevant by copying the words of the book onto a digital medium and then burning the book. The story survives. It’s the substance of what I bought. I bought Casablanca – which consists of what, paper and ink? No, it consists of the entire pattern of words therein which *are* Casablanca.
If authors wish to bind buyers of books to a licensing agreement where rights and duties are spelled out in clear language, then they ought to do that. The fact that they don’t do this is telling.
Authors and inventors are merely capitalizing upon an old system of privilege in the law. They are not relying upon normal business practices such as contracts which spell out the rights of each party. That much is clear.
“Under copyright, the author licenses the consumer good, but not the producer good. Sale of a book is a limited license to consume the product, not to own the book “kitchen”.”
Where is the licensing agreement?
“If you assert that you DO own the “kitchen”, then you create a conflict, a rivalry between yourself and the author”
Great. Let’s go to court:
1) The author sold it to me for cash.
2) It is in my sole possession.
3) I can freely use, alter or destroy it.
4) There is no contract whatsoever that says otherwise.
“But, but, but…..”
- April 11, 2011 at 11:05 pm
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@Zorg April 11, 2011 at 8:33 pm
The medium of paper and ink is irrelevant. I can show that it is irrelevant by copying the words of the book onto a digital medium and then burning the book. The story survives. It’s the substance of what I bought. I bought Casablanca – which consists of what, paper and ink? No, it consists of the entire pattern of words therein which *are* Casablanca.
OK this part I like. You are admitting at least, that there is a “work” there.
If authors wish to bind buyers of books to a licensing agreement where rights and duties are spelled out in clear language, then they ought to do that. The fact that they don’t do this is telling.
This puzzles me. There is no alternative to copyrights currently operating in the market, so I would presume the author transferred under the conditions of existing copyright law, in which case no such additional agreement is necessary. If you are assuming that it is transferred in an absence of copyrights, then maybe the author would make a special contract, and maybe books would $1000, and maybe lots of stuff. You cannot assume availability under copyrights, and then blame the author for acting as if there is no such thing…right?
Authors and inventors are merely capitalizing upon an old system of privilege in the law.
ou mean, authors and inventors are engaging in market operation under the rules in existence affecting that trade. If you are going to assume some other condition, you are going to have to speculate about how books find their way into your hands as a consumer. I don’t know what that might be (and neither do you) but it certainly would operate differently that it does today. I think you would have to spell that out.
Where is the licensing agreement?
It is called copyrights. If you are hypothesizing about a world without copyrights, tell me how the author suddenly no longer cares about enforcing his rights to his own property?
1) The author sold it to me for cash.
OK what is it and what were the conditions of the sale? I see you bought some candy. What makes you think you own the kitchen?
2) It is in my sole possession.
Fine. Eat the candy and read the book. That is what your possess, a book that you can read.
3) I can freely use, alter or destroy it.
You can read it, mark it up, or destroy it. You cannot copy and distribute it. That is a limitation on your right to use it how you wish. Otherwise, you are good to go.
If you buy candy from me, you can eat it, fondle it, or stick it up your nose. You cannot come into my kitchen and make some more whenever you feel like it. That’s mine.
4) There is no contract whatsoever that says otherwise.
No, there is copyright law. Also, there is no contract required to keep you out of my kitchen, even if you buy some candy. That is the way property rights work; you don’ t need a contract to enforce them.
- April 11, 2011 at 11:39 pm
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I asked you where the licensing agreement was because you said the author licenses the story to the buyer, and you respond with, “It’s called copyrights.” Thanks for clearing that up, because I almost got confused and thought that there was no licensing agreement.
Your responses all refer to and are based on existing copyright law. We are not discussing copyright law, so you leave me with nothing relevant to respond to. You simply dodged the questions.
- April 12, 2011 at 7:37 am
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@Zorg April 11, 2011 at 11:39 pm
What do you mean, where is it? You created a hypothetical situation in which you assume you receive a book without a contract limiting use.
If you assume copyrights exist, why would you want to find one? If you assume it does not exist, what would prevent the author for making you sign one as an alternative to copyrights?
No matter what you think might happen that gets you the right to copy an author’s work, it is most likely that an author will either find a way to protect his property, or forego writing it in the first place.
I don’ t know there is a response. What other alternative do you think exists?
- April 12, 2011 at 11:47 am
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I am asking you: Is there is a licensing agreement between author and buyer?
I did not create any hypotheticals. You said authors license buyers. So I asked you where the licensing agreement was.
- April 12, 2011 at 1:36 pm
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@ Zorg April 12, 2011 at 11:47 am
How do I know? You invented the hypothetical.
“license” is a concept of transfering a right to limited use. It MAY be done by contract, or it may be done by operation of law. It makes no difference. What is your point?
Neil wrote: “I wrote Alongside Night and own what I wrote.”
Stephan Kinsella replied, “No you don’t. Information is not ownable.”
There is it, about as bald a communist anti-propertarian, anti-individual rights, and anti-libertarian claim as has ever been made.
With this statement Stephan Kinsella has definitively proved himself not a libertarian.
April 11, 2011 at 9:52 pm-
Schulman: Information is not property, not a scarce good. Copying it does not destroy the original, does not take away from the seller of the book the seller’s property. IP law however does arbitrarily infringe upon the buyer’s use of his own property. If someone were to copy a novel and represent it as their own writing I would believe that to be punishable as fraud but nothing else.
Property as understood by libertarian thinking does not include non-scarce goods.- April 11, 2011 at 10:39 pm
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Gee, I’ve never thought of that before! You’ve convinced me! *snort*
April 12, 2011 at 4:10 am-
You quote a single line and say Kinsella has “proved himself not a libertarian.” Kinsella has, by that line, “proved” nothing. You have “proved” nothing.
Citing a single line like this is not an argument, but an informal fallacy I call a “trap door.” When someone says it, that person is evicted from the realm of the argument, and is not to be taken seriously, as if he’s suddenly vanished from the rhetorical stage upon pulling a lever.
That is not rational discussion, Neil, with adducing of arguments and evidence, it’s an attempt to create a substitute for it. It belongs in the realm of propaganda and emotionally driven persuasion, not in that of argument.
Randians (though rarely Rand herself) have been fond of this for decades, back at least to Barbara Branden saying about the poor, “If you want to help them, you will not be stopped.” Bon mots can rivet attention and win over a crowd. They neither disqualify an opponent nor constitute — let alone win — an argument.
I’m tired of trap doors being activated. As this and a hundred other IP discussions (closer than, say, Facebook to genuine venues for argument) show, this issue is highly intricate. Kinsella is adducing issues and implications of homesteading and the nature of property that deserve proper attention, with respect for his libertarian framework, and not mere dismissal in a few aphorisms (or “snort”s) from EasyChairman Neil.
- April 12, 2011 at 1:55 pm
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Steve, is the defendant’s statement “Yes I killed her” enough for a conviction in a murder trial?
Stephan Kinsella’s statement, “No you don’t” to my statement that I own Alongside Night is sufficient to identity him as an opponent of my property right in the unique thing I made, and not a libertarian, which is always in all cases a proponent of individual property rights.
- April 12, 2011 at 2:30 pm
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“unique thingness” is now enough for ownability. Hunh?
So here are people who are enemies of property rights, commies, unlibertarian, in addition to moi: Rothbard, Benjamin Tucker, Wendy McElroy, Tom Palmer, Roderick Long, Sheldon Richman, Jeff Tucker, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, and a most other libertarians!
He acts as if we just made up this scarcity thing. IT’s old! E.g.:
David Hume, 1751 (see Hume on Intellectual Property and the Problematic “Labor” Metaphor)Benjamin Tucker, 1890s (see McElroy’s “Contra Copyright, Again”)Arnold Plant, 1934, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” 35–36Rothbard: see my post Justice and Property Rights: Rothbard on Scarcity, Property, Contracts…- April 12, 2011 at 8:34 pm
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“But the answer here that I prefer to give is: if this logos is so damned unlimited as not to be an economic object — then why do you want to reproduce mine? The limits on this kind of good are not drawn by its infinite ability to replicate itself, which is a way in which the logos is not limited. However, just as property rights in the radio spectrum are not limited by area but by amplitude and frequency, the limits on logoright are not to be found in its ability to be infinitely reproduced, but in the finite identity to be exploited for its qualities and traits that distinguish any given logos from any other logos. In terms used by economists, when defining the scarcity of a logos we must look to limits of horizontal competition between different kinds of goods, rather than to the limits of vertical competition within a kind of good.”
–The Libertarian Case for IP- April 13, 2011 at 2:03 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
even though it sounds repetitive, I have to say that your claim is a non-sequitur. The metaphysical justification of IP, even if true, does not fix the logical errors in the property rights theory that you build upon it. Then there is also of course the other problem I’ve been mentioning, the incoherence: you have not been able to define logos in a coherent manner. Some logos are relevant for property rights, some are not. Sometimes they are not relevant, sometimes they are. Looking at things is ok, but photographing them not. Copying them for educational and comedic purposes is, but without it isn’t. What if I earn money by teaching or am a stand up comedian? You provide no answer.
Make up your mind. Either you prefer emotions and then don’t pretend to argue, or you prefer logic and then stop running away.
- April 12, 2011 at 5:44 pm
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“There is it, about as bald a communist anti-propertarian, anti-individual rights, and anti-libertarian claim as has ever been made.”
There it is. Your comprehension skills are either so shot you actually think an attempt to reconsider and refine the boundary between ownable and not ownable means we are throwing out the concept of ownable entirely, or you are well-trained in sophistry and are constructing a straw man to make you feel better about your own ill-conceived creation-based approach to property.
Either way, your schoolyard debating tactics won’t work on people here, and that’s why I like this institute. Take your tantrum-throwing up to Washington D.C. I promise you’ll have more of an effect on those people than anyone here.
This “communist” charge is one of the dumbest things I have ever heard, and Tom Woods needs to add it to the list of “zombie words”. Apparently you would be running around calling all the abolitionists during the 19th Century “communists” because they were suggesting that no one can own another persons’s body. And of course by claiming other peoples’ bodies can never be property, those people are rejecting private property all together and might as well have joined up with the Bolshevists.
How bout I just call you a fascist dictator for thinking that because you wrote some book and I stumble across a copy of it on the internet, I need to run and ask you if I’m allowed to download it onto my computer.
For the record, I am musician and have been my entire life. I compose and produce and have plenty of material by this point. As a fellow author, I can vouch for how tyrannical and insane it is that you think as soon as you put together some piece of art you become the sole decider on how everyone else is to enjoy that art. It was being forced to think about this in terms of the music I write that first made me abandon all this nonsense.
And I am well aware that letting go of these bizarre insistences will only make it far easier for me to make a career out of making music. You’re shooting yourself in the foot. I’ll definitely never read your book because I have to pay for it, but I might have read it if I could get it for free. That goes for lots of other people, some of whom may be interested in paying you to write more stuff to be turned into plays and shown at theaters to make theater owners money. Go ahead and stamp your foot and say you own your book. You’re dooming it to obscurity and a couple hundred years for now you can be sure no one is even aware of your book, thanks to your insistence to make people pay to see it.
Enough with the “communist” crap. Grow the f*ck up or go hang out in a elementary school playground where you can argue with people on your own level.
April 12, 2011 at 6:00 pm-
You can get the book for free from the website: http://www.alongsidenight.com/
“Reason is not automatic. Those who deny it cannot be conquered by it.”
Ayn Rand
Nate-M wrote, “Obviously it doesn’t make you the original author.”
Okay, boychick. If not me, who is the author of Alongside Night?
- April 12, 2011 at 10:18 am
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JNS,
You have repeatedly insulted many people here but you haven’t defended your logic at all. What purpose does calling someone “boychick” provide? You’re able to be condescending. Big deal. If you really wanted to impress us, defend your arguments. Name calling without substance is just cheap tricks.
I don’t see how you’re a victim to volume, because if you had substantively answered one or two of the early queries about the logic behind your position, this discussion might already be over.
- April 12, 2011 at 2:35 pm
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Count up the number of messages I’ve posted in this forum, alone, added to three decades of writing on this topic. You demand a full argument? Read The Libertarian Case for IP at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/ and MCP at
http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/04/mcp/“I don’t see how you’re a victim to volume, because if you had substantively answered one or two of the early queries about the logic behind your position, this discussion might already be over.”
This thread was started on April 1; my first comment is April 2.
Early enough for you, boychick?
- April 12, 2011 at 6:34 pm
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JNS,
First, calling me boychick merely reinforces my argument and undermines your reputation. I’ll address that in more detail later.
Second, I never questioned how much material you have generated. By all accounts, you are a prolific writer. I and others are questioning the quality of your argument.
Third, you may have responded early to this thread, but you have for dozens of posts now, dodged answering any specific questions about your position, specifically those that refer to contradictions or logical issues.
You continue to link to your material, yet you have also continued to avoid addressing very polite and plain questions. I won’t assume motive, but we can certainly judge action. When confronted by this, you resort to petty name calling and more avoidance, which serves to make your position look indefensible as I don’t think it actually hurts anyone’s feelings, which is what I guess you were trying to achieve by being so personal when challenged.
Perhaps that is a consequence of your esteem, some hangup which prevents you from engaging in introspection and critical analysis of your position on IP. It’s a shame. I haven’t read your novel, but by all accounts you were at one time an important libertarian hero. Now you seem to be just another bitter guy on blogs, striking out personally at anyone who questions your opinion.
Why write or respond if you’re not going to be responsive to the discourse? There are other sites and mediums if your goal is to treat people badly and avoid any serious discussion. At least for your sake, do it under a pseudonym, so your previous work and reputation aren’t tarnished by this bizarre mode of internet self-immolation.
- April 12, 2011 at 5:47 pm
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This has nothing to do with authorship. If you are claiming that it should be illegal for me to announce that I wrote something, then congrats. You’ve entered the realm of denying free speech.
Making copies has absolutely nothing to do with who anyone thinks the actual author was. This is entirely off-topic from an IP discussion and belongs in a discussion about the legitimacy of laws that curtail free speech, like libel and slander. Plagiarism has absolutely nothing to do with IP.
Even if we choose not to believe something that is objectively true does not mean that we won’t end up altering our lives and business to deal with it. Perhaps the surest sign of the ‘true reality’ is the observation of how people are adapting to it. I might not believe in things I cannot directly see, for example, UV rays from the sun. But I can observe that I get an undesirable sunburn if I don’t use sunscreen.
I cite the changes observed over the last decade in various industries, like the video game industry, the music industry, the movie industry, television (or broadcasting generally), and others, as evidence that the true nature of the ownership of physical property rights is different than what we believed when intellectual property was more strongly tied to some physical medium.
Video games have shifted away from trying to compete with the raw distribution capability of piracy networks to offering gaming content on a much more epic scale a la MMORPG’s and providing services where gamers can interact with each other, rather than simply consume the content written on a data cd.
The music industry has discovered that the time it takes to search for a quality pirated version of a song is clearly worth more to many people that the 99 cents it takes to get that song instantly on I-Tunes. Also, for those who are to cheap and lazy for I-Tunes or piracy (me), Grooveshark is free to use on your computer. Apparently it still generates enough money to keep the servers on, and the record companies happy.
The movie and broadcast industries are changing too.
It seems we are undergoing a transition from a decades long system (1950-200?) where IP producers could reap enormous and long lasting rewards from a relatively short period of work (thanks to artificial scarcity imposed by IP law), to a system where IP producers must produce constantly (like their blue collar brethren) in order to stay relevant. (I don’t mean to sound too populist there- I don’t think this is a communist vs capitalist argument).
It doesn’t surprise me that music artists who produced their greatest records in the 1980′s are fighting bitterly to maintain millions of dollars per year in royalties. What does surprise me is that companies known for constantly innovating amazing new things would get into multi-million dollar battles over who invented the ‘swipe’ feature on a freaking cell phone!
Wildberry wrote:
“How do I know? You invented the hypothetical. “license” is a concept of transfering a right to limited use. It MAY be done by contract, or it may be done by operation of law. It makes no difference. What is your point?”
What hypothetical did I invent? You either have an agreement with someone or you don’t.
You are now actually saying that a state law is an agreement between two people? You can say that an author licenses a story to a reader because the state says so? Then why are you here arguing? What’s to argue? Whatever the state says is all you ever need to know about anything. If they say blacks are slaves, then blacks have obviously agreed to be licensed to slave masters. If anyone asks where the agreement is, you point to state law that says blacks are property.
Because no one needs agreements in order to protect their property, right?Stop with the ridiculous question-begging and just defend your position with logic. You remind me of the attorney in Miracle on 34th Street who proves that the defendant is Santa Claus because the USPS delivers mail to him addressed to Santa! : )
- April 12, 2011 at 5:25 pm
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No offense intended…
@Zorg April 12, 2011 at 2:51 pm
Look, dufus, you said this, right?
So if you say you are licensing the story to the reader but not actually selling it, why not have a licensing agreement?
If limited right to use is specified under the copyright law that was a condition of the transfer, why would I ALSO need a separate contract redundant to those rights already established?
If you are HYPOTHSIZING that copyrights do not exist, then there is NO REASON that a contract could NOT be used to establish these limited use rights as a condition of transfer. It might not be efficient (see Coase Theorem) because of the high transaction cost associated with negotiating a contract with every potential customer, but hey, it is POSSIBLE.
You are now actually saying that a state law is an agreement between two people?
Yes, I am actually saying that laws operate by establishing rights and consequences for violating those rights. That is why NO CONTRACT IS REQUIRED TO ENFORCE PROPERTY RIGHTS, get it? OR…. You can establish property rights, or modify them, through contract. Your point is????
As for the rest, it is just a confused mess that I won’t bother trying to straighten out for you. If you have a question, what is it?
- April 12, 2011 at 6:14 pm
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I said, “You are now actually saying that a state law is an agreement between two people?”
You say: “Yes, I am actually saying that laws operate by establishing rights and consequences for violating those rights. That is why NO CONTRACT IS REQUIRED TO ENFORCE PROPERTY RIGHTS, get it?”
Fine. You’re a legal positivist then. The law establishes rights. Any state decree that forces people to interact in a certain way is an “agreement” between them, and that’s why an author is “licensing” the reader when he sells a book to him. That’s great. So why are you arguing with us then? We’re here talking about the legitimacy of those laws and the basis for claimed rights. All you can do is refer to the law and continually beg the question. I wonder if you even know what that means – to beg the question.
Well, I’m done with you now that you’ve started in with the name calling. Google “ad hominem” and “begging the question.” Z ya!
- April 12, 2011 at 6:45 pm
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@Zorg April 12, 2011 at 6:14 pm
Don’t be so sensitive, Dufus is a term of endearment!
No, you don’t get it. Laws can reflect social norms and agreements about ethical codes.
In any case, if a law is not unjust and doesn’t need to be overturned for ethical or economic reasons, it establishes the basis for a mutual understanding rights between parties, such that an independent contract is not required IN ADDITION to establish these rights.
This is the case where two parties enter an exchange under the framework of rights that are codified in existing law. This is the context in which copyrights operates, today, in the real world.
You apparently take issue with something here, but I can’t figure out what it is. Would you like to explain what it is?
You want to re-open the discussion of whether these property rights are ligitimate, starting from the beginning?
Why not add something, or present something or ask somethnig or challenge somthing instead of spending your time trying to categorize me in some particular way by putting words in my mouth?
- April 12, 2011 at 7:05 pm
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“Laws can reflect social norms and agreements about ethical codes”
They sure can, and enforcing those laws on anyone who is not part of the agreement is totally unjustifiable.
We’re not talking about making a community where one of the rules for entry is that you can’t make copies of other peoples’ creative works (and no, this does not produce IP, because no one outside the community is bound to any of their communal agreements).
But the people outside the community still cannot trespass on the community’s physical property, regardless of what agreements have been made.
Ethics obviously has nothing to do with reaching agreement. If everyone reaches agreement, then there is no conflict and no need to even bring up ethics! Ethics is a set of logicall deductible theorems that separate performatively self-consistent action from performatively self-contradicting action. No agreement can ever make murder justifiable, because murder is incompatible with argumentation. Again, see Hoppe.
From what I can tell, Schulmann’s logos argument makes a very glaring equivocation of a universal form and a particular instance of that form.
Nobody would deny that if you design a logo or right a story of a manuscript or whatever, that you own that *instance* of that “logo”, which would include the pattern of ink on the paper, for example.
But then you all of a sudden jump from ownership of a particular instance of a logo to ownership of the universal category of that logo, which in turn implies ownership of every particular instance of that logo.
This is where I see the absurdity. Sure when you design a logo on a physical object you own that physical object and the *instance* of that logo, but you certainly do not own the universal category of that logo. If I build a factory of a certain design I own that particular factory, not every instance of a factory that belongs to some universal category, be it the category of factories, the category of factories using this design, or any other category (the utter arbitrariness of what categories to use permeates every pro-IP argument).
When you design a logo, you own the instance of that logo, not every instance of that logo. Thus “logorights” is nothing more than a particular interpretation of some physical property rights. Every “logoright” in this sense is already a part of physical property rights acquired only by homesteading.
If “logorights” implies that ownership of an instance of a category can lead to ownership of every instance of that category then it conflicts with physical property to the point that people could not even act. Whatever claim to ownership over your own body you have is potentially a claim of ownership to every body ever.
For all you’ve said about “identity” Schulmann, it should be clear to you that the process of identification separates different copies of a creative work (or or different instances of a logo) and can only lead you to the conclusion that your claim to ownership stops precisely where the boundary of identification is drawn. You own the object that is a singular “thing”, an identifiable means to and end. You don’t by doing so all of a sudden own a set of identifiable objects which, as we can all agree, are always distiguishable by the mere fact that they are different instances.
- April 13, 2011 at 12:40 am
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Roderick Long makes this argument about universals in his paper from 1995
https://c4sif.org/2011/04/roderick-longs-classic-demolition-of-intellectual-property/- April 13, 2011 at 2:44 pm
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@ Stephan Kinsella April 13, 2011 at 12:40 am
I can see why this guy is your man, although I have to admit he made your argument in far fewer words that you have. I can do better:
IP has an unsavory past.
We have IP because we have the State.
Ideas are free.
Externalities don’t matter.
Monopolies are bad.
Technology makes property rights obsolete.
PR campaigns to boycot competitors are more efficient than those pesky property rights.Finito!
This little excerpt from the link Stephan posted says it all, I think.
“It is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copyrights) that they do not arise out of the scarcity of the objects which become appropriated. They are not a consequence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute law; and, whereas in general the institution of private property makes for the preservation of scarce goods, tending (as we might somewhat loosely say) to lead us “to make the most of them,” property rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained. Whereas we might expect that public action concerning private property would normally be directed at the prevention of the raising of prices, in these cases the object of the legislation is to confer the power of raising prices by enabling the creation of scarcity. The beneficiary is made the owner of the entire supply of a product for which there may be no easily obtainable substitute. It is the intention of the legislators that he shall be placed in a position to secure an income from the monopoly conferred upon him by restricting the supply in order to raise the price.” – Arnold Plant
- April 12, 2011 at 11:38 pm
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@Zorg April 12, 2011 at 8:40 pm
Yes, this says it all. It can be summarized this way: “Ideas/IP are free, all monopolies are equally bad, and we have IP because we have the state, .”
He assumes the conclusion that an original work is non-scarce by the principle that they could be infinately replicated, yet ignores the necessity of the private production of the original, scarce work. Ease of replication is not that which establishes whether something is ownable, although ideas are free.
He equivocates the connotations of monopoly, as Mises clearly explains as the misunderstanding of the nature of economic monopoly v. property monopoly. Product monopolies do not do what he claims, property monopolies are everywhere in a free market.
Finally, he treats the economic issue of externalities and public choice as simply mercantilism. Without the state, we would be free from state coercion.
Other than that, it is a fine statement.
April 13, 2011 at 7:26 am-
it is not ignoring it. You can produce scarce “ideas” in your head all the time and keep them “locked” (in your head). But when someone happens to know them too (by accident, individual revelation or by learning from you), it no longer is “scarce” and any force used to prevent other person from using what he learned is illegitimate (unless it was covered by contract).
(comment doesn’t show up, sorry for duplication).
- April 13, 2011 at 11:03 am
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This disagreement about the meaning of the word “scarce” accounts for a substantial chunk of the debate, in my opinion. With respect to IP:
Some people say “scarce” and mean difficulty of propagation or duplication. E.g., it’s easy to copy an MP3 file.
Some people say “scarce” and mean difficulty of design. E.g., it’s difficult to write a popular novel.
Technology pushes propagation and duplication toward triviality, but has not substantially diminished the essential difficulties of design.
- April 13, 2011 at 12:51 pm
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ESV,
Well said.
- April 13, 2011 at 12:26 pm
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“He assumes the conclusion that an original work is non-scarce”
Not assumed, observed. It is non-scarce as soon as it is published. What the author wants and gets as a monopolist is to control the production and price of that non-scarce good in order to make a market. This does not come about through natural law or contract, but by statute.
“yet ignores the necessity of the private production of the original, scarce work.”
Everything must be privately produced. And referring to the original as scarce is irrelevant since it only becomes an economic good when it is published and marketed. It remains scarce in the sense that it is a particular story and not another, but that fact is irrelevant to the monopoly on production of that particular good. The natural market therefore is that Story A1 compete with Story B2 through Z10000000, which it always does. But the market on production is what the statute of privilege aims at. This enables production of Story A to be monopolized in order to fix its price in relation to the prices of other monopolized stories.
Competition breaks this cartel-of-individual-monopolies (is there a term for that?) structure and drives down price to the actual market price, which in the digital realm is eventually going to approach zero, reflecting its non-scarcity in full. Paper & ink books though will likely always have a production cost relative to other such books and therefore still bring in a profit provided there is a demand for this type scarce incarnation of the work.
- April 13, 2011 at 1:09 pm
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@Zorg April 13, 2011 at 12:26 pm
It is non-scarce as soon as it is published
Yes, and scarce before it was published, and owned by an individual. What “rights” does this original owner have, if any?
And referring to the original as scarce is irrelevant since it only becomes an economic good when it is published and marketed.
Yes, and as an economic good, we should apply economic analysis to the issue of property rights, and how they operate in a free market. See Mises/Coase on externalities.
It remains scarce in the sense that it is a particular story and not another, but that fact is irrelevant to the monopoly on production of that particular good.
This is the nature of product monopoly, which is everywhere, and is not equivalent to economic monopoly. It is not that bad books cost $5 and great ones cost $5,000. It is that “books” complete, just like hotels compete. You cannot, however, open a hot dog stand in the lobby of my hotel.
But the market on production is what the statute of privilege aims at. This enables production of Story A to be monopolized in order to fix its price in relation to the prices of other monopolized stories.
How is this statement any different for any other property? Are you simply restating the operation of private property in the economy? My hotel is “monopolized”, but I compete with your hotel. Right?
There is no “cartel of individual monopolies” although making that concept up is helpful to your erroneous conclusion that an author of a book is part of any larger cartel. All books compete with all other books. As a consumer, you decide which to consume. Good books attract more consumers. What theory of property justifies the acquistion of property without compensation to the owner? You are simply making this statement because know that you can replicate the original work cheaply. The relative low cost of replication is why books cost $5 and not more. In the 1300′s, books were very, very expensive compared to other goods. You are simply saying that technology makes things ceaper to produce.
The relvant production cost is the cost of producing the original manuscript, not the production of copies. When you introduce a new model car, the cost of replication is not the only cost. There is a capital cost that has to be accounted for. In your theory, you dismiss the capital cost and expect the cost should be limited to the cost of replication. Sorry, things don’t get produced that way, do they?
When you want a new car, do you just borrow your neibor’s and copy it? Why can you make this leap of dismissing property rights just because replication is cheap?
He assumes the conclusion that an original work is non-scarce by the principle that they could be infinately replicated, yet ignores the necessity of the private production of the original, scarce work.
Finally someone owns up to the labour fallacy.
@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 2:05 am
Sorry, but thanks for playing.
Do you dispute that an author owns his original manuscript before any copies are made or it is distributed to anyone? If so, why is that?
- April 13, 2011 at 1:31 pm
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Sorry, but thanks for playing.
Que?
Do you dispute that an author owns his original manuscript before any copies are made or it is distributed to anyone?
He owns it before and after. Copies don’t change ownership. He still “owns” the original assuming he still has the original in his possession. Everyone who has made a copy (if they have made a copy) own their copy and not his original.
Property rights are great. Everyone understands who owns what, so that we can avoid and resolve conflicts simply and cheaply.
@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 1:31 pm
Since agree on that point, no need to debate the labor theory of property, or any other theory of natural property rights, since we arrive at the same conclusion. Right?
So, here I am, owning an original manuscript. As such, I have a claim to the economics rights to its use and distribution.
And there you are, wanting to acquire a copy if what is “in” the manuscript (say a novel), and you calim the economic right to the use and distribution of that copy.
These are conflicting claims of rights. Each must defend their positions. What methodolgoy do you recommend for deciding what we should do?
- April 13, 2011 at 6:11 pm
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I think you mean the labour theory of value. You and JNS and most IP proponents including Randians are all appealing to a form of the LTV when you insist creation is a property right.
So, here I am, owning an original manuscript. As such, I have a claim to the economics rights to its use and distribution.
I don’t know what economic rights are, but so far it sounds reasonable.
And there you are, wanting to acquire a copy if what is “in” the manuscript (say a novel), and you calim the economic right to the use and distribution of that copy.
I don’t follow this.
These are conflicting claims of rights.
How so?
Each must defend their positions.
Must they?
What methodolgoy do you recommend for deciding what we should do?
There are two pieces of property if there is a copy. Who owns which? Does someone else own all of the goods you have which are copies or based on a template/pattern? Does Chrysler own [sic] your car, and KitchenAid [sic] your blender, and Samsung [sic] your TV?
Lay out a chain of reasoning here. How does the second party get a copy of the manuscript? That’s the devil in the details.
- April 13, 2011 at 7:58 pm
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@DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 6:11 pm
I think you mean the labour theory of value. You and JNS and most IP proponents including Randians are all appealing to a form of the LTV when you insist creation is a property right.
I actually meant to say “a property theory based on the labor theory of value”. Sorry for the shorthand gibberish. Actually, I don’t hold that view. My view is very libertarian.
Property rights are asserted and defended. They are a human device. Basic property rights, and certainly the right of an author to his original manuscript, derive from the principles of self ownership and the private ownership of the means of production. But if you agree that an author owns his original manuscript, we don’t need to argue about that, right? We can start from that common ground.So, here I am, owning an original manuscript. As such, I have a claim to the economics rights to its use and distribution.
I don’t know what economic rights are, but so far it sounds reasonable.
Economic rights: the right to sell, gift or destroy property that one owns. It is an exclusive right of property ownership, and is a bundle of rights that enable a given right to be alienated from the sum total of rights that comprise private ownership. For example, it would be an exercise of the economic rights of a landlord to grant the right of possession but not the right of sale to a tenant. I can sell my land but retain mineral rights, etc.
And there you are, wanting to acquire a copy if what is “in” the manuscript (say a novel), and you claim the economic right to the use and distribution of that copy.
I don’t follow this.
I am setting up a scenario where I have a manuscript, which I own, and you have money, and want to possess what I’ve written. You think it will be useful to you in some way. You are approaching the deal with the position that if I sell you a copy, you own it outright; you can sell it, gift it, or destroy it. I no longer would have any rights in the copy. That is the starting position of our impending transaction.
These are conflicting claims of rights.
How so?
Again with the shorthand. My claim is that if I sell or give you a copy of my manuscript, I only pass you the right to possess and read a copy. Your claim is that if I sell or give you a copy, there are no restrictions, just like if I sold you a car. No part of that car is mine.
Each must defend their positions.
Must they?
Rights must be asserted and then defended. I would attempt to defend my right to decide the terms of releasing my property to you. You would attempt to defend your right to take it only under conditions of clear title, thus relinquishing any rights I might still claim to have after I transfer a copy to you. We need to take the next step.
What methodology do you recommend for deciding what we should do?
There are two pieces of property if there is a copy. Who owns which
I own them both, the original and the copy. You want the copy. You don’t own anything yet. Play along.
Does someone else own all of the goods you have which are copies or based on a template/pattern? Does Chrysler own [sic] your car, and KitchenAid [sic] your blender, and Samsung [sic] your TV?
No. If I make something with my own means of production, I stand before the market trying to make a deal. I take into consideration everything I know. I know that cars and appliances and TVs are hard to copy. The average consumer isn’t going to try, and even if they did, they would not likely compete on price. That is the situation with the items you mentioned. You need a factory to compete in making copies. That requires capital. You are not likely to invest the required capital just to get one copy. These are the facts surrounding the transactions you describe.
This is not the situation with an intellectual product. Once it is released, every copy is also a factory. This is a rather unique situation. That presents a market problem that is not handled well by the standard rules of property, where the cost of making copies is high (cars) or infinite (land).
Here is the scenario:
I have a manuscript, which I own. You want a copy. I have to decide what I will do, and you have to decide what you will do. That is the nature of the economic calculations that comprise the catallactics of economic trade and pricing theory, and the praxeology of human action.
I am leading you up to a moment where we face each other under these conditions. Do you have any issues with the way I’ve laid it out? Have I violated any ethical principles of property, etc. that you would like to object to? Can we start from here without having to go back and argue anything that has led up to this moment?
Lay out a chain of reasoning here. How does the second party get a copy of the manuscript? That’s the devil in the details.
Well, it is a market problem. I am a property owner. I have produced a product which you demand. From my point of view, I want to internalize the benefits of my production process. You want to pay what it is worth to you. I have produced a manuscript, and for whatever reason, you believe it would be useful to possess it. Let’s negotiate.
What I know is this. If I sell it to you with no strings attached, you will be able to “publish it” freely because of the low marginal cost of making copies. It is analogous to the following: I own a hotel. Each time I rent out a room, I sell an equal share of my hotel to the tenant. Now he can rent out rooms too. After a few weeks, everyone who has stayed in my hotel is renting out rooms in what is my hotel, and I no longer have a valuable economic interest it. I can’t sell it, because it already has 100’s of partners, all renting out rooms. Where is the return for the investment in buying the hotel? How would such an arrangement make it worthwhile to try to own and operate any hotel?
How should I solve this market problem?
This is the scenario I am posing. Do you accept the premises of this example? Do you have a problem going forward, or do you want to argue about something I’ve said so far?
- April 13, 2011 at 9:55 pm
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Wildberry, I will have to keep it short, because you wrote a long essay and I could spend hours picking it apart.
First of all, I only skimmed it looking for relevance.
This
Basic property rights, and certainly the right of an author to his original manuscript, derive from the principles of self ownership and the private ownership of the means of production.
makes absolutely no sense. What are the “principles of self ownership”?
Economic rights: the right to sell, gift or destroy property that one owns.
I have never heard of economic rights. The right to dispose of your property as you choose is just a part of basic property rights. There is no specifically economic rights component to property rights.
I am setting up a scenario where I have a manuscript, which I own, and you have money, and want to possess what I’ve written. You think it will be useful to you in some way. You are approaching the deal with the position that if I sell you a copy, you own it outright; you can sell it, gift it, or destroy it. I no longer would have any rights in the copy. That is the starting position of our impending transaction.
And we either agree on terms or we don’t. Pretty basic exchange theory.
My claim is that if I sell or give you a copy of my manuscript, I only pass you the right to possess and read a copy.
That’s fine, you can stipulate that contractually. It has nothing to do with property rights, and everything to do with conditions of exchange.
Rights must be asserted and then defended.
They do not have to be. They could be. No one is compelled to defend his rights.
I know that cars and appliances and TVs are hard to copy.
You didn’t answer my question. Who owns your car, you or Chrysler? Who owns your TV, you or Samsung? There can only be ONE owner, in order to avoid conflict (a purpose of property rights). Who is that owner?
This is the scenario I am posing. Do you accept the premises of this example? Do you have a problem going forward, or do you want to argue about something I’ve said so far?
Honestly, you lost me. I don’t understand the need to set up some long and arbitrary example to make a point. We can deduce the correct answer by applying sound first principles. What are the principles you are promoting?
Also, this is why I keep petitioning you to debate with me in the community. Forum comment threads are not good for discussion. Your longer comments are almost post worthy on their own, but they get lost in these discussions, which frankly is a disincentive for me to spend a lot of time breaking down and replying to your argument precisely.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:04 am
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@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 9:55 pm
I agree this format is a problem in keeping any form of continuity.
Fundamentally, there is the first principle of property ownership. Personally I think that is settled. No one has an argument that the author doesn’t own his own manuscript.
Do you agree? Yes or no?
If yes, then the issue is an economics of law question from there. That issue is too complex, probably, to have as a side discussion to any one of the many threads Kinsella creates with his posts.
Can you be specific about what you have in mind?
- April 14, 2011 at 11:57 am
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Fundamentally, there is the first principle of property ownership.
I am still unsure what you mean by a first principle of property ownership.
No one has an argument that the author doesn’t own his own manuscript.
I think we do have an argument though. The author owns the manuscript as written on his paper, he doesn’t own the manuscript if he wrote it on my paper. JNS can’t come over to my house, write passages from Alongside Night on my walls or table, and then claim he owns them. Or can he?
You still have not answered my question about the car and the television. Who owns them?
Thanks.
- April 14, 2011 at 12:23 pm
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@DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 11:57 am
I was writing to you when this posted and didn’t see it before.
I said self-ownership, and private means. Your walls are not within JNS’s means. He doesn’t own your walls in any case I can imagine.
Also, you have some kind of misunderstanding about what the “infringement” of IP means. It does not mean I own, or claim to own your property. Either you owe me damages under contract or tort theory, or you are liable criminally. Those are the choices. IP laws are civil laws, except in extreme cases of willful acts.
There is no real theory, despite what is so often repeated here, that me having rights to IP means I own your property. That is a complete fabrication.
- April 14, 2011 at 12:56 pm
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@ DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 11:57 am
Assume that the manuscript is written on my paper. Do I own it?
By the way, if JNS wrote a passage on your wall without your consent, he woud be liable for damages, but you would not “own” what he wrote on your wall if he already owns it.
Two separate issues, right?
- April 14, 2011 at 1:28 pm
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What are means? Do you mean private property or something different?
I haven’t articulated an argument about infringement at all. Did you mean to reply to someone else?
I am trying to methodically work through your rights system for property so I can better understand your argument.
You have still not answered my question about the car or the television, I believe this is the 3rd time I have reminded you. Surely it is a question you can answer very easily, unless you are genuinely unsure of what you do and do now own. Would you please answer me this time?
- April 14, 2011 at 1:33 pm
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Assume that the manuscript is written on my paper. Do I own it?
If you own the paper, you own whatever is written upon it.
By the way, if JNS wrote a passage on your wall without your consent, he woud be liable for damages
What if he wrote on my wall with my consent? Would he own my wall or not?
but you would not “own” what he wrote on your wall if he already owns it.
You’re assuming the conclusion. You claim he owns something, without explaining how he owns it. That’s pretty convenient. If he owned what he writes, then he would own my wall by writing on it. Either that or I would own it because as you claimed, it is my wall, and I can do with it what I want.
Do you see an issue with this? Please be very specific.
Two separate issues, right?
It is the same issue. You assume JNS has some ownership of non-property that conflicts with my ownership of my property. Property rights do not create conflicts. They are applied to resolve and prevent conflicts.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:35 pm
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@DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 1:28 pm
What are means? Do you mean private property or something different?”
Privately owned means of production. Are you not familiar with this term? If I own the iron and furnace, transform those into a sword, I own the sword because I have employed my privately owned means of production. Mises use this term extensively, especially in this writings criticizing socialism, which holds that the state owns the means of production.
I haven’t articulated an argument about infringement at all. Did you mean to reply to someone else?
No, I was talking to you. By infringement, I mean my claim that you have violated my rights in my property. That claim is not a claim on your property, unlike many, including Kinsella claim. It is a claim of liability for harm under a theory of tort law or damages under contract law. In neither case does that liability result in me claiming any kind of ownership in your property. That is a fabricated claim. Such a violation of my rights to my property is simply called an “infringement” in the context of IP.
I am trying to methodically work through your rights system for property so I can better understand your argument.
I am trying to figure out what you don’t understand, so we can agree that the author owns his manuscript and move on.
You have still not answered my question about the car or the television, I believe this is the 3rd time I have reminded you. Surely it is a question you can answer very easily, unless you are genuinely unsure of what you do and do now own. Would you please answer me this time?
I thought I did when I said that if you sell me chattel, like cars, trains and automobiles, or TVs or Appliances, I own them. I also said that when I buy a TV I don’t own the TV factory, just a single TV. It is an easy answer for these types of consumer goods. OK?
- April 14, 2011 at 3:32 pm
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@ DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 1:33 pm
If you own the paper, you own whatever is written upon it.
OK, fine, we agree then. If I own the paper, and I used only what is my property, or something from the public domain (like letters of the alphabet, ideas, grammar rules, air to breath, etc.), and produce a manuscript, I own it. It is my property and no one has a better title to it than me. OK?
What if he wrote on my wall with my consent? Would he own my wall or not?
Of course not. Are you really confused about this or do you think I am?
You’re assuming the conclusion.</blockquote.
I am stating my conclusion. I am saying that IF he already owned what he wrote, and he did not intend to transfer ownership to you by the act of writing on your wall with your consent, then you cannot assume that he transferred it to you. Since he owns it, it is up to him to decide if he wants to give it up, no you.
You claim he owns something, without explaining how he owns it. That’s pretty convenient. If he owned what he writes, then he would own my wall by writing on it. Either that or I would own it because as you claimed, it is my wall, and I can do with it what I want.
It is not that I don’t understand your position. There are two issue here. Let’s separate them.
First, does he own what he writes or do you? There is no escaping the fact that this is a property problem.
If I assume the existence of copyright law at the time of the writing, the answer is clear; you own your wall and what is written on it, but your use of that writing is limited by the terms of use specified by copyright law, which says, that transfer of the copyright itself is not transferred without explicit written evidence of intent to transfer by the owner, very similar to the rules (statute of fraud) for transferring title to land.
If I assume the absence of copyright law, then we cannot assume that he would write it, even with your permission, for if he understood at the time that buy such an act, he would be conveying something of value (to him) without negotiating some exchange from you, he would not do it. A rational person who is aware of this fact would not write on your wall in the first place.
This is the assumption that is often depended upon here to make the anti-IP case for copying; that the copy is available in the absence of copyrights, under the exact same conditions that would exist in the presence of copyright laws. This is a huge assumption because it leads to the wrong conclusion.
If I own a manuscript, and there is no copyright laws, I understand then that as soon as I disclose it, I willable transferring all economic rights to it. Anyone and everyone who has a copy of it would have equal rights to its use without limitations. Under those conditions, I would be very careful how I disclosed it, and you would have to pay dearly to get a copy.
I earlier used the analogy of a hotel to illustrate this. If every time I rented a room, the renter could assume that he bought the hotel, I would be very careful about the contract and my right to enforce it before I rented a room, or even more important, before I invested in owning a hotel in the first place. This is the problem of economic externalities.
The second issue of what happens to your property, after it is written upon.
It is your wall under any assumption. With or without copyrights, unless you transfer your wall to him, it remains yours. The only issue is about what is written.
It is a fabricated claim to insist that the concept of IP is that my rights in IP somehow stakes a claim on your property. This is false. It creates a tort claim, or a contract claim, or both. Nothing in IP law operates as a confiscation of your property.
If you want me to elaborate, tell me your issue with this.
You assume JNS has some ownership of non-property that conflicts with my ownership of my property. Property rights do not create conflicts. They are applied to resolve and prevent conflicts.
To be clear, I do not assume nor do I argue for what you say. Where is the conflict? It is not over your property. You own the wall. If he had tacked a $100 bill to your wall, would he own your wall?
Of course not; if I pee on your tree, that doesn’t prove I own it, right? Because the tree is yours, you have liability rights against people who pee on your tree without your consent.
A property rights problem does arises, however, if you claimed the $100 and he disagreed with your claim. You would have to defend your asserted right to the $100. How would this be resolved? We would look to the intent of the original owner. We start with who owned the$100 before it was tacked to your wall. If the owner intended to give you the $100, then it has been transferred by his act of nailing it to your wall, a constructive transfer. If he did not intend to transfer it, then all you could do is demand that he remove it from your wall.
You could not claim ownership of it simply based on the fact that it is nailed to our wall.
So, the issue comes down to this: Did he own the $100 before he nailed it to your wall?
- April 14, 2011 at 3:33 pm
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Sorry, the editing function here is not working, for some reason, so I couldn’t correct the formatting. If it is too difficult to read, I can repost.
- April 14, 2011 at 12:14 pm
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@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 9:55 pm
Let me try to be brief for once.
We own our selves. What we produce with our own means and with our own personal capabilities, belongs to us. This is pure libertarian principles of private property rights.
Economic rights: see my response to Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:27 am
What we agree to and how we enforce that agreement is precisely the issue.
It has everything to do with property rights. The subject of any contract is the exchange of property. How can I contract for something which I do not own, or have the rights to trade?
If asserted rights are not defended (in the face of a confrontation) they are not rights. Therefore rights must be defensible. However, you are correct, they can be abandoned, perhaps to avoid confrontation. At that point, they cease to be rights, at least for that individual at that time.
If you transfer title to chattel to me, I own it, provided I have paid you for it. What I have paid in exchange for possession is precisely the issue I am raising.
I am promoting the principles of private property and free trade, as they apply to the exchange of intellectual works. I am attempting to see if we can proceed from a basis of agreement without debating how we get there.
That basis is that we agree that the author owns his manuscript. Do you agree?
- April 14, 2011 at 12:26 pm
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I meant:
“If you transfer title to chattel to me, I own it, provided I have paid you for it. What I have received in exchange for what I’ve paid is precisely the issue I am raising.”
- April 14, 2011 at 2:03 am
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Wildberry,
Economic rights: the right to sell, gift or destroy property that one owns.
And you still have that with or without IP. What you don’t have without IP is the ability to sell, gift or destroy other people’s property: the copies.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:05 am
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@Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:03 am
No conclusions assumed in that comment, right?
- April 14, 2011 at 2:29 am
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Wildberry,
of course there is a conclusion: IP contradicts other rights. Making up newspeak such as “economic rights” does not fix it.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:27 am
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Wildberry,
I am leading you up to a moment where we face each other under these conditions.
But that is precisely what IP is not about. IP is about applying restrictions to people you have no contractual relationship with. If you lease (let’s use that term for simplification) someone a book with restrictive permissions, that has nothing to do with IP. That’s just a conditional transfer of title (of the money from the lessee to the lessor).
IP is about restricting the behaviour of third parties who get a hold of the information without either being in contract with the IP owner or altering the property of the IP owner. So, the IP theoreticians need to extend the definition of trespass from “alteration of one’s property” to “being causally affected by one’s property”. That is of course problematic for the same reasons I’ve been repeating for quite some time now, it contradicts other rights and is incoherent.
But who am I talking to.
- April 14, 2011 at 12:58 pm
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Yourself.
- April 13, 2011 at 8:58 pm
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DixieFlatline wrote, “I think you mean the labour theory of value. You and JNS and most IP proponents including Randians are all appealing to a form of the LTV when you insist creation is a property right.”
I’ve noted Wildberry’s answer; let me speak for myself.
The property theory I’ve put forward does not derive from nor depend on “labor theory of value.” At no point in my argumentation have I ever suggested that work creates value.
What human action creates is a new thing — a thing with new and distinct properties that give it a new identity and new properties that can be exploited.
Whether anyone chooses to act with respect to this new thing — to find value in it to be exploited or traded — is a secondary question.
The anti-IP position conflates the two — purposively to confuse the issue, in my opinion.
There is a stark difference between a thing being made and what people choose to do with it after it is made. Just because someone works to make something doesn’t mean anyone else desires it, which is the source of it having value.
But, conversely, if someone else desires it that does act to demonstrate there is some real THING to desire that would not have existed with its creators human action.
Human action — work, if you will — does make a new thing, and that is a proof of existence and utility, not a proof of value.
Subjective value theory is unaffected by this property-rights position.
- April 13, 2011 at 11:46 pm
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What human action creates is a new thing — a thing with new and distinct properties that give it a new identity and new properties that can be exploited.
Every single creation is unique, no two creations or creators are identical. No two moments in time are equal. No two valuations are equal.
As to the rest, I think we agree on STV. But you’re still not explaining how creation has anything to do with property.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:09 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The property theory I’ve put forward does not derive from nor depend on “labor theory of value.”
So why do you then repeatedly refer to it? Such as this:
If you say the logos doesn’t have value, then why does imposing a logos on two dollars worth of computer diskettes make them several-dollars worth of software?
And if a logos has no value as a separate property from that object which it is imposed upon, why would you be upset it you brought home the book you thought was ATLAS SHRUGGED and found that the first sentence was not, “Who is John Galt?”
So you don’t even know what you’re talking about. In addition to that, we don’t claim that the immaterial aspects of things don’t have value.
Also, you say:
If a logos has no value in itself, then removing it from the objects on which it is found should make no difference in the values found in those objects.
Unless you can show how to do this without altering the object’s physical attributes, IP is contradictory (or redundant) with respect to it.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:28 am
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Peter Surda wrote in a clear and understandable question:
“The property theory I’ve put forward does not derive from nor depend on “labor theory of value. So why do you then repeatedly refer to it? Such as this:”
“‘If you say the logos doesn’t have value, then why does imposing a logos on two dollars worth of computer diskettes make them several-dollars worth of software? And if a logos has no value as a separate property from that object which it is imposed upon, why would you be upset it you brought home the book you thought was ATLAS SHRUGGED and found that the first sentence was not, “Who is John Galt?’”
Answered in my reply to DixieFlatline at http://blog.mises.org/16319/the-origins-of-libertarian-ip-abolitionism/comment-page-2/#comment-772292:
There is a stark difference between a thing being made and what people choose to do with it after it is made. Just because someone works to make something doesn’t mean anyone else desires it, which is the source of it having value.
But, conversely, if someone else desires it that does act to demonstrate there is some real THING to desire that would not have existed with its creator’s human action.
“Also, you say:
‘If a logos has no value in itself, then removing it from the objects on which it is found should make no difference in the values found in those objects.’
“Unless you can show how to do this without altering the object’s physical attributes, IP is contradictory (or redundant) with respect to it.”
It can’t be removed without altering any of the object’s physical attributes. It can be removed without altering any of the object’s OTHER physical attributes, therefore creating a difference between the two entities — one with the logos, one without.
The properties and utility of the object of one (with) is now different from the other (without), and humans can make a subjective value judgment based on the difference between one and the other.
- April 14, 2011 at 10:03 am
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JNS,
There is a stark difference between a thing being made and what people choose to do with it after it is made.
I don’t think Peter or I are contesting that. We’re asking you to substantiate the relevance of it.
The properties and utility of the object of one (with) is now different from the other (without), and humans can make a subjective value judgment based on the difference between one and the other.
The properties may be different, but only individual actors can make claims about utility. You can’t make objective claims about utility without rejecting subjective value theory. This is what I have been pointing out.
Human can make a subjective value judgment between two (seemingly) identical cans of coke because as I indicated above, there are no two perfectly identical objects. Any sense of commonality is probably more likely due to the limitation of our senses and ability to perceive, not some fact of material existence. As I have indicated, perfect copies are impossible in our scarce reality.
This sort of thing is why the position of pro-IP folk have to tend towards the labor theory.
IP Abolitionists rightly understand that all action is creation, and all human action is the product of emulation. Emulation is the foundation for creation.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:02 am
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Wildberry,
These are conflicting claims of rights.
Yet you complain when I say that IP and rights in physical goods contradict each other. Who knows what’s going on in your head.
- April 14, 2011 at 10:50 am
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@Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:02 am
Maybe you could learn to ask better questions, or offer something that is conprehensive and contributes to mutual understanding.
- April 14, 2011 at 10:51 am
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That is, “comprehensible”.
How many copies of Atlas Shrugged exist? Millions. How many Atlas Shrugged’s are there? One. Atlas Shrugged is just as scarce a commodity as the day Ayn Rand finished the manuscript. It was one Atlas Shrugged then and one Atlas Shrugged now. Atlas Shrugged is a unique thing. Only the number of carriers of that singular and scarce object varies.
- April 13, 2011 at 5:27 pm
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“How many copies of Atlas Shrugged exist? Millions. How many Atlas Shrugged’s are there? One. Atlas Shrugged is just as scarce a commodity as the day Ayn Rand finished the manuscript.”
That’s a distinction without a difference, Neil. My copy of Atlas is the same as yours, is the same as Rand’s. Atlas is NOT a scarce commodity. Calling it a unique thing as opposed to its “carriers” doesn’t change anything. It always exists on carriers. It’s a carrier mediated thing. We all have it on carriers, therefore we all have the story. The pattern of the words is in the possession of every person owning a copy of the book. Rand didn’t keep parts of it locked away. She released the whole thing that she called Atlas Shrugged, causing it to be published to the world. The “unique thing” is not in any danger of disappearing, and you can’t remove it from the millions of “copies.”
- April 13, 2011 at 7:30 pm
- April 13, 2011 at 8:25 pm
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Atlas Shrugged has no meaning except in the human mind. Each human has a slightly different interpretation and provides a different valuation to any book. There are as many different variations and interpretations created from reading Atlas Shrugged as there are people who have read the book. And it is not as though Atlas Shrugged was created in some box called the human mind by itself. Everyone who has made anything has experienced life, reading the books of others, talking and learning from others…
- April 13, 2011 at 8:49 pm
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Would the solipsists please leave this universe and stick to their own bubble? People are talking to each other in this one.
- April 13, 2011 at 10:31 pm
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I don’t think this is solipsism. I think this is a clue to the root point, with respect to your logorights formulation, that many of your opponents diverge. In your logorights description, you ask:
Are two separately existing Entities,
sharing the exact same Identity, (A) identical in themselves (that
is, metaphysically the same Entity, though observably not the
same Existent, since each exists apart from the other), or (B) not
identical in themselves but identical only to the consciousness
that perceives them.(This is somewhat technical language, easy to misinterpret it unless you’ve read through the definitions up to that point in my opinion.)
Although you (Neil) answer [a], I have a sneaking feeling that Stephan Kinsella would answer [b]. This is the earliest (i.e., most fundamental) point at which I can see a divergence.
In answer to your earlier question: Platonist, Nominalist, or Randian/neo-Aristotelian/Objectivist, my guess that Kinsella’s and Swaringen’s answer would not be the last. Though this is just my speculation, I surmise they’d pick a forth option that would lead to [b], Conceptualist.
April 13, 2011 at 11:18 pm-
@J Neil Schulman:
Your whole theory is flawed because it is not consistent and based on the illusionary fundament of true identity in spacetime: On what grounds do you tell if something is IDENTICAL? What is the basis for that? Physics? Have fun with molecules, particles and quantum physics. Have fun with different content mediums.
Philosophical grounds? Metaphysics? You believe in recognizing the “Ding an sich”? Really? You believe in essences? Really?
What makes a story unique? The words? The content? The form? Some metaphysical essence?
What makes a work derivative? What ISN’T derivative?
What is it that does EXACTLY define your “logorights”? You can’t give an answer to that because there isn’t one.
- April 14, 2011 at 12:58 am
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From The Libertarian Case for Ip at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/
When it comes to questions of identity, the copy IS the original; an entity is an entity: A is A.
One may wish, at this point, to expand the discussion to entities which are similar but not exactly identical, and put forward the position that each copy is a different entity as well as a different existent.
The discussion would then have to continue to take in boundary effects and threshhold limits of which attributes define an entity and which do not, but the principle would remain intact. Such boundary problems and threshhold effects relate to all questions of ownership and property–otherwise shining a flashlight onto someone’s lawn could be considered, on the face of it, photon invasion of that property. Obviously whether damage is or is not done to the lawn has to be asked at some point: this is what I mean by boundary limits and threshhold effects.
It strikes me that the clearest illustration I can give that property rights are dependent on a thing’s identity, not merely on its material existence, is the following question: have I violated your property rights if I pulverize your car, but leave you in possession of every microgram of dust?
Answering no defeats one’s argument by reducing to absurdity.
But if one answers yes, then what one is claiming ownership of was a thing — an entity — and one must claim that by removing the identity of that thing I have violated one’s property rights.
This concedes that property rights are bound to the identity, as well as the mere existence, of a property, and if this is so, then does it not follow that the ownership of that property’s identity is as exclusive to its owner as everything else about it?
Thus, to a propertarian, my logoright case is proved by the Law of Identity alone …
- April 15, 2011 at 6:40 pm
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No one here is going to disagree with “identity” to the extent you mean “form.” Of course anyone recognizes it as a violation of property to sit in your car, slash your tires or blow up your car regardless of whether you still have the pieces.
But by making this argument it occurs to me that you somehow see this destruction as somehow similar to copying.
If someone uses their replication device to beam a copy of my car to their house and I never see them do this or meet them my entire life or hear of this I am none the wiser. There was no aggression, and I have not been injured. I can still eat, go to work/etc. just like before. The car manufacturer was not harmed, he still has just as many cars to sell as he had before. The car designer is still out there designing new cars. But there is now a guy with a car he wouldn’t otherwise have had.
Who should this bother? Why? How can this be compared to destruction? This guy now has a car he didn’t have, and I still have mine. I suppose you may say that he might have had to purchase one instead, but so what? What if he used walked instead of used a car? It’s still a loss of money to the manufacturer either way. And by the logic that we should be trying to keep prices up we should all try to be lazy and unproductive so as to raise the value of things produced. We should dump factories and make things by hand.
- April 15, 2011 at 7:51 pm
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@Matthew Swaringen April 15, 2011 at 6:40 pm
I suppose if we lived in a world where this was actually possible, we would have to figure out how to handle it. Since the problem of getting a new car would be solved as long as there was one to copy from at zero cost, then as JNS pointed out earlier, we would have arrived at the Star Trek stage of manufacturing. All we have to worry about is how to get new car designs. Otherwise, we will be stuck with whatever we have the day such devices are invented and available.
In one respect, if replication of cars like you say is potentially possible at some future time, then that time has arrived in the era of digital publishing. Once you have an original to copy from, you can make a zillion copies for next to nothing.
If you were in the new car design and prototype development business, how would you propose dealing the externality issues associated with the low cost of replication once your new/improved model is released, in a world where low cost “magic” replication of cars is possible?
Replicating cars without a mass production factory is not economically possible today, but if all you did need was the original to copy from, we would be set, as long as we are satisfied with the cars we now have available to copy. And when they get old and rusty and not worth copying, what then? Original replicas are made my hand so we can copy them for free?
In the case of a book, each copy is a factory of mass production. How do you propose new books get written? Take something other than a work of fiction; a history book or an dictionary, or some highly technical manual. We freeze development where we are today and everybody has free access to everything old but nothing new?
- April 13, 2011 at 11:10 pm
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Neil, be honest: Who is to decide WHICH information pattern should be treated as IP (=logoright) and WHICH NOT?
A novel? Yes? A garden design? No? A hairdo? No? A “special move”? No? A gesture? No? A business method? No? Yes? Maybe?
And who is to decide WHICH ACTION regarding an IP (=logoright) is deemed infringement? You? On what ground?
You and all the other IP-proponents have not brought forward ANY KIND of consistent IP theory.
- April 14, 2011 at 1:21 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “Neil, be honest: Who is to decide WHICH information pattern should be treated as IP (=logoright) and WHICH NOT?
A novel? Yes? A garden design? No? A hairdo? No? A “special move”? No? A gesture? No? A business method? No? Yes? Maybe?
“And who is to decide WHICH ACTION regarding an IP (=logoright) is deemed infringement? You? On what ground?
“You and all the other IP-proponents have not brought forward ANY KIND of consistent IP theory.”
There’s two parts to this question. How can you tell what qualifies to be an ownable thing, and who decides?
The second question is simple. In a statist society the state decides; in a libertarian society property rights disputes will be settled either violently — if one party is aggressive and refuses peaceful dispute settlement — or non-violently, if mediation or binding arbitration can be agreed on. I lean toward the General Submission for Arbitration that can be found on the website of the C4SS at http://c4ss.org/gsa/.
The first question is a threshold boundary question. All property rights disputes are subject to threshold and boundary questions, as well as identification procedures. Anticipating this land is surveyed, posted, and property boundaries registered; auto manufacturers print VIN’s on cars before shipping them to dealers; Elvis commemorative plates come with numbered certificates of authenticity.
The specific threshold you’re asking for is part science and part human art. A computer can mathematically compare one file with another to detect whether it’s the same file, or a similar file, or a completely different file. A reader can read a book and make a determination whether it’s the same story and characters as another book, or a different one.
The answers you’re looking for are market decisions, established by agreed-upon standards and precedents in dispute resolution. Free market case law will be not unsimilar to case law in statist civil courts. Arbitors will look to professional and commercial standards to determine what’s a unique property and what is common coin.
You want better than that, ask Rip Van Winkle for a report from the future.
- April 14, 2011 at 3:45 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
there are still fundamental questions which you did not address:
– how does the method of copying influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. looking vs. photographing vs xeroxing)
– how does the intent of the copier influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. educational or comedical purpose)
– how does the type of derivation influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. referencing, paraphrasing, translating, encoding)Mind you, unlike the complexity of the logos, which may be with a bit of leeway expressed in bits and be compared to e.g. distance with regards to rights in physical goods, these are heterogeneous variables with no obvious connection to anything other than imagination. Why should the method, purpose or the amount of a violation determine whether a violation occurred or not? That’s neither libertarian nor principled.
- April 14, 2011 at 11:09 am
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@Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:02 am
You are, inadvertently, describing the operation of economic rights to a thing, i.e property.
If I own a car, I can transfer any of the multitude of economic rights that are bundled in the ownership of the car. I can transfer it to you provided you don’t drive it. I can forbid you from sublease agreements. I can limit the range of your use privilege. I can list only those things you are permitted to do, so that anything not on the list is forbidden.
My ability to do these things derives from my ownership of the car, my property. You will either pay me for what I think they are worth, or we will not make a deal. If you just want to sit in my car for an hour, that is a different price than buying it outright. If you take it, you get punished criminally under principles of property rights. If you simply violate the terms of our agreement, you pay me damages under contract/tort liability rights.
There are a number of things that can be done with a book. I am interested, as the owner, in controlling those uses, because it is in my interest to insure the benefits of having produced a book accrue to me, and not you, unless you pay me what I think they are worth.
Put in economic terms, I am interested in internalizing externalities at a low transaction cost. See Coase, or more modernly, David Friedman.
- April 14, 2011 at 1:10 pm
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Peter Surda asked,
“- how does the method of copying influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. looking vs. photographing vs xeroxing)”
How does looking at a house differ from moving in?
“- how does the intent of the copier influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. educational or comedical purpose)”
That’s a question to be directed to a statist since your question refers to current statist law.
“- how does the type of derivation influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. referencing, paraphrasing, translating, encoding)”
Some uses are below the threshold for damages or deprivation of the fruits of ownership and others aren’t. For example, a cool breeze from your property to mine brings me the pleasant smell of your orange grove. I may breathe in that scent without damaging you. Climbing your fence, grabbing and eating one of the oranges, raises the threshold, but possible not enough to be a violaton. Harvesting your orange crop and selling it at the farmer’s market without your permission is definitely a violation.
J Neil Schulman is the intellectual equivalent of a Hairy Musket.
@J Neil Schulman
You claim your “logoright” theory is based on identity. Let’s discuss a short example:
Under your “logoright” thingy someone could have the “logoright” to a statement, eg “Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla”.
Please answer the following questions as exactly and specifically as possible:
1) How long does a statement (story etc.) have to be to be “logorighted”?
2) When does another statement (story etc.) become an identical entity of your “logorighted” one? Which percentage of the information pattern has to be identical?
What about other languages? What about indirect citations? What about altering the positions of the words? What about paraphrasing? Have the words to be identical? Has the word pattern to be identical?
Why and why not?
3) What actions regarding this “logorighted” statement (story etc.) do you consider an infringement?Another thing: What about patents?
- April 14, 2011 at 1:41 am
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote,
“You claim your “logoright” theory is based on identity. Let’s discuss a short example:
“Under your “logoright” thingy someone could have the “logoright” to a statement, eg “Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla”.
“Please answer the following questions as exactly and specifically as possible:
1) How long does a statement (story etc.) have to be to be “logorighted”?
Long enough to be identifiable as a unique thing.
Alongside Night is around 70,000 words. A short story can be a few thousand words. A poem can be very terse. It doesn’t take a lot of words to be something unique. There used to be a game show called “Name That Tune” in which songs could be identified by playing only a few bars.
How long does it take to identify the name and author of the following poem as something unique?
“Half a league, half a league, half a league onward.”
I just Googled that, hit “I feel lucky,” and came up with the following page: http://www.sparknotes.com/poetry/tennyson/section9.rhtml — which tells me these three words, repeated three times, then a fourth word, is Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade.”
Google’s software algorithm did not require a human brain to give a mathematically precise ID to this piece of MCP.
“2) When does another statement (story etc.) become an identical entity of your “logorighted” one? Which percentage of the information pattern has to be identical?”
Enough to be apparent that one could not exist if the other did not. That’s a judgment to be made in a dispute resolution process.
“What about other languages? What about indirect citations? What about altering the positions of the words? What about paraphrasing? Have the words to be identical? Has the word pattern to be identical? Why and why not?”
There are translation programs that could correlate translations of the same composition. Some of them are pretty bad; others are more accurate.
Again, like all property rights disputes, these can be solved when one party claims infringement and another party denies it. Let the arbiter decide.
3) What actions regarding this “logorighted” statement (story etc.) do you consider an infringement?
Provable damage or deprivation of the fruits of ownership, same as with any other property rights infringement
“Another thing: What about patents?”
I’m not defending statist laws. But the principles are the same for invention of any other type of authorship: the production of something identifiably unique.
- April 14, 2011 at 9:56 am
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“Long enough to be identifiable as a unique thing.”
And what happens when different people disagree on what this length is?
“in which songs could be identified by playing only a few bars.”
Indeed. So this implies that whistling a little bit of a tune you heard is violation of peoples’ “logorights”. That is to say that anyone that ever writes a piece of a melody owns everybody’s vocal chords.
““Half a league, half a league, half a league onward.””
You just violated the author’s copyright and I’m going to turn you in for it.
Also, you are blindly assuming that Google was right. How do you know that someone didn’t use this exact line in poem before this one? How do you know this author did not “steal” that line from another author? Why are you assuming that whoever gets the IP claim of creation actually was the “creator”?
And what you are saying is incredibly absurd. Can I copyright the following poem: “Life sucks”? If you say no because you or Google can’t identify it, I say screw that I know damn well I wrote it and if you guys can’t identify it as my poem that’s your problem. I can identify it! Next time I hear someone say life sucks they’ll see me in court!
“Enough to be apparent that one could not exist if the other did not. That’s a judgment to be made in a dispute resolution process.”
In other words, by taking influence from other creative works, as every creative author must do, you are risking violating the “logorights” of your influences and have no way of determining before-hand whether or not you are breaking the law. This is a huge incentive to not produce any creative works at all. You will only know after you’re sitting in court with a conviction that you did something wrong. Why even bother trying to be creative?
“Again, like all property rights disputes, these can be solved when one party claims infringement and another party denies it. Let the arbiter decide.”
You are confusing the practical problem of enforcing the law with the theoretical problem of determining what the law should be. Of course in a libertarian society it is highly unlikely that any actual justice system will be ideal and conform perfectly to justifiable behavior, but that has no impact on what is justifiable behavior and what is not. Regardless of the imperfections of a market-based justice system, a justice system that rewards murder or recognizes IP or “logorights” is a flawed justice system. That is the issue here.
“Provable damage or deprivation of the fruits of ownership, same as with any other property rights infringement”
Deprivation of the “fruits of ownership”!? And now we have illegalized competition. After all, the “fruits of ownership” of a productive firm will be diminished as a result of other competitors. But it doesn’t stop there. The actual market price of your property will go down if your neighbor keeps a cluttered, unkempt yard and so by this reasoning your neighbor has violated your property rights and owes you compensation.
“I’m not defending statist laws. But the principles are the same for invention of any other type of authorship: the production of something identifiably unique.”
And the problem you fail to see is that “uniquely identifiable” defeats your whole case. Different copies of even the exact same story are uniquely identifiable and so your ownership of one would not imply the ownership of the other. Different copies of the same story are still different identifiable objects. If identity is the basis, then any form of IP, including “logorights”, is immediately compromised because they all involve an extrapolation of ownership from one identifiable object to a whole category of them.
This whole post glossed over the critical point being raised. Can I copyright an 8-note melody? Why or why not? What about 7, or 6 notes? What about a single note? What about the very use of the 12-note chromatic scale in a rhythmically steady fashion? When did I copy a song? By copying every note? What about just the chord progression? What if I just borrowed from the chorus?
Your answer to all of these, as is always the answer provided by IP supporters, is “there are answers”. If there are, then tell me the number right now. 7 notes or 8 notes? Which one is it? If you can’t decide before-hand, then your theory is not an objective well-defined system of property rights but the defense of a dictatorial setting where some judge’s opinion becomes what is justifiable and what is not, and no one is capable of even beginning to guess what his decisions will be before they happen. Such a society would be a disaster of perpetual conflict and consume itself in no time.
- April 14, 2011 at 11:56 am
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@sweatervest April 14, 2011 at 9:56 am
I just want to focus on one thing you said:
In other words, by taking influence from other creative works, as every creative author must do, you are risking violating the “logorights” of your influences and have no way of determining before-hand whether or not you are breaking the law. This is a huge incentive to not produce any creative works at all. You will only know after you’re sitting in court with a conviction that you did something wrong. Why even bother trying to be creative?
If this were true, many of the normal activities of humans would have to cease. But they have not ceased, and we have IP laws. Why is this?
Humans have a very well-developed ability to detect patterns. Popular songs can be recognized with as few as three notes. Google can recognize a pattern that associates a few words to an entire work.
Rules of law (pardon my use of something that exists) can be divided into “bright line” rules and rules which are highly dependent on the specific facts. I have explained this previously by using homicide, which is a bright line rule, and self-defense, which is a finding that can only be reached if we know much more than whether there was a “killing of a human by another human”.
If I wrote as the first line of my book “It was the best of times, and the worst of times”, would you recognized it? If Dickens brought infringement suit against my use, and that was the only similarity between his work and mine, who would win?
Regardless of whether we actually went to court over this, I, in writing my book, know whether I made this up out of thin air, or whether I simply copied it from Dickens. If he could prove I had access, (which would be trivial) then it would be incredible for me to claim that I came up with it on my own. If I used the words,
“…it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair; we had everything before us, we had nothing before us; we were all going directly to Heaven, we were all going the other way.”, would you still know it was Dickens?
Is it credible for me to claim that I came up with this exact pattern of expression completely independently of Dickens? Maybe, but it is unlikely.
Although I think you may have earlier stated that you don’t care what the law says, I just want to make it clear to you that if you did care enough to read a summary of how the copyright laws operate around this issue, you would find that it has a coherent system for resolving this issue, and that in all but the most fantastic situations, it is entirely consistent with the intuition you already have.As a result, just knowing that if I actually infringe on someone’s copyrights I will suffer some negative consequence, I will strive to avoid it. I will not copy a clearly recognizable phrase. I don’t need to. I can say, “These were the best times of our lives, but also the worst.” That would make it less likely to be infringing, yet still expresses the meaning I intend.
As an added bonus, I suspect that the work of Dickens is by now in the public domain. By the time something gets that popular, it is no longer copyrighted. Why wouldn’t I copy it then? Because most readers would recognize that I was simply taking Dickens’s words and claiming them as my own. I would lose credibility as a creative artist. So I would try to be original. That originality is part of the standard for works protected by copyrights.
In summary, you are acting like it is a total and complete minefield, when in fact it is all rather easily navigated. If in fact you start from scratch and write a novel, and avoid copying directly those things that you know were made popular by others, you will avoid almost all potential problems. If it ain’t broke, why fix it?
- April 14, 2011 at 2:47 pm
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“If this were true, many of the normal activities of humans would have to cease. But they have not ceased, and we have IP laws. Why is this?”
Because the state, despite all of its efforts and claims, can’t be everywhere all the time.
I fail to understand how you disagree that any creative process draws from the creations you have seen in the past. No matter how original you think you are being, you are drawing influence from the things you have experienced already.
“Humans have a very well-developed ability to detect patterns. Popular songs can be recognized with as few as three notes. Google can recognize a pattern that associates a few words to an entire work.”
This has nothing to do with what I said. You are still implying that if you want to safely make music without potentially being a criminal, you need to listen to every copyrighted melody ever made and memorize them all before starting.
“Rules of law (pardon my use of something that exists)”
I’m sorry, I thought we were debating what should be, not what is. Thank you for reminding me that statutory laws exist. I’m an anarchist so you should probably also remind me that states exist. Also, since I care about ethics, you should just point out that crime exists.
“can be divided into “bright line” rules and rules which are highly dependent on the specific facts. I have explained this previously by using homicide, which is a bright line rule, and self-defense, which is a finding that can only be reached if we know much more than whether there was a “killing of a human by another human”.”
That doesn’t change the fact that self-defense is a precisely defined concept. It may be difficult or impossible to determine in a specific case whether or not an act of violence actually was self-defense, but in order for the question, “Was this self-defense” to even be meaningful there must exist a sharp conceptual division between what is self-defense and what is not. If there is no sharp line then the question, “Was this self-defense” has no well-defined answer and putting together facts to try and answer it is a waste of time. That such a process is not a waste of time is tantamount to the fact that self-defense is a well-defined concept.
The whole purpose of theories of ethics (including property rights) is to work out the conceptual problems. If you haven’t worked out the sharply defined conceptual problems you will hopelessly lost in trying to solve real-world cases. It’s like trying to solve a physics problem before you even know how to solve algebraic equations.
“If I wrote as the first line of my book “It was the best of times, and the worst of times”, would you recognized it? If Dickens brought infringement suit against my use, and that was the only similarity between his work and mine, who would win?”
As an IP proponent it is your job to answer that question! That you are asking me only convinces me further that IP is a vacuous theory. My whole point is that if the theorists cannot answer all those questions then their theory is empty. It is a non-sequitur to jump from this to pointing out that real world cases about physical property have details that need to be worked out on a per-case basis. Physical property theory always gives answers to those questions, even if determining the answer involves collecting facts that would be impractical or impossible to collect. At least it gives an answer! IP theories do not give answers to any questions regarding the division between legitimate IP claims and illegitimate IP claims (i.e. 7 notes or 8 notes).
“Although I think you may have earlier stated that you don’t care what the law says, I just want to make it clear to you that if you did care enough to read a summary of how the copyright laws operate around this issue, you would find that it has a coherent system for resolving this issue, and that in all but the most fantastic situations, it is entirely consistent with the intuition you already have.”
It absolutely is not. Under the current copyright law a person can copyright an 8-note melody, and that is not at all in line with my intuition. It is patently absurd to me on every level that there would be property rights in any amount of music. No, every single court case over IP has been utterly absurd to me. I know why you are saying this. It’s because you think I care that the law is “coherent” and claim it is not.
I don’t care if a law is “coherent” and it is absurd to think I should. A law that says everyone has to drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday is perfectly coherent and answers all the questions regarding whether a person is guilty of breaking it or not. Are you suggesting that is sufficient to justify this law?
Yes, you can draw arbitrary lines in the sand. It doesn’t change the fact that they are arbitrary and it is thus tyrannical to exercise violence based on where you draw those lines.
I think you still conceive of ethics as a “Let’s get together and agree on how society will work” sort of situation. As I have pointed out before, this is nonsense because if everyone came to agreement there would be no conflicts and no need for any sort of ethic. Ethics is not about people making agreements on how to do things. It is about determining how to act when there is *disagreement*.
Suggesting that agreement yields justifiability is a more sophisticated way of saying “might is right”, which is no more and no less than a flat rejection of any ethics.
“As a result, just knowing that if I actually infringe on someone’s copyrights I will suffer some negative consequence, I will strive to avoid it. I will not copy a clearly recognizable phrase. I don’t need to. I can say, “These were the best times of our lives, but also the worst.” That would make it less likely to be infringing, yet still expresses the meaning I intend.”
This has nothing to do with “intention”, and I think you miss my point. My point is not that a person may “accidentally” copy a melody. My point is that whenever a person writes a melody he thinks about the melodies he has heard other people write and no matter how hard he tries, no matter what his intention is, he is making use of those structures he has heard. I do it all the time. I discovered from listening to other music that I love certain chord progressions, and melodic elements, and I use them all the time. I use them because I heard them in other pieces and want to try using them myself. Is that breaking the law or not? It has nothing to do with intention.
A lame musician may simply recreate a song because he has no inspiration and can’t come up with anything original. Is he guilty of breaking copyright? Shall we punish him for not being creative enough?
Keep in mind you said “less likely to be infringing”, not “not infringing”. You’re still not sure, there is still a chance you are infringing, so why bother? Why not spend your time doing something that won’t potentially land you in court?
“As an added bonus, I suspect that the work of Dickens is by now in the public domain. By the time something gets that popular, it is no longer copyrighted. Why wouldn’t I copy it then? Because most readers would recognize that I was simply taking Dickens’s words and claiming them as my own. I would lose credibility as a creative artist. So I would try to be original. That originality is part of the standard for works protected by copyrights.”
Why yes! It’s almost as though there is no need for copyrights and suggesting that something bad would happen if they weren’t around is silly! After all, people don’t need a gun pointed at their heads to not want to recreate other peoples’ work. Of course copyright extends far beyond that, to those who just want to listen and not tweak. Unfortunately, there is no way to isolate the latter cases from the former in a non-arbitrary way. By making it illegal to listen to music in some ways, you cannot help but make it illegal to write music in some ways.
“In summary, you are acting like it is a total and complete minefield, when in fact it is all rather easily navigated.”
You seem to think that just because you can navigate it means it’s okay. Yes, and you could navigate my “drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday” with far less effort that this! It doesn’t change the fact that I pulled “5″, “Everclear” and “Sunday” out of my ass and there is no logical explanation for the choice. The same goes for how many notes make a copyrightable melody or whatever limits are placed on what can be patented. Citing an example (statutory law) of arbitrary lines drawn in the sand doesn’t conflict with this, it only reassures me that one is in fact capable of drawing arbitrary lines.
“If in fact you start from scratch and write a novel, and avoid copying directly those things that you know were made popular by others, you will avoid almost all potential problems.”
Assuming of course that everyone everywhere is completely reasonable and no creative author would dare attempt to abuse his legal privileges to extort helpless up-and-coming creative people out of money! Also, you used a vague term: “directly”. We come full circle back to the concepts being inherently vague and thus failing to establish concretely who is guilty and when. Also, “made popular” is far more vague. How many people have to care, and how much, before something is “popular”?
If I did this with music I would discard potential ideas to use until I’m left with nothing and congrats, no music for anybody.
“If it ain’t broke, why fix it?”
Indeed. Physical property rights deals with all these issues just fine. Confounding the issue with suspicious, vague claims to property that were clearly not homesteaded or traded towards the claimant, seems at best pointless and at worst dangerous. IP will not lead to more creative authorship or technological innovation but less. IP clearly does not lead to more peace but causes huge international problems in which people in Sweden are supposedly bound by laws passed in the United States (I am citing a real world example, but what possible formulation of IP could avoid that issue?) and plenty of college students have been slapped with fines so huge they’ll never make a solid living. Issues inherent to enforcing IP have obviously led to far more problems than they could ever solve, assuming there are any “problem” to be solved at all.
Physical property rights provide plenty of avenues, in fact more than any alternative including IP rights, to make a living from being creative or innovative, and protect authors’ rights to refrain from publishing. If it ain’t broke, why fix it?
- April 14, 2011 at 4:55 pm
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@sweatervest April 14, 2011 at 2:47 pm
Because the state, despite all of its efforts and claims, can’t be everywhere all the time.
I suppose “Big brother is not quite big enough”, is one possible explanation. However I think you overlook that fact that the state is not a party to a dispute. Infringement is a cause of action brought by the rights holder, not by the state. The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal. Therefore, you explanation is not reasonable. The state has no motive; damages go to the plaintiff, not the state.
I fail to understand how you disagree that any creative process draws from the creations you have seen in the past. No matter how original you think you are being, you are drawing influence from the things you have experienced already.
You fail to understand it because I have not said otherwise. Of course you are correct. It is merely the act of copying that is prohibited. That leaves a wide swath of human knowledge, information and experience that is fair game.
This has nothing to do with what I said. You are still implying that if you want to safely make music without potentially being a criminal, you need to listen to every copyrighted melody ever made and memorize them all before starting.
I said no such thing. If you are a musician, and you compose a song that starts with the first five bars of “Love me Tender”, do you think, as a composer, you will not notice, or that no one else will.
It is true that there are rare cases where a famous musician is sued by an obscure artist over the similarity between tunes or lyrics. In these cases, it is the burden of the plaintiff to prove the elements of infringement. The more obscure, the more difficult to prove access. It is not really much of a real problem, in reality. However if you are a musician, you have to decide whether listening to music from other composers is a help or a hindrance as far as originality goes. It is inescapable that if your song is similar to another that you have heard, you will notice.
I’m sorry, I thought we were debating what should be, not what is. Thank you for reminding me that statutory laws exist. I’m an anarchist so you should probably also remind me that states exist. Also, since I care about ethics, you should just point out that crime exists.
I fail to understand your sensitivity to this. If we were trying to establish the meaning or usage of a word, would you object to referencing a dictionary? Ignoring the dictionary, the law, or the state does not make them disappear, and I don’t expect that I have write my own dictionary to talk to you. Lighten up.
That doesn’t change the fact that self-defense is a precisely defined concept. It may be difficult or impossible to determine in a specific case whether or not an act of violence actually was self-defense, but in order for the question, “Was this self-defense” to even be meaningful there must exist a sharp conceptual division between what is self-defense and what is not. If there is no sharp line then the question, “Was this self-defense” has no well-defined answer and putting together facts to try and answer it is a waste of time. That such a process is not a waste of time is tantamount to the fact that self-defense is a well-defined concept.
I think all you did here is demonstrate my point; the general rule is easy to understand, but not so easy to apply given the vast range of possible facts. Therefore, it is also a “fuzzy” rule.
The whole purpose of theories of ethics (including property rights) is to work out the conceptual problems. If you haven’t worked out the sharply defined conceptual problems you will hopelessly lost in trying to solve real-world cases. It’s like trying to solve a physics problem before you even know how to solve algebraic equations.
On the other hand, you cannot solve complex orbital problems with simple algebra, especially on the scale of interstellar space. In my view, there is too much emphasis here on the alchemy of the origin of property rights. It is equally legitimate to acknowledge that they exist, that they operate according to certain rules, and there are different scales and scopes of analysis. At some point, this becomes a philosophical rat hole that goes on forever. Isn’t the longevity of these blogs reasonable evidence of that? Are we really all that stupid that we just can’t see the truth? Or is this a philosophical question that has no definitive proof that can be universally held? I think the latter. All I’m interested in, frankly, is to get a consensus that an author owns his own manuscript, and we can move on from there. It ultimately doesn’t matter how you reach that conclusion as long as we can accept that premise as a first principle.
“If I wrote as the first line of my book “It was the best of times, and the worst of times”, would you recognized it? If Dickens brought infringement suit against my use, and that was the only similarity between his work and mine, who would win?”
As an IP proponent it is your job to answer that question!
With all due respect, the answer is already crystal clear. It is only because you object to my answer, and reject anything that is not re-written here in this blog, that the debate rages on. It is not the case that there is no answer, it is that you don’t like the answer, and object when I try to explain by pointing to what already exists for resolving this question. You are saying in effect, “explain algebra to me, but don’t use numbers.”; kinda difficult.
That you are asking me only convinces me further that IP is a vacuous theory.
Do you really not get that it was a rhetorical question? I am not asking you to tell me the answer! I am asking you to think about what is involved in answering the question.
My whole point is that if the theorists cannot answer all those questions then their theory is empty. It is a non-sequitur to jump from this to pointing out that real world cases about physical property have details that need to be worked out on a per-case basis. Physical property theory always gives answers to those questions, even if determining the answer involves collecting facts that would be impractical or impossible to collect. At least it gives an answer! IP theories do not give answers to any questions regarding the division between legitimate IP claims and illegitimate IP claims (i.e. 7 notes or 8 notes).
If this was the case, we would not longer need criminal trials. We would just have an accusation, look up the rule, and pass out sentence. Property theory does not give precise answers. It gives general rules and assigns rights according to those rules, against which facts can be interpreted. Live is not software code, unless you are in the Matrix!
It absolutely is not. Under the current copyright law a person can copyright an 8-note melody, and that is not at all in line with my intuition.
Do you know this for a fact? I think you might be wrong. Now what?
It is patently absurd to me on every level that there would be property rights in any amount of music. No, every single court case over IP has been utterly absurd to me. I know why you are saying this. It’s because you think I care that the law is “coherent” and claim it is not.
Whatever. What am I supposed to do with this?
I don’t care if a law is “coherent” and it is absurd to think I should. A law that says everyone has to drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday is perfectly coherent and answers all the questions regarding whether a person is guilty of breaking it or not. Are you suggesting that is sufficient to justify this law?
Yes, you can draw arbitrary lines in the sand. It doesn’t change the fact that they are arbitrary and it is thus tyrannical to exercise violence based on where you draw those lines.
This is hysterical. It sounds like you need to back off the 5 Hour!
I think you still conceive of ethics as a “Let’s get together and agree on how society will work” sort of situation. As I have pointed out before, this is nonsense because if everyone came to agreement there would be no conflicts and no need for any sort of ethic. Ethics is not about people making agreements on how to do things. It is about determining how to act when there is *disagreement*.
Agreements define disagreement. If it is not one of the other, it hasn’t come up yet.
Suggesting that agreement yields justifiability is a more sophisticated way of saying “might is right”, which is no more and no less than a flat rejection of any ethics.
You are certainly covering a lot of territory. “Might makes right” is the first line of defense of an asserted right. It comes with a high transaction cost. Ethics is an agreement to act morally according to certain ethical principles. That lowers the transaction costs.
This has nothing to do with “intention”, and I think you miss my point. My point is not that a person may “accidentally” copy a melody. My point is that whenever a person writes a melody he thinks about the melodies he has heard other people write and no matter how hard he tries, no matter what his intention is, he is making use of those structures he has heard. I do it all the time. I discovered from listening to other music that I love certain chord progressions, and melodic elements, and I use them all the time. I use them because I heard them in other pieces and want to try using them myself. Is that breaking the law or not? It has nothing to do with intention.
You say all of this as if it is the objective of copyrights law to stifle the creation of music. Yet we have copyright laws and we have lots of music. Is it just that ineffective? If so, why are you so adamantly against it? Have you been sued? Are you being sniffled or victimized?
A lame musician may simply recreate a song because he has no inspiration and can’t come up with anything original. Is he guilty of breaking copyright? Shall we punish him for not being creative enough?
The world is filled with cover-bands. I have never seen the Gestapo at a dive bar with a live band. What’s up?
Keep in mind you said “less likely to be infringing”, not “not infringing”. You’re still not sure, there is still a chance you are infringing, so why bother? Why not spend your time doing something that won’t potentially land you in court?
If you are really concerned about being hit by a bus, you can stay in your house. Otherwise, it might be a reasonable risk to live a little. You act like you don’t have any musical room to move (credit to John Mayall).
After all, people don’t need a gun pointed at their heads to not want to recreate other peoples’ work.
Unfortunately, some people do. If men were angles, etc. If you are not one, then what are you worried about?
Of course copyright extends far beyond that, to those who just want to listen and not tweak. Unfortunately, there is no way to isolate the latter cases from the former in a non-arbitrary way. By making it illegal to listen to music in some ways, you cannot help but make it illegal to write music in some ways.
Hyperbole.
You seem to think that just because you can navigate it means it’s okay. Yes, and you could navigate my “drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday” with far less effort that this! It doesn’t change the fact that I pulled “5″, “Everclear” and “Sunday” out of my ass and there is no logical explanation for the choice. The same goes for how many notes make a copyrightable melody or whatever limits are placed on what can be patented. Citing an example (statutory law) of arbitrary lines drawn in the sand doesn’t conflict with this, it only reassures me that one is in fact capable of drawing arbitrary lines.
“Arbitrary” has such a bad rep! Remember my earlier comment about bright lines? Well the “fuzzy’ thing is somewhat arbitrary, meaning exactly where you draw the line is not mathematically precise. It is “arbitrary, not as in “no rhyme nor reason; random” but “we have to draw it somewhere, at some point in the infinite boundary conditions of uncertainty”.
Assuming of course that everyone everywhere is completely reasonable and no creative author would dare attempt to abuse his legal privileges to extort helpless up-and-coming creative people out of money!
Well, isn’t this why we have laws, (and PDA’s in your utopian vision)?
Also, you used a vague term: “directly”. We come full circle back to the concepts being inherently vague and thus failing to establish concretely who is guilty and when. Also, “made popular” is far more vague. How many people have to care, and how much, before something is “popular”?
Like so many who write here, you say these things as if we all are a bunch of idiots who can’t tell our ass from a hole in the ground. How about assuming intelligence instead of stupidity, and apply a little common sense, and ask if what I said could possibly be said and understood by a reasonable person? Life is not precise, but we generally have an idea where we are when we wake up in the morning. That is about all that is required to overcome your hyperbolic objection.
If I did this with music I would discard potential ideas to use until I’m left with nothing and congrats, no music for anybody.
This may be a problem for you, but I seem to have heard that the music industry is worth billions per year. How in the heck could that happen, given the oppressive land of copyrights and State coercion and terror tactics?
Indeed. Physical property rights deals with all these issues just fine.
I’m always fascinated when I hear people describe their fantasies as if they were a part of the real world. Last time I checked we live in a world that includes copyrights (yep, just checked again, and sure enough!) How the hell do you know with such certainly that your theories of “physical property rights deals with these issues just fine”? You have a theory, an untested theory. You haven’t even graduated to the real issues of how property and liability rights operate, and the difficulty of externalities that have to be addressed under your theory of “physical property rights”. How is it that you feel justified in speaking with such authority?
IP will not lead to more creative authorship or technological innovation but less.
You make it sound like we live in a world without it, and you are responding to the threat of bringing it about! Don’t you have things backwards?
- April 14, 2011 at 5:40 pm
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> The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal. Therefore, you explanation is not reasonable. The state has no motive; damages go to the plaintiff, not the state.
Haha. You keep telling yourself that. It’s pretty obvious that this is not the case and the state has a distinct and obvious motivation in IP law. Oh and there is absolutely criminal levels of copyright violation. For a guy who goes on and on about defending copyrights and IP law you sure have a lousy understanding of it.
Copyright infringement is a crime if the defendant acted willfully and
e i the r ( 1 ) for comme rc ia l advantage or private financial gain, ( 2 ) by reproducing or distributing infringing copies of works with a total retail
value of over $1,000 over a 180-day period, or (3) by distributing a “work
being prepared for commercial distribution” by making it available on a
publicly-accessible computer network. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). Copyright
infringement is a felony only if the infringement involved reproduction or
distribution of at least 10 copies of copyrighted works worth more than
$2,500 in a 180-day period, or involved distribution of a “work being
prepared for commercial distribution” over a publicly-accessible computer
network. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2319.Sharing a music file over the internet is a criminal act. The IP fascists still haven’t gotten around criminalizing patent violations, but there are certainly big advocates of IP working on it.
Of course you are correct. It is merely the act of copying that is prohibited.
Except, of course, your wrong. Much of IP law focuses on actions that have nothing to do with copying. There are plenty of ways to run foul of patents without any copying occurring _at_all_. It _happens_constantly_. Case after case after case. Lawsuits after lawsuits after lawsuits successfully prosecuted that have not one wit of anything to do with copying.
In my view, there is too much emphasis here on the alchemy of the origin of property rights.
Were this comes from is the plain obvious fact that IP law has no real relation to property rights. Dejure property rights is a extension of defacto property rights that are universal in nature and occur spontaneously in any human society. Property rights not only exist because they are desirable, they exist because they are required. What can be debated is the specific applications and nature of property rights.
There is no such thing that happens with anything related to IP Law. There is no such thing as ‘owning a idea’ or ‘owning a concept’. It’s physically impossible.
The ONLY reasonable defense for IP law is based on a argument of expediency. That human society is wealthier, better off, with IP law then without it. That supporting IP law will invariably end up with the ‘Greatest Good for the Greatest Number’ type thing. Yet this is something that so-called Pro-IP libertarians seem to steadfastly refuse to debate about. Because, you know, something like that requires actual evidence and careful consideration.
Going the intellectually lazy route and continue to equate IP law with property rights.. then get all hand-wavy, diversionary, and pseudo-spiritual is all that IP fascists have a seem to have when their logical fallacies are challenged.
- April 14, 2011 at 6:31 pm
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“However I think you overlook that fact that the state is not a party to a dispute. Infringement is a cause of action brought by the rights holder, not by the state. The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal. Therefore, you explanation is not reasonable. The state has no motive; damages go to the plaintiff, not the state.”
Okay I think I see what you are saying here, but if I do it only suggests to me that most people don’t take IP claims that seriously. I still think the error you make you and other places in this post is in assuming that “IP discourages innovation” is incompatible with “IP and innovation coexist”. These are not incompatible. All the first statement means is that in the absence of IP, *with all other things constant*, there would be more innovation than there is now with IP.
So I don’t think any observation of the existence of IP and the creative process contradicts the charge that IP interferes with the creative process. What matters is I have yet to hear or come up with a theory of IP that does not make all of these things people always do illegal according to it. That is more or less my point in bringing it up. I intend to demonstrate that if IP were to be upheld perfectly it would result in a dystopia of no innovation or creation.
This is distinct from physical property rights. They are not, and never will be, perfectly upheld, but if they were it would lead to a utopia (to be clear, I am not a utilitarian and admit that “utopia” must be subjective. A person who wants nothing other than to violate others would consider this to be a dystopia. But either way, it would be wealthy and full of innovation and creation). Of course such a scenario is either impossible or highly unlikely, but this is how these things are approached. Every physics problem ever done is an impossible idealization of reality. And yet physics gave us modern technology.
“You fail to understand it because I have not said otherwise. Of course you are correct. It is merely the act of copying that is prohibited. That leaves a wide swath of human knowledge, information and experience that is fair game.”
Okay I did misunderstand, but I think you also misunderstand me! What I am arguing here is that the “wide swath” of which you speak is synthesized by referencing the part of knowledge/information/experience that is already expressed. Sure, physically speaking, all the patterns already exist. Everything Shakespeare wrote existed at least conceptually before he actually put it all together, but what he wrote was guided by what had already been written. So I say if you actually close yourself off to already existing creative works you remove the only way to actually synthesize any of the rest of the patterns/experiences that are already out there but not yet expressed.
What I am arguing is that if you could have access to all the relevant details, you would find that every single “great” or even “popular” creative work has at least one quote from an earlier piece that the author previously experienced. That may sound crazy, but maybe some of the greatest lines of poetry were uttered by unknown people and overheard by their “authors” as they walked down the street. But I don’t see this as problematic. Authorship is, as far as I can tell, taking pieces of other works and finding new and interesting ways to put those elements together.
I’ll admit while this is technically a problem IP would have to face, there is no need to get so far off the central points, which are about copying other peoples’ recordings and even selling them. There’s plenty of juicy controversy over that (i.e. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with it).
“I fail to understand your sensitivity to this. If we were trying to establish the meaning or usage of a word, would you object to referencing a dictionary? Ignoring the dictionary, the law, or the state does not make them disappear, and I don’t expect that I have write my own dictionary to talk to you. Lighten up.”
Haha I didn’t get mad I was just being sarcastic because, to be honest, I think it’s a silly thing to bring up. Obviously if statutory law played at all into how I am thinking about this I would reach the same conclusion you do. It reminded of the many times non-libertarians have “reminded” me that states have existed constantly throughout western history as I try to explain why they *shouldn’t* exist.
“I think all you did here is demonstrate my point; the general rule is easy to understand, but not so easy to apply given the vast range of possible facts. Therefore, it is also a “fuzzy” rule.”
But with IP even the general rule can’t be understood! That is what I am trying to say.
“On the other hand, you cannot solve complex orbital problems with simple algebra, especially on the scale of interstellar space.”
Yes, you have to solve them with more complicated algebra or differential equations. Every physics problem involves modeling a real system as an ideal abstraction that can be described precisely with mathematical equations. I think you are getting too caught up on the modeling step. You always lose accuracy in this step, and what you end up studying is not exactly what you are trying to know more about. But you can’t know anything unless you study the idealization. The only way to gain any sort of solution, accurate or not, is to model complex orbital systems in interstellar space. For one, we certainly don’t know all the subtle variations in radius and reflectivity on different parts of the surfaces of planets. They are treated as point particles. An absurd assumption, right!? Sure, but accounting for the details can only change the answer so much, so we narrow the solution down to something that tells us more than enough to accurately predict telescope observations.
“In my view, there is too much emphasis here on the alchemy of the origin of property rights.”
Well, to me this is like saying solving physics problems relies too much on the “alchemy” of Newton’s Laws of Motion. They are pretty mysterious right? Especially if you take them for granted and don’t try to understand where they come from. But if you don’t have Newton’s Laws, you have nothing. You can throw out physics claims left and right like “heavier objects fall faster” which is almost always true (because of air friction) but you won’t gain any insight into understanding reality, and you will never predict things before you see them. To do that, you need the “alchemy” of Newton’s Laws.
The “alchemy” is the basis of the theory. Of course I don’t think it is alchemy. I think you should focus your critique on what you think is the alchemy. We’re getting too distracted by this stuff about Platonic forms.
“Are we really all that stupid that we just can’t see the truth? Or is this a philosophical question that has no definitive proof that can be universally held? I think the latter.”
We are going down a rat hole here! Because what I would say in response is that what you are putting forth is a “definitive proof” that an answer to this particular question has no definitive proof. So it must not be that you are adverse to definitive proofs (if you were you couldn’t argue anything!) It must just be that you think this particular thing has no definitive proof. But if you are to convince me, you must show me your definitive proof of this claim!
“All I’m interested in, frankly, is to get a consensus that an author owns his own manuscript, and we can move on from there. It ultimately doesn’t matter how you reach that conclusion as long as we can accept that premise as a first principle.”
This may surprise you but I think we are all in agreement about this! The author owns his manuscript. I agree with that. He decides what to do with it. If he wants to not publish it, someone would have to violate his *physical* property rights to get his hands on it, for copying or anything else. If he does want to publish it, he can have the publisher sign a contract to only make copies on the author’s consent. Then the publisher can require everyone who buys the book to sign a contract first saying they won’t copy it (EULAs are not valid contracts, but this is just a problem with how things are done now). This is all in line with physical property rights.
But what if someone violates the contract? Then a copy gets out that people can acquire without entering contracts. The original copier is guilty of breaching copyright and can be punished for this, but none of the people who copy the first illegal copy are guilty of anything. The work is now in the public domain and the author has no legal avenue to compel people to buy his work from the publisher and not obtain an unlicensed copy.
Furthermore, what if someone comes over to my house, I bought a copy of the book, and while I’m in the kitchen he photocopies every page? Now, technically, he trespassed on my property by doing that without my permission, but if he doesn’t damage the physical book I can’t really hold him for any restitution. Then he goes out and shares this copy and people start copying it. Then the copy got out and there were no contract violations (unless the contract said you violate it even if you accidentally leave it out somewhere to be copied).
So I think we are in agreement until someone breaks the contract or accidentally allows someone to copy the book.
“With all due respect, the answer is already crystal clear. It is only because you object to my answer, and reject anything that is not re-written here in this blog, that the debate rages on. It is not the case that there is no answer, it is that you don’t like the answer, and object when I try to explain by pointing to what already exists for resolving this question. You are saying in effect, “explain algebra to me, but don’t use numbers.”; kinda difficult.”
No, it’s like asking you to explain algebra to me instead of just presenting its results and expecting me to just believe they are logical results. Explaining algebra is quite a task. It would involve a head-first dive into axiomatic set theory. Presenting its results to be memorized is quite easy. Sure you know how to add, subtract, multiple and divide but do you know why it works?
You keep wanting me to look up copyright laws, and I already have. They didn’t give me the information I have requested. I think you are mistaken on what information I am looking for, and I think you misunderstand the nature of my objection to drawing arbitrary lines in the sand.
“If this was the case, we would not longer need criminal trials. We would just have an accusation, look up the rule, and pass out sentence. Property theory does not give precise answers. It gives general rules and assigns rights according to those rules, against which facts can be interpreted. Live is not software code, unless you are in the Matrix!”
I never said we will ever have a perfectly sound and irrefutable property rights theory. Knowledge is always in an incomplete state and people will debate over what the right theory is. I am not trying to discourage you from criticizing my property rights theory. I want you to actually criticize it instead of jumping to this issue about theory verses practice. Perhaps I’ve pushed by Kantian idealism too hard here, because that’s really not the issue. I think you misunderstand me greatly (probably my fault) when you suggest I am looking at life as a software program. I know exactly what you are talking about. I am actually strongly opposed to the idea that humans are just complicated computers (I’m a dualist like Mises).
Rather, let me make another analogy to physics. The way people figured out Newton’s laws, particularly that an object in motion remains in motion, is that they thought well if it didn’t remain in motion it would have to stop, but where? Why stop here, instead of there? There’s no answer to that question, so it must be that objects in motion remain in motion (unless something intervenes of course, in which case when and where is not arbitrary, but the when and where of the intervention). You could easily say “I have a physics theory that says things stop after 10 feet of motion”. Sure, that resolves the question, but in a completely arbitrary way. Why 10 feet and not 20 feet? Etc. etc.
I would suspect that you are about to tell me that ethics is not physics. Ethics is about people acting together, physics is about deterministic reality. This is where we disagree. To me (thank you Hoppe) ethics is just like math or physics: a set of statements that can be argumentatively justified, that is claimed “true”.
“Do you know this for a fact? I think you might be wrong. Now what?”
One of my professors mentioned that a few years back, it may be wrong. But I still think you misunderstand the nature of my objection. There is no number that, if I saw it in the statutory law, would make me think “oh well that makes sense”. It is the very fact that a number is being assigned that I am claiming is absurd.
“Whatever. What am I supposed to do with this?”
This is a response to you making claims about my intuition. I figured you would be interested in hearing what my actual intuition is, that’s all.
“Agreements define disagreement. If it is not one of the other, it hasn’t come up yet.”
I know what you mean, that we would be agreeing that a disagreement took place, but this dodges my point. A and B disagree on how to use a good. Of course they are agreeing to disagree. But agreeing to disagree doesn’t exactly solve the problem. They don’t say, “Okay, so we agree that disagree on how to use this good” and then walk away. There is still a problem, and ethics is the solution. What I am saying is that people have to disagree (and, yes agree to do disagree) for there to be any problem for ethics to solve. If they instead agreed that they did not disagree on how to use anything, they would just walk away (or do whatever they’re gonna do) and there is no problem for ethics to even talk about.
“This is hysterical. It sounds like you need to back off the 5 Hour!”
I’m calling you out on this one. This was the best point I brought up in that post. It is a conclusive disproof of the claim that coherency of a law speaks at all to its legitimacy. Call it names all you want, but that’s dodging the argument!
“Last time I checked we live in a world that includes copyrights (yep, just checked again, and sure enough!)”
This is why I get sarcastic. Crime exists too, so why are you even pretending that ethics matters for anything. People kill each other, so you can’t have anything to say about it.
Most of the rest of what you said I already covered. That IP and innovation coexist does not rule out IP working against innovation. You highly misunderstand what you call my “utopian fantasies” or whatever, which may be my fault, but I find it pretty silly that people make such nonsense charges against an attempt to use rational analysis to better understand things. All you seem to want to say is “the world has uncertainties so who knows”. At least I’m theorizing! At least I keep bringing stuff to the table to be debated!
- April 14, 2011 at 6:38 pm
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@nate-m April 14, 2011 at 5:40 pm
Haha. You keep telling yourself that. It’s pretty obvious that this is not the case and the state has a distinct and obvious motivation in IP law.
OK, explain the motive to me.
Oh and there is absolutely criminal levels of copyright violation. For a guy who goes on and on about defending copyrights and IP law you sure have a lousy understanding of it.
Instead of this; The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal.
I should have said this: The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is most often </bL a civil cause of action, not criminal.
Nice catch.In such circumstances as qualify under criminal statutes BOTH civil and criminal causes of action would stand. So, the state would be a party to the criminal action, but the civil action would still stand for the plaintiff, the copyright holder. Remember OJ Simpson? The main point is this: In a civil action, damages go to the plaintiff, in a criminal action, the fines go to the state and the perp goes to jail, potentially. The state pays for jails. So tell me, what is your theory for why the state is motivated by IP laws?
Much of IP law focuses on actions that have nothing to do with copying.
I was referring to copyright. Do you have anything of substance to say, other than you think I’m stupid and ignorant?
Were this comes from is the plain obvious fact that IP law has no real relation to property rights.Dejure property rights is a extension of defacto property rights that are universal in nature and occur spontaneously in any human society.
You are misinformed. They are not universal, but are suited to their particular purpose. They arise when the need arises. The history of property rights emerging in the beaver trapping indigenous Indians of north east America is a fascinating case history, for example.
Property rights not only exist because they are desirable, they exist because they are required. What can be debated is the specific applications and nature of property rights.
On this I agree, if I understand your meaning.
There is no such thing that happens with anything related to IP Law. There is no such thing as ‘owning a idea’ or ‘owning a concept’. It’s physically impossible.
For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid.
The ONLY reasonable defense for IP law is based on a argument of expediency. That human society is wealthier, better off, with IP law then without it. That supporting IP law will invariably end up with the ‘Greatest Good for the Greatest Number’ type thing. Yet this is something that so-called Pro-IP libertarians seem to steadfastly refuse to debate about. Because, you know, something like that requires actual evidence and careful consideration.
Well, I certainly gratified that you cleared this all up for me. At least we have reduced the problem to the ONLY reasonable defense. That should simplify things.
Going the intellectually lazy route and continue to equate IP law with property rights.. then get all hand-wavy, diversionary, and pseudo-spiritual is all that IP fascists have a seem to have when their logical fallacies are challenged.
This is brilliant. Do you mind if I quote you on this?
- April 14, 2011 at 6:40 pm
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Crap! That’s twice.
What happened to the “click to edit” function?
- April 14, 2011 at 6:43 pm
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Slightly easier to read:
@nate-m April 14, 2011 at 5:40 pm
Haha. You keep telling yourself that. It’s pretty obvious that this is not the case and the state has a distinct and obvious motivation in IP law.
OK, explain the motive to me.
Oh and there is absolutely criminal levels of copyright violation. For a guy who goes on and on about defending copyrights and IP law you sure have a lousy understanding of it.
Instead of this; The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal.
I should have said this: The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is most often a civil cause of action, not criminal.
Nice catch.In such circumstances as qualify under criminal statutes BOTH civil and criminal causes of action would stand. So, the state would be a party to the criminal action, but the civil action would still stand for the plaintiff, the copyright holder. Remember OJ Simpson? The main point is this: In a civil action, damages go to the plaintiff, in a criminal action, the fines go to the state and the perp goes to jail, potentially. The state pays for jails. So tell me, what is your theory for why the state is motivated by IP laws?
Much of IP law focuses on actions that have nothing to do with copying.
I was referring to copyright. Do you have anything of substance to say, other than you think I’m stupid and ignorant?
Were this comes from is the plain obvious fact that IP law has no real relation to property rights.Dejure property rights is a extension of defacto property rights that are universal in nature and occur spontaneously in any human society.
You are misinformed. They are not universal, but are suited to their particular purpose. They arise when the need arises. The history of property rights emerging in the beaver trapping indigenous Indians of north east America is a fascinating case history, for example.
Property rights not only exist because they are desirable, they exist because they are required. What can be debated is the specific applications and nature of property rights.
On this I agree, if I understand your meaning.
There is no such thing that happens with anything related to IP Law. There is no such thing as ‘owning a idea’ or ‘owning a concept’. It’s physically impossible.
For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid.
The ONLY reasonable defense for IP law is based on a argument of expediency. That human society is wealthier, better off, with IP law then without it. That supporting IP law will invariably end up with the ‘Greatest Good for the Greatest Number’ type thing. Yet this is something that so-called Pro-IP libertarians seem to steadfastly refuse to debate about. Because, you know, something like that requires actual evidence and careful consideration.
Well, I certainly gratified that you cleared this all up for me. At least we have reduced the problem to the ONLY reasonable defense. That should simplify things.
Going the intellectually lazy route and continue to equate IP law with property rights.. then get all hand-wavy, diversionary, and pseudo-spiritual is all that IP fascists have a seem to have when their logical fallacies are challenged.
This is brilliant. Do you mind if I quote you on this?
- April 14, 2011 at 7:46 pm
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So tell me, what is your theory for why the state is motivated by IP laws?
Patent fees provide direct profit motivation. The patent office is the only profitable branch of government.
During the cold war the patent system provided a means in which the USA government could intercept inventions that may have strategic value and prevent them from going public.
It’s also useful in ‘political rent seeking’. Large corporations use the patent system as a weapon to prevent competition from new enterprises. As a result politicians that support patent monopolies are provided financial contributions, employment after ‘public service’ and other kick-backs. Also it provides opportunities to profit from fraud and corruption through the manipulating the bureaucratic process in the patent office.
Copyrights were established as a mechanism for censorship. They have perpetuated as a mechanism for manipulating the market in favor of large publishing companies. As a result statist government has enjoyed considerable political support from these media companies in more ways then one. The majority of popular/traditional media outlets, through mechanisms like the FCC, and ran and controlled by a few major corporations. These corporations have significant interest in movies, music, and television industries.
In return for acts like the DCMA, expanding copyright terms, expanding enforcement resources, pushing international treaties, and other such legal activities that can heavily impact the profitability of these large media conglomerates politicians enjoy significant political support. The politicians exploit this for their own political goals… such as running for reelection.
Campaign finance reform plays into this in a fairly obvious way. I can explain it to you if you want.
[quote]For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. [/quote]
Then you freely admit that copyright law has nothing to do with protecting property?
[quote]It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid.[/quote]
A drunk ‘seeks to avoid’ running over small children on the sidewalk when they are driving. However, quit often, they do end up driving up into the sidewalk by mistake and if there was children there they would of been killed. Happens quite a bit. It’s not a valid defense of a drunk driver to say he is trying to avoid what he did actually do.
Well, I certainly gratified that you cleared this all up for me. At least we have reduced the problem to the ONLY reasonable defense. That should simplify things.
It actually does.
It would allow people here to discuss the merits of IP law and whether or not the violations of private property are worth it. Rather then being continuously sidetracked with a bunch of ‘copyrights/patents are property rights and thus are libertarian’ mumbo-jumbo.
- April 15, 2011 at 2:51 pm
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@nate-m April 14, 2011 at 7:46 pm
Patent fees provide direct profit motivation. The patent office is the only profitable branch of government.
From the USPTO website:
Results of Operations
The USPTO generated a net income of $94.7 million for the year ended September 30, 2010, an increase of $149.5 million over FY 2009 net cost of $54.8 million. This variation is the result of a few factors, explained in more detail in the Statement of Net Cost discussion.So, your theory is that Fed is motivated by $94.7M of revenue over costs (governments don’t work on a profit motive, since it is a government agency. Think DMV) out of a total budget of something like $3.5 Trillion? Hmmm. Also, the discussion mentions deferred costs of getting fees before the application is processed, when all costs have been accounted for, as one explanation for why 2010 was in the black, and 2009 was not.
During the cold war the patent system provided a means in which the USA government could intercept inventions that may have strategic value and prevent them from going public.
Is this a bad thing? You WANTED to speak German or Japanese?
It’s also useful in ‘political rent seeking’. Large corporations use the patent system as a weapon to prevent competition from new enterprises. As a result politicians that support patent monopolies are provided financial contributions, employment after ‘public service’ and other kick-backs. Also it provides opportunities to profit from fraud and corruption through the manipulating the bureaucratic process in the patent office.
I don’t doubt this. I agree that mercantilism is always bad. This is not unique to patents or copyrights, though, right?
Copyrights were established as a mechanism for censorship. They have perpetuated as a mechanism for manipulating the market in favor of large publishing companies. As a result statist government has enjoyed considerable political support from these media companies in more ways then one. The majority of popular/traditional media outlets, through mechanisms like the FCC, and ran and controlled by a few major corporations. These corporations have significant interest in movies, music, and television industries.
Mercantilism is bad. That has nothing to do with the legitimacy of the principles of IP, just like our current government proves nothing about the fundamental principles of self-government. Things can, do and have gotten out of whack. To borrow from Kinsella (who stole the idea from Tucker apparently) you want to throw out the baby with the bathwater because you think it is Rosemary’s baby?
In return for acts like the DCMA, expanding copyright terms, expanding enforcement resources, pushing international treaties, and other such legal activities that can heavily impact the profitability of these large media conglomerates politicians enjoy significant political support. The politicians exploit this for their own political goals… such as running for reelection.
Which of these two do you think is more harmful overall, the Federal Reserve and global central banking, or patents and copyrights?
Campaign finance reform plays into this in a fairly obvious way. I can explain it to you if you want.
No need. I probably agree the political system that is based on collusion between business and government is a common enemy.
For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights.
Then you freely admit that copyright law has nothing to do with protecting property?
What? Copyright law enforces property rights in original works of authorship AND specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. What do you make of that datapoint?
It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid
A drunk ‘seeks to avoid’ running over small children on the sidewalk when they are driving. However, quit often, they do end up driving up into the sidewalk by mistake and if there was children there they would of been killed. Happens quite a bit. It’s not a valid defense of a drunk driver to say he is trying to avoid what he did actually do.
Good point. Let’s look it over. As an ex ante principle of law, driving drunk is illegal precisely because it increases the probability that drunks will not be able to avoid running over children even if they try, while the ex post principle provides for additional punishment if the drunk fails.
The purpose of a law against drunk driving is to incentivize the driver not to drive drunk, and to insure unpleasant and costly consequences if he does, AND injures someone. In this way, it would be reasonable to say that the law seeks to avoid squished children, but does not always succeed.
You have given an example of when the purpose of the DUI law fails. Do you have an example where the purpose of copyright fails because it actually has protected an “idea” which it specifically seeks to avoid doing?
It actually does.
It would allow people here to discuss the merits of IP law and whether or not the violations of private property are worth it. Rather then being continuously sidetracked with a bunch of ‘copyrights/patents are property rights and thus are libertarian’ mumbo-jumbo.Despite my earlier sarcasm, I actually agree with you that there are other issues. This is why I have been saying lately that IF we can agree that the author owns his original manuscript, provided he produced it with his own means of production, then we can get onto the economics of law issue that you allude to.
This is the more significant issue, I agree.
- April 14, 2011 at 2:58 pm
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“I, in writing my book, know whether I made this up out of thin air, or whether I simply copied it from Dickens”
The first one is not an option. There is no such thing as making something up “out of thin air”, unless you’ve been existing in a vacuum up until that point. You have to draw influence from somewhere, and there is no way to decide in a non-arbitrary fashion what amount of influence from a single work is “too much”.
- April 14, 2011 at 3:44 pm
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@ sweatervest April 14, 2011 at 2:58 pm
OK, but that is a bit of a nitpick.
What I mean specifically is, without any access to the/a protected work. Everything else, which is considerable as you point out, is fair game.
To be even more precise, the issue is:
1) Are the two works “substantially similar”, AND
2) a) is there direct evidence of copying; b) is there circumstantial evidence of access AND substantial similarity between the works; or c) is there such striking similarity between the two works that there is no other reasonable explanation other than copying.
- April 14, 2011 at 10:48 am
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Neil,
Your responses, IMHO, are very solid. I have yet to see you struggle with a single inquiery.
It is ironic/predictable that your theory comports with the principles of “statist laws”. The results you obtain are essentially the same results from the operation of existing law, in general.
I realize that is not relevant to our argument, but it is an interesting data point.
Regards,
FYI, Wildberry’s contributions are so scattered and incoherent, I have largely stopped reading them.
- April 15, 2011 at 3:12 pm
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Wildberry is the intellectual equivalent of a Cleveland steamer.
- April 15, 2011 at 4:41 pm
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The only thing worse than passive aggression is gross passive aggression.
BTM, win.
- April 15, 2011 at 8:40 pm
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Too many question begging assertions. I keep hearing why IP exists over and over but not any proof that it is actually helpful. When internal contradictions between IP and physical property are pointed out the assumption is physical property should cede, yet no good reasons as to why. Schulman seems to say this has to do with some kind of superior metaphysical notion called “identity” that has greater importance to existence than existence.
It’s just bizarre.
The Ever-Present Wildberry wrote:
“Copyright law enforces property rights in original works of authorship AND specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. What do you make of that datapoint?”
I’m wondering how a story is not an idea. It’s an idea that was fleshed out and put down on paper. Seems like another distinction without a difference to me, like the fact that a story is a “thing” with a unique identity which makes it different from other things with identities (no kidding?). Patents also obviously refer to ideas. Strip away the semantic question-begging tricks referencing property away from IP arguments and what’s left? It’s just an effort to commodify and monopolize information flow. All of the verbiage of the construct of property is lifted out from the economic world of scarce resources and rivalrous goods, and then superimposed onto the non-economic world of information (ideas, utterances, patterns). It sorta reminds me of how Rand superimposed economic language onto interpersonal relationships. It certainly sounds just as creepy and leads to the same type of confusion. You just can’t take one rubric and apply it to everything. This is how a lot of weird philosophies get traction. Some true insight is taken from one area of life and brought to others where it simply doesn’t belong and doesn’t work.
Instead of IP proponents trying to argue that ideas are property by analogy, what they really need to do in order to test themselves is to first develop a consistent non-contradictory theory of property which would naturally include IP. I certainly don’t see that being done here. I’m reading here just one analogy after another. But analogies are only helpful to illustrate something; they don’t establish anything. The analog is always taken for granted and that’s why an analogy works to convince, but when people skip the foundational logic of the very thing they want to establish, the analogies become mere rhetoric. As if a car driving from land onto a ferry establishes that a story is property! Give me a break, guys.
- April 16, 2011 at 8:10 pm
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@Zorg April 16, 2011 at 1:15 am
OK, this is hilarious. Seriously funny.
Tell me, O Wise One, does an Originator own the raw material of his creation? He uses SOMETHING to create with. What is it? Is it ideas? Possibly, eh? What else is there? So either he owns ideas which he uses as raw material to create a story he then owns, or he does not own the ideas – if ideas can’t be owned. If the latter is the case, then how can he claim to own something he made which doesn’t consist of elements that he previously owned – and more importantly, still doesn’t? I think someone actually brought this up before.
Listen, Grasshopper; if I use air to forge a sword, when I am finished, is the question of owning the sword merely one of whether or not I owned the air?
The transformation in question requires a forge and other capital equipment, raw materials, labor, and a production plan; when all brought together in exactly the proper order, the results are a finished good: a sword.
This transformation also requires things from the public domain: air, and the idea that a sword is better for hacking other people than a lump of raw materials, and the knowledge that when you are finished making it, someone will want it. In this case, it is clear who owns the sword, is it not? Even though making it does not require that everything that went into the production is owned as property at the outset.
The principle here then, is that tracking ownership of property depends on tracking those things that are NOT in the public domain. Something you own (capital goods, raw materials, self) PLUS something in the public domain (ideas, air, process knowledge, personal skills, and knowledge of the sword market). If something is in the public domain, no one owns it, but you don’t lose your ownership of other things because you use them, right? We track the things others don’t own to figure out ownership claims.
The exact same situation is the case with authorship; ideas, letters of the alphabet, facts, formulas, the English language, rules of grammar, and the knowledge of a common understanding of words and expressions of language among people who can read, are all things that exist in the public domain, like air. No one owns them, and you would have just as much right to use these things however you see fit; you don’t need to own air to breath it, you just need to know that no one else claims to own it.
What I do own is myself, and all the capabilities of expression that is unique to me. I own the pen and paper I use to capture my expressions. I don’t own the letters of the alphabet, but because I use them, it means that I own nothing?
This is how one arrives at the conclusion that an author owns the original manuscript that he creates. It is a scarce good, as it is unique in the universe. It is comprised of ideas, words, language and taken all together, constitutes something I will call an original expression. No one on earth, as long as I keep it to myself, has a better claim to it than I.
Do you disagree with this conclusion? I really want to know. Please answer.
Star Trek would still be Star Trek without IP laws.
How can you be so sure about this? The fact is that ST was created in a world in which copyrights existed. Surly then, you would agree that whether it would or not exist without copyrights is a matter of pure speculation. That is one difference between our arguments. I can point to facts, you can only point to your speculations.
that is before you get into the whole thing where they own it forever and can prosecute people for looking at what they originally broadcast for free.
Just a clarification of some facts; copyright term is not forever (despite the fact that it is too long in my opinion) and you cannot prosecute people for what you claim. There is something called a fair use doctrine, and one of the key cases having to do with this issue dealt with the home recording of TV. You can’t get prosecuted for doing that.
It’s funny that you would get all uppity
Really? “Uppity”? Like buying Playboy for the articles, I only watched ST for the philosophy.
Now, I guess we must protect the right of some XYZ corporation which owns the rights to license Spock dolls or whatever.
Your theory of private property is wavering. Private property is OK as long as it isn’t owned by a nasty, evil Corporation?
TV programming that was made to sell dish soap and bubble gum 40 years ago has become a monster franchise for a select few to milk forever.
Roddenberry died in 1991, so only until 2061. And under principles of a free market, libertarians try to not dictate how people use their property, even if it is to sell bubble gum.
Have you ever watched a Star Trek clip which was illegally posted on YouTube (as everything else in the world is)? Did it make you feel dirty? Did you have to avert your eyes when you thought of the FBI Warning on your old Star Trek VCR tapes?
Funny. Ethics and morality are different things; that’s why there are two words instead of one. We may all do things that we know are wrong. We are talking about the principles, not the conduct.
YouTube is an interesting situation. Isn’t it interesting that if YouTube posted music files or copyrighted books, it would get busted, but not video clips? This seems inconsistent with the treatment of Napster, doesn’t it?
Ok, now get busy Mr Thief and write the Widow Roddenberry a nice fat check for depriving the franchise of its property by your lying eyes and evil intent! XYZ/Paramount has mouths to feed, you know. Or, better yet, call the FBI and turn yourself in. They’re always looking for people to roll. : )
Every day I walk past beggars and don’t give them any money. And they ask me for it every day, even though I never fork it over. Does that make me a bad person?
That was fun.
Wildberry,
I’m posting at the end, since apparently your post was lost in the recent site updates.
Just because you keep making the same ignorant point over and over doesn’t mean you are saying anything relevant or correct.
Just because you keep ignoring the flow of conversation and diverge it does not mean what you are saying is either relevant or correct.
Contracts assign liability rights and require privity of the parties. Property assigns ownership rights, and does not require a contract, and therefore privity is irrelevant.
Therefore, you should not conflate the ability to restrict someone contractually with a property right. It’s a non-sequitur. Make up your mind, either the fact that you can restrict a potential customer contractually does not imply there is property involved, or you cannot apply such a restriction to third parties. Either way, it’s irrelevant with regards to IP so kindly stop referring to it.
This, on the other hand, is idiotic. You’ve actually outdone yourself.
If anything is idiotic, it is certainly not me. I try to formulate coherent arguments. What you produce is a waste of time. Your attempts to crawl up Schulman’s ass, how you commended him for answering all the questions, although any flow of arguments he engages in clearly ends in him contradicting himself, further support my former claim that your purpose for the debates here is to earn recognition for your nonexistent talents rather than intellectual curiosity.
- April 18, 2011 at 12:47 pm
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Eat me Surda.
Only you would equate my statements of support for Neil with something vulgar.
Dear J. Neil Schulman,
since it looks like my post was scrapped with the site updates too, I repost it here:
How does looking at a house differ from moving in?
Looking at a house or taking a picture of it does not alter the integrity of the house. Both however result in a copy. Xeroxing a picture does alter integrity, but xeroxing a copy does not. So how do you formulate coherent rules to decide what is legal and what not?
That’s a question to be directed to a statist since your question refers to current statist law.
In your logorights article as well as a former reply to me, you write that you do support fair use. Now you deny it. So which is it? Can you make up your mind?
Some uses are below the threshold for damages or deprivation of the fruits of ownership and others aren’t.
Apart from not explaining how to differentiate it, you neglect that it is the type of action rather than hypothetical value of it that is the question. In fact you create a new question and bring back the value of the good into light, although you earlier denied that you talk about value. So, whether copying is permitted or not depends on value? Does that also apply to physical goods? Can I steal something that is cheap?
For example, a cool breeze from your property to mine brings me the pleasant smell of your orange grove. I may breathe in that scent without damaging you. Climbing your fence, grabbing and eating one of the oranges, raises the threshold, but possible not enough to be a violaton. Harvesting your orange crop and selling it at the farmer’s market without your permission is definitely a violation.
As I said above, the distinction that “we” (loosely used to refer to IP opponents here) make is that the first one does not involve anyone altering the integrity of the property, whereas the next two do. The value of each action is irrelevant.
The scent is just some pollen and other microscopic parts of the tree that the air currents moved. Purely hypothetically, the original owner might claim he wants them back, but a reasonable judge would probably tell him that it’s a foreseeable naturally occurring phenomenon and if that was not his intention he should have kept the tree in an airtight seal. Just like, for example, when someone takes a picture of the tree, that are just the photons from the sun reflected by the tree that the camera captures and can be prevented by keeping the tree behind an opaque case. If photographing is a property rights violation, then so is smelling of pollen, whistling at girls with short skirts, not having to breathe in the sweat of co-travellers in a train compartment because they use deodorant, and other phenomena commonly known as externalities.
You have yet to provide any coherent claim. It all seems to come back to the value (which you deny). Nevertheless, the first chapter of “Building Blocks For Liberty” by Walter Block at al. explains why approaches other than physical integrity fail both logically and praxeologically.
****
- April 10, 2011 at 3:49 pm
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I see a utility in ceasing to use the term “IP” and beginning to use the term Media-Carried Property — MCP.
This should make it clear that driving your car onto someone else’s ferry doesn’t give the ferry owner title to your car.
April 10, 2011 at 3:55 pm
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MCP. Wow. Now there are rights in the “properties” of things. There is no end to where this is heading, as things have lots of properties!
Neil envisions a real thing as a bucket that holds a substance–information. The information is of course immateral but he thinks it is ownable since when a thing “carries” this information then the owner of the thing values the thing more. This is simply does not follow at all.
April 10, 2011 at 4:03 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “MCP. Wow. Now there are rights in the ‘properties’ of things. There is no end to where this is heading, as things have lots of properties!”
A true statement, for once, and one I made three decades ago in my article Informational Property: Logorights.
“Neil envisions a real thing as a bucket that holds a substance–information.”
Back to normal, you misstate my position.
Corrected to: “Neil envisions a real thing as a bucket that holds another real thing: a logos.”
April 11, 2011 at 12:45 am
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Media-Carried Property
And since all media is already covered by physical property rights, MCP needs to either contradict it or be irrelevant.
Confront it.
April 11, 2011 at 2:24 am
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A book that is transmitted via em waves to a reciever and then immediately deleted on the sender’s hard drive exists nowhere but in the signal until it hits the receiving antenna. Is the signal covered by property rights? Or does the book “not exist” for a while, not until such time as it is imprinted on a dvd?
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Kid Salami,
if I remember correctly, EM radiation has dual characteristics (particle + wave). As particles, they are potentially owned by someone anyway, regardless of whether you interpret it is data encoded and sent at a specific frequency. Furthermore, it still does not follow that ownership of frequencies gives the owner any right to what the owners of receivers do. It would only mean that some EM interference might be illegal, not that the reception is illegal.
And last but not least, the arguments Neil is making are so far removed from your nitpicking that I have to wonder again why are you making them. I get it that it is possible to make coherent arguments for IP. But it is for the IP proponents to make them. Obviously, they don’t want to. It is the sacrifices that follow from a coherent IP theory that they are unwilling to make. Let them confront the contradictions first. You’re only confusing them. It almost sounds like you don’t want Neil to confront his contradictions.
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All I did was ask you a question. I am once again accused of nitpicking or arguing for the sake of it or whatever? You don’t have to answer.
“if I remember correctly, EM radiation has dual characteristics (particle + wave). As particles, they are potentially owned by someone”
Ok, that’s all I wanted.
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Kid Salami,
you’re a smart chap. Surely you must have been able to make an educated guess what I was going to answer before I even answered. So why ask?
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Well sometimes you just can’t win. I think (in fact am sure) there is circularity in a theory where you assume that photons can be “owned”. I ask to make sure I’m not missing something or misrepresenting your position – apparently then I’m nitpicking. If I don’t ask and “guess” what you mean, then I’ll most certainly be accused of erecting a strawman.
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Kid Salami,
I don’t get your point. You know I’m a falsificationist, so why are you asking me whether something exists?
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YOu said
“And since all media is already covered by physical property rights”
I believe the signal to be one of these “media”. And I’m trying to determine whether you think EM waves are covered by “physical property rights”, or whether this is not, in your view, a “medium” as used by you in the quote above. One if these must be true mustn’t it?
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Kid Salami,
And I’m trying to determine whether you think EM waves are covered by “physical property rights”, or whether this is not, in your view, a “medium” as used by you in the quote above. One if these must be true mustn’t it?
There are multiple ways to cover EM waves through property rights that do not require IP. I don’t really have a solid opinion which of those should be preferred. However, I tend towards the approach where the ownership of the receiver is the decisive factor from the perspective of property rights. Whether the EM waves as such are ownable is kind of a useless question, since without a receiver we have no way of knowing what is happening with them anyway. On the other hand, that does not answer your question if the book exists while being in transmit only.
I don’t know what else to tell you about this topic.
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“Whether the EM waves as such are ownable is kind of a useless question”
Well, I agree – but I’m not the one saying, repeatedly, “all media is already covered by physical property rights”.
You can certainly save yourself from having to consider this “useless” question by declaring that an em signal is NOT one of these “media”. Then your statement above about all the “all media is already covered by physical property rights” can remain true. Or you can say that photons are “ownable” and so subject to property rights, as you suggested may be possible in some circumstances – I think this is absurd but it’s up to you. I don’t see a third alternative.
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Kid Salami,
ok, I get your point. The thing is however, it’s not really up to me. If someone thinks that there should be rights in data in transit (which is already unclear, since Neil said that looking at things is not violating any rights, which of course begs the question why copying based on visual stimuli is, but that’s not important now), then I can retort that all media (including subatomic particles) are potentially owned. I’m not the one making the assumptions.
If my hypothetical opponent thinks that there should be rights in data in transit, then replying that all media including particles are potentially covered by property rights in the physical matter is appropriate and equally absurd (or not). It does not even need to be owned by the same person for the whole duration of the transit, it can also change ownership depending on who’s premises it’s passing (which I think is the simplest and most obvious solution). It’s like the question about homesteading dynamic processes, e.g. a river. The simplest solution is that you only have a claim on the water molecules while they are on your premises. You don’t have a claim against people who own the land down- or upstream. Maybe (I’m hesitant) you might have an easement claim against someone who’s upstream. But that is completely different from IP, because that is a claim against someone who’s “downstream”.
I think I have to apologise, I should be more aware that you’re also a curious soul in search of answers.
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“ownership of frequencies”
Although I have no idea what you mean by this.
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Kid Salami,
that is a hypothetical alternative right. It does not matter what exactly it means. My point is that it’s an alternative rather than amendment.
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Then it’s not something you are suggesting is sensible yourself? Ok.
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Kid Salami,
the question is irrelevant to me at this stage. It only becomes relevant when you can show how it fits into a context of other theories. There is no such thing as an assumption “as such”. That’s nonsense. Assumptions can only be evaluated in relation to other assumptions. I don’t care if a book “exists” while it’s being transmitted. What does it even mean? It’s just mumbo jumbo with no effect on the questions I’m asking.
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Hmm. I wonder if a light particle is ownable. It’s always traveling, cant be captured.
I would think ownership of a given EM spectrum itself makes sense–the right to use a given waveband in a given geographic area for data communication purposes.
But note that Neil says the EM waves themselves are the medium (and see my other post just now about storage media and data signals in a “carrier wave”). This is odd b/c normally we think of waves as themselves perturbations of some medium. For light, that’s the ether, which most physicists now reject, following Einstein’s special theory of relativity. If that is the case, there is no medium, really, and it seems odd to think of the waves and particles as a medium. When you encode information by EM what you do is modulate it somehow. So you are just sending out an EM wave.
BTW I lean to Beckmann’s view that there is in fact an ether–the gravitational field itself is the ether (see Bethell here http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/bethell4.1.1.html). So there is an ether, and the Em waves travel in the gravitational field ether. Or so Beckmann argues (persuasively IMO).
April 12, 2011 at 5:16 pm
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Beckmann’s book (Einstein Plus Two) is the most fascinating piece of physics literature I have read in my entire time being an undergrad physicist. All of a sudden modern physics wasn’t a jumble of confusing mysticism.
Totally off-topic I know, but that books totally changed my life as a physicist.
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Kid Salami,
EM waves are a medium that can carry information objects — what I’m now tagging Media Carried Property — MCP. The carrier signal can transmit and receive MCP that can be used even without being recorded at the receiving end.
Examples of that are programs broadcast on television or radio to broadcast receivers, or sent from satellites to satellite dishes.
information objects sent through fiber optic cable can also be MCP.
April 11, 2011 at 7:19 am
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that can be used even without being recorded at the receiving end.
Nitpick:
They still must be copied. They must be received, recorded, duplicated, modified, amplified, etc etc. in order to be viewed by anybody. In the case of old analog televisions and radios this happens rather quickly using relatively primitive technology, but it still occurs.
With digital media it’s much more deliberate since your dealing with mathematical representation of information that must be stored in computer memory and processed several times before it becomes human readable.
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Peter Surda wrote, “And since all media is already covered by physical property rights, MCP needs to either contradict it or be irrelevant. Confront it.”
Please point to a physical property right. I’ve never seen any right before and I’d very much like to see one.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Please point to a physical property right. I’ve never seen any right before and I’d very much like to see one.
Obviously I meant that the right refers to physical material (i.e. material addressed by IP-less rights), rather than the right is somehow physical.
Kindly stop avoiding and answer. Where is the example of IP or MCP or logorights that neither contradicts rights in already owned material nor is redundant with respect to them?
I’ve been asking you the same simple question for six days. You have not shown a single attempt at answering it. If you’re correct, what are you afraid of? Are you afraid of contradictions? It’s like in the joke where Reagan calls Gorbachov and ask him how much farmers earn in Soviet Union, and Gorbachov retorts “But you oppress the black!”.
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Neil, the property right is the relation between an actor and a scarce resource–it just means he is the owner of that scarce thing–that he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.
The problem with your theory is that it would assign to B a partial property right in a scarce resource that A has previously homesteaded: it gives B a veto right over how A might use his property. THus before IP or logorights, A owned the scarce resource–he had full property rights in it. After logorights, A and B are co-owners. By the magic of B inventing something with his own property, your logorights sytsem has assigned some of A’s property rights to B. This is redistribution of wealth, or theft, however you want to call it.
April 11, 2011 at 10:42 am
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@ Stephan Kinsella April 11, 2011 at 9:47 am
Neil, the property right is the relation between an actor and a scarce resource–it just means he is the owner of that scarce thing–that he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.
This sounds suspiciously like an admission that property is a human device, as “he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.” How does he get to do that? It is ordained from the heavens?
Also, your description is incomplete, because property rights also define the relationship between a property owner and other property owners. This is true of all rights, yet you want to make some kind of exception for IP rights.
The problem with your theory is that it would assign to B a partial property right in a scarce resource that A has previously homesteaded: it gives B a veto right over how A might use his property.
IP “theory”, does not assign property rights in A to B’s property. IP makes no claim on the property of others. This is misdirection, much like your “ideas are free” line of reasoning.
As you have previously said, conflicting rights create limitations of use; ALL RIGHTS. So unless you are arguing against all rights, you must accept that the presence of rights in A imposes limitations in the rights of B. Remove the rights in A, and B’s limitation s also vanish.
I think it is abundantly clear at this point, that you are arguing that you want to be free to use the property of others simply by denying their right to own it. You are demonstrating that in fact, rights and property are human devices which arise by consent of those who wish to cooperate with others. You wish to define them in a way that you get what you want for free.
You continue to insist that IP rights make a claim of ownership of other’s property, yet you don’t make the same claim for rights in other property. That appears to be a contradiction, to borrow Peter’s favorite phrase.
Speaking of which, Kid has, by one innocent question, falsified Peter’s claim with his own words and methodology, that “physical property is 100% owned” by getting him to admit that he thinks “particles” are also owned. Obviously there are particles that are not owned, so property cannot be 100% already covered by property rights.
I may be an amateur, but I can read the writing on the wall. All I can say is thank God you and your followers are merely a gnat on the ass of the real world. Thankfully, there is little to no chance that will ever change.
To borrow from Neil on this point; you are simply a member of the entitlement gang, with a case of the “gimmies”.
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Lieberry,
Speaking of which, Kid has, by one innocent question, falsified Peter’s claim with his own words and methodology, that “physical property is 100% owned” by getting him to admit that he thinks “particles” are also owned. Obviously there are particles that are not owned, so property cannot be 100% already covered by property rights.
Stop misrepresenting my claims. I did not say that particles are owned. I said that they are potentially owned. Just like, for example, the rocks on Pluto’s surface are potentially owned, just noone managed to get a hold of them yet so they don’t have an owner at the moment. If you are capable of receiving a particle, then the most straight explanation (albeit evidently not the only one possible) is that since the moment of reception it is yours. If noone is able to receive a particle, then the question of ownership is moot.
Furthermore, whether there is ownership in particles or waves or any other approaches (like transmitters or receivers) is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the rights are defined in a non-contradictory manner. Whichever you or Neil or Kid Salami pick I don’t care. Stephan and I for example disagree in how ownership of EM radiation should work. So what? That does not fix the self contradiction in Neil’s claims, nor does it prove any of the convoluted demagoguery you produce.
Stop lying and evading. I’m not going to rephrase my arguments yet again so that you can ignore them yet again. I’ve done this enough times already. You have had plenty of opportunities to ask for clarification. But you can’t do that can you Lieberry? Because that would require you to approach the problem with genuine interest and you don’t want that. You just want others to recognise your nonexistent greatness.
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Stephen Kinsella wrote,
“Neil, the property right is the relation between an actor and a scarce resource–it just means he is the owner of that scarce thing–that he is the one who gets to permit, or deny, others’ use of that thing.”
Correct.
“The problem with your theory is that it would assign to B a partial property right in a scarce resource that A has previously homesteaded: it gives B a veto right over how A might use his property.”
A, as the original creator, is the original “homesteader,” if we must use the Lockean language. A licensed to B a specific use of A’s property. A retains all rights not licensed. Any C’s, D’s, E’s, etc have no right to use any rights that A retains, and only to use “B”‘s rights that A has not specifically made non-transferable.
“Thus before IP or logorights, A owned the scarce resource–he had full property rights in it. After logorights, A and B are co-owners.”
Not quite. B has licensed a specific and delimited usage of A’s property. A retains all unlicensed rights. To say that a license for usage is the same as ownership confuses the transaction.
“By the magic of B inventing something with his own property, your logorights sytsem has assigned some of A’s property rights to B.”
You just reversed the roles of A and B. B has invented nothing; A is the inventor.
“This is redistribution of wealth, or theft, however you want to call it.”
Every sale or other property transaction is a redistribution of wealth. Libertarians and propertarians only object to forced redistributions of wealth, not consentual ones.
I have no idea what you mean by theft in this context since your discussion is of a consentual arrangement between A and B, and the usual plea for the rights of C to take what is not his is not even addressed.
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Stephan Kinsella wrote: “A homesteads a scarce resource. Then he uses it in a certain way. It turns out this way is similar to how B has used his own property. There is no contract between B and A. What are you talking about?”
What are you talking about?
I write Alongside Night and own what I wrote. I don’t care whether you call me A or B. No one else has any property rights in it and because it’s already owned it’s not available for homesteading. Someone else writing and owning something else of their own has nothing whatsoever to do with this discussion.
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@Stephan Kinsella April 11, 2011 at 1:37 pm
The replies of the IP socialists are so predictable by now.
To quote BtM, “OK. We’re in agreement then.” You are talking about yourself, right?
If you object to the fact that IP gives a third party property rights in your already owned property, they say “well all rights have limits duuhhhh what’s the big deal?”
But by such reasoning you can jusify any crime. If A rapes B, and we object, saying this violates B’s rights to her body, well, you just say, “Well what’s the big deal? No rights are absolute!”
What a crock. The fact that no rights are absolute and yet we seem to be able to distinguish rape from other acts implies just the opposite. Precisely because such distinctions are necessary and evident, we define rights and protect them.
You are advocating that we abolish existing rights in IP, I am not. It is you who is advocating that we abolish the distinctions we currently hold as legitimate rights, so by analogy it is you who is justifying crime by ignoring the victim’s rights.
Or they say that there are always gray areas between adjoining property tracts. But in the standard case of Blackacre and Greenacre near each other, we already all recognize that there is a resource owned by B and one owned by G; that the tracts abut each other at a physical boundary that is of necessity gray, does not mean there is not Blackacre and Greenachre.
Yet at the same time you acknowledged this obvious fact, you deny the exact same relationship in IP by simply making the presumption that “we DO NOT already all recognize that there is a resource owned…”. The boundary is grey in both cases in exactly the same way, as it is grey at the boundaries of ALL rights. Since all rights are capable of conflict, we establish rules, which become laws. Good laws benefit both parties, bad laws harm both. Your proposal for outright IP abolition harms both producers and consumers of intellectual products, and you actually understand why. Where does that leave you, ethically?
I.e., the issue of transitions or continuums or gray areas only comes up when we know there are two definite areas and then a transition between them. If a dessert is next to a forest, they both still exist even if there is some transitino therebetween.
A poetic truism. By your analogy, then, all boundaries between abutting property rights have some grey zones, which implies what? That we must DISTINGUISH how to allocate those rights and limitations? OF COURSE!
Likewise, if we KNEW that we MUST HAVE a finite, nonzero patent term–that it HAS TO BE between zero and infinity, then perhaps we could not blame the Schulmans and other IP socialists from arbitrarily picking some number like 20 yeras–after all it is between zero and infinity, and “might be” close to the ideal peak of the Guassian Laffer Innovation Curve that only God can see.
What a zero. According to your reasoning, everything is arbitrary, and one thing cannot possibly be discerned from another. How does anyone see in all this fog? Your support of zero is well known. All opposition to your absolutism implies non-zero. That makes the score, Kinsella (and a very few entitlement hogs) zero, the rest of the civilized world, non-zero.
Since the issue you raise is actually an economics-of-law problem, I know you don’t mind if a few economists weigh in besides Rothbard, right? How about Mises and Hayek to name a couple? I for one do not favor an economic system that requires producers to produce for external economies. How about you?
They just assume, like central planning socialists always do.
Why, at this point in the discussion, are you so concerned about term, all of a sudden? Since you insist no rights can exist, what do you care how long the non-zero term is?
For those who see the logic of property rights in production, even where the product is an intellectual work, the issue of term is indeed a grey zone. As a result, it is a difficult problem, like all problems of the economics of law. Coase started us out and David Friedman has written a very interesting book on the subject. But for you, Stephan, don’t bother. No need to worry, since all rights in IP are illegitimate in the first place.
Save your time for more blogging. That’s what’s really important.
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
That is a perfect statement of the communist ethic.
April 10, 2011 at 9:40 pm
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So were EXACTLY is the difference in practice between your “logoright” and what Ayn Rand thought about “IP”?
Please answer HERE as correctly and specifically as possible!
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Dear, J. Neil Schulman,
That is a perfect statement of the communist ethic.
Since all the actions are already covered by physical property rights, what is it that you’re referring to as communist? There is nothing left. You’re using metaphysical nonsense to mask your contradiction. Confront it.
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Every logos is an object made out of information.
Not all information is an information object.
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So someone orders the particles existing in this universe and is hereby changing information and therefore owns that changed information (=”logoright”)?
You think that your “logoright” is the only source of homesteading, don’t you?
There are millions of questions arising from that. A few:
1) Who decides what amount of information change (=pattern “creation”) is sufficient for homesteading?
2) As property is the right to exclude: How do you exclude people from using “logorighted” objects eg in their imagination?April 11, 2011 at 10:00 am
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Given sufficient resolution, all information can be represented digitally, so there must be a minimum number of bits that are subject to IP. Though I might be wrong, I’d intuitively say that 1 bit is not enough. Nor 2, nor 3. It seems like *any* minimum number is arbitrary. Even if it were not, you could 0-pad your way to intellectual property.
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So let me see if I have this right.
The anti-MCP advocates in this forum see nothing wrong with going into a Barnes and Noble store with their iPADs, going up to the children’s section, taking off the shelf a copy of The Berenstain Bears Get the Gimmes, using the iPAD’s camera to copy every page in the book, then shooting it out with Barnes and Noble’s security guards when they attempt to confiscate the iPAD.
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this ignores context, contracts, rules set by the owner of the (real, no offense) property. But right–there is nothing wrong per se with using non-scarce information. Information is not ownable. It’s not communist to say this.
Your position is transparently incompatible with libertarian property rights. It is incompatible with property rights in scarce means and with Lockean homesteading. YOu seek to supplant these libertarian fundamentals with your mystical weird theory about “material identity” and “logos” etc. Neil, it just makes no sense whatsoever, and almost everyone can see this. You are completely confused on this point.
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It ignores nothing.
Are you arguing that without prior notice — without a security guard requiring you to check your iPAD or leave it in your car — you have consented for Barnes and Noble to take ownership of your iPAD? That merely by bringing your property into their property they now own it?
How about the clothes you’re wearing and the money in your wallet? Do you grant a property right to Barnes and Noble the moment you walk into their store?
Or, is it possible for your sphere of ownership of your own things to remain yours even as you enter into someone else’s property?
No, you want it both ways. Your iPad remains yours yet you may use it as a burglar tool without consequence. You have the ethic of the Jolly Roger: what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is mine, too.
When I first created Alongside Night there was only one manuscript. It was a scarce object. All its bundle of rights due me from creating it were owned by me. That bundle of rights attached not only to the paper it was typed on but also to the thing which I created: the novel. I did not make the paper; I made the novel. The novel — not the paper — is the real, objective, discernible, observable, readable thing that I made. That bundle of rights included the human action of making copies, which I as the owner owned and still own.
Yet, in your Jolly Roger ethic, you can steal the thing of value — the novel — and because you’ve left me the paper you claim to have violated no property rights.
This is the argument of a buccaneer, a scoundrel, a grifter. Your quoting Locke on property rights in land doesn’t change that.
And anyone who isn’t blinded by having a Case of the Gimmes sees that.
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So YOU see nothing wrong with going through the streets and LOOKING at all the property you can see there and hereby (after YOUR THEORY) stealing and pirating all day long?
What about those poor house/garden/car owners who you rob with your eyes and your brain? Did you pay them? Why not? How could you!
I rather guess you even look at many monuments and process this information in your brain and EVEN speak about them. Did you ever draw a painting of something you saw? Shame on you.
PS: Did you even pay the royalties for using the Internet to the guy who invented it?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tim_Berners-Lee-
Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “So YOU see nothing wrong with going through the streets and LOOKING at all the property you can see there and hereby (after YOUR THEORY) stealing and pirating all day long?”
You know, you could at least pretend some familiarity with what I’ve actually written instead of making a fool of yourself by always attacking absurdities that are no part of my arguments and aren’t implied by them, or derivable from them, in the slightest.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
so, if I see something, remember it and then talk or write about it, does it violate other people’s rights or not? If it does, then Anti-IP Libertarian is right. If not, then you need to abandon IP.
Stop running away and confront the arguments.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The anti-MCP advocates in this forum see nothing wrong with going into a Barnes and Noble store with their iPADs, going up to the children’s section, taking off the shelf a copy of The Berenstain Bears Get the Gimmes, using the iPAD’s camera to copy every page in the book, then shooting it out with Barnes and Noble’s security guards when they attempt to confiscate the iPAD.
Well, since all your examples do contain the use of B&N’s physical property, your argument it a non-sequitur.
I kindly ask you again, confront the contradiction and the non-sequiturs in your arguments. I also noticed that my question on your article you refer to made it through moderation, but you left it unanswered.
April 11, 2011 at 8:05 am
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The fact that you feel the need to invoke such ludicrous scenarios suggests that you’re aware of how weak your position is. Peter and Stephan are showing you far more respect than you deserve.
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Yes, I must at all costs satisfy myself that I’ve lived up to the standards of someone self-identified as “Beefcake the Mighty.”
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OK, good, we’re in agreement then.
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Beware, Neil, or Lord Buzungulus, Bringer of the Purple Light will be on your case next!
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Stephan Kinsella wrote: “So some information is ownable. Some is not. What is the difference?”
See The Libertarian Case for IP at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/
April 10, 2011 at 5:28 pm
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
That is a perfect statement of the communist ethic.
It’s funny and a little sad you can’t see how ridiculous your calling such an obvious thing, “communist ethic”.
You’re arguing that you could have knowledge in your mind you have no right to use. You’re arguing that you do not have the right to use your mind freely, and you have the stones to call others communist. Your lack of self-awareness is fascinating.
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The argument that “you can have knowledge in your mind that you have no right to use” has never been any part of my logorights theory, which is not about claiming property rights in what’s in other people’s minds but rights in Media-Carried Property (MCP). Of course people sign Non-Disclosure Agreements all the time wherein they can have knowledge that they have no right to use. But, again, that has nothing whatsoever to do with the MCP rights.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
But, again, that has nothing whatsoever to do with the MCP rights.
Exactly. Because the only thing MCP can do is to redistribute media (i.e. theft) or be redundant. Can you show me example where it doesn’t? You can’t. But you need it because otherwise your theory falls apart. Thus you continue to contradict yourself.
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You’re arguing that you could have knowledge in your mind you have no right to use.”
But that’s not what you wrote before. You previously wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
You just added the words “in your mind” which were not in your previous statement.
You can have and use whatever knowledge you want “in your mind.” That is not the issue, and you repeatedly resort to this straw man to avoid addressing the property rights in externally existing and observable things.
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “You’re arguing that you could have knowledge in your mind you have no right to use.”
But that’s not what you wrote before. You previously wrote, “You have a right to use knowledge and information you have, regardless of who created it.”
You just added the words “in your mind” which were not in your previous statement.
Well, this is redundant; how can you have knowledge that is not in your mind?
You can have and use whatever knowledge you want “in your mind.” That is not the issue, and you repeatedly resort to this straw man to avoid addressing the property rights in externally existing and observable things.
I cannot figure out why you focus on “observable” as some salient property of things that makes them ownable.
And how can you use knowledge that is not in your mind…. this is inconceivable.
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “Well, this is redundant; how can you have knowledge that is not in your mind?”
The knowledge could be on a computer screen in front of your eyes, or in a book, just to give two examples.
“I cannot figure out why you focus on ‘observable’ as some salient property of things that makes them ownable.”
Because something being observable by more than one observer is one test of objective reality of a thing. Not necessarily the definitive test, or the only test. But it implies the real.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The knowledge could be on a computer screen in front of your eyes, or in a book, just to give two examples.
However, both examples are already covered by physical property rights, therefore IP needs to expropriate them or be redundant (if you are already the owner of the screen or the paper).
It would be really really great if you finally stopped running and answered the question.
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If you are arguing for a CONSISTENT theory of “IP” (aka “logoright”) then you have to go all the way:
There can be no exceptions for certain types of information processing just because you want that this way without creating inconsistencies (it’s the same with the statutory “fair use”-clauses).
Either you state that EVERY information processing against the will of an owner of “logorighted” property is infringement, or none.
Your “theory” sounds like: It is only forbidden to steal something if you are going to sell it.
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All property rights are subject to rational boundaries and questions of what is and is not an infringement. If I put my foot on your car bumper to tie my shoe, is that a property rights violation as egregious as stealing your car? Is sticking a pizza card on your doorknob the same sort of invasion as breaking and entering?
Your all-or-nothing argument reduces to absurdity when applied to any property rights dispute.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
All property rights are subject to rational boundaries and questions of what is and is not an infringement.
However, if there is no case where a right does not overlap with other rights, then the right is either contradictory to them or redundant. Just like, for example, right to a job, right to healthcare and IP.
Face the contradiction.
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Zorg (the villain from The Fifth Element? — there’s some psychological visibility!) wrote, “It actually argues against your case since you MUST sell the story when you sell the carrier (since that’s the only way it exists for any of us) – UNLESS, of course, you have a contract with the buyer that says otherwise.”
So unless you have en explicit contract stating otherwise, when you set foot on someone else’s property you’ve sold yourself into slavery. Got it.
April 11, 2011 at 12:28 am
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“Zorg (the villain from The Fifth Element? — there’s some psychological visibility!)”
Haha. No, just a happy coincidence. : )
“So unless you have en explicit contract stating otherwise, when you set foot on someone else’s property you’ve sold yourself into slavery. Got it.”
I have no idea how that relates to what I said. I have tried to stay away from using analogies to argue this. You should too since you’re not very good at it.
I was saying that in the absence of a contract, when you sell the book you are selling the story along with it. You cannot help but do this. It’s why people buy the book. It’s what gives the book value. To claim that you didn’t sell the story is just false. You keep selling it over and over again, and indeed expect to have a monopoly on the selling. The story is a necessary part of the book. It is the book. You can’t sell something and then claim you didn’t.
If you want to retain ownership, don’t sell. Selling means that you relinquish ownership of one thing in exchange for ownership of another (money). The blank media by itself is not what fetches a decent price for a book. You know that you are selling people the story. It’s no big mystery.
If there is confusion over the issue and you want to insist that you continue to have a right to control what happens after the sale, then by all means have people sign an agreement with you. That eliminates confusion, thereby solving the problem of disagreements concerning the rights involved. Shouldn’t this be considered as the most rational approach to the issue? Why refuse to spell out your rights and those of the buyer in clear English? Do you want an honest trade with the buyer or not? Do you want them to respect what you think is your right? Put it in writing, then they can choose to agree or not. Full disclosure. Tell them, “I am licensing this copy to you. You may not reproduce it. Agreed?” And you’re done.
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Zorg wrote, “If you want to retain ownership, don’t sell.”
When I make my created works available for use am very clear about not including the right to make copies without my permission. I retain all rights not specifically sold or licensed, and so state in all released versions of the work, clearly demarcating my property rights.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
clearly demarcating my property rights
Your “demarcation” logically encroaches upon other people’s property, therefore is always theft or redundant.
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Peter Surda wrote, “Your “demarcation” logically encroaches upon other people’s property, therefore is always theft or redundant.”
Absurd as usual, AbSurda.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Absurd as usual, AbSurda.
As usual, you avoid to answer because by answering you would prove that you contradict yourself.
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“I retain all rights not specifically sold or licensed, and so state in all released versions of the work, clearly demarcating my property rights.”
I was talking about using a contract as a way to protect the rights you say you have and want to retain. Your position forces you to assert some sort of natural right, so you want to express it to readers in a copyright notice. That’s fine as far as it goes. But others don’t agree that you can sell something and not sell it at the same time – unless you have a contract which specifies what is being sold and what isn’t. (I know, it sounds crazy, doesn’t it?)
So if you say you are licensing the story to the reader but not actually selling it, why not have a licensing agreement? Isn’t this a reasonable way to resolve the issue? Under the rubric of contract, you can bind buyers of your book to an agreement not to copy or make available for copying, or whatever you can get agreement on. What’s wrong with that? It would go a long way toward binding the conscience of the buyers, which is what you want.
You want them to help you protect the work.This actually addresses the problem as you see it. But in this case you are relying on your indisputable right as a sovereign individual to make agreements with those you do business with, rather than calling upon a dubious natural right to own the contents of the book even after selling it.
No one who is against IP can quarrel with this approach. A contract is for the purpose of spelling out the relationship between the two parties. In a contract, the parties are actually making their own law. To me this is more libertarian than trying to bind everyone in the world to your declaration that you retain ownership of that which you sell. Many people simply don’t see it that way, but get them to sign an agreement at the point of sale and at the very least you have put your stamp on their conscience.
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One thing that has to be noted here is Kinsella’s continued, principled acknowledgment of Palmer’s good work on the anti-IP front. Apart from his work on this issue, Palmer is a true fiend who would never reciprocate the compliment and in fact regularly engages in smears against the Mises Institute (that is, when he’s not engaging in anal sex).
April 11, 2011 at 9:24 pm
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I don’t know that that last bit is relevant… it certainly helps to bring down the standards here, though.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
If a car drives from land onto a ferry, it is separated from the land, but it doesn’t cease to be a car.
But it also does not change the ownership of the ferry. It can only be on the ferry with the ferry owner’s permission, otherwise the car driver is trespassing. Since you’re claiming that it’s the copier rather than the book author that is trespassing when a copy is created, you have produced just another non-sequitur.
The only case where your objection might have real-world application would be if someone memorized a logos and at some future point reconstituted it onto an objectively perceivable medium.
That would invalidate practically all patents. Furthermore, what if I used manual labour to copy a book, such as rewriting it by hand? That matches your description, yet I doubt you would be so lenient in permitting it.
Face it, instead if confronting the contradiction, you make up more and more nonsense.
All IP (or “logorights”) is either theft or irrelevant. I’ll repeat this as long as you keep avoiding this.
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One of these days you’ll actually read The Libertarian Case for IP and won’t have to repeat asking questions I’ve already answered in full long before you got around to asking them.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
I read it. It deals with the justification of IP, not with the logical incoherence thereof. Even if I agreed with everything you say there, you’d still be contradicting yourself.
Now, where is the answer? Nowhere. You don’t have it. You think that your ethics protects you from self-contradiction. It doesn’t. That’s just religious fanaticism.
Come on, stop hiding and face me.
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More clownish posturing by Peter abSurda.
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And it would not be complete without more avoidance from J. Neil Schulman. I have reservations against calling people cowards unless they really earn it, so instead I’ll just say “told you so”.
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The implications of this debate inevitably extend not to the narrow discussion of “IP” but to all property. This will happen because at some point technology will more than likely enable Star Trek like transporters in which matter is disassembled then reassembled elsewhere and “material identity” will be the defining feature of all property; or because human beings will enter into virtual realities where, once again, no property has a physical presence other than “material identity.”
In fact, any truly advanced technological civilization, if it has property rights at all, will regard an original “sample” as the only property worth having, since everything else will be replicable.
So, now’s the time to stake out the defining propertarian position for the rest of economic destiny. If the Stephan Kinsellas do manage to wipe out what they call IP and I’ll now be calling MCP, the future will eventually be one with no property rights at all.
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J. Neil Schulman wrote, “If the Stephan Kinsellas do manage to wipe out what they call IP and I’ll now be calling MCP, the future will eventually be one with no property rights at all.”
The transporter/replicator machine itself is subject to property rights regarding physical objects that we all agree on. So to is the matter/material/feedstock that these machines use to assemble copies. The assembled object is, too. The operator/programmer/owner of the machine would assert property rights over their own body.
How does it follow that, in the world we are imagining here, no IP/MCP means no property rights?
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Neil:
The implications of this debate inevitably extend not to the narrow discussion of “IP” but to all property. This will happen because at some point technology will more than likely enable Star Trek like transporters in which matter is disassembled then reassembled elsewhere and “material identity” will be the defining feature of all property; or because human beings will enter into virtual realities where, once again, no property has a physical presence other than “material identity.”
Exactly, and if you have your way your IP rights will then be used to attack people’s use of 3D printers, and so on — see https://c4sif.org/2011/03/white-paper-on-3d-printing-and-the-law-the-coming-copyfight/
What happened is this, Neil. The state and church used their power to censor speech when the printing press started threatening their scribe-controlling monopoly on ideas. This morphed into copyright law due to bad economics and rent-seeking by publishers etc. The state also granted monopolies to gain loyalty and reward sycophants; this morphed into patents due to bad economics and confusion about property rights.
Patent and copyright harm human life, but esp. for copyright the effects were not too great until 1990s when the Internet arose. Before then a book was always on a physical medium, so copyright law’s effect was fairly muted and int the background. With the liberation of information from physical media the effects of copyright started to be multipled. People started taking notice. It is more obviulsy evil now and that is why we are winning and you are losing.
And your side will surely push to stifle 3D printers and replicators if they ever become practical, in the name of IP. And thus gradually your belief in property rights in scarce goods will be gradually supplanted by your worship of property rights in ideal objects, gradually crowding out all property rights and killing the human race.
In fact, any truly advanced technological civilization, if it has property rights at all, will regard an original “sample” as the only property worth having, since everything else will be replicable.
This is ridiculous. It would be a boon to civilization if people could push a button on their 3D printer and have it create a car or mansion or food or clothes. Who cares if it resembles yours? I imagine in a real libertarian society there would be competition to be the most-imitated. People would brag, “yeah, I designed this table, and I have gotten 75 million ‘hits’ on facebook’s 3d printer sharing section. oh yeah, baby, people see how good I am.”
So, now’s the time to stake out the defining propertarian position for the rest of economic destiny. If the Stephan Kinsellas do manage to wipe out what they call IP and I’ll now be calling MCP, the future will eventually be one with no property rights at all.
In a world where we live in some hybrid internet space and have replicators and 3d printers etc., the proliferation of information and the sharability of computer programs will be a boon to society. Your system would do all it could to restrict the flow of information and the use of ideas.
Now you have morphed to MCP. Obviously you, like every other libertarian IP advocate I have encountered, don’t have a coherent system worked out. You say you oppose state IP law. Yet you don’t want to abolish it. when we ask what will replace it, you don’t know. At least you are working on it. Let me konw when you finally figure out the contours of this anti-Lockean system you want to foist on humanity.
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“Exactly, and if you have your way your IP rights will then be used to attack people’s use of 3D printers, and so on.”
Just like with a 2D printer, you have the right to use your 3D printer to make or make copies of things you own or have licensed.
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Exactly–you view us as living by permission, not by right. We have to get permission for every thing we do with our property. Horrible. Totalitarian.
I don’t need to “own” something to copy it. If I have heard of the idea of an airplane and can construct one with my own materials, I only need own them, not “the idea of an airplane”. Where do you get this? This is insane.
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Stephan Kinsella wrote, “Exactly–you view us as living by permission, not by right. We have to get permission for every thing we do with our property. Horrible. Totalitarian. I don’t need to “own” something to copy it. If I have heard of the idea of an airplane and can construct one with my own materials, I only need own them, not “the idea of an airplane”. Where do you get this? This is insane.”
You have the right to live using your own property. You need permission to use someone else’s. That’s libertarianism, not totalitarianism.
My argument is and has always been a defense of owning things, not ideas. You have an original idea for how to fly, fly. But just because you can look into a candy store window doesn’t transfer title of the candy to you. You want to use what someone else has created then buy the right from them or live within the means of your own innate genius. Your needs are not a claim on the property of others. That is totalitarianism. That is communism. That is not libertarian no matter how many infantile tantrums you throw.
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But just because you can look into a candy store window doesn’t transfer title of the candy to you.
If you buy that piece of candy and then examine how it was created or you learn from a third party how it was created then you can make as much candy as you want.
According to your view of property this would be a horrific violence against the confectioner.
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Imagine that I walk by the candy store and see, in the window, peppermint swirl candies (e.g., Brach’s Star Brites) on display for sale. I’ve never seen these before, but, because I know a little about making confections, I can guess, discern, or mentally “reverse engineer” how to make a peppermint swirl.
Could the maker of those candies claim a logoright on the design or construction of the candies?
If I go home and make peppermint swirls myself, using ingredients that I own, for my own private consumption, am I doing something wrong?
If I make them exactly as above and then sell them (thereby competing with the original seller), am I doing something wrong? Even if I use my own name, brand markings, etc.?
I realize that this is a very simple case. The complexity of a peppermint swirl is tiny compared to a novel. However, it seems like there must be some lower limit to the complexity that IP/MCP protects, lest we end up in the “Ug the First” situation. If a peppermint swirl is too low, could you explain what the lower limit of MCP complexity is, and give an example?
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Could the maker of those candies claim a logoright on the design or construction of the candies?
Yes. They if they the creator of the idea of the peppermint swirl then you would be violating their rights by making your own.
If I go home and make peppermint swirls myself, using ingredients that I own, for my own private consumption, am I doing something wrong?
Your engaging in violent theft if you do that.
At least according to Neil. If you were not a communist you would first have to go and get permission from the cook in order to sell copies of his candies.
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@ESV April 11, 2011 at 5:31 pm
People seem to get pissed around here when I refer to the law as the basis to establish some principle or other. Are you one of those? You don’t object if I refer to the dictionary to define a term, do you?
Assuming not, in the case of copyrights there is a lower limit; for example ideas, facts, formulas, short slogans and phrases are not protectable. They are and remain in the public domain, meaning no one and everyone owns them equally. Also in that domain are works that may have been protectable, but have expired; once in the public domain, always there. This is how public domain information accumulates over time, and why Shakespeare’s plays are in the public domain, even if they were written today, they could be copyrighted. This is below the threshold of “protected works”.
In the specific case of a literary work, unless an author meets the threshold of “original work of authorship”, the work is not protectable and remains below the threshold. Copy right requires, much as I understand the theory of logos to require, some actual intellectual endeavor on the part of the author, including some measure of creativity. A list of names in a phonebook is not protectable, because it lacks the creative element associated with authorship. A literary work is above the threshold. If you’ve ever read a book, then you know what I mean when I say that a literary work is like pornography; it is hard to describe, but you know it when you see it. Beyond a certain level of complexity, I don’t think any rational person would have difficulty understanding that it is above some threshold that makes it “an original work of authorship”.
You are specifically referring to a recipe, which is not protectable as a copyright, but might be under trade secret. But trade secrets can be reverse-engineered with no problem, so in your example, buying candy and reverse engineering it and making your own and opening a shop next door is not an issue for IP.
Think of the economics of a recipe. It turns out it is harder than most people think to make candy, and most people will just buy candy when they want it and buy it from somewhere that makes what they like. Everyone CAN make candy, but it is not trivial to make it come out exactly like that in the store. This creates a high threshold of “pain” in the make/buy decision, and so most people will buy it, and use their time elsewhere.
Likewise, a book is much easier to read than it is to write. It is easier to copy than to read. Although a book can be easily copied with currently available, cheap technology, copyrights prohibit that, except for certain uses, while this is not the case for a recipe, where copying is not prohibited. What is the difference between a book and a recipe?
Tucker wrote a daily about how “ideas are free” based on this very concept, the inexhaustibility of ideas and recipes. He came up with a “magic bagel” that could be copied magically. He concludes that if it is easy to copy, then it must be free, like his magic bagel. But of course in our world, there is no magic bagel. You have to actually mix dough, roll them and bake them in an oven. Actual work is involved. As a consumer of bagels, you make or buy, you can’t just copy.
Here is the way I look at it. In economic terms candy is a consumer product. The producer goods for candy is a kitchen, oven, and ingredients, and a recipe. Two people who have the same recipe and attempt to make an exact copy of the candy in the window, may be able to come close, in a very controlled and similar kitchen and oven, and with the same levels of skill as the original confectioner.
The original confectioner has an advantage if he has kept his recipe secret. If you want it, you have to reverse-engineer his process. That set of facts makes trade secret laws adequate to prevent the confectioner from being forced to produce for external markets. It is not that easy to copy his results, and if you do, you compete on other grounds not related to the candy, like location, presentation, etc. There is no “candy tools and die” that allows you to skip the “making candy part”, and go right to the “having candy part”. Just like in farming, you can’t skip the plowing and planting and skip right to the harvest.
Keeping with the production analogy, the author must first create an original manuscript. The production effort and resources that go into that effort is his capital costs of tooling and producing the first prototype. That original manuscript is in fact also a producer good, much like a tool die, which makes the marginal cost of additional copies very low, once you have the original manuscript “producer good” to make it from. Each copy that is produced as a consumer good is also a producer good, because it can serve as the “die” to make additional copies, without having to duplicate the effort and expense that the author expended to produce the original manuscript.
If you assert that when you buy a book, you are buying a producer good and not a consumer good, then you are asserting by analogy that when you buy candy, you are also own the kitchen and the recipe. In reality, you buy candy, which you consume. If you want to MAKE candy, you have to be prepared to invest in the candy-making enterprise. That is likely to be quite a bit more expensive that the nickel you pay for the candy.
Under copyright, the author licenses the consumer good, but not the producer good. Sale of a book is a limited license to consume the product, not to own the book “kitchen”.
If you assert that you DO own the “kitchen”, then you create a conflict, a rivalry between yourself and the author, and both will attempt to defend their rights. The pro-IP argument is that you bought the candy, not the kitchen. The anti-IP argument is that when you sell me candy, you sell me the kitchen.
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Nate-M wrote, “If you buy that piece of candy and then examine how it was created or you learn from a third party how it was created then you can make as much candy as you want. According to your view of property this would be a horrific violence against the confectioner. ”
Wrong. I’ve never made such a claim regarding candy or candy recipes.
But if you examine Alongside Night or learn from a third party how it was created, that doesn’t make you its author or entitled you to his rights of authorship.
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ESV,
Sell copies of Alongside Night as your own and tell people you “reverse engineered” it. I dare you. I double dare you.
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Wrong. I’ve never made such a claim regarding candy or candy recipes.
So your concept of IP only extends to literary work? Cooks and engineers do not have any of the same ‘rights’ that authors and comedians enjoy, apparently.
But if you examine Alongside Night or learn from a third party how it was created, that doesn’t make you its author or entitled you to his rights of authorship
Obviously it doesn’t make you the original author. Not anymore then following a recipe for food makes me the guy that created the recipe.
There does not seem to be any point here.
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The question of what replaces statist law and regulation applies to every aspect of libertarian theory, not just replacing statist copyright and patent laws with natural-rights implementation of MCP.
I’ve already said that for now I’d be happy if libertarians abide by property rights in MCP of authors and inventors whose works they find valuable, with no enforcement other than social preferencing.
And yes — to preclude your having to search through messages where I refer to using guns to enforce my property rights — I’m using extreme and overblown language to give my arguments rhetorical impact. I’m both a dramatist and a comedy writer; it comes with the turf.
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“I’ve already said that for now I’d be happy if libertarians abide by property rights in MCP of authors and inventors whose works they find valuable, with no enforcement other than social preferencing.”
That’s great, but it weakens your argument. You want us to believe that your rights are being violated and your property is being stolen, but you’re fine with abandoning enforcement?
It doesn’t jibe.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
This will happen because at some point technology will more than likely enable Star Trek like transporters in which matter is disassembled then reassembled elsewhere and “material identity” will be the defining feature of all property; or because human beings will enter into virtual realities where, once again, no property has a physical presence other than “material identity.”
You forget that in Star Trek there were not only transporters but replicators as well. They even were based on the same principles. They just made up some technobabble to explain why you can’t replicate living creatures. But even that was not entirely correct, there was an episode where a transporter accident created two Will Rikers. According your self-contradictory theory, that would actually only be one Will Riker with two bodies.
Who’s absurd now?
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One of the defects of this form of discussion is that volume tends to win, irrespective of whether a response is new, on point, makes sense, and so forth.
One of the tactics of those who participate is always to claim victory, always to claim that their nonsensical challenges have never been answered, and to taunt anyone who fails to respond to even a single one of their comments.
This is a strategy not of argument but of filibuster.
Peter Surda, you have asked no real or understandable questions that I have not fully and adequately answered. I don’t know whether your thinking process is too compromised by nonsense to understand the answers, or whether content plays no part in your participation here and you get satisfaction merely by seeing your name on the screen.
Either way, let me state for the record that I do not consider you a serious participant in this discussion. My bona fides are well known; I know nothing about you that leads me to believe you have any intellectual authority on this topic. Your infantile taunts, added to your incomprehensibility of reason and writing, give a strong indication that you don’t.
There’s an old saw about rolling around in the mud with pigs. It gets you dirty and the pig enjoys it.
Enjoy the mudbath. You’re unworthy of my time and I’m ignoring your tactic of filibustering nonsense from now on.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
Either way, let me state for the record that I do not consider you a serious participant in this discussion.
The feeling is mutual, but unlike you I’m not making up excuses to run away.
Your infantile taunts, added to your incomprehensibility of reason and writing, give a strong indication that you don’t.
You’re a religious fanatic who thinks that emotions beat logic. Your choice, not my problem.
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I’ll say it again, Peter: you and Stephan have shown this fool far, far more respect than he deserves.
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Agreed. Schulmann’s latest response to Peter is the kind of childish ad hominem I expect from a die-hard liberal (yes I know that is itself a kind of ad hominem, I hope you all call appreciate the humor!).
I see this very often where I dare to bring libertarian ideas to people who want nothing to do with them. Instead of debating what I say, they start giving me therapy sessions where they’re gonna “figure out” why I would think the ridiculous things I think.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
I just realised what you said:
you have asked no real or understandable questions that I have not fully and adequately answered.
If your approach was genuine, you would have asked for a clarification upon not understanding a question. I do that all the time. However, you did not ask, you just made up an excuse for not answering it. Obviously, you are not interested in a debate.
Let me ask you this: if you claim to have the moral upper ground, are you permitted to contradict yourself?
April 11, 2011 at 4:58 pm
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Neil
You are such a comedian! Not a very good one though. Then again, filth is not really very funny.
Sione
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Wildberry wrote:
“If you assert that when you buy a book, you are buying a producer good and not a consumer good, then you are asserting by analogy that when you buy candy, you are also own the kitchen and the recipe.”
No. The author sells the story when he sells the book. When I buy the book, all I have is the story. The medium of paper and ink is irrelevant. I can show that it is irrelevant by copying the words of the book onto a digital medium and then burning the book. The story survives. It’s the substance of what I bought. I bought Casablanca – which consists of what, paper and ink? No, it consists of the entire pattern of words therein which *are* Casablanca.
If authors wish to bind buyers of books to a licensing agreement where rights and duties are spelled out in clear language, then they ought to do that. The fact that they don’t do this is telling.
Authors and inventors are merely capitalizing upon an old system of privilege in the law. They are not relying upon normal business practices such as contracts which spell out the rights of each party. That much is clear.
“Under copyright, the author licenses the consumer good, but not the producer good. Sale of a book is a limited license to consume the product, not to own the book “kitchen”.”
Where is the licensing agreement?
“If you assert that you DO own the “kitchen”, then you create a conflict, a rivalry between yourself and the author”
Great. Let’s go to court:
1) The author sold it to me for cash.
2) It is in my sole possession.
3) I can freely use, alter or destroy it.
4) There is no contract whatsoever that says otherwise.
“But, but, but…..”
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@Zorg April 11, 2011 at 8:33 pm
The medium of paper and ink is irrelevant. I can show that it is irrelevant by copying the words of the book onto a digital medium and then burning the book. The story survives. It’s the substance of what I bought. I bought Casablanca – which consists of what, paper and ink? No, it consists of the entire pattern of words therein which *are* Casablanca.
OK this part I like. You are admitting at least, that there is a “work” there.
If authors wish to bind buyers of books to a licensing agreement where rights and duties are spelled out in clear language, then they ought to do that. The fact that they don’t do this is telling.
This puzzles me. There is no alternative to copyrights currently operating in the market, so I would presume the author transferred under the conditions of existing copyright law, in which case no such additional agreement is necessary. If you are assuming that it is transferred in an absence of copyrights, then maybe the author would make a special contract, and maybe books would $1000, and maybe lots of stuff. You cannot assume availability under copyrights, and then blame the author for acting as if there is no such thing…right?
Authors and inventors are merely capitalizing upon an old system of privilege in the law.
ou mean, authors and inventors are engaging in market operation under the rules in existence affecting that trade. If you are going to assume some other condition, you are going to have to speculate about how books find their way into your hands as a consumer. I don’t know what that might be (and neither do you) but it certainly would operate differently that it does today. I think you would have to spell that out.
Where is the licensing agreement?
It is called copyrights. If you are hypothesizing about a world without copyrights, tell me how the author suddenly no longer cares about enforcing his rights to his own property?
1) The author sold it to me for cash.
OK what is it and what were the conditions of the sale? I see you bought some candy. What makes you think you own the kitchen?
2) It is in my sole possession.
Fine. Eat the candy and read the book. That is what your possess, a book that you can read.
3) I can freely use, alter or destroy it.
You can read it, mark it up, or destroy it. You cannot copy and distribute it. That is a limitation on your right to use it how you wish. Otherwise, you are good to go.
If you buy candy from me, you can eat it, fondle it, or stick it up your nose. You cannot come into my kitchen and make some more whenever you feel like it. That’s mine.
4) There is no contract whatsoever that says otherwise.
No, there is copyright law. Also, there is no contract required to keep you out of my kitchen, even if you buy some candy. That is the way property rights work; you don’ t need a contract to enforce them.
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I asked you where the licensing agreement was because you said the author licenses the story to the buyer, and you respond with, “It’s called copyrights.” Thanks for clearing that up, because I almost got confused and thought that there was no licensing agreement.
Your responses all refer to and are based on existing copyright law. We are not discussing copyright law, so you leave me with nothing relevant to respond to. You simply dodged the questions.
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@Zorg April 11, 2011 at 11:39 pm
What do you mean, where is it? You created a hypothetical situation in which you assume you receive a book without a contract limiting use.
If you assume copyrights exist, why would you want to find one? If you assume it does not exist, what would prevent the author for making you sign one as an alternative to copyrights?
No matter what you think might happen that gets you the right to copy an author’s work, it is most likely that an author will either find a way to protect his property, or forego writing it in the first place.
I don’ t know there is a response. What other alternative do you think exists?
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I am asking you: Is there is a licensing agreement between author and buyer?
I did not create any hypotheticals. You said authors license buyers. So I asked you where the licensing agreement was.
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@ Zorg April 12, 2011 at 11:47 am
How do I know? You invented the hypothetical.
“license” is a concept of transfering a right to limited use. It MAY be done by contract, or it may be done by operation of law. It makes no difference. What is your point?
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Neil wrote: “I wrote Alongside Night and own what I wrote.”
Stephan Kinsella replied, “No you don’t. Information is not ownable.”
There is it, about as bald a communist anti-propertarian, anti-individual rights, and anti-libertarian claim as has ever been made.
With this statement Stephan Kinsella has definitively proved himself not a libertarian.
April 11, 2011 at 9:52 pm
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Schulman: Information is not property, not a scarce good. Copying it does not destroy the original, does not take away from the seller of the book the seller’s property. IP law however does arbitrarily infringe upon the buyer’s use of his own property. If someone were to copy a novel and represent it as their own writing I would believe that to be punishable as fraud but nothing else.
Property as understood by libertarian thinking does not include non-scarce goods.-
Gee, I’ve never thought of that before! You’ve convinced me! *snort*
April 12, 2011 at 4:10 am
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You quote a single line and say Kinsella has “proved himself not a libertarian.” Kinsella has, by that line, “proved” nothing. You have “proved” nothing.
Citing a single line like this is not an argument, but an informal fallacy I call a “trap door.” When someone says it, that person is evicted from the realm of the argument, and is not to be taken seriously, as if he’s suddenly vanished from the rhetorical stage upon pulling a lever.
That is not rational discussion, Neil, with adducing of arguments and evidence, it’s an attempt to create a substitute for it. It belongs in the realm of propaganda and emotionally driven persuasion, not in that of argument.
Randians (though rarely Rand herself) have been fond of this for decades, back at least to Barbara Branden saying about the poor, “If you want to help them, you will not be stopped.” Bon mots can rivet attention and win over a crowd. They neither disqualify an opponent nor constitute — let alone win — an argument.
I’m tired of trap doors being activated. As this and a hundred other IP discussions (closer than, say, Facebook to genuine venues for argument) show, this issue is highly intricate. Kinsella is adducing issues and implications of homesteading and the nature of property that deserve proper attention, with respect for his libertarian framework, and not mere dismissal in a few aphorisms (or “snort”s) from EasyChairman Neil.
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Steve, is the defendant’s statement “Yes I killed her” enough for a conviction in a murder trial?
Stephan Kinsella’s statement, “No you don’t” to my statement that I own Alongside Night is sufficient to identity him as an opponent of my property right in the unique thing I made, and not a libertarian, which is always in all cases a proponent of individual property rights.
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“unique thingness” is now enough for ownability. Hunh?
So here are people who are enemies of property rights, commies, unlibertarian, in addition to moi: Rothbard, Benjamin Tucker, Wendy McElroy, Tom Palmer, Roderick Long, Sheldon Richman, Jeff Tucker, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, and a most other libertarians!
He acts as if we just made up this scarcity thing. IT’s old! E.g.:
David Hume, 1751 (see Hume on Intellectual Property and the Problematic “Labor” Metaphor)Benjamin Tucker, 1890s (see McElroy’s “Contra Copyright, Again”)Arnold Plant, 1934, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” 35–36Rothbard: see my post Justice and Property Rights: Rothbard on Scarcity, Property, Contracts…-
“But the answer here that I prefer to give is: if this logos is so damned unlimited as not to be an economic object — then why do you want to reproduce mine? The limits on this kind of good are not drawn by its infinite ability to replicate itself, which is a way in which the logos is not limited. However, just as property rights in the radio spectrum are not limited by area but by amplitude and frequency, the limits on logoright are not to be found in its ability to be infinitely reproduced, but in the finite identity to be exploited for its qualities and traits that distinguish any given logos from any other logos. In terms used by economists, when defining the scarcity of a logos we must look to limits of horizontal competition between different kinds of goods, rather than to the limits of vertical competition within a kind of good.”
–The Libertarian Case for IP-
Dear J. Neil Schulman,
even though it sounds repetitive, I have to say that your claim is a non-sequitur. The metaphysical justification of IP, even if true, does not fix the logical errors in the property rights theory that you build upon it. Then there is also of course the other problem I’ve been mentioning, the incoherence: you have not been able to define logos in a coherent manner. Some logos are relevant for property rights, some are not. Sometimes they are not relevant, sometimes they are. Looking at things is ok, but photographing them not. Copying them for educational and comedic purposes is, but without it isn’t. What if I earn money by teaching or am a stand up comedian? You provide no answer.
Make up your mind. Either you prefer emotions and then don’t pretend to argue, or you prefer logic and then stop running away.
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“There is it, about as bald a communist anti-propertarian, anti-individual rights, and anti-libertarian claim as has ever been made.”
There it is. Your comprehension skills are either so shot you actually think an attempt to reconsider and refine the boundary between ownable and not ownable means we are throwing out the concept of ownable entirely, or you are well-trained in sophistry and are constructing a straw man to make you feel better about your own ill-conceived creation-based approach to property.
Either way, your schoolyard debating tactics won’t work on people here, and that’s why I like this institute. Take your tantrum-throwing up to Washington D.C. I promise you’ll have more of an effect on those people than anyone here.
This “communist” charge is one of the dumbest things I have ever heard, and Tom Woods needs to add it to the list of “zombie words”. Apparently you would be running around calling all the abolitionists during the 19th Century “communists” because they were suggesting that no one can own another persons’s body. And of course by claiming other peoples’ bodies can never be property, those people are rejecting private property all together and might as well have joined up with the Bolshevists.
How bout I just call you a fascist dictator for thinking that because you wrote some book and I stumble across a copy of it on the internet, I need to run and ask you if I’m allowed to download it onto my computer.
For the record, I am musician and have been my entire life. I compose and produce and have plenty of material by this point. As a fellow author, I can vouch for how tyrannical and insane it is that you think as soon as you put together some piece of art you become the sole decider on how everyone else is to enjoy that art. It was being forced to think about this in terms of the music I write that first made me abandon all this nonsense.
And I am well aware that letting go of these bizarre insistences will only make it far easier for me to make a career out of making music. You’re shooting yourself in the foot. I’ll definitely never read your book because I have to pay for it, but I might have read it if I could get it for free. That goes for lots of other people, some of whom may be interested in paying you to write more stuff to be turned into plays and shown at theaters to make theater owners money. Go ahead and stamp your foot and say you own your book. You’re dooming it to obscurity and a couple hundred years for now you can be sure no one is even aware of your book, thanks to your insistence to make people pay to see it.
Enough with the “communist” crap. Grow the f*ck up or go hang out in a elementary school playground where you can argue with people on your own level.
April 12, 2011 at 6:00 pm
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You can get the book for free from the website: http://www.alongsidenight.com/
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“Reason is not automatic. Those who deny it cannot be conquered by it.”
Ayn Rand
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Nate-M wrote, “Obviously it doesn’t make you the original author.”
Okay, boychick. If not me, who is the author of Alongside Night?
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JNS,
You have repeatedly insulted many people here but you haven’t defended your logic at all. What purpose does calling someone “boychick” provide? You’re able to be condescending. Big deal. If you really wanted to impress us, defend your arguments. Name calling without substance is just cheap tricks.
I don’t see how you’re a victim to volume, because if you had substantively answered one or two of the early queries about the logic behind your position, this discussion might already be over.
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Count up the number of messages I’ve posted in this forum, alone, added to three decades of writing on this topic. You demand a full argument? Read The Libertarian Case for IP at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/ and MCP at
http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/04/mcp/“I don’t see how you’re a victim to volume, because if you had substantively answered one or two of the early queries about the logic behind your position, this discussion might already be over.”
This thread was started on April 1; my first comment is April 2.
Early enough for you, boychick?
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JNS,
First, calling me boychick merely reinforces my argument and undermines your reputation. I’ll address that in more detail later.
Second, I never questioned how much material you have generated. By all accounts, you are a prolific writer. I and others are questioning the quality of your argument.
Third, you may have responded early to this thread, but you have for dozens of posts now, dodged answering any specific questions about your position, specifically those that refer to contradictions or logical issues.
You continue to link to your material, yet you have also continued to avoid addressing very polite and plain questions. I won’t assume motive, but we can certainly judge action. When confronted by this, you resort to petty name calling and more avoidance, which serves to make your position look indefensible as I don’t think it actually hurts anyone’s feelings, which is what I guess you were trying to achieve by being so personal when challenged.
Perhaps that is a consequence of your esteem, some hangup which prevents you from engaging in introspection and critical analysis of your position on IP. It’s a shame. I haven’t read your novel, but by all accounts you were at one time an important libertarian hero. Now you seem to be just another bitter guy on blogs, striking out personally at anyone who questions your opinion.
Why write or respond if you’re not going to be responsive to the discourse? There are other sites and mediums if your goal is to treat people badly and avoid any serious discussion. At least for your sake, do it under a pseudonym, so your previous work and reputation aren’t tarnished by this bizarre mode of internet self-immolation.
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This has nothing to do with authorship. If you are claiming that it should be illegal for me to announce that I wrote something, then congrats. You’ve entered the realm of denying free speech.
Making copies has absolutely nothing to do with who anyone thinks the actual author was. This is entirely off-topic from an IP discussion and belongs in a discussion about the legitimacy of laws that curtail free speech, like libel and slander. Plagiarism has absolutely nothing to do with IP.
April 12, 2011 at 7:39 am
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Even if we choose not to believe something that is objectively true does not mean that we won’t end up altering our lives and business to deal with it. Perhaps the surest sign of the ‘true reality’ is the observation of how people are adapting to it. I might not believe in things I cannot directly see, for example, UV rays from the sun. But I can observe that I get an undesirable sunburn if I don’t use sunscreen.
I cite the changes observed over the last decade in various industries, like the video game industry, the music industry, the movie industry, television (or broadcasting generally), and others, as evidence that the true nature of the ownership of physical property rights is different than what we believed when intellectual property was more strongly tied to some physical medium.
Video games have shifted away from trying to compete with the raw distribution capability of piracy networks to offering gaming content on a much more epic scale a la MMORPG’s and providing services where gamers can interact with each other, rather than simply consume the content written on a data cd.
The music industry has discovered that the time it takes to search for a quality pirated version of a song is clearly worth more to many people that the 99 cents it takes to get that song instantly on I-Tunes. Also, for those who are to cheap and lazy for I-Tunes or piracy (me), Grooveshark is free to use on your computer. Apparently it still generates enough money to keep the servers on, and the record companies happy.
The movie and broadcast industries are changing too.
It seems we are undergoing a transition from a decades long system (1950-200?) where IP producers could reap enormous and long lasting rewards from a relatively short period of work (thanks to artificial scarcity imposed by IP law), to a system where IP producers must produce constantly (like their blue collar brethren) in order to stay relevant. (I don’t mean to sound too populist there- I don’t think this is a communist vs capitalist argument).
It doesn’t surprise me that music artists who produced their greatest records in the 1980′s are fighting bitterly to maintain millions of dollars per year in royalties. What does surprise me is that companies known for constantly innovating amazing new things would get into multi-million dollar battles over who invented the ‘swipe’ feature on a freaking cell phone!
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Wildberry wrote:
“How do I know? You invented the hypothetical. “license” is a concept of transfering a right to limited use. It MAY be done by contract, or it may be done by operation of law. It makes no difference. What is your point?”
What hypothetical did I invent? You either have an agreement with someone or you don’t.
You are now actually saying that a state law is an agreement between two people? You can say that an author licenses a story to a reader because the state says so? Then why are you here arguing? What’s to argue? Whatever the state says is all you ever need to know about anything. If they say blacks are slaves, then blacks have obviously agreed to be licensed to slave masters. If anyone asks where the agreement is, you point to state law that says blacks are property.
Because no one needs agreements in order to protect their property, right?Stop with the ridiculous question-begging and just defend your position with logic. You remind me of the attorney in Miracle on 34th Street who proves that the defendant is Santa Claus because the USPS delivers mail to him addressed to Santa! : )
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No offense intended…
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@Zorg April 12, 2011 at 2:51 pm
Look, dufus, you said this, right?
So if you say you are licensing the story to the reader but not actually selling it, why not have a licensing agreement?
If limited right to use is specified under the copyright law that was a condition of the transfer, why would I ALSO need a separate contract redundant to those rights already established?
If you are HYPOTHSIZING that copyrights do not exist, then there is NO REASON that a contract could NOT be used to establish these limited use rights as a condition of transfer. It might not be efficient (see Coase Theorem) because of the high transaction cost associated with negotiating a contract with every potential customer, but hey, it is POSSIBLE.
You are now actually saying that a state law is an agreement between two people?
Yes, I am actually saying that laws operate by establishing rights and consequences for violating those rights. That is why NO CONTRACT IS REQUIRED TO ENFORCE PROPERTY RIGHTS, get it? OR…. You can establish property rights, or modify them, through contract. Your point is????
As for the rest, it is just a confused mess that I won’t bother trying to straighten out for you. If you have a question, what is it?
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I said, “You are now actually saying that a state law is an agreement between two people?”
You say: “Yes, I am actually saying that laws operate by establishing rights and consequences for violating those rights. That is why NO CONTRACT IS REQUIRED TO ENFORCE PROPERTY RIGHTS, get it?”
Fine. You’re a legal positivist then. The law establishes rights. Any state decree that forces people to interact in a certain way is an “agreement” between them, and that’s why an author is “licensing” the reader when he sells a book to him. That’s great. So why are you arguing with us then? We’re here talking about the legitimacy of those laws and the basis for claimed rights. All you can do is refer to the law and continually beg the question. I wonder if you even know what that means – to beg the question.
Well, I’m done with you now that you’ve started in with the name calling. Google “ad hominem” and “begging the question.” Z ya!
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@Zorg April 12, 2011 at 6:14 pm
Don’t be so sensitive, Dufus is a term of endearment!
No, you don’t get it. Laws can reflect social norms and agreements about ethical codes.
In any case, if a law is not unjust and doesn’t need to be overturned for ethical or economic reasons, it establishes the basis for a mutual understanding rights between parties, such that an independent contract is not required IN ADDITION to establish these rights.
This is the case where two parties enter an exchange under the framework of rights that are codified in existing law. This is the context in which copyrights operates, today, in the real world.
You apparently take issue with something here, but I can’t figure out what it is. Would you like to explain what it is?
You want to re-open the discussion of whether these property rights are ligitimate, starting from the beginning?
Why not add something, or present something or ask somethnig or challenge somthing instead of spending your time trying to categorize me in some particular way by putting words in my mouth?
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“Laws can reflect social norms and agreements about ethical codes”
They sure can, and enforcing those laws on anyone who is not part of the agreement is totally unjustifiable.
We’re not talking about making a community where one of the rules for entry is that you can’t make copies of other peoples’ creative works (and no, this does not produce IP, because no one outside the community is bound to any of their communal agreements).
But the people outside the community still cannot trespass on the community’s physical property, regardless of what agreements have been made.
Ethics obviously has nothing to do with reaching agreement. If everyone reaches agreement, then there is no conflict and no need to even bring up ethics! Ethics is a set of logicall deductible theorems that separate performatively self-consistent action from performatively self-contradicting action. No agreement can ever make murder justifiable, because murder is incompatible with argumentation. Again, see Hoppe.
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From what I can tell, Schulmann’s logos argument makes a very glaring equivocation of a universal form and a particular instance of that form.
Nobody would deny that if you design a logo or right a story of a manuscript or whatever, that you own that *instance* of that “logo”, which would include the pattern of ink on the paper, for example.
But then you all of a sudden jump from ownership of a particular instance of a logo to ownership of the universal category of that logo, which in turn implies ownership of every particular instance of that logo.
This is where I see the absurdity. Sure when you design a logo on a physical object you own that physical object and the *instance* of that logo, but you certainly do not own the universal category of that logo. If I build a factory of a certain design I own that particular factory, not every instance of a factory that belongs to some universal category, be it the category of factories, the category of factories using this design, or any other category (the utter arbitrariness of what categories to use permeates every pro-IP argument).
When you design a logo, you own the instance of that logo, not every instance of that logo. Thus “logorights” is nothing more than a particular interpretation of some physical property rights. Every “logoright” in this sense is already a part of physical property rights acquired only by homesteading.
If “logorights” implies that ownership of an instance of a category can lead to ownership of every instance of that category then it conflicts with physical property to the point that people could not even act. Whatever claim to ownership over your own body you have is potentially a claim of ownership to every body ever.
For all you’ve said about “identity” Schulmann, it should be clear to you that the process of identification separates different copies of a creative work (or or different instances of a logo) and can only lead you to the conclusion that your claim to ownership stops precisely where the boundary of identification is drawn. You own the object that is a singular “thing”, an identifiable means to and end. You don’t by doing so all of a sudden own a set of identifiable objects which, as we can all agree, are always distiguishable by the mere fact that they are different instances.
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Roderick Long makes this argument about universals in his paper from 1995
https://c4sif.org/2011/04/roderick-longs-classic-demolition-of-intellectual-property/-
@ Stephan Kinsella April 13, 2011 at 12:40 am
I can see why this guy is your man, although I have to admit he made your argument in far fewer words that you have. I can do better:
IP has an unsavory past.
We have IP because we have the State.
Ideas are free.
Externalities don’t matter.
Monopolies are bad.
Technology makes property rights obsolete.
PR campaigns to boycot competitors are more efficient than those pesky property rights.Finito!
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This little excerpt from the link Stephan posted says it all, I think.
“It is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copyrights) that they do not arise out of the scarcity of the objects which become appropriated. They are not a consequence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute law; and, whereas in general the institution of private property makes for the preservation of scarce goods, tending (as we might somewhat loosely say) to lead us “to make the most of them,” property rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained. Whereas we might expect that public action concerning private property would normally be directed at the prevention of the raising of prices, in these cases the object of the legislation is to confer the power of raising prices by enabling the creation of scarcity. The beneficiary is made the owner of the entire supply of a product for which there may be no easily obtainable substitute. It is the intention of the legislators that he shall be placed in a position to secure an income from the monopoly conferred upon him by restricting the supply in order to raise the price.” – Arnold Plant
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@Zorg April 12, 2011 at 8:40 pm
Yes, this says it all. It can be summarized this way: “Ideas/IP are free, all monopolies are equally bad, and we have IP because we have the state, .”
He assumes the conclusion that an original work is non-scarce by the principle that they could be infinately replicated, yet ignores the necessity of the private production of the original, scarce work. Ease of replication is not that which establishes whether something is ownable, although ideas are free.
He equivocates the connotations of monopoly, as Mises clearly explains as the misunderstanding of the nature of economic monopoly v. property monopoly. Product monopolies do not do what he claims, property monopolies are everywhere in a free market.
Finally, he treats the economic issue of externalities and public choice as simply mercantilism. Without the state, we would be free from state coercion.
Other than that, it is a fine statement.
April 13, 2011 at 7:26 am
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it is not ignoring it. You can produce scarce “ideas” in your head all the time and keep them “locked” (in your head). But when someone happens to know them too (by accident, individual revelation or by learning from you), it no longer is “scarce” and any force used to prevent other person from using what he learned is illegitimate (unless it was covered by contract).
(comment doesn’t show up, sorry for duplication).
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This disagreement about the meaning of the word “scarce” accounts for a substantial chunk of the debate, in my opinion. With respect to IP:
Some people say “scarce” and mean difficulty of propagation or duplication. E.g., it’s easy to copy an MP3 file.
Some people say “scarce” and mean difficulty of design. E.g., it’s difficult to write a popular novel.
Technology pushes propagation and duplication toward triviality, but has not substantially diminished the essential difficulties of design.
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ESV,
Well said.
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“He assumes the conclusion that an original work is non-scarce”
Not assumed, observed. It is non-scarce as soon as it is published. What the author wants and gets as a monopolist is to control the production and price of that non-scarce good in order to make a market. This does not come about through natural law or contract, but by statute.
“yet ignores the necessity of the private production of the original, scarce work.”
Everything must be privately produced. And referring to the original as scarce is irrelevant since it only becomes an economic good when it is published and marketed. It remains scarce in the sense that it is a particular story and not another, but that fact is irrelevant to the monopoly on production of that particular good. The natural market therefore is that Story A1 compete with Story B2 through Z10000000, which it always does. But the market on production is what the statute of privilege aims at. This enables production of Story A to be monopolized in order to fix its price in relation to the prices of other monopolized stories.
Competition breaks this cartel-of-individual-monopolies (is there a term for that?) structure and drives down price to the actual market price, which in the digital realm is eventually going to approach zero, reflecting its non-scarcity in full. Paper & ink books though will likely always have a production cost relative to other such books and therefore still bring in a profit provided there is a demand for this type scarce incarnation of the work.
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@Zorg April 13, 2011 at 12:26 pm
It is non-scarce as soon as it is published
Yes, and scarce before it was published, and owned by an individual. What “rights” does this original owner have, if any?
And referring to the original as scarce is irrelevant since it only becomes an economic good when it is published and marketed.
Yes, and as an economic good, we should apply economic analysis to the issue of property rights, and how they operate in a free market. See Mises/Coase on externalities.
It remains scarce in the sense that it is a particular story and not another, but that fact is irrelevant to the monopoly on production of that particular good.
This is the nature of product monopoly, which is everywhere, and is not equivalent to economic monopoly. It is not that bad books cost $5 and great ones cost $5,000. It is that “books” complete, just like hotels compete. You cannot, however, open a hot dog stand in the lobby of my hotel.
But the market on production is what the statute of privilege aims at. This enables production of Story A to be monopolized in order to fix its price in relation to the prices of other monopolized stories.
How is this statement any different for any other property? Are you simply restating the operation of private property in the economy? My hotel is “monopolized”, but I compete with your hotel. Right?
There is no “cartel of individual monopolies” although making that concept up is helpful to your erroneous conclusion that an author of a book is part of any larger cartel. All books compete with all other books. As a consumer, you decide which to consume. Good books attract more consumers. What theory of property justifies the acquistion of property without compensation to the owner? You are simply making this statement because know that you can replicate the original work cheaply. The relative low cost of replication is why books cost $5 and not more. In the 1300′s, books were very, very expensive compared to other goods. You are simply saying that technology makes things ceaper to produce.
The relvant production cost is the cost of producing the original manuscript, not the production of copies. When you introduce a new model car, the cost of replication is not the only cost. There is a capital cost that has to be accounted for. In your theory, you dismiss the capital cost and expect the cost should be limited to the cost of replication. Sorry, things don’t get produced that way, do they?
When you want a new car, do you just borrow your neibor’s and copy it? Why can you make this leap of dismissing property rights just because replication is cheap?
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He assumes the conclusion that an original work is non-scarce by the principle that they could be infinately replicated, yet ignores the necessity of the private production of the original, scarce work.
Finally someone owns up to the labour fallacy.
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@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 2:05 am
Sorry, but thanks for playing.
Do you dispute that an author owns his original manuscript before any copies are made or it is distributed to anyone? If so, why is that?
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Sorry, but thanks for playing.
Que?
Do you dispute that an author owns his original manuscript before any copies are made or it is distributed to anyone?
He owns it before and after. Copies don’t change ownership. He still “owns” the original assuming he still has the original in his possession. Everyone who has made a copy (if they have made a copy) own their copy and not his original.
Property rights are great. Everyone understands who owns what, so that we can avoid and resolve conflicts simply and cheaply.
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@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 1:31 pm
Since agree on that point, no need to debate the labor theory of property, or any other theory of natural property rights, since we arrive at the same conclusion. Right?
So, here I am, owning an original manuscript. As such, I have a claim to the economics rights to its use and distribution.
And there you are, wanting to acquire a copy if what is “in” the manuscript (say a novel), and you calim the economic right to the use and distribution of that copy.
These are conflicting claims of rights. Each must defend their positions. What methodolgoy do you recommend for deciding what we should do?
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I think you mean the labour theory of value. You and JNS and most IP proponents including Randians are all appealing to a form of the LTV when you insist creation is a property right.
So, here I am, owning an original manuscript. As such, I have a claim to the economics rights to its use and distribution.
I don’t know what economic rights are, but so far it sounds reasonable.
And there you are, wanting to acquire a copy if what is “in” the manuscript (say a novel), and you calim the economic right to the use and distribution of that copy.
I don’t follow this.
These are conflicting claims of rights.
How so?
Each must defend their positions.
Must they?
What methodolgoy do you recommend for deciding what we should do?
There are two pieces of property if there is a copy. Who owns which? Does someone else own all of the goods you have which are copies or based on a template/pattern? Does Chrysler own [sic] your car, and KitchenAid [sic] your blender, and Samsung [sic] your TV?
Lay out a chain of reasoning here. How does the second party get a copy of the manuscript? That’s the devil in the details.
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@DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 6:11 pm
I think you mean the labour theory of value. You and JNS and most IP proponents including Randians are all appealing to a form of the LTV when you insist creation is a property right.
I actually meant to say “a property theory based on the labor theory of value”. Sorry for the shorthand gibberish. Actually, I don’t hold that view. My view is very libertarian.
Property rights are asserted and defended. They are a human device. Basic property rights, and certainly the right of an author to his original manuscript, derive from the principles of self ownership and the private ownership of the means of production. But if you agree that an author owns his original manuscript, we don’t need to argue about that, right? We can start from that common ground.So, here I am, owning an original manuscript. As such, I have a claim to the economics rights to its use and distribution.
I don’t know what economic rights are, but so far it sounds reasonable.
Economic rights: the right to sell, gift or destroy property that one owns. It is an exclusive right of property ownership, and is a bundle of rights that enable a given right to be alienated from the sum total of rights that comprise private ownership. For example, it would be an exercise of the economic rights of a landlord to grant the right of possession but not the right of sale to a tenant. I can sell my land but retain mineral rights, etc.
And there you are, wanting to acquire a copy if what is “in” the manuscript (say a novel), and you claim the economic right to the use and distribution of that copy.
I don’t follow this.
I am setting up a scenario where I have a manuscript, which I own, and you have money, and want to possess what I’ve written. You think it will be useful to you in some way. You are approaching the deal with the position that if I sell you a copy, you own it outright; you can sell it, gift it, or destroy it. I no longer would have any rights in the copy. That is the starting position of our impending transaction.
These are conflicting claims of rights.
How so?
Again with the shorthand. My claim is that if I sell or give you a copy of my manuscript, I only pass you the right to possess and read a copy. Your claim is that if I sell or give you a copy, there are no restrictions, just like if I sold you a car. No part of that car is mine.
Each must defend their positions.
Must they?
Rights must be asserted and then defended. I would attempt to defend my right to decide the terms of releasing my property to you. You would attempt to defend your right to take it only under conditions of clear title, thus relinquishing any rights I might still claim to have after I transfer a copy to you. We need to take the next step.
What methodology do you recommend for deciding what we should do?
There are two pieces of property if there is a copy. Who owns which
I own them both, the original and the copy. You want the copy. You don’t own anything yet. Play along.
Does someone else own all of the goods you have which are copies or based on a template/pattern? Does Chrysler own [sic] your car, and KitchenAid [sic] your blender, and Samsung [sic] your TV?
No. If I make something with my own means of production, I stand before the market trying to make a deal. I take into consideration everything I know. I know that cars and appliances and TVs are hard to copy. The average consumer isn’t going to try, and even if they did, they would not likely compete on price. That is the situation with the items you mentioned. You need a factory to compete in making copies. That requires capital. You are not likely to invest the required capital just to get one copy. These are the facts surrounding the transactions you describe.
This is not the situation with an intellectual product. Once it is released, every copy is also a factory. This is a rather unique situation. That presents a market problem that is not handled well by the standard rules of property, where the cost of making copies is high (cars) or infinite (land).
Here is the scenario:
I have a manuscript, which I own. You want a copy. I have to decide what I will do, and you have to decide what you will do. That is the nature of the economic calculations that comprise the catallactics of economic trade and pricing theory, and the praxeology of human action.
I am leading you up to a moment where we face each other under these conditions. Do you have any issues with the way I’ve laid it out? Have I violated any ethical principles of property, etc. that you would like to object to? Can we start from here without having to go back and argue anything that has led up to this moment?
Lay out a chain of reasoning here. How does the second party get a copy of the manuscript? That’s the devil in the details.
Well, it is a market problem. I am a property owner. I have produced a product which you demand. From my point of view, I want to internalize the benefits of my production process. You want to pay what it is worth to you. I have produced a manuscript, and for whatever reason, you believe it would be useful to possess it. Let’s negotiate.
What I know is this. If I sell it to you with no strings attached, you will be able to “publish it” freely because of the low marginal cost of making copies. It is analogous to the following: I own a hotel. Each time I rent out a room, I sell an equal share of my hotel to the tenant. Now he can rent out rooms too. After a few weeks, everyone who has stayed in my hotel is renting out rooms in what is my hotel, and I no longer have a valuable economic interest it. I can’t sell it, because it already has 100’s of partners, all renting out rooms. Where is the return for the investment in buying the hotel? How would such an arrangement make it worthwhile to try to own and operate any hotel?
How should I solve this market problem?
This is the scenario I am posing. Do you accept the premises of this example? Do you have a problem going forward, or do you want to argue about something I’ve said so far?
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Wildberry, I will have to keep it short, because you wrote a long essay and I could spend hours picking it apart.
First of all, I only skimmed it looking for relevance.
This
Basic property rights, and certainly the right of an author to his original manuscript, derive from the principles of self ownership and the private ownership of the means of production.
makes absolutely no sense. What are the “principles of self ownership”?
Economic rights: the right to sell, gift or destroy property that one owns.
I have never heard of economic rights. The right to dispose of your property as you choose is just a part of basic property rights. There is no specifically economic rights component to property rights.
I am setting up a scenario where I have a manuscript, which I own, and you have money, and want to possess what I’ve written. You think it will be useful to you in some way. You are approaching the deal with the position that if I sell you a copy, you own it outright; you can sell it, gift it, or destroy it. I no longer would have any rights in the copy. That is the starting position of our impending transaction.
And we either agree on terms or we don’t. Pretty basic exchange theory.
My claim is that if I sell or give you a copy of my manuscript, I only pass you the right to possess and read a copy.
That’s fine, you can stipulate that contractually. It has nothing to do with property rights, and everything to do with conditions of exchange.
Rights must be asserted and then defended.
They do not have to be. They could be. No one is compelled to defend his rights.
I know that cars and appliances and TVs are hard to copy.
You didn’t answer my question. Who owns your car, you or Chrysler? Who owns your TV, you or Samsung? There can only be ONE owner, in order to avoid conflict (a purpose of property rights). Who is that owner?
This is the scenario I am posing. Do you accept the premises of this example? Do you have a problem going forward, or do you want to argue about something I’ve said so far?
Honestly, you lost me. I don’t understand the need to set up some long and arbitrary example to make a point. We can deduce the correct answer by applying sound first principles. What are the principles you are promoting?
Also, this is why I keep petitioning you to debate with me in the community. Forum comment threads are not good for discussion. Your longer comments are almost post worthy on their own, but they get lost in these discussions, which frankly is a disincentive for me to spend a lot of time breaking down and replying to your argument precisely.
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@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 9:55 pm
I agree this format is a problem in keeping any form of continuity.
Fundamentally, there is the first principle of property ownership. Personally I think that is settled. No one has an argument that the author doesn’t own his own manuscript.
Do you agree? Yes or no?
If yes, then the issue is an economics of law question from there. That issue is too complex, probably, to have as a side discussion to any one of the many threads Kinsella creates with his posts.
Can you be specific about what you have in mind?
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Fundamentally, there is the first principle of property ownership.
I am still unsure what you mean by a first principle of property ownership.
No one has an argument that the author doesn’t own his own manuscript.
I think we do have an argument though. The author owns the manuscript as written on his paper, he doesn’t own the manuscript if he wrote it on my paper. JNS can’t come over to my house, write passages from Alongside Night on my walls or table, and then claim he owns them. Or can he?
You still have not answered my question about the car and the television. Who owns them?
Thanks.
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@DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 11:57 am
I was writing to you when this posted and didn’t see it before.
I said self-ownership, and private means. Your walls are not within JNS’s means. He doesn’t own your walls in any case I can imagine.
Also, you have some kind of misunderstanding about what the “infringement” of IP means. It does not mean I own, or claim to own your property. Either you owe me damages under contract or tort theory, or you are liable criminally. Those are the choices. IP laws are civil laws, except in extreme cases of willful acts.
There is no real theory, despite what is so often repeated here, that me having rights to IP means I own your property. That is a complete fabrication.
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@ DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 11:57 am
Assume that the manuscript is written on my paper. Do I own it?
By the way, if JNS wrote a passage on your wall without your consent, he woud be liable for damages, but you would not “own” what he wrote on your wall if he already owns it.
Two separate issues, right?
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What are means? Do you mean private property or something different?
I haven’t articulated an argument about infringement at all. Did you mean to reply to someone else?
I am trying to methodically work through your rights system for property so I can better understand your argument.
You have still not answered my question about the car or the television, I believe this is the 3rd time I have reminded you. Surely it is a question you can answer very easily, unless you are genuinely unsure of what you do and do now own. Would you please answer me this time?
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Assume that the manuscript is written on my paper. Do I own it?
If you own the paper, you own whatever is written upon it.
By the way, if JNS wrote a passage on your wall without your consent, he woud be liable for damages
What if he wrote on my wall with my consent? Would he own my wall or not?
but you would not “own” what he wrote on your wall if he already owns it.
You’re assuming the conclusion. You claim he owns something, without explaining how he owns it. That’s pretty convenient. If he owned what he writes, then he would own my wall by writing on it. Either that or I would own it because as you claimed, it is my wall, and I can do with it what I want.
Do you see an issue with this? Please be very specific.
Two separate issues, right?
It is the same issue. You assume JNS has some ownership of non-property that conflicts with my ownership of my property. Property rights do not create conflicts. They are applied to resolve and prevent conflicts.
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@DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 1:28 pm
What are means? Do you mean private property or something different?”
Privately owned means of production. Are you not familiar with this term? If I own the iron and furnace, transform those into a sword, I own the sword because I have employed my privately owned means of production. Mises use this term extensively, especially in this writings criticizing socialism, which holds that the state owns the means of production.
I haven’t articulated an argument about infringement at all. Did you mean to reply to someone else?
No, I was talking to you. By infringement, I mean my claim that you have violated my rights in my property. That claim is not a claim on your property, unlike many, including Kinsella claim. It is a claim of liability for harm under a theory of tort law or damages under contract law. In neither case does that liability result in me claiming any kind of ownership in your property. That is a fabricated claim. Such a violation of my rights to my property is simply called an “infringement” in the context of IP.
I am trying to methodically work through your rights system for property so I can better understand your argument.
I am trying to figure out what you don’t understand, so we can agree that the author owns his manuscript and move on.
You have still not answered my question about the car or the television, I believe this is the 3rd time I have reminded you. Surely it is a question you can answer very easily, unless you are genuinely unsure of what you do and do now own. Would you please answer me this time?
I thought I did when I said that if you sell me chattel, like cars, trains and automobiles, or TVs or Appliances, I own them. I also said that when I buy a TV I don’t own the TV factory, just a single TV. It is an easy answer for these types of consumer goods. OK?
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@ DixieFlatline April 14, 2011 at 1:33 pm
If you own the paper, you own whatever is written upon it.
OK, fine, we agree then. If I own the paper, and I used only what is my property, or something from the public domain (like letters of the alphabet, ideas, grammar rules, air to breath, etc.), and produce a manuscript, I own it. It is my property and no one has a better title to it than me. OK?
What if he wrote on my wall with my consent? Would he own my wall or not?
Of course not. Are you really confused about this or do you think I am?
You’re assuming the conclusion.</blockquote.
I am stating my conclusion. I am saying that IF he already owned what he wrote, and he did not intend to transfer ownership to you by the act of writing on your wall with your consent, then you cannot assume that he transferred it to you. Since he owns it, it is up to him to decide if he wants to give it up, no you.
You claim he owns something, without explaining how he owns it. That’s pretty convenient. If he owned what he writes, then he would own my wall by writing on it. Either that or I would own it because as you claimed, it is my wall, and I can do with it what I want.
It is not that I don’t understand your position. There are two issue here. Let’s separate them.
First, does he own what he writes or do you? There is no escaping the fact that this is a property problem.
If I assume the existence of copyright law at the time of the writing, the answer is clear; you own your wall and what is written on it, but your use of that writing is limited by the terms of use specified by copyright law, which says, that transfer of the copyright itself is not transferred without explicit written evidence of intent to transfer by the owner, very similar to the rules (statute of fraud) for transferring title to land.
If I assume the absence of copyright law, then we cannot assume that he would write it, even with your permission, for if he understood at the time that buy such an act, he would be conveying something of value (to him) without negotiating some exchange from you, he would not do it. A rational person who is aware of this fact would not write on your wall in the first place.
This is the assumption that is often depended upon here to make the anti-IP case for copying; that the copy is available in the absence of copyrights, under the exact same conditions that would exist in the presence of copyright laws. This is a huge assumption because it leads to the wrong conclusion.
If I own a manuscript, and there is no copyright laws, I understand then that as soon as I disclose it, I willable transferring all economic rights to it. Anyone and everyone who has a copy of it would have equal rights to its use without limitations. Under those conditions, I would be very careful how I disclosed it, and you would have to pay dearly to get a copy.
I earlier used the analogy of a hotel to illustrate this. If every time I rented a room, the renter could assume that he bought the hotel, I would be very careful about the contract and my right to enforce it before I rented a room, or even more important, before I invested in owning a hotel in the first place. This is the problem of economic externalities.
The second issue of what happens to your property, after it is written upon.
It is your wall under any assumption. With or without copyrights, unless you transfer your wall to him, it remains yours. The only issue is about what is written.
It is a fabricated claim to insist that the concept of IP is that my rights in IP somehow stakes a claim on your property. This is false. It creates a tort claim, or a contract claim, or both. Nothing in IP law operates as a confiscation of your property.
If you want me to elaborate, tell me your issue with this.
You assume JNS has some ownership of non-property that conflicts with my ownership of my property. Property rights do not create conflicts. They are applied to resolve and prevent conflicts.
To be clear, I do not assume nor do I argue for what you say. Where is the conflict? It is not over your property. You own the wall. If he had tacked a $100 bill to your wall, would he own your wall?
Of course not; if I pee on your tree, that doesn’t prove I own it, right? Because the tree is yours, you have liability rights against people who pee on your tree without your consent.
A property rights problem does arises, however, if you claimed the $100 and he disagreed with your claim. You would have to defend your asserted right to the $100. How would this be resolved? We would look to the intent of the original owner. We start with who owned the$100 before it was tacked to your wall. If the owner intended to give you the $100, then it has been transferred by his act of nailing it to your wall, a constructive transfer. If he did not intend to transfer it, then all you could do is demand that he remove it from your wall.
You could not claim ownership of it simply based on the fact that it is nailed to our wall.
So, the issue comes down to this: Did he own the $100 before he nailed it to your wall?
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Sorry, the editing function here is not working, for some reason, so I couldn’t correct the formatting. If it is too difficult to read, I can repost.
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@ DixieFlatline April 13, 2011 at 9:55 pm
Let me try to be brief for once.
We own our selves. What we produce with our own means and with our own personal capabilities, belongs to us. This is pure libertarian principles of private property rights.
Economic rights: see my response to Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:27 am
What we agree to and how we enforce that agreement is precisely the issue.
It has everything to do with property rights. The subject of any contract is the exchange of property. How can I contract for something which I do not own, or have the rights to trade?
If asserted rights are not defended (in the face of a confrontation) they are not rights. Therefore rights must be defensible. However, you are correct, they can be abandoned, perhaps to avoid confrontation. At that point, they cease to be rights, at least for that individual at that time.
If you transfer title to chattel to me, I own it, provided I have paid you for it. What I have paid in exchange for possession is precisely the issue I am raising.
I am promoting the principles of private property and free trade, as they apply to the exchange of intellectual works. I am attempting to see if we can proceed from a basis of agreement without debating how we get there.
That basis is that we agree that the author owns his manuscript. Do you agree?
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I meant:
“If you transfer title to chattel to me, I own it, provided I have paid you for it. What I have received in exchange for what I’ve paid is precisely the issue I am raising.”
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Wildberry,
Economic rights: the right to sell, gift or destroy property that one owns.
And you still have that with or without IP. What you don’t have without IP is the ability to sell, gift or destroy other people’s property: the copies.
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@Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:03 am
No conclusions assumed in that comment, right?
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Wildberry,
of course there is a conclusion: IP contradicts other rights. Making up newspeak such as “economic rights” does not fix it.
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Wildberry,
I am leading you up to a moment where we face each other under these conditions.
But that is precisely what IP is not about. IP is about applying restrictions to people you have no contractual relationship with. If you lease (let’s use that term for simplification) someone a book with restrictive permissions, that has nothing to do with IP. That’s just a conditional transfer of title (of the money from the lessee to the lessor).
IP is about restricting the behaviour of third parties who get a hold of the information without either being in contract with the IP owner or altering the property of the IP owner. So, the IP theoreticians need to extend the definition of trespass from “alteration of one’s property” to “being causally affected by one’s property”. That is of course problematic for the same reasons I’ve been repeating for quite some time now, it contradicts other rights and is incoherent.
But who am I talking to.
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Yourself.
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DixieFlatline wrote, “I think you mean the labour theory of value. You and JNS and most IP proponents including Randians are all appealing to a form of the LTV when you insist creation is a property right.”
I’ve noted Wildberry’s answer; let me speak for myself.
The property theory I’ve put forward does not derive from nor depend on “labor theory of value.” At no point in my argumentation have I ever suggested that work creates value.
What human action creates is a new thing — a thing with new and distinct properties that give it a new identity and new properties that can be exploited.
Whether anyone chooses to act with respect to this new thing — to find value in it to be exploited or traded — is a secondary question.
The anti-IP position conflates the two — purposively to confuse the issue, in my opinion.
There is a stark difference between a thing being made and what people choose to do with it after it is made. Just because someone works to make something doesn’t mean anyone else desires it, which is the source of it having value.
But, conversely, if someone else desires it that does act to demonstrate there is some real THING to desire that would not have existed with its creators human action.
Human action — work, if you will — does make a new thing, and that is a proof of existence and utility, not a proof of value.
Subjective value theory is unaffected by this property-rights position.
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What human action creates is a new thing — a thing with new and distinct properties that give it a new identity and new properties that can be exploited.
Every single creation is unique, no two creations or creators are identical. No two moments in time are equal. No two valuations are equal.
As to the rest, I think we agree on STV. But you’re still not explaining how creation has anything to do with property.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
The property theory I’ve put forward does not derive from nor depend on “labor theory of value.”
So why do you then repeatedly refer to it? Such as this:
If you say the logos doesn’t have value, then why does imposing a logos on two dollars worth of computer diskettes make them several-dollars worth of software?
And if a logos has no value as a separate property from that object which it is imposed upon, why would you be upset it you brought home the book you thought was ATLAS SHRUGGED and found that the first sentence was not, “Who is John Galt?”
So you don’t even know what you’re talking about. In addition to that, we don’t claim that the immaterial aspects of things don’t have value.
Also, you say:
If a logos has no value in itself, then removing it from the objects on which it is found should make no difference in the values found in those objects.
Unless you can show how to do this without altering the object’s physical attributes, IP is contradictory (or redundant) with respect to it.
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Peter Surda wrote in a clear and understandable question:
“The property theory I’ve put forward does not derive from nor depend on “labor theory of value. So why do you then repeatedly refer to it? Such as this:”
“‘If you say the logos doesn’t have value, then why does imposing a logos on two dollars worth of computer diskettes make them several-dollars worth of software? And if a logos has no value as a separate property from that object which it is imposed upon, why would you be upset it you brought home the book you thought was ATLAS SHRUGGED and found that the first sentence was not, “Who is John Galt?’”
Answered in my reply to DixieFlatline at http://blog.mises.org/16319/the-origins-of-libertarian-ip-abolitionism/comment-page-2/#comment-772292:
There is a stark difference between a thing being made and what people choose to do with it after it is made. Just because someone works to make something doesn’t mean anyone else desires it, which is the source of it having value.
But, conversely, if someone else desires it that does act to demonstrate there is some real THING to desire that would not have existed with its creator’s human action.
“Also, you say:
‘If a logos has no value in itself, then removing it from the objects on which it is found should make no difference in the values found in those objects.’
“Unless you can show how to do this without altering the object’s physical attributes, IP is contradictory (or redundant) with respect to it.”
It can’t be removed without altering any of the object’s physical attributes. It can be removed without altering any of the object’s OTHER physical attributes, therefore creating a difference between the two entities — one with the logos, one without.
The properties and utility of the object of one (with) is now different from the other (without), and humans can make a subjective value judgment based on the difference between one and the other.
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JNS,
There is a stark difference between a thing being made and what people choose to do with it after it is made.
I don’t think Peter or I are contesting that. We’re asking you to substantiate the relevance of it.
The properties and utility of the object of one (with) is now different from the other (without), and humans can make a subjective value judgment based on the difference between one and the other.
The properties may be different, but only individual actors can make claims about utility. You can’t make objective claims about utility without rejecting subjective value theory. This is what I have been pointing out.
Human can make a subjective value judgment between two (seemingly) identical cans of coke because as I indicated above, there are no two perfectly identical objects. Any sense of commonality is probably more likely due to the limitation of our senses and ability to perceive, not some fact of material existence. As I have indicated, perfect copies are impossible in our scarce reality.
This sort of thing is why the position of pro-IP folk have to tend towards the labor theory.
IP Abolitionists rightly understand that all action is creation, and all human action is the product of emulation. Emulation is the foundation for creation.
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Wildberry,
These are conflicting claims of rights.
Yet you complain when I say that IP and rights in physical goods contradict each other. Who knows what’s going on in your head.
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@Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:02 am
Maybe you could learn to ask better questions, or offer something that is conprehensive and contributes to mutual understanding.
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That is, “comprehensible”.
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How many copies of Atlas Shrugged exist? Millions. How many Atlas Shrugged’s are there? One. Atlas Shrugged is just as scarce a commodity as the day Ayn Rand finished the manuscript. It was one Atlas Shrugged then and one Atlas Shrugged now. Atlas Shrugged is a unique thing. Only the number of carriers of that singular and scarce object varies.
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“How many copies of Atlas Shrugged exist? Millions. How many Atlas Shrugged’s are there? One. Atlas Shrugged is just as scarce a commodity as the day Ayn Rand finished the manuscript.”
That’s a distinction without a difference, Neil. My copy of Atlas is the same as yours, is the same as Rand’s. Atlas is NOT a scarce commodity. Calling it a unique thing as opposed to its “carriers” doesn’t change anything. It always exists on carriers. It’s a carrier mediated thing. We all have it on carriers, therefore we all have the story. The pattern of the words is in the possession of every person owning a copy of the book. Rand didn’t keep parts of it locked away. She released the whole thing that she called Atlas Shrugged, causing it to be published to the world. The “unique thing” is not in any danger of disappearing, and you can’t remove it from the millions of “copies.”
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Atlas Shrugged has no meaning except in the human mind. Each human has a slightly different interpretation and provides a different valuation to any book. There are as many different variations and interpretations created from reading Atlas Shrugged as there are people who have read the book. And it is not as though Atlas Shrugged was created in some box called the human mind by itself. Everyone who has made anything has experienced life, reading the books of others, talking and learning from others…
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Would the solipsists please leave this universe and stick to their own bubble? People are talking to each other in this one.
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I don’t think this is solipsism. I think this is a clue to the root point, with respect to your logorights formulation, that many of your opponents diverge. In your logorights description, you ask:
Are two separately existing Entities,
sharing the exact same Identity, (A) identical in themselves (that
is, metaphysically the same Entity, though observably not the
same Existent, since each exists apart from the other), or (B) not
identical in themselves but identical only to the consciousness
that perceives them.(This is somewhat technical language, easy to misinterpret it unless you’ve read through the definitions up to that point in my opinion.)
Although you (Neil) answer [a], I have a sneaking feeling that Stephan Kinsella would answer [b]. This is the earliest (i.e., most fundamental) point at which I can see a divergence.
In answer to your earlier question: Platonist, Nominalist, or Randian/neo-Aristotelian/Objectivist, my guess that Kinsella’s and Swaringen’s answer would not be the last. Though this is just my speculation, I surmise they’d pick a forth option that would lead to [b], Conceptualist.
April 13, 2011 at 11:18 pm
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@J Neil Schulman:
Your whole theory is flawed because it is not consistent and based on the illusionary fundament of true identity in spacetime: On what grounds do you tell if something is IDENTICAL? What is the basis for that? Physics? Have fun with molecules, particles and quantum physics. Have fun with different content mediums.
Philosophical grounds? Metaphysics? You believe in recognizing the “Ding an sich”? Really? You believe in essences? Really?
What makes a story unique? The words? The content? The form? Some metaphysical essence?
What makes a work derivative? What ISN’T derivative?
What is it that does EXACTLY define your “logorights”? You can’t give an answer to that because there isn’t one.
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From The Libertarian Case for Ip at http://jneilschulman.rationalreview.com/2011/03/the-libertarian-case-for-ip/
When it comes to questions of identity, the copy IS the original; an entity is an entity: A is A.
One may wish, at this point, to expand the discussion to entities which are similar but not exactly identical, and put forward the position that each copy is a different entity as well as a different existent.
The discussion would then have to continue to take in boundary effects and threshhold limits of which attributes define an entity and which do not, but the principle would remain intact. Such boundary problems and threshhold effects relate to all questions of ownership and property–otherwise shining a flashlight onto someone’s lawn could be considered, on the face of it, photon invasion of that property. Obviously whether damage is or is not done to the lawn has to be asked at some point: this is what I mean by boundary limits and threshhold effects.
It strikes me that the clearest illustration I can give that property rights are dependent on a thing’s identity, not merely on its material existence, is the following question: have I violated your property rights if I pulverize your car, but leave you in possession of every microgram of dust?
Answering no defeats one’s argument by reducing to absurdity.
But if one answers yes, then what one is claiming ownership of was a thing — an entity — and one must claim that by removing the identity of that thing I have violated one’s property rights.
This concedes that property rights are bound to the identity, as well as the mere existence, of a property, and if this is so, then does it not follow that the ownership of that property’s identity is as exclusive to its owner as everything else about it?
Thus, to a propertarian, my logoright case is proved by the Law of Identity alone …
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No one here is going to disagree with “identity” to the extent you mean “form.” Of course anyone recognizes it as a violation of property to sit in your car, slash your tires or blow up your car regardless of whether you still have the pieces.
But by making this argument it occurs to me that you somehow see this destruction as somehow similar to copying.
If someone uses their replication device to beam a copy of my car to their house and I never see them do this or meet them my entire life or hear of this I am none the wiser. There was no aggression, and I have not been injured. I can still eat, go to work/etc. just like before. The car manufacturer was not harmed, he still has just as many cars to sell as he had before. The car designer is still out there designing new cars. But there is now a guy with a car he wouldn’t otherwise have had.
Who should this bother? Why? How can this be compared to destruction? This guy now has a car he didn’t have, and I still have mine. I suppose you may say that he might have had to purchase one instead, but so what? What if he used walked instead of used a car? It’s still a loss of money to the manufacturer either way. And by the logic that we should be trying to keep prices up we should all try to be lazy and unproductive so as to raise the value of things produced. We should dump factories and make things by hand.
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@Matthew Swaringen April 15, 2011 at 6:40 pm
I suppose if we lived in a world where this was actually possible, we would have to figure out how to handle it. Since the problem of getting a new car would be solved as long as there was one to copy from at zero cost, then as JNS pointed out earlier, we would have arrived at the Star Trek stage of manufacturing. All we have to worry about is how to get new car designs. Otherwise, we will be stuck with whatever we have the day such devices are invented and available.
In one respect, if replication of cars like you say is potentially possible at some future time, then that time has arrived in the era of digital publishing. Once you have an original to copy from, you can make a zillion copies for next to nothing.
If you were in the new car design and prototype development business, how would you propose dealing the externality issues associated with the low cost of replication once your new/improved model is released, in a world where low cost “magic” replication of cars is possible?
Replicating cars without a mass production factory is not economically possible today, but if all you did need was the original to copy from, we would be set, as long as we are satisfied with the cars we now have available to copy. And when they get old and rusty and not worth copying, what then? Original replicas are made my hand so we can copy them for free?
In the case of a book, each copy is a factory of mass production. How do you propose new books get written? Take something other than a work of fiction; a history book or an dictionary, or some highly technical manual. We freeze development where we are today and everybody has free access to everything old but nothing new?
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Neil, be honest: Who is to decide WHICH information pattern should be treated as IP (=logoright) and WHICH NOT?
A novel? Yes? A garden design? No? A hairdo? No? A “special move”? No? A gesture? No? A business method? No? Yes? Maybe?
And who is to decide WHICH ACTION regarding an IP (=logoright) is deemed infringement? You? On what ground?
You and all the other IP-proponents have not brought forward ANY KIND of consistent IP theory.
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote, “Neil, be honest: Who is to decide WHICH information pattern should be treated as IP (=logoright) and WHICH NOT?
A novel? Yes? A garden design? No? A hairdo? No? A “special move”? No? A gesture? No? A business method? No? Yes? Maybe?
“And who is to decide WHICH ACTION regarding an IP (=logoright) is deemed infringement? You? On what ground?
“You and all the other IP-proponents have not brought forward ANY KIND of consistent IP theory.”
There’s two parts to this question. How can you tell what qualifies to be an ownable thing, and who decides?
The second question is simple. In a statist society the state decides; in a libertarian society property rights disputes will be settled either violently — if one party is aggressive and refuses peaceful dispute settlement — or non-violently, if mediation or binding arbitration can be agreed on. I lean toward the General Submission for Arbitration that can be found on the website of the C4SS at http://c4ss.org/gsa/.
The first question is a threshold boundary question. All property rights disputes are subject to threshold and boundary questions, as well as identification procedures. Anticipating this land is surveyed, posted, and property boundaries registered; auto manufacturers print VIN’s on cars before shipping them to dealers; Elvis commemorative plates come with numbered certificates of authenticity.
The specific threshold you’re asking for is part science and part human art. A computer can mathematically compare one file with another to detect whether it’s the same file, or a similar file, or a completely different file. A reader can read a book and make a determination whether it’s the same story and characters as another book, or a different one.
The answers you’re looking for are market decisions, established by agreed-upon standards and precedents in dispute resolution. Free market case law will be not unsimilar to case law in statist civil courts. Arbitors will look to professional and commercial standards to determine what’s a unique property and what is common coin.
You want better than that, ask Rip Van Winkle for a report from the future.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
there are still fundamental questions which you did not address:
– how does the method of copying influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. looking vs. photographing vs xeroxing)
– how does the intent of the copier influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. educational or comedical purpose)
– how does the type of derivation influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. referencing, paraphrasing, translating, encoding)Mind you, unlike the complexity of the logos, which may be with a bit of leeway expressed in bits and be compared to e.g. distance with regards to rights in physical goods, these are heterogeneous variables with no obvious connection to anything other than imagination. Why should the method, purpose or the amount of a violation determine whether a violation occurred or not? That’s neither libertarian nor principled.
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@Peter Surda April 14, 2011 at 2:02 am
You are, inadvertently, describing the operation of economic rights to a thing, i.e property.
If I own a car, I can transfer any of the multitude of economic rights that are bundled in the ownership of the car. I can transfer it to you provided you don’t drive it. I can forbid you from sublease agreements. I can limit the range of your use privilege. I can list only those things you are permitted to do, so that anything not on the list is forbidden.
My ability to do these things derives from my ownership of the car, my property. You will either pay me for what I think they are worth, or we will not make a deal. If you just want to sit in my car for an hour, that is a different price than buying it outright. If you take it, you get punished criminally under principles of property rights. If you simply violate the terms of our agreement, you pay me damages under contract/tort liability rights.
There are a number of things that can be done with a book. I am interested, as the owner, in controlling those uses, because it is in my interest to insure the benefits of having produced a book accrue to me, and not you, unless you pay me what I think they are worth.
Put in economic terms, I am interested in internalizing externalities at a low transaction cost. See Coase, or more modernly, David Friedman.
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Peter Surda asked,
“- how does the method of copying influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. looking vs. photographing vs xeroxing)”
How does looking at a house differ from moving in?
“- how does the intent of the copier influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. educational or comedical purpose)”
That’s a question to be directed to a statist since your question refers to current statist law.
“- how does the type of derivation influence whether a violation occurred (e.g. referencing, paraphrasing, translating, encoding)”
Some uses are below the threshold for damages or deprivation of the fruits of ownership and others aren’t. For example, a cool breeze from your property to mine brings me the pleasant smell of your orange grove. I may breathe in that scent without damaging you. Climbing your fence, grabbing and eating one of the oranges, raises the threshold, but possible not enough to be a violaton. Harvesting your orange crop and selling it at the farmer’s market without your permission is definitely a violation.
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J Neil Schulman is the intellectual equivalent of a Hairy Musket.
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@J Neil Schulman
You claim your “logoright” theory is based on identity. Let’s discuss a short example:
Under your “logoright” thingy someone could have the “logoright” to a statement, eg “Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla”.
Please answer the following questions as exactly and specifically as possible:
1) How long does a statement (story etc.) have to be to be “logorighted”?
2) When does another statement (story etc.) become an identical entity of your “logorighted” one? Which percentage of the information pattern has to be identical?
What about other languages? What about indirect citations? What about altering the positions of the words? What about paraphrasing? Have the words to be identical? Has the word pattern to be identical?
Why and why not?
3) What actions regarding this “logorighted” statement (story etc.) do you consider an infringement?Another thing: What about patents?
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Anti-IP Libertarian wrote,
“You claim your “logoright” theory is based on identity. Let’s discuss a short example:
“Under your “logoright” thingy someone could have the “logoright” to a statement, eg “Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla Blablabla”.
“Please answer the following questions as exactly and specifically as possible:
1) How long does a statement (story etc.) have to be to be “logorighted”?
Long enough to be identifiable as a unique thing.
Alongside Night is around 70,000 words. A short story can be a few thousand words. A poem can be very terse. It doesn’t take a lot of words to be something unique. There used to be a game show called “Name That Tune” in which songs could be identified by playing only a few bars.
How long does it take to identify the name and author of the following poem as something unique?
“Half a league, half a league, half a league onward.”
I just Googled that, hit “I feel lucky,” and came up with the following page: http://www.sparknotes.com/poetry/tennyson/section9.rhtml — which tells me these three words, repeated three times, then a fourth word, is Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade.”
Google’s software algorithm did not require a human brain to give a mathematically precise ID to this piece of MCP.
“2) When does another statement (story etc.) become an identical entity of your “logorighted” one? Which percentage of the information pattern has to be identical?”
Enough to be apparent that one could not exist if the other did not. That’s a judgment to be made in a dispute resolution process.
“What about other languages? What about indirect citations? What about altering the positions of the words? What about paraphrasing? Have the words to be identical? Has the word pattern to be identical? Why and why not?”
There are translation programs that could correlate translations of the same composition. Some of them are pretty bad; others are more accurate.
Again, like all property rights disputes, these can be solved when one party claims infringement and another party denies it. Let the arbiter decide.
3) What actions regarding this “logorighted” statement (story etc.) do you consider an infringement?
Provable damage or deprivation of the fruits of ownership, same as with any other property rights infringement
“Another thing: What about patents?”
I’m not defending statist laws. But the principles are the same for invention of any other type of authorship: the production of something identifiably unique.
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“Long enough to be identifiable as a unique thing.”
And what happens when different people disagree on what this length is?
“in which songs could be identified by playing only a few bars.”
Indeed. So this implies that whistling a little bit of a tune you heard is violation of peoples’ “logorights”. That is to say that anyone that ever writes a piece of a melody owns everybody’s vocal chords.
““Half a league, half a league, half a league onward.””
You just violated the author’s copyright and I’m going to turn you in for it.
Also, you are blindly assuming that Google was right. How do you know that someone didn’t use this exact line in poem before this one? How do you know this author did not “steal” that line from another author? Why are you assuming that whoever gets the IP claim of creation actually was the “creator”?
And what you are saying is incredibly absurd. Can I copyright the following poem: “Life sucks”? If you say no because you or Google can’t identify it, I say screw that I know damn well I wrote it and if you guys can’t identify it as my poem that’s your problem. I can identify it! Next time I hear someone say life sucks they’ll see me in court!
“Enough to be apparent that one could not exist if the other did not. That’s a judgment to be made in a dispute resolution process.”
In other words, by taking influence from other creative works, as every creative author must do, you are risking violating the “logorights” of your influences and have no way of determining before-hand whether or not you are breaking the law. This is a huge incentive to not produce any creative works at all. You will only know after you’re sitting in court with a conviction that you did something wrong. Why even bother trying to be creative?
“Again, like all property rights disputes, these can be solved when one party claims infringement and another party denies it. Let the arbiter decide.”
You are confusing the practical problem of enforcing the law with the theoretical problem of determining what the law should be. Of course in a libertarian society it is highly unlikely that any actual justice system will be ideal and conform perfectly to justifiable behavior, but that has no impact on what is justifiable behavior and what is not. Regardless of the imperfections of a market-based justice system, a justice system that rewards murder or recognizes IP or “logorights” is a flawed justice system. That is the issue here.
“Provable damage or deprivation of the fruits of ownership, same as with any other property rights infringement”
Deprivation of the “fruits of ownership”!? And now we have illegalized competition. After all, the “fruits of ownership” of a productive firm will be diminished as a result of other competitors. But it doesn’t stop there. The actual market price of your property will go down if your neighbor keeps a cluttered, unkempt yard and so by this reasoning your neighbor has violated your property rights and owes you compensation.
“I’m not defending statist laws. But the principles are the same for invention of any other type of authorship: the production of something identifiably unique.”
And the problem you fail to see is that “uniquely identifiable” defeats your whole case. Different copies of even the exact same story are uniquely identifiable and so your ownership of one would not imply the ownership of the other. Different copies of the same story are still different identifiable objects. If identity is the basis, then any form of IP, including “logorights”, is immediately compromised because they all involve an extrapolation of ownership from one identifiable object to a whole category of them.
This whole post glossed over the critical point being raised. Can I copyright an 8-note melody? Why or why not? What about 7, or 6 notes? What about a single note? What about the very use of the 12-note chromatic scale in a rhythmically steady fashion? When did I copy a song? By copying every note? What about just the chord progression? What if I just borrowed from the chorus?
Your answer to all of these, as is always the answer provided by IP supporters, is “there are answers”. If there are, then tell me the number right now. 7 notes or 8 notes? Which one is it? If you can’t decide before-hand, then your theory is not an objective well-defined system of property rights but the defense of a dictatorial setting where some judge’s opinion becomes what is justifiable and what is not, and no one is capable of even beginning to guess what his decisions will be before they happen. Such a society would be a disaster of perpetual conflict and consume itself in no time.
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@sweatervest April 14, 2011 at 9:56 am
I just want to focus on one thing you said:
In other words, by taking influence from other creative works, as every creative author must do, you are risking violating the “logorights” of your influences and have no way of determining before-hand whether or not you are breaking the law. This is a huge incentive to not produce any creative works at all. You will only know after you’re sitting in court with a conviction that you did something wrong. Why even bother trying to be creative?
If this were true, many of the normal activities of humans would have to cease. But they have not ceased, and we have IP laws. Why is this?
Humans have a very well-developed ability to detect patterns. Popular songs can be recognized with as few as three notes. Google can recognize a pattern that associates a few words to an entire work.
Rules of law (pardon my use of something that exists) can be divided into “bright line” rules and rules which are highly dependent on the specific facts. I have explained this previously by using homicide, which is a bright line rule, and self-defense, which is a finding that can only be reached if we know much more than whether there was a “killing of a human by another human”.
If I wrote as the first line of my book “It was the best of times, and the worst of times”, would you recognized it? If Dickens brought infringement suit against my use, and that was the only similarity between his work and mine, who would win?
Regardless of whether we actually went to court over this, I, in writing my book, know whether I made this up out of thin air, or whether I simply copied it from Dickens. If he could prove I had access, (which would be trivial) then it would be incredible for me to claim that I came up with it on my own. If I used the words,
“…it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair; we had everything before us, we had nothing before us; we were all going directly to Heaven, we were all going the other way.”, would you still know it was Dickens?
Is it credible for me to claim that I came up with this exact pattern of expression completely independently of Dickens? Maybe, but it is unlikely.
Although I think you may have earlier stated that you don’t care what the law says, I just want to make it clear to you that if you did care enough to read a summary of how the copyright laws operate around this issue, you would find that it has a coherent system for resolving this issue, and that in all but the most fantastic situations, it is entirely consistent with the intuition you already have.As a result, just knowing that if I actually infringe on someone’s copyrights I will suffer some negative consequence, I will strive to avoid it. I will not copy a clearly recognizable phrase. I don’t need to. I can say, “These were the best times of our lives, but also the worst.” That would make it less likely to be infringing, yet still expresses the meaning I intend.
As an added bonus, I suspect that the work of Dickens is by now in the public domain. By the time something gets that popular, it is no longer copyrighted. Why wouldn’t I copy it then? Because most readers would recognize that I was simply taking Dickens’s words and claiming them as my own. I would lose credibility as a creative artist. So I would try to be original. That originality is part of the standard for works protected by copyrights.
In summary, you are acting like it is a total and complete minefield, when in fact it is all rather easily navigated. If in fact you start from scratch and write a novel, and avoid copying directly those things that you know were made popular by others, you will avoid almost all potential problems. If it ain’t broke, why fix it?
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“If this were true, many of the normal activities of humans would have to cease. But they have not ceased, and we have IP laws. Why is this?”
Because the state, despite all of its efforts and claims, can’t be everywhere all the time.
I fail to understand how you disagree that any creative process draws from the creations you have seen in the past. No matter how original you think you are being, you are drawing influence from the things you have experienced already.
“Humans have a very well-developed ability to detect patterns. Popular songs can be recognized with as few as three notes. Google can recognize a pattern that associates a few words to an entire work.”
This has nothing to do with what I said. You are still implying that if you want to safely make music without potentially being a criminal, you need to listen to every copyrighted melody ever made and memorize them all before starting.
“Rules of law (pardon my use of something that exists)”
I’m sorry, I thought we were debating what should be, not what is. Thank you for reminding me that statutory laws exist. I’m an anarchist so you should probably also remind me that states exist. Also, since I care about ethics, you should just point out that crime exists.
“can be divided into “bright line” rules and rules which are highly dependent on the specific facts. I have explained this previously by using homicide, which is a bright line rule, and self-defense, which is a finding that can only be reached if we know much more than whether there was a “killing of a human by another human”.”
That doesn’t change the fact that self-defense is a precisely defined concept. It may be difficult or impossible to determine in a specific case whether or not an act of violence actually was self-defense, but in order for the question, “Was this self-defense” to even be meaningful there must exist a sharp conceptual division between what is self-defense and what is not. If there is no sharp line then the question, “Was this self-defense” has no well-defined answer and putting together facts to try and answer it is a waste of time. That such a process is not a waste of time is tantamount to the fact that self-defense is a well-defined concept.
The whole purpose of theories of ethics (including property rights) is to work out the conceptual problems. If you haven’t worked out the sharply defined conceptual problems you will hopelessly lost in trying to solve real-world cases. It’s like trying to solve a physics problem before you even know how to solve algebraic equations.
“If I wrote as the first line of my book “It was the best of times, and the worst of times”, would you recognized it? If Dickens brought infringement suit against my use, and that was the only similarity between his work and mine, who would win?”
As an IP proponent it is your job to answer that question! That you are asking me only convinces me further that IP is a vacuous theory. My whole point is that if the theorists cannot answer all those questions then their theory is empty. It is a non-sequitur to jump from this to pointing out that real world cases about physical property have details that need to be worked out on a per-case basis. Physical property theory always gives answers to those questions, even if determining the answer involves collecting facts that would be impractical or impossible to collect. At least it gives an answer! IP theories do not give answers to any questions regarding the division between legitimate IP claims and illegitimate IP claims (i.e. 7 notes or 8 notes).
“Although I think you may have earlier stated that you don’t care what the law says, I just want to make it clear to you that if you did care enough to read a summary of how the copyright laws operate around this issue, you would find that it has a coherent system for resolving this issue, and that in all but the most fantastic situations, it is entirely consistent with the intuition you already have.”
It absolutely is not. Under the current copyright law a person can copyright an 8-note melody, and that is not at all in line with my intuition. It is patently absurd to me on every level that there would be property rights in any amount of music. No, every single court case over IP has been utterly absurd to me. I know why you are saying this. It’s because you think I care that the law is “coherent” and claim it is not.
I don’t care if a law is “coherent” and it is absurd to think I should. A law that says everyone has to drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday is perfectly coherent and answers all the questions regarding whether a person is guilty of breaking it or not. Are you suggesting that is sufficient to justify this law?
Yes, you can draw arbitrary lines in the sand. It doesn’t change the fact that they are arbitrary and it is thus tyrannical to exercise violence based on where you draw those lines.
I think you still conceive of ethics as a “Let’s get together and agree on how society will work” sort of situation. As I have pointed out before, this is nonsense because if everyone came to agreement there would be no conflicts and no need for any sort of ethic. Ethics is not about people making agreements on how to do things. It is about determining how to act when there is *disagreement*.
Suggesting that agreement yields justifiability is a more sophisticated way of saying “might is right”, which is no more and no less than a flat rejection of any ethics.
“As a result, just knowing that if I actually infringe on someone’s copyrights I will suffer some negative consequence, I will strive to avoid it. I will not copy a clearly recognizable phrase. I don’t need to. I can say, “These were the best times of our lives, but also the worst.” That would make it less likely to be infringing, yet still expresses the meaning I intend.”
This has nothing to do with “intention”, and I think you miss my point. My point is not that a person may “accidentally” copy a melody. My point is that whenever a person writes a melody he thinks about the melodies he has heard other people write and no matter how hard he tries, no matter what his intention is, he is making use of those structures he has heard. I do it all the time. I discovered from listening to other music that I love certain chord progressions, and melodic elements, and I use them all the time. I use them because I heard them in other pieces and want to try using them myself. Is that breaking the law or not? It has nothing to do with intention.
A lame musician may simply recreate a song because he has no inspiration and can’t come up with anything original. Is he guilty of breaking copyright? Shall we punish him for not being creative enough?
Keep in mind you said “less likely to be infringing”, not “not infringing”. You’re still not sure, there is still a chance you are infringing, so why bother? Why not spend your time doing something that won’t potentially land you in court?
“As an added bonus, I suspect that the work of Dickens is by now in the public domain. By the time something gets that popular, it is no longer copyrighted. Why wouldn’t I copy it then? Because most readers would recognize that I was simply taking Dickens’s words and claiming them as my own. I would lose credibility as a creative artist. So I would try to be original. That originality is part of the standard for works protected by copyrights.”
Why yes! It’s almost as though there is no need for copyrights and suggesting that something bad would happen if they weren’t around is silly! After all, people don’t need a gun pointed at their heads to not want to recreate other peoples’ work. Of course copyright extends far beyond that, to those who just want to listen and not tweak. Unfortunately, there is no way to isolate the latter cases from the former in a non-arbitrary way. By making it illegal to listen to music in some ways, you cannot help but make it illegal to write music in some ways.
“In summary, you are acting like it is a total and complete minefield, when in fact it is all rather easily navigated.”
You seem to think that just because you can navigate it means it’s okay. Yes, and you could navigate my “drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday” with far less effort that this! It doesn’t change the fact that I pulled “5″, “Everclear” and “Sunday” out of my ass and there is no logical explanation for the choice. The same goes for how many notes make a copyrightable melody or whatever limits are placed on what can be patented. Citing an example (statutory law) of arbitrary lines drawn in the sand doesn’t conflict with this, it only reassures me that one is in fact capable of drawing arbitrary lines.
“If in fact you start from scratch and write a novel, and avoid copying directly those things that you know were made popular by others, you will avoid almost all potential problems.”
Assuming of course that everyone everywhere is completely reasonable and no creative author would dare attempt to abuse his legal privileges to extort helpless up-and-coming creative people out of money! Also, you used a vague term: “directly”. We come full circle back to the concepts being inherently vague and thus failing to establish concretely who is guilty and when. Also, “made popular” is far more vague. How many people have to care, and how much, before something is “popular”?
If I did this with music I would discard potential ideas to use until I’m left with nothing and congrats, no music for anybody.
“If it ain’t broke, why fix it?”
Indeed. Physical property rights deals with all these issues just fine. Confounding the issue with suspicious, vague claims to property that were clearly not homesteaded or traded towards the claimant, seems at best pointless and at worst dangerous. IP will not lead to more creative authorship or technological innovation but less. IP clearly does not lead to more peace but causes huge international problems in which people in Sweden are supposedly bound by laws passed in the United States (I am citing a real world example, but what possible formulation of IP could avoid that issue?) and plenty of college students have been slapped with fines so huge they’ll never make a solid living. Issues inherent to enforcing IP have obviously led to far more problems than they could ever solve, assuming there are any “problem” to be solved at all.
Physical property rights provide plenty of avenues, in fact more than any alternative including IP rights, to make a living from being creative or innovative, and protect authors’ rights to refrain from publishing. If it ain’t broke, why fix it?
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@sweatervest April 14, 2011 at 2:47 pm
Because the state, despite all of its efforts and claims, can’t be everywhere all the time.
I suppose “Big brother is not quite big enough”, is one possible explanation. However I think you overlook that fact that the state is not a party to a dispute. Infringement is a cause of action brought by the rights holder, not by the state. The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal. Therefore, you explanation is not reasonable. The state has no motive; damages go to the plaintiff, not the state.
I fail to understand how you disagree that any creative process draws from the creations you have seen in the past. No matter how original you think you are being, you are drawing influence from the things you have experienced already.
You fail to understand it because I have not said otherwise. Of course you are correct. It is merely the act of copying that is prohibited. That leaves a wide swath of human knowledge, information and experience that is fair game.
This has nothing to do with what I said. You are still implying that if you want to safely make music without potentially being a criminal, you need to listen to every copyrighted melody ever made and memorize them all before starting.
I said no such thing. If you are a musician, and you compose a song that starts with the first five bars of “Love me Tender”, do you think, as a composer, you will not notice, or that no one else will.
It is true that there are rare cases where a famous musician is sued by an obscure artist over the similarity between tunes or lyrics. In these cases, it is the burden of the plaintiff to prove the elements of infringement. The more obscure, the more difficult to prove access. It is not really much of a real problem, in reality. However if you are a musician, you have to decide whether listening to music from other composers is a help or a hindrance as far as originality goes. It is inescapable that if your song is similar to another that you have heard, you will notice.
I’m sorry, I thought we were debating what should be, not what is. Thank you for reminding me that statutory laws exist. I’m an anarchist so you should probably also remind me that states exist. Also, since I care about ethics, you should just point out that crime exists.
I fail to understand your sensitivity to this. If we were trying to establish the meaning or usage of a word, would you object to referencing a dictionary? Ignoring the dictionary, the law, or the state does not make them disappear, and I don’t expect that I have write my own dictionary to talk to you. Lighten up.
That doesn’t change the fact that self-defense is a precisely defined concept. It may be difficult or impossible to determine in a specific case whether or not an act of violence actually was self-defense, but in order for the question, “Was this self-defense” to even be meaningful there must exist a sharp conceptual division between what is self-defense and what is not. If there is no sharp line then the question, “Was this self-defense” has no well-defined answer and putting together facts to try and answer it is a waste of time. That such a process is not a waste of time is tantamount to the fact that self-defense is a well-defined concept.
I think all you did here is demonstrate my point; the general rule is easy to understand, but not so easy to apply given the vast range of possible facts. Therefore, it is also a “fuzzy” rule.
The whole purpose of theories of ethics (including property rights) is to work out the conceptual problems. If you haven’t worked out the sharply defined conceptual problems you will hopelessly lost in trying to solve real-world cases. It’s like trying to solve a physics problem before you even know how to solve algebraic equations.
On the other hand, you cannot solve complex orbital problems with simple algebra, especially on the scale of interstellar space. In my view, there is too much emphasis here on the alchemy of the origin of property rights. It is equally legitimate to acknowledge that they exist, that they operate according to certain rules, and there are different scales and scopes of analysis. At some point, this becomes a philosophical rat hole that goes on forever. Isn’t the longevity of these blogs reasonable evidence of that? Are we really all that stupid that we just can’t see the truth? Or is this a philosophical question that has no definitive proof that can be universally held? I think the latter. All I’m interested in, frankly, is to get a consensus that an author owns his own manuscript, and we can move on from there. It ultimately doesn’t matter how you reach that conclusion as long as we can accept that premise as a first principle.
“If I wrote as the first line of my book “It was the best of times, and the worst of times”, would you recognized it? If Dickens brought infringement suit against my use, and that was the only similarity between his work and mine, who would win?”
As an IP proponent it is your job to answer that question!
With all due respect, the answer is already crystal clear. It is only because you object to my answer, and reject anything that is not re-written here in this blog, that the debate rages on. It is not the case that there is no answer, it is that you don’t like the answer, and object when I try to explain by pointing to what already exists for resolving this question. You are saying in effect, “explain algebra to me, but don’t use numbers.”; kinda difficult.
That you are asking me only convinces me further that IP is a vacuous theory.
Do you really not get that it was a rhetorical question? I am not asking you to tell me the answer! I am asking you to think about what is involved in answering the question.
My whole point is that if the theorists cannot answer all those questions then their theory is empty. It is a non-sequitur to jump from this to pointing out that real world cases about physical property have details that need to be worked out on a per-case basis. Physical property theory always gives answers to those questions, even if determining the answer involves collecting facts that would be impractical or impossible to collect. At least it gives an answer! IP theories do not give answers to any questions regarding the division between legitimate IP claims and illegitimate IP claims (i.e. 7 notes or 8 notes).
If this was the case, we would not longer need criminal trials. We would just have an accusation, look up the rule, and pass out sentence. Property theory does not give precise answers. It gives general rules and assigns rights according to those rules, against which facts can be interpreted. Live is not software code, unless you are in the Matrix!
It absolutely is not. Under the current copyright law a person can copyright an 8-note melody, and that is not at all in line with my intuition.
Do you know this for a fact? I think you might be wrong. Now what?
It is patently absurd to me on every level that there would be property rights in any amount of music. No, every single court case over IP has been utterly absurd to me. I know why you are saying this. It’s because you think I care that the law is “coherent” and claim it is not.
Whatever. What am I supposed to do with this?
I don’t care if a law is “coherent” and it is absurd to think I should. A law that says everyone has to drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday is perfectly coherent and answers all the questions regarding whether a person is guilty of breaking it or not. Are you suggesting that is sufficient to justify this law?
Yes, you can draw arbitrary lines in the sand. It doesn’t change the fact that they are arbitrary and it is thus tyrannical to exercise violence based on where you draw those lines.
This is hysterical. It sounds like you need to back off the 5 Hour!
I think you still conceive of ethics as a “Let’s get together and agree on how society will work” sort of situation. As I have pointed out before, this is nonsense because if everyone came to agreement there would be no conflicts and no need for any sort of ethic. Ethics is not about people making agreements on how to do things. It is about determining how to act when there is *disagreement*.
Agreements define disagreement. If it is not one of the other, it hasn’t come up yet.
Suggesting that agreement yields justifiability is a more sophisticated way of saying “might is right”, which is no more and no less than a flat rejection of any ethics.
You are certainly covering a lot of territory. “Might makes right” is the first line of defense of an asserted right. It comes with a high transaction cost. Ethics is an agreement to act morally according to certain ethical principles. That lowers the transaction costs.
This has nothing to do with “intention”, and I think you miss my point. My point is not that a person may “accidentally” copy a melody. My point is that whenever a person writes a melody he thinks about the melodies he has heard other people write and no matter how hard he tries, no matter what his intention is, he is making use of those structures he has heard. I do it all the time. I discovered from listening to other music that I love certain chord progressions, and melodic elements, and I use them all the time. I use them because I heard them in other pieces and want to try using them myself. Is that breaking the law or not? It has nothing to do with intention.
You say all of this as if it is the objective of copyrights law to stifle the creation of music. Yet we have copyright laws and we have lots of music. Is it just that ineffective? If so, why are you so adamantly against it? Have you been sued? Are you being sniffled or victimized?
A lame musician may simply recreate a song because he has no inspiration and can’t come up with anything original. Is he guilty of breaking copyright? Shall we punish him for not being creative enough?
The world is filled with cover-bands. I have never seen the Gestapo at a dive bar with a live band. What’s up?
Keep in mind you said “less likely to be infringing”, not “not infringing”. You’re still not sure, there is still a chance you are infringing, so why bother? Why not spend your time doing something that won’t potentially land you in court?
If you are really concerned about being hit by a bus, you can stay in your house. Otherwise, it might be a reasonable risk to live a little. You act like you don’t have any musical room to move (credit to John Mayall).
After all, people don’t need a gun pointed at their heads to not want to recreate other peoples’ work.
Unfortunately, some people do. If men were angles, etc. If you are not one, then what are you worried about?
Of course copyright extends far beyond that, to those who just want to listen and not tweak. Unfortunately, there is no way to isolate the latter cases from the former in a non-arbitrary way. By making it illegal to listen to music in some ways, you cannot help but make it illegal to write music in some ways.
Hyperbole.
You seem to think that just because you can navigate it means it’s okay. Yes, and you could navigate my “drink 5 bottles of Everclear every Sunday” with far less effort that this! It doesn’t change the fact that I pulled “5″, “Everclear” and “Sunday” out of my ass and there is no logical explanation for the choice. The same goes for how many notes make a copyrightable melody or whatever limits are placed on what can be patented. Citing an example (statutory law) of arbitrary lines drawn in the sand doesn’t conflict with this, it only reassures me that one is in fact capable of drawing arbitrary lines.
“Arbitrary” has such a bad rep! Remember my earlier comment about bright lines? Well the “fuzzy’ thing is somewhat arbitrary, meaning exactly where you draw the line is not mathematically precise. It is “arbitrary, not as in “no rhyme nor reason; random” but “we have to draw it somewhere, at some point in the infinite boundary conditions of uncertainty”.
Assuming of course that everyone everywhere is completely reasonable and no creative author would dare attempt to abuse his legal privileges to extort helpless up-and-coming creative people out of money!
Well, isn’t this why we have laws, (and PDA’s in your utopian vision)?
Also, you used a vague term: “directly”. We come full circle back to the concepts being inherently vague and thus failing to establish concretely who is guilty and when. Also, “made popular” is far more vague. How many people have to care, and how much, before something is “popular”?
Like so many who write here, you say these things as if we all are a bunch of idiots who can’t tell our ass from a hole in the ground. How about assuming intelligence instead of stupidity, and apply a little common sense, and ask if what I said could possibly be said and understood by a reasonable person? Life is not precise, but we generally have an idea where we are when we wake up in the morning. That is about all that is required to overcome your hyperbolic objection.
If I did this with music I would discard potential ideas to use until I’m left with nothing and congrats, no music for anybody.
This may be a problem for you, but I seem to have heard that the music industry is worth billions per year. How in the heck could that happen, given the oppressive land of copyrights and State coercion and terror tactics?
Indeed. Physical property rights deals with all these issues just fine.
I’m always fascinated when I hear people describe their fantasies as if they were a part of the real world. Last time I checked we live in a world that includes copyrights (yep, just checked again, and sure enough!) How the hell do you know with such certainly that your theories of “physical property rights deals with these issues just fine”? You have a theory, an untested theory. You haven’t even graduated to the real issues of how property and liability rights operate, and the difficulty of externalities that have to be addressed under your theory of “physical property rights”. How is it that you feel justified in speaking with such authority?
IP will not lead to more creative authorship or technological innovation but less.
You make it sound like we live in a world without it, and you are responding to the threat of bringing it about! Don’t you have things backwards?
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> The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal. Therefore, you explanation is not reasonable. The state has no motive; damages go to the plaintiff, not the state.
Haha. You keep telling yourself that. It’s pretty obvious that this is not the case and the state has a distinct and obvious motivation in IP law. Oh and there is absolutely criminal levels of copyright violation. For a guy who goes on and on about defending copyrights and IP law you sure have a lousy understanding of it.
Copyright infringement is a crime if the defendant acted willfully and
e i the r ( 1 ) for comme rc ia l advantage or private financial gain, ( 2 ) by reproducing or distributing infringing copies of works with a total retail
value of over $1,000 over a 180-day period, or (3) by distributing a “work
being prepared for commercial distribution” by making it available on a
publicly-accessible computer network. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). Copyright
infringement is a felony only if the infringement involved reproduction or
distribution of at least 10 copies of copyrighted works worth more than
$2,500 in a 180-day period, or involved distribution of a “work being
prepared for commercial distribution” over a publicly-accessible computer
network. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2319.Sharing a music file over the internet is a criminal act. The IP fascists still haven’t gotten around criminalizing patent violations, but there are certainly big advocates of IP working on it.
Of course you are correct. It is merely the act of copying that is prohibited.
Except, of course, your wrong. Much of IP law focuses on actions that have nothing to do with copying. There are plenty of ways to run foul of patents without any copying occurring _at_all_. It _happens_constantly_. Case after case after case. Lawsuits after lawsuits after lawsuits successfully prosecuted that have not one wit of anything to do with copying.
In my view, there is too much emphasis here on the alchemy of the origin of property rights.
Were this comes from is the plain obvious fact that IP law has no real relation to property rights. Dejure property rights is a extension of defacto property rights that are universal in nature and occur spontaneously in any human society. Property rights not only exist because they are desirable, they exist because they are required. What can be debated is the specific applications and nature of property rights.
There is no such thing that happens with anything related to IP Law. There is no such thing as ‘owning a idea’ or ‘owning a concept’. It’s physically impossible.
The ONLY reasonable defense for IP law is based on a argument of expediency. That human society is wealthier, better off, with IP law then without it. That supporting IP law will invariably end up with the ‘Greatest Good for the Greatest Number’ type thing. Yet this is something that so-called Pro-IP libertarians seem to steadfastly refuse to debate about. Because, you know, something like that requires actual evidence and careful consideration.
Going the intellectually lazy route and continue to equate IP law with property rights.. then get all hand-wavy, diversionary, and pseudo-spiritual is all that IP fascists have a seem to have when their logical fallacies are challenged.
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“However I think you overlook that fact that the state is not a party to a dispute. Infringement is a cause of action brought by the rights holder, not by the state. The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal. Therefore, you explanation is not reasonable. The state has no motive; damages go to the plaintiff, not the state.”
Okay I think I see what you are saying here, but if I do it only suggests to me that most people don’t take IP claims that seriously. I still think the error you make you and other places in this post is in assuming that “IP discourages innovation” is incompatible with “IP and innovation coexist”. These are not incompatible. All the first statement means is that in the absence of IP, *with all other things constant*, there would be more innovation than there is now with IP.
So I don’t think any observation of the existence of IP and the creative process contradicts the charge that IP interferes with the creative process. What matters is I have yet to hear or come up with a theory of IP that does not make all of these things people always do illegal according to it. That is more or less my point in bringing it up. I intend to demonstrate that if IP were to be upheld perfectly it would result in a dystopia of no innovation or creation.
This is distinct from physical property rights. They are not, and never will be, perfectly upheld, but if they were it would lead to a utopia (to be clear, I am not a utilitarian and admit that “utopia” must be subjective. A person who wants nothing other than to violate others would consider this to be a dystopia. But either way, it would be wealthy and full of innovation and creation). Of course such a scenario is either impossible or highly unlikely, but this is how these things are approached. Every physics problem ever done is an impossible idealization of reality. And yet physics gave us modern technology.
“You fail to understand it because I have not said otherwise. Of course you are correct. It is merely the act of copying that is prohibited. That leaves a wide swath of human knowledge, information and experience that is fair game.”
Okay I did misunderstand, but I think you also misunderstand me! What I am arguing here is that the “wide swath” of which you speak is synthesized by referencing the part of knowledge/information/experience that is already expressed. Sure, physically speaking, all the patterns already exist. Everything Shakespeare wrote existed at least conceptually before he actually put it all together, but what he wrote was guided by what had already been written. So I say if you actually close yourself off to already existing creative works you remove the only way to actually synthesize any of the rest of the patterns/experiences that are already out there but not yet expressed.
What I am arguing is that if you could have access to all the relevant details, you would find that every single “great” or even “popular” creative work has at least one quote from an earlier piece that the author previously experienced. That may sound crazy, but maybe some of the greatest lines of poetry were uttered by unknown people and overheard by their “authors” as they walked down the street. But I don’t see this as problematic. Authorship is, as far as I can tell, taking pieces of other works and finding new and interesting ways to put those elements together.
I’ll admit while this is technically a problem IP would have to face, there is no need to get so far off the central points, which are about copying other peoples’ recordings and even selling them. There’s plenty of juicy controversy over that (i.e. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with it).
“I fail to understand your sensitivity to this. If we were trying to establish the meaning or usage of a word, would you object to referencing a dictionary? Ignoring the dictionary, the law, or the state does not make them disappear, and I don’t expect that I have write my own dictionary to talk to you. Lighten up.”
Haha I didn’t get mad I was just being sarcastic because, to be honest, I think it’s a silly thing to bring up. Obviously if statutory law played at all into how I am thinking about this I would reach the same conclusion you do. It reminded of the many times non-libertarians have “reminded” me that states have existed constantly throughout western history as I try to explain why they *shouldn’t* exist.
“I think all you did here is demonstrate my point; the general rule is easy to understand, but not so easy to apply given the vast range of possible facts. Therefore, it is also a “fuzzy” rule.”
But with IP even the general rule can’t be understood! That is what I am trying to say.
“On the other hand, you cannot solve complex orbital problems with simple algebra, especially on the scale of interstellar space.”
Yes, you have to solve them with more complicated algebra or differential equations. Every physics problem involves modeling a real system as an ideal abstraction that can be described precisely with mathematical equations. I think you are getting too caught up on the modeling step. You always lose accuracy in this step, and what you end up studying is not exactly what you are trying to know more about. But you can’t know anything unless you study the idealization. The only way to gain any sort of solution, accurate or not, is to model complex orbital systems in interstellar space. For one, we certainly don’t know all the subtle variations in radius and reflectivity on different parts of the surfaces of planets. They are treated as point particles. An absurd assumption, right!? Sure, but accounting for the details can only change the answer so much, so we narrow the solution down to something that tells us more than enough to accurately predict telescope observations.
“In my view, there is too much emphasis here on the alchemy of the origin of property rights.”
Well, to me this is like saying solving physics problems relies too much on the “alchemy” of Newton’s Laws of Motion. They are pretty mysterious right? Especially if you take them for granted and don’t try to understand where they come from. But if you don’t have Newton’s Laws, you have nothing. You can throw out physics claims left and right like “heavier objects fall faster” which is almost always true (because of air friction) but you won’t gain any insight into understanding reality, and you will never predict things before you see them. To do that, you need the “alchemy” of Newton’s Laws.
The “alchemy” is the basis of the theory. Of course I don’t think it is alchemy. I think you should focus your critique on what you think is the alchemy. We’re getting too distracted by this stuff about Platonic forms.
“Are we really all that stupid that we just can’t see the truth? Or is this a philosophical question that has no definitive proof that can be universally held? I think the latter.”
We are going down a rat hole here! Because what I would say in response is that what you are putting forth is a “definitive proof” that an answer to this particular question has no definitive proof. So it must not be that you are adverse to definitive proofs (if you were you couldn’t argue anything!) It must just be that you think this particular thing has no definitive proof. But if you are to convince me, you must show me your definitive proof of this claim!
“All I’m interested in, frankly, is to get a consensus that an author owns his own manuscript, and we can move on from there. It ultimately doesn’t matter how you reach that conclusion as long as we can accept that premise as a first principle.”
This may surprise you but I think we are all in agreement about this! The author owns his manuscript. I agree with that. He decides what to do with it. If he wants to not publish it, someone would have to violate his *physical* property rights to get his hands on it, for copying or anything else. If he does want to publish it, he can have the publisher sign a contract to only make copies on the author’s consent. Then the publisher can require everyone who buys the book to sign a contract first saying they won’t copy it (EULAs are not valid contracts, but this is just a problem with how things are done now). This is all in line with physical property rights.
But what if someone violates the contract? Then a copy gets out that people can acquire without entering contracts. The original copier is guilty of breaching copyright and can be punished for this, but none of the people who copy the first illegal copy are guilty of anything. The work is now in the public domain and the author has no legal avenue to compel people to buy his work from the publisher and not obtain an unlicensed copy.
Furthermore, what if someone comes over to my house, I bought a copy of the book, and while I’m in the kitchen he photocopies every page? Now, technically, he trespassed on my property by doing that without my permission, but if he doesn’t damage the physical book I can’t really hold him for any restitution. Then he goes out and shares this copy and people start copying it. Then the copy got out and there were no contract violations (unless the contract said you violate it even if you accidentally leave it out somewhere to be copied).
So I think we are in agreement until someone breaks the contract or accidentally allows someone to copy the book.
“With all due respect, the answer is already crystal clear. It is only because you object to my answer, and reject anything that is not re-written here in this blog, that the debate rages on. It is not the case that there is no answer, it is that you don’t like the answer, and object when I try to explain by pointing to what already exists for resolving this question. You are saying in effect, “explain algebra to me, but don’t use numbers.”; kinda difficult.”
No, it’s like asking you to explain algebra to me instead of just presenting its results and expecting me to just believe they are logical results. Explaining algebra is quite a task. It would involve a head-first dive into axiomatic set theory. Presenting its results to be memorized is quite easy. Sure you know how to add, subtract, multiple and divide but do you know why it works?
You keep wanting me to look up copyright laws, and I already have. They didn’t give me the information I have requested. I think you are mistaken on what information I am looking for, and I think you misunderstand the nature of my objection to drawing arbitrary lines in the sand.
“If this was the case, we would not longer need criminal trials. We would just have an accusation, look up the rule, and pass out sentence. Property theory does not give precise answers. It gives general rules and assigns rights according to those rules, against which facts can be interpreted. Live is not software code, unless you are in the Matrix!”
I never said we will ever have a perfectly sound and irrefutable property rights theory. Knowledge is always in an incomplete state and people will debate over what the right theory is. I am not trying to discourage you from criticizing my property rights theory. I want you to actually criticize it instead of jumping to this issue about theory verses practice. Perhaps I’ve pushed by Kantian idealism too hard here, because that’s really not the issue. I think you misunderstand me greatly (probably my fault) when you suggest I am looking at life as a software program. I know exactly what you are talking about. I am actually strongly opposed to the idea that humans are just complicated computers (I’m a dualist like Mises).
Rather, let me make another analogy to physics. The way people figured out Newton’s laws, particularly that an object in motion remains in motion, is that they thought well if it didn’t remain in motion it would have to stop, but where? Why stop here, instead of there? There’s no answer to that question, so it must be that objects in motion remain in motion (unless something intervenes of course, in which case when and where is not arbitrary, but the when and where of the intervention). You could easily say “I have a physics theory that says things stop after 10 feet of motion”. Sure, that resolves the question, but in a completely arbitrary way. Why 10 feet and not 20 feet? Etc. etc.
I would suspect that you are about to tell me that ethics is not physics. Ethics is about people acting together, physics is about deterministic reality. This is where we disagree. To me (thank you Hoppe) ethics is just like math or physics: a set of statements that can be argumentatively justified, that is claimed “true”.
“Do you know this for a fact? I think you might be wrong. Now what?”
One of my professors mentioned that a few years back, it may be wrong. But I still think you misunderstand the nature of my objection. There is no number that, if I saw it in the statutory law, would make me think “oh well that makes sense”. It is the very fact that a number is being assigned that I am claiming is absurd.
“Whatever. What am I supposed to do with this?”
This is a response to you making claims about my intuition. I figured you would be interested in hearing what my actual intuition is, that’s all.
“Agreements define disagreement. If it is not one of the other, it hasn’t come up yet.”
I know what you mean, that we would be agreeing that a disagreement took place, but this dodges my point. A and B disagree on how to use a good. Of course they are agreeing to disagree. But agreeing to disagree doesn’t exactly solve the problem. They don’t say, “Okay, so we agree that disagree on how to use this good” and then walk away. There is still a problem, and ethics is the solution. What I am saying is that people have to disagree (and, yes agree to do disagree) for there to be any problem for ethics to solve. If they instead agreed that they did not disagree on how to use anything, they would just walk away (or do whatever they’re gonna do) and there is no problem for ethics to even talk about.
“This is hysterical. It sounds like you need to back off the 5 Hour!”
I’m calling you out on this one. This was the best point I brought up in that post. It is a conclusive disproof of the claim that coherency of a law speaks at all to its legitimacy. Call it names all you want, but that’s dodging the argument!
“Last time I checked we live in a world that includes copyrights (yep, just checked again, and sure enough!)”
This is why I get sarcastic. Crime exists too, so why are you even pretending that ethics matters for anything. People kill each other, so you can’t have anything to say about it.
Most of the rest of what you said I already covered. That IP and innovation coexist does not rule out IP working against innovation. You highly misunderstand what you call my “utopian fantasies” or whatever, which may be my fault, but I find it pretty silly that people make such nonsense charges against an attempt to use rational analysis to better understand things. All you seem to want to say is “the world has uncertainties so who knows”. At least I’m theorizing! At least I keep bringing stuff to the table to be debated!
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@nate-m April 14, 2011 at 5:40 pm
Haha. You keep telling yourself that. It’s pretty obvious that this is not the case and the state has a distinct and obvious motivation in IP law.
OK, explain the motive to me.
Oh and there is absolutely criminal levels of copyright violation. For a guy who goes on and on about defending copyrights and IP law you sure have a lousy understanding of it.
Instead of this; The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal.
I should have said this: The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is most often </bL a civil cause of action, not criminal.
Nice catch.In such circumstances as qualify under criminal statutes BOTH civil and criminal causes of action would stand. So, the state would be a party to the criminal action, but the civil action would still stand for the plaintiff, the copyright holder. Remember OJ Simpson? The main point is this: In a civil action, damages go to the plaintiff, in a criminal action, the fines go to the state and the perp goes to jail, potentially. The state pays for jails. So tell me, what is your theory for why the state is motivated by IP laws?
Much of IP law focuses on actions that have nothing to do with copying.
I was referring to copyright. Do you have anything of substance to say, other than you think I’m stupid and ignorant?
Were this comes from is the plain obvious fact that IP law has no real relation to property rights.Dejure property rights is a extension of defacto property rights that are universal in nature and occur spontaneously in any human society.
You are misinformed. They are not universal, but are suited to their particular purpose. They arise when the need arises. The history of property rights emerging in the beaver trapping indigenous Indians of north east America is a fascinating case history, for example.
Property rights not only exist because they are desirable, they exist because they are required. What can be debated is the specific applications and nature of property rights.
On this I agree, if I understand your meaning.
There is no such thing that happens with anything related to IP Law. There is no such thing as ‘owning a idea’ or ‘owning a concept’. It’s physically impossible.
For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid.
The ONLY reasonable defense for IP law is based on a argument of expediency. That human society is wealthier, better off, with IP law then without it. That supporting IP law will invariably end up with the ‘Greatest Good for the Greatest Number’ type thing. Yet this is something that so-called Pro-IP libertarians seem to steadfastly refuse to debate about. Because, you know, something like that requires actual evidence and careful consideration.
Well, I certainly gratified that you cleared this all up for me. At least we have reduced the problem to the ONLY reasonable defense. That should simplify things.
Going the intellectually lazy route and continue to equate IP law with property rights.. then get all hand-wavy, diversionary, and pseudo-spiritual is all that IP fascists have a seem to have when their logical fallacies are challenged.
This is brilliant. Do you mind if I quote you on this?
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Crap! That’s twice.
What happened to the “click to edit” function?
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Slightly easier to read:
@nate-m April 14, 2011 at 5:40 pm
Haha. You keep telling yourself that. It’s pretty obvious that this is not the case and the state has a distinct and obvious motivation in IP law.
OK, explain the motive to me.
Oh and there is absolutely criminal levels of copyright violation. For a guy who goes on and on about defending copyrights and IP law you sure have a lousy understanding of it.
Instead of this; The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is a civil cause of action, not criminal.
I should have said this: The state is the plaintiff only in criminal cases. IP is most often a civil cause of action, not criminal.
Nice catch.In such circumstances as qualify under criminal statutes BOTH civil and criminal causes of action would stand. So, the state would be a party to the criminal action, but the civil action would still stand for the plaintiff, the copyright holder. Remember OJ Simpson? The main point is this: In a civil action, damages go to the plaintiff, in a criminal action, the fines go to the state and the perp goes to jail, potentially. The state pays for jails. So tell me, what is your theory for why the state is motivated by IP laws?
Much of IP law focuses on actions that have nothing to do with copying.
I was referring to copyright. Do you have anything of substance to say, other than you think I’m stupid and ignorant?
Were this comes from is the plain obvious fact that IP law has no real relation to property rights.Dejure property rights is a extension of defacto property rights that are universal in nature and occur spontaneously in any human society.
You are misinformed. They are not universal, but are suited to their particular purpose. They arise when the need arises. The history of property rights emerging in the beaver trapping indigenous Indians of north east America is a fascinating case history, for example.
Property rights not only exist because they are desirable, they exist because they are required. What can be debated is the specific applications and nature of property rights.
On this I agree, if I understand your meaning.
There is no such thing that happens with anything related to IP Law. There is no such thing as ‘owning a idea’ or ‘owning a concept’. It’s physically impossible.
For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid.
The ONLY reasonable defense for IP law is based on a argument of expediency. That human society is wealthier, better off, with IP law then without it. That supporting IP law will invariably end up with the ‘Greatest Good for the Greatest Number’ type thing. Yet this is something that so-called Pro-IP libertarians seem to steadfastly refuse to debate about. Because, you know, something like that requires actual evidence and careful consideration.
Well, I certainly gratified that you cleared this all up for me. At least we have reduced the problem to the ONLY reasonable defense. That should simplify things.
Going the intellectually lazy route and continue to equate IP law with property rights.. then get all hand-wavy, diversionary, and pseudo-spiritual is all that IP fascists have a seem to have when their logical fallacies are challenged.
This is brilliant. Do you mind if I quote you on this?
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So tell me, what is your theory for why the state is motivated by IP laws?
Patent fees provide direct profit motivation. The patent office is the only profitable branch of government.
During the cold war the patent system provided a means in which the USA government could intercept inventions that may have strategic value and prevent them from going public.
It’s also useful in ‘political rent seeking’. Large corporations use the patent system as a weapon to prevent competition from new enterprises. As a result politicians that support patent monopolies are provided financial contributions, employment after ‘public service’ and other kick-backs. Also it provides opportunities to profit from fraud and corruption through the manipulating the bureaucratic process in the patent office.
Copyrights were established as a mechanism for censorship. They have perpetuated as a mechanism for manipulating the market in favor of large publishing companies. As a result statist government has enjoyed considerable political support from these media companies in more ways then one. The majority of popular/traditional media outlets, through mechanisms like the FCC, and ran and controlled by a few major corporations. These corporations have significant interest in movies, music, and television industries.
In return for acts like the DCMA, expanding copyright terms, expanding enforcement resources, pushing international treaties, and other such legal activities that can heavily impact the profitability of these large media conglomerates politicians enjoy significant political support. The politicians exploit this for their own political goals… such as running for reelection.
Campaign finance reform plays into this in a fairly obvious way. I can explain it to you if you want.
[quote]For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. [/quote]
Then you freely admit that copyright law has nothing to do with protecting property?
[quote]It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid.[/quote]
A drunk ‘seeks to avoid’ running over small children on the sidewalk when they are driving. However, quit often, they do end up driving up into the sidewalk by mistake and if there was children there they would of been killed. Happens quite a bit. It’s not a valid defense of a drunk driver to say he is trying to avoid what he did actually do.
Well, I certainly gratified that you cleared this all up for me. At least we have reduced the problem to the ONLY reasonable defense. That should simplify things.
It actually does.
It would allow people here to discuss the merits of IP law and whether or not the violations of private property are worth it. Rather then being continuously sidetracked with a bunch of ‘copyrights/patents are property rights and thus are libertarian’ mumbo-jumbo.
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@nate-m April 14, 2011 at 7:46 pm
Patent fees provide direct profit motivation. The patent office is the only profitable branch of government.
From the USPTO website:
Results of Operations
The USPTO generated a net income of $94.7 million for the year ended September 30, 2010, an increase of $149.5 million over FY 2009 net cost of $54.8 million. This variation is the result of a few factors, explained in more detail in the Statement of Net Cost discussion.So, your theory is that Fed is motivated by $94.7M of revenue over costs (governments don’t work on a profit motive, since it is a government agency. Think DMV) out of a total budget of something like $3.5 Trillion? Hmmm. Also, the discussion mentions deferred costs of getting fees before the application is processed, when all costs have been accounted for, as one explanation for why 2010 was in the black, and 2009 was not.
During the cold war the patent system provided a means in which the USA government could intercept inventions that may have strategic value and prevent them from going public.
Is this a bad thing? You WANTED to speak German or Japanese?
It’s also useful in ‘political rent seeking’. Large corporations use the patent system as a weapon to prevent competition from new enterprises. As a result politicians that support patent monopolies are provided financial contributions, employment after ‘public service’ and other kick-backs. Also it provides opportunities to profit from fraud and corruption through the manipulating the bureaucratic process in the patent office.
I don’t doubt this. I agree that mercantilism is always bad. This is not unique to patents or copyrights, though, right?
Copyrights were established as a mechanism for censorship. They have perpetuated as a mechanism for manipulating the market in favor of large publishing companies. As a result statist government has enjoyed considerable political support from these media companies in more ways then one. The majority of popular/traditional media outlets, through mechanisms like the FCC, and ran and controlled by a few major corporations. These corporations have significant interest in movies, music, and television industries.
Mercantilism is bad. That has nothing to do with the legitimacy of the principles of IP, just like our current government proves nothing about the fundamental principles of self-government. Things can, do and have gotten out of whack. To borrow from Kinsella (who stole the idea from Tucker apparently) you want to throw out the baby with the bathwater because you think it is Rosemary’s baby?
In return for acts like the DCMA, expanding copyright terms, expanding enforcement resources, pushing international treaties, and other such legal activities that can heavily impact the profitability of these large media conglomerates politicians enjoy significant political support. The politicians exploit this for their own political goals… such as running for reelection.
Which of these two do you think is more harmful overall, the Federal Reserve and global central banking, or patents and copyrights?
Campaign finance reform plays into this in a fairly obvious way. I can explain it to you if you want.
No need. I probably agree the political system that is based on collusion between business and government is a common enemy.
For someone who criticizes others for not knowing IP law, you are certainly full of it here. Copyright law specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights.
Then you freely admit that copyright law has nothing to do with protecting property?
What? Copyright law enforces property rights in original works of authorship AND specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. What do you make of that datapoint?
It is not rational to oppose something for doing what it specifically seeks to avoid
A drunk ‘seeks to avoid’ running over small children on the sidewalk when they are driving. However, quit often, they do end up driving up into the sidewalk by mistake and if there was children there they would of been killed. Happens quite a bit. It’s not a valid defense of a drunk driver to say he is trying to avoid what he did actually do.
Good point. Let’s look it over. As an ex ante principle of law, driving drunk is illegal precisely because it increases the probability that drunks will not be able to avoid running over children even if they try, while the ex post principle provides for additional punishment if the drunk fails.
The purpose of a law against drunk driving is to incentivize the driver not to drive drunk, and to insure unpleasant and costly consequences if he does, AND injures someone. In this way, it would be reasonable to say that the law seeks to avoid squished children, but does not always succeed.
You have given an example of when the purpose of the DUI law fails. Do you have an example where the purpose of copyright fails because it actually has protected an “idea” which it specifically seeks to avoid doing?
It actually does.
It would allow people here to discuss the merits of IP law and whether or not the violations of private property are worth it. Rather then being continuously sidetracked with a bunch of ‘copyrights/patents are property rights and thus are libertarian’ mumbo-jumbo.Despite my earlier sarcasm, I actually agree with you that there are other issues. This is why I have been saying lately that IF we can agree that the author owns his original manuscript, provided he produced it with his own means of production, then we can get onto the economics of law issue that you allude to.
This is the more significant issue, I agree.
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“I, in writing my book, know whether I made this up out of thin air, or whether I simply copied it from Dickens”
The first one is not an option. There is no such thing as making something up “out of thin air”, unless you’ve been existing in a vacuum up until that point. You have to draw influence from somewhere, and there is no way to decide in a non-arbitrary fashion what amount of influence from a single work is “too much”.
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@ sweatervest April 14, 2011 at 2:58 pm
OK, but that is a bit of a nitpick.
What I mean specifically is, without any access to the/a protected work. Everything else, which is considerable as you point out, is fair game.
To be even more precise, the issue is:
1) Are the two works “substantially similar”, AND
2) a) is there direct evidence of copying; b) is there circumstantial evidence of access AND substantial similarity between the works; or c) is there such striking similarity between the two works that there is no other reasonable explanation other than copying.
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Neil,
Your responses, IMHO, are very solid. I have yet to see you struggle with a single inquiery.
It is ironic/predictable that your theory comports with the principles of “statist laws”. The results you obtain are essentially the same results from the operation of existing law, in general.
I realize that is not relevant to our argument, but it is an interesting data point.
Regards,
April 15, 2011 at 3:05 pm
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FYI, Wildberry’s contributions are so scattered and incoherent, I have largely stopped reading them.
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Wildberry is the intellectual equivalent of a Cleveland steamer.
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The only thing worse than passive aggression is gross passive aggression.
BTM, win.
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Too many question begging assertions. I keep hearing why IP exists over and over but not any proof that it is actually helpful. When internal contradictions between IP and physical property are pointed out the assumption is physical property should cede, yet no good reasons as to why. Schulman seems to say this has to do with some kind of superior metaphysical notion called “identity” that has greater importance to existence than existence.
It’s just bizarre.
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The Ever-Present Wildberry wrote:
“Copyright law enforces property rights in original works of authorship AND specifically excludes ideas from the subject matter of copyrights. What do you make of that datapoint?”
I’m wondering how a story is not an idea. It’s an idea that was fleshed out and put down on paper. Seems like another distinction without a difference to me, like the fact that a story is a “thing” with a unique identity which makes it different from other things with identities (no kidding?). Patents also obviously refer to ideas. Strip away the semantic question-begging tricks referencing property away from IP arguments and what’s left? It’s just an effort to commodify and monopolize information flow. All of the verbiage of the construct of property is lifted out from the economic world of scarce resources and rivalrous goods, and then superimposed onto the non-economic world of information (ideas, utterances, patterns). It sorta reminds me of how Rand superimposed economic language onto interpersonal relationships. It certainly sounds just as creepy and leads to the same type of confusion. You just can’t take one rubric and apply it to everything. This is how a lot of weird philosophies get traction. Some true insight is taken from one area of life and brought to others where it simply doesn’t belong and doesn’t work.
Instead of IP proponents trying to argue that ideas are property by analogy, what they really need to do in order to test themselves is to first develop a consistent non-contradictory theory of property which would naturally include IP. I certainly don’t see that being done here. I’m reading here just one analogy after another. But analogies are only helpful to illustrate something; they don’t establish anything. The analog is always taken for granted and that’s why an analogy works to convince, but when people skip the foundational logic of the very thing they want to establish, the analogies become mere rhetoric. As if a car driving from land onto a ferry establishes that a story is property! Give me a break, guys.
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@Zorg April 16, 2011 at 1:15 am
OK, this is hilarious. Seriously funny.
Tell me, O Wise One, does an Originator own the raw material of his creation? He uses SOMETHING to create with. What is it? Is it ideas? Possibly, eh? What else is there? So either he owns ideas which he uses as raw material to create a story he then owns, or he does not own the ideas – if ideas can’t be owned. If the latter is the case, then how can he claim to own something he made which doesn’t consist of elements that he previously owned – and more importantly, still doesn’t? I think someone actually brought this up before.
Listen, Grasshopper; if I use air to forge a sword, when I am finished, is the question of owning the sword merely one of whether or not I owned the air?
The transformation in question requires a forge and other capital equipment, raw materials, labor, and a production plan; when all brought together in exactly the proper order, the results are a finished good: a sword.
This transformation also requires things from the public domain: air, and the idea that a sword is better for hacking other people than a lump of raw materials, and the knowledge that when you are finished making it, someone will want it. In this case, it is clear who owns the sword, is it not? Even though making it does not require that everything that went into the production is owned as property at the outset.
The principle here then, is that tracking ownership of property depends on tracking those things that are NOT in the public domain. Something you own (capital goods, raw materials, self) PLUS something in the public domain (ideas, air, process knowledge, personal skills, and knowledge of the sword market). If something is in the public domain, no one owns it, but you don’t lose your ownership of other things because you use them, right? We track the things others don’t own to figure out ownership claims.
The exact same situation is the case with authorship; ideas, letters of the alphabet, facts, formulas, the English language, rules of grammar, and the knowledge of a common understanding of words and expressions of language among people who can read, are all things that exist in the public domain, like air. No one owns them, and you would have just as much right to use these things however you see fit; you don’t need to own air to breath it, you just need to know that no one else claims to own it.
What I do own is myself, and all the capabilities of expression that is unique to me. I own the pen and paper I use to capture my expressions. I don’t own the letters of the alphabet, but because I use them, it means that I own nothing?
This is how one arrives at the conclusion that an author owns the original manuscript that he creates. It is a scarce good, as it is unique in the universe. It is comprised of ideas, words, language and taken all together, constitutes something I will call an original expression. No one on earth, as long as I keep it to myself, has a better claim to it than I.
Do you disagree with this conclusion? I really want to know. Please answer.
Star Trek would still be Star Trek without IP laws.
How can you be so sure about this? The fact is that ST was created in a world in which copyrights existed. Surly then, you would agree that whether it would or not exist without copyrights is a matter of pure speculation. That is one difference between our arguments. I can point to facts, you can only point to your speculations.
that is before you get into the whole thing where they own it forever and can prosecute people for looking at what they originally broadcast for free.
Just a clarification of some facts; copyright term is not forever (despite the fact that it is too long in my opinion) and you cannot prosecute people for what you claim. There is something called a fair use doctrine, and one of the key cases having to do with this issue dealt with the home recording of TV. You can’t get prosecuted for doing that.
It’s funny that you would get all uppity
Really? “Uppity”? Like buying Playboy for the articles, I only watched ST for the philosophy.
Now, I guess we must protect the right of some XYZ corporation which owns the rights to license Spock dolls or whatever.
Your theory of private property is wavering. Private property is OK as long as it isn’t owned by a nasty, evil Corporation?
TV programming that was made to sell dish soap and bubble gum 40 years ago has become a monster franchise for a select few to milk forever.
Roddenberry died in 1991, so only until 2061. And under principles of a free market, libertarians try to not dictate how people use their property, even if it is to sell bubble gum.
Have you ever watched a Star Trek clip which was illegally posted on YouTube (as everything else in the world is)? Did it make you feel dirty? Did you have to avert your eyes when you thought of the FBI Warning on your old Star Trek VCR tapes?
Funny. Ethics and morality are different things; that’s why there are two words instead of one. We may all do things that we know are wrong. We are talking about the principles, not the conduct.
YouTube is an interesting situation. Isn’t it interesting that if YouTube posted music files or copyrighted books, it would get busted, but not video clips? This seems inconsistent with the treatment of Napster, doesn’t it?
Ok, now get busy Mr Thief and write the Widow Roddenberry a nice fat check for depriving the franchise of its property by your lying eyes and evil intent! XYZ/Paramount has mouths to feed, you know. Or, better yet, call the FBI and turn yourself in. They’re always looking for people to roll. : )
Every day I walk past beggars and don’t give them any money. And they ask me for it every day, even though I never fork it over. Does that make me a bad person?
That was fun.
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Wildberry,
I’m posting at the end, since apparently your post was lost in the recent site updates.
Just because you keep making the same ignorant point over and over doesn’t mean you are saying anything relevant or correct.
Just because you keep ignoring the flow of conversation and diverge it does not mean what you are saying is either relevant or correct.
Contracts assign liability rights and require privity of the parties. Property assigns ownership rights, and does not require a contract, and therefore privity is irrelevant.
Therefore, you should not conflate the ability to restrict someone contractually with a property right. It’s a non-sequitur. Make up your mind, either the fact that you can restrict a potential customer contractually does not imply there is property involved, or you cannot apply such a restriction to third parties. Either way, it’s irrelevant with regards to IP so kindly stop referring to it.
This, on the other hand, is idiotic. You’ve actually outdone yourself.
If anything is idiotic, it is certainly not me. I try to formulate coherent arguments. What you produce is a waste of time. Your attempts to crawl up Schulman’s ass, how you commended him for answering all the questions, although any flow of arguments he engages in clearly ends in him contradicting himself, further support my former claim that your purpose for the debates here is to earn recognition for your nonexistent talents rather than intellectual curiosity.
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Eat me Surda.
Only you would equate my statements of support for Neil with something vulgar.
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Dear J. Neil Schulman,
since it looks like my post was scrapped with the site updates too, I repost it here:
How does looking at a house differ from moving in?
Looking at a house or taking a picture of it does not alter the integrity of the house. Both however result in a copy. Xeroxing a picture does alter integrity, but xeroxing a copy does not. So how do you formulate coherent rules to decide what is legal and what not?
That’s a question to be directed to a statist since your question refers to current statist law.
In your logorights article as well as a former reply to me, you write that you do support fair use. Now you deny it. So which is it? Can you make up your mind?
Some uses are below the threshold for damages or deprivation of the fruits of ownership and others aren’t.
Apart from not explaining how to differentiate it, you neglect that it is the type of action rather than hypothetical value of it that is the question. In fact you create a new question and bring back the value of the good into light, although you earlier denied that you talk about value. So, whether copying is permitted or not depends on value? Does that also apply to physical goods? Can I steal something that is cheap?
For example, a cool breeze from your property to mine brings me the pleasant smell of your orange grove. I may breathe in that scent without damaging you. Climbing your fence, grabbing and eating one of the oranges, raises the threshold, but possible not enough to be a violaton. Harvesting your orange crop and selling it at the farmer’s market without your permission is definitely a violation.
As I said above, the distinction that “we” (loosely used to refer to IP opponents here) make is that the first one does not involve anyone altering the integrity of the property, whereas the next two do. The value of each action is irrelevant.
The scent is just some pollen and other microscopic parts of the tree that the air currents moved. Purely hypothetically, the original owner might claim he wants them back, but a reasonable judge would probably tell him that it’s a foreseeable naturally occurring phenomenon and if that was not his intention he should have kept the tree in an airtight seal. Just like, for example, when someone takes a picture of the tree, that are just the photons from the sun reflected by the tree that the camera captures and can be prevented by keeping the tree behind an opaque case. If photographing is a property rights violation, then so is smelling of pollen, whistling at girls with short skirts, not having to breathe in the sweat of co-travellers in a train compartment because they use deodorant, and other phenomena commonly known as externalities.
You have yet to provide any coherent claim. It all seems to come back to the value (which you deny). Nevertheless, the first chapter of “Building Blocks For Liberty” by Walter Block at al. explains why approaches other than physical integrity fail both logically and praxeologically.
- See Schulman: Kinsella is “the foremost enemy of property rights” ; Query for Schulman on Patents and Logorights; Kinsella v. Schulman on Logorights and IP. [↩]
- Roderick Long: Bye-Bye for IP; My IP Odyssey; Roderick Long Finally Realizes IP is Unjustified. [↩]
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