Andreas Von Gunten, Intellectual Property is Common Property: Arguments for the Abolition of Private Intellectual Property Rights (Zurich: buch & netz, 2015).
Abstract:
Defenders of intellectual property rights argue that these rights are justified because creators and inventors deserve compensation for their labour, because their ideas and expressions are their personal property and because the total amount of creative work and innovation increases when inventors and creators have a prospect of generating high income through the exploitation of their monopoly rights. This view is not only widely accepted by the general public, but also enforced through a very effective international legal framework. And it is endorsed by most academic researchers and commentators in this field. In this essay, I will show that the classical arguments for the justification of private intellectual property rights can be contested, and that there are many good reasons to abolish intellectual property rights completely in favour of an intellectual commons where every person is allowed to use every cultural expression and invention in whatever way he wishes. I will first give a short overview of the classical arguments for the justification of intellectual property as they are usually stated. We will then discuss the question of whether the creator or inventor deserves his de jure monopoly, by using John Christman’s categories of income and control rights to analyse property rights. The aim here is to show that it does not make sense to create control rights for abstract objects, as they are not scarce, and that there is no logical connection between the surplus which may be generated through income rights and the labour which has been put into a cultural artefact or an invention, and therefore it is not justified to grant monopoly rights on the basis of Lockean natural rights arguments for self-ownership and the just appropriation of worldly resources. As it is possible to reject Christman’s property rights categories, I will then go on to show on the basis of Richard Dawkins’ postulation of the ‘meme’ and Ludwik Fleck’s theory of the ‘thought collective’ that creative processes should be interpreted as interpersonal or collective processes, and therefore it is not justified to grant intellectual property rights to individuals on the basis of the idea that the individual who has put labour into the creative work or the invention should be the one to whom the contents of the work belong exclusively. As it is still possible to postulate the utilitarian argument that intellectual property rights are just because they increase the amount of creative works and inventions, I will argue in the last chapter that, from a libertarian as well as from an egalitarian point of view, the justification of intellectual monopoly rights on utilitarian grounds cannot be maintained. Therefore it is time to abolish the current global intellectual property law regime in favour of an intellectual commons for the good of all human beings and societies.
Have not read yet, but from the abstract, this book seems like it might have some promise. Oddly, the book it nowhere cites me though at least it cites Boldrin & Levine, and Tom Palmer.
That said, it refers to IP as “common property,” which it is not; there are no property rights at all in nonscarce things like information or ideas. The issue is not whether IP “is property” or not, or what kind of property it is1 (which is exactly why IP proponents classify it as “intellectual” property—a type of property, but a unique one);2 it is whether IP laws are justified or not. They are not. There are reasons why. It remains to be seen whether the author really understands why. Stay tuned…
Update: From ChatGPT:
prompt: summarize this book in 1-3 pages, including a detailed explanation of the auhtor’s case against IP. It is systematic and principled, and is it compable with Kinsella https://c4sif.org/2025/05/problem-with-intellectual-property-tttc-wp-2/
Summary of Intellectual Property is Common Property by Andreas von Gunten
1. Overview and Structure
The book is a systematic and principled argument against the institution of private intellectual property (IP) rights. Andreas von Gunten frames IP not as a legitimate form of property but as a state-granted monopoly that restricts the free use and exchange of information, ideas, and creative works. It moves through philosophical, economic, legal, and moral dimensions, dismantling each standard justification for IP. The style is scholarly but accessible, with philosophical reasoning backed by empirical critique.
2. The Author’s Case Against IP
(a) IP as State-Granted Monopoly
Von Gunten argues that IP rights—copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc.—do not arise naturally from property norms but are artificial monopolies enforced by the state. Unlike tangible property, which is scarce and rivalrous, IP’s objects (ideas, patterns, expressions) are non-rivalrous: multiple people can use them without depletion or exclusion. Exclusive rights over such goods inherently restrict others’ liberty to use information they have legitimately acquired.
(b) Commons Nature of Ideas
His central thesis is that intellectual creations belong to the commons. Creativity always builds on prior knowledge, culture, and shared intellectual resources. Privatizing them is an unjust enclosure of this commons. The “intellectual commons” analogy parallels environmental commons: both are resources all can draw from without depletion, and enclosure harms human flourishing.
(c) Rejection of Incentive-Based Justifications
Von Gunten critiques the incentive argument—i.e., that creators need IP protection to produce—both empirically and conceptually. He finds no strong evidence that IP laws are necessary for creativity or innovation, pointing to thriving scientific, artistic, and technological work without formal IP protection (e.g., open source). In many cases, IP distorts markets and suppresses innovation by locking up essential building blocks.
(d) Moral and Libertarian Objections
From a libertarian angle, von Gunten maintains that ownership is justified only to prevent conflict over scarce resources—not to control non-scarce goods. Enforcing IP inevitably means infringing on others’ tangible property (e.g., their own paper, computers) to prevent them from making copies, which constitutes aggression.
(e) IP as Censorship and Restriction of Freedom
IP enforcement limits how people can use their own property to express or embody ideas they have learned. This is akin to censorship, curbing free speech, education, and technological advancement.
3. Systematic and Principled Nature
The work is systematic in scope—covering law, economics, and philosophy—and principled in foundation, holding to the idea that only scarce, rivalrous goods can be justly owned. It takes each standard IP justification (natural rights, utilitarian incentive, personality theory, fairness) and dismantles it on its own terms, while anchoring the critique in libertarian principles: non-aggression, voluntary exchange, and preservation of the commons for non-scarce goods.
4. Compatibility with Kinsella’s View
Von Gunten’s framework is highly compatible with Stephan Kinsella’s anti-IP theory:
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Shared Premises: Both see IP as a state-created monopoly incompatible with legitimate property norms.
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Scarcity Principle: Both hold that real property rights exist to allocate scarce resources to avoid conflict; ideas are non-scarce and thus not ownable.
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Rights Violation in Enforcement: Both stress that IP enforcement aggresses against tangible property owners.
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Commons Language vs. Libertarian Norms: While von Gunten often uses “commons” and egalitarian framing, and Kinsella more often uses strict libertarian rights theory, the conclusions converge.
5. Conclusion
Intellectual Property is Common Property delivers a principled, multi-angle attack on IP law. It challenges both utilitarian and natural rights defenses, advocating outright abolition. The reasoning is highly consistent with Kinsella’s own, making it a strong complementary resource for those seeking a systematic libertarian case against intellectual property.
If you want, I can also make a side-by-side table comparing von Gunten’s key arguments with your own anti-IP framework so the overlaps and differences are visually clear.
| Aspect | Von Gunten | Kinsella |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of IP | State-granted monopoly over non-rivalrous goods; artificial and unjust enclosure of the commons. | State-created monopoly; illegitimate because it grants control over non-scarce goods. |
| Core Property Theory | Only scarce, rivalrous resources can be justly owned; ideas belong to the commons. | Property rights exist to avoid conflict over scarce resources; ideas are not scarce, thus cannot be owned. |
| Incentive Argument | Empirical evidence does not show IP is necessary for innovation; counterexamples include open source and science. | Even if incentives “work,” they don’t justify aggression against legitimate property; justice is not utilitarian. |
| Moral/Libertarian Basis | IP enforcement infringes others’ tangible property (paper, computers, presses) to stop copying. | IP enforcement aggresses against owners of scarce resources who use them to copy or reproduce ideas. |
| View on Creativity | Creative work is a collective process, built from shared cultural resources (intellectual commons). | Innovation always builds on prior knowledge; no right to block others from using learned patterns. |
| Rights Justification | Rejects natural-rights claims for IP; rights don’t extend to non-scarce goods. | Lockean homesteading applies only to scarce goods; patterns/information cannot be homesteaded. |
| Framing | Uses “commons” and egalitarian language to emphasize shared access to ideas. | Frames strictly in libertarian property theory and the scarcity principle; less egalitarian rhetoric. |
| Policy Conclusion | Abolish private IP rights; preserve and expand the intellectual commons. | Abolish IP laws entirely; revert to property rights rooted in scarcity and contract. |
- See “What Libertarianism Is,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society, at Appendix I; see also Legal Foundations of a Free Society, p. 421. [↩]
- See Legal Foundations of a Free Society, p. 427–30 & 427 n.77; 444 at n.11. [↩]
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