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Antitrust vs. Trademark Law

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As I have discussed elsewhere (State Antitrust (anti-monopoly) law versus state IP (pro-monopoly) law), the state grants monopolies (patents and copyright) then penalizes companies for using (“abusing”) them, in contravention of state antitrust law–so that there is a “tension” between these state laws.

And now here’s an example of a similar tension between trademark–another state granted monopoly–and antitrust law: Dechert Attorneys Representing Clients in Possible Apparel Licensing Matter with NCAA Colleges, where lawyers demand colleges stop enforcing trademark rights–or face antitrust action (h/t Skip Oliva).

Yet another demonstration that state IP is of course a grant of monopoly (see “Are Patents “Monopolies”?“).

Update: Yet another example: Martin Senftleben (University of Amsterdam), “Copyright, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression – Has the CJEU Developed Appropriate Balancing Frameworks in Pelham II and IKEA?,” CIPIL Evening Seminar, Cambridge Law Faculty (Nov. 2026) (podcast version). Senftleben looks at two 2026 rulings by the EU’s Court of Justice. In Pelham II, the latest round of the decades-long Kraftwerk sampling fight, the Court held that copyright’s “pastiche” exception is not a catch-all, but covers new works that evoke an existing work while being noticeably different from it.1 In IKEA, the Belgian party Vlaams Belang had branded its immigration program the “IKEA-PLAN” (Immigratie Kan Echt Anders, “Immigration Really Can Be Different”), complete with IKEA’s marks and look-alike assembly-instruction stick figures. The Court held that free expression, including political parody, can in principle be “due cause” for using a famous mark, but that merely invoking free speech isn’t enough, and using a famous brand’s reputation to amplify an unrelated message probably won’t qualify.2 Senftleben asks whether these tests leave users enough room and legal certainty to speak, and why copyright (specific parody and pastiche exceptions) and trademark (an open-ended “due cause” defense) handle the same conflict with different tools.

Why does the EU have to “balance” at all? Because its Charter of Fundamental Rights protects intellectual property in Article 17(2) and freedom of expression in Article 11 as fundamental rights of equal rank. Since IP is a restriction on what you may say and do with your own property, the two inevitably collide. And you can’t really blame the judges: they’re required to apply the law as enacted, so when two enactments clash, all they can do is improvise vague, case-by-case “balancing” tests. That’s cold comfort for anyone trying to figure out in advance whether they may make a parody or use a sample. The problem is law made by legislation: there’s no guarantee that one batch of legislation will be compatible with another, since legislators, unlike judges, aren’t bound by precedent.3 Genuine rights are compossible; they never need to be “balanced” against each other. That they must be is a sign that one of them (here, IP) is not a real right at all. Trademark law collides not just with antitrust law, but with free speech too.

And regarding conflicting statutes, see also KOL505 | The Conflict Between AI and Copyright: World Liberty Summit 2026–Bolivia.

  1. Case C-590/23, CG and YN v. Pelham GmbH, EU:C:2026:290 (CJEU Grand Chamber, Apr. 14, 2026). [↩]
  2. Case C-298/23, Inter IKEA Systems BV v. Algemeen Vlaams Belang VZW (CJEU Grand Chamber, Sept. 8, 2026). [↩]
  3. See Kinsella, “KOL505 | The Conflict Between AI and Copyright: World Liberty Summit 2026–Bolivia,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Nov. 11, 2026); idem, “On the Role of Commentators and Codes and the Oracles of the Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 31, 2025). [↩]
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  • Ryan June 13, 2011, 11:34 am

    Mr. Kinsella,

    Doesn’t this problem stem from how federal courts have interpreted the Lanham Act? At common law, a trademark holder had to show use as a trademark qua trademark; that is, a holder had protection to the extent he used it to signify the source of his goods. And this right was limited to its source signifying function; it didn’t confer a right in gross. But now, especially when it comes to collegiate licensing, courts treat trademarks like a copyright or patent. Which leads to absurdities like the University of Alabama barring its cheerleaders from buying their own championship rings by threatening an infringement suit, even though the girls obviously wouldn’t suffer a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the rings.

    So isn’t this antitrust suit just a backdoor way to undermine a dubious interpretation of the Lanham Act?

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