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Machlup Review of Fox, Monopolies and Patents, A Study of the History and Future of the Patent Monopoly

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Fritz Machlup”Review of Monopolies and Patents, A Study of the History and Future of thePatent Monopoly. by Harold G. Fox,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Nov., 1948), pp. 215–217.

Of course, not online. I would say ironically, but unforunately it’s not ironic anymore; it’s routine and pathetic: a paper by a patent skeptic reviewing the work of an IP promoter, but paywalled and hidden away due to copyright. Copyright is censorship at work–and preventing the spread of criticism of copyright and patent! Grok’s summary:

Summary of Findings

The paper analyzes the strength and variations in patent protection across 60 countries (selected based on 1997 GDP) over a 150-year period (from 1850 to 1999), using historical data on patent laws. It focuses on four key features: the existence of a patent system, the duration of patents, the “working period” (time before a patent could be revoked if not used), and discriminatory provisions against foreign patentees. The study tests three hypotheses for these patterns:

  1. Economic Development (Relative Wealth): Wealthier nations (measured by per capita GDP relative to the global leader) are more likely to have patent systems and allow longer working periods for patentees. This aligns with theories suggesting that technological leaders benefit more from strong protection, while followers prefer weaker systems.
  2. Political Conditions (Democracy and Institutions): Countries with democratic features—such as elected leaders and effective, elected legislatures—are more likely to offer patent protection, grant longer patent durations, and discriminate less against foreign inventors. Authoritarian regimes tend to provide weaker or no protection, possibly due to short-term perspectives or costs of administration.
  3. Legal Traditions (Path Dependence): Differences in legal families (e.g., English common law, French/German/Scandinavian civil law, communist, or other) significantly influence patent policies, even after controlling for economic and political factors. For example:
    • Civil-law countries (especially French) are more likely to have patent systems but impose shorter working periods and more discrimination against foreigners.
    • Common-law (English) countries allow longer working periods and less discrimination.
    • Countries outside major legal families (e.g., some Middle Eastern or African nations) have weaker protection and more foreign curbs.

The analysis uses univariate comparisons (e.g., Table 1) and multivariate regressions (e.g., Table 2, including ordered logit, Tobit, and OLS models) to confirm these patterns. It also notes historical trends: patent protection weakened in Europe in the 1860s-1870s and in developing nations in the 1960s-1970s, but strengthened globally in the 20th century due to trade agreements. The study highlights limitations, such as not accounting for complementary policies (e.g., trade secrets) or judicial interpretations, and calls for further research on interactions between patents and broader political/economic contexts.

Pro-Patent or Anti-Patent?

The paper is neither pro-patent nor anti-patent; it is empirically neutral and descriptive. It documents historical and cross-national patterns in patent protection without advocating for stronger or weaker systems. Instead, it focuses on explaining why variations exist, drawing on economic theories (e.g., Nordhaus’s optimal patent models) but not evaluating whether patents overall promote innovation or welfare. It acknowledges the complexity of patent policy, influenced by diverse actors with narrow agendas, but avoids normative judgments.

Reference to Machlup’s 1958 Study

The paper does not mention or discuss Fritz Machlup’s 1958 study (“An Economic Review of the Patent System”) at all. There are no references to Machlup in the text, citations, or bibliography. The closest related works cited are historical analyses like Edith Penrose’s 1951 book on international patents and theoretical models like William Nordhaus’s 1969 work on innovation and welfare.

 

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